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
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
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THE
CONTEMPORARY
REVIEW

VOLUME XIV. APRIL—JULY, 1870

STRAHAN & CO., PUBLISHERS

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

And Magazine of Thought.

A CHAPTER OF ACCIDENTS IN COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY.

VERY different from the real similarities that can be discovered in nearly all the religions of the world, and which, owing to their deeply human character, in no way necessitate the admission that one religion borrowed from the other, are those minute coincidences between the Jewish and the Pagan religions which have so often been discussed by learned theologians, and which were intended by them as proof positive, either that the Pagans borrowed their religious ideas direct from the Old Testament, or that some fragments of a primeval revelation, granted to the ancestors of the whole race of mankind, had been preserved in the temples of Greece and Italy. Bochart, in his "Geographia Sacra," considered the identity of Noah and Saturn so firmly established as hardly to admit of the possibility of a doubt. The three sons of Saturn, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, he represented as having been originally the three sons of Noah, Jupiter being Ham; Neptune, Japhet; and Shem, Pluto. Even in the third generation the two families were proved to have been one, for Phut, the son of Ham, or of Jupiter Hammon, could be no other than Apollo Pythius; Canaan no other than Mercury; and Nimrod no other than Bacchus, whose original name was supposed to have been Bar-chus, the son of Cush. G. J. Vossius, in

his learned work "*De Origine et Progressu Idolatriæ*" (1688), identified Saturn with Adam, Janus with Noah, Pluto with Ham, Neptune with Japhet, Minerva with Naamah, Vulcan with Tubal Cain, Typhon with Og. Huet, the friend of Bochart, and the colleague of Bossuet, went still further, and in his classical work, the "*Demonstratio Evangelica*," he attempted to prove that the whole theology of the heathen nations was borrowed from Moses, whom he identified not only with ancient law-givers, like Zoroaster and Orpheus, but with gods and demi-gods, such as Apollo, Vulcan, Faunus, and Priapus.

All this happened not more than two hundred years ago, and even a hundred years ago, nay, even after the discovery of Sanskrit and the rise of Comparative Philology, the troublesome ghost of Huet was by no means laid at once. On the contrary, as soon as the ancient language and religion of India became known in Europe, they were received by many people in the same spirit. Sanskrit, like all other languages, was to be derived from Hebrew, the ancient religion of the Brahmans from the Old Testament.

There was at that time an enthusiasm among Oriental scholars, particularly at Calcutta, and an interest for Oriental antiquities in the public at large, of which we in these days of apathy for Eastern literature can hardly form an adequate idea. Everybody wished to be first in the field, and to bring to light some of the treasures which were supposed to be hidden in the sacred literature of the Brahmans. Sir William Jones, the founder of the Asiatic Society at Calcutta, published in the first volume of the "*Asiatic Researches*" his famous essay "*On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India*," and he took particular care to state that his essay, though published only in 1788, had been written in 1784. In that essay he endeavoured to show that there existed an intimate connection, not only between the mythology of India and that of Greece and Italy, but likewise between the legendary stories of the Brahmans and the accounts of certain historical events as recorded in the Old Testament. No doubt, the temptation was great. No one could look down for a moment into the rich mine of religious and mythological lore that was suddenly opened before the eyes of scholars and theologians, without being struck by a host of similarities, not only in the languages, but also in the ancient traditions of the Hindus, the Greeks, and Romans; and if at that time the Greeks and Romans were still supposed to have borrowed their language and their religion from Jewish quarters, the same conclusion could hardly be avoided with regard to the language and the religion of the Brahmans of India.

The first impulse to look in the ancient religion of India for reminiscences of revealed truth seems to have come from missionaries rather than from scholars. It arose from a motive, in

itself most excellent, of finding some common ground for those who wished to convert and those who were to be converted. Only, instead of looking for that common ground where it really was to be found, viz., in the broad foundations on which all religions are built up,—the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life,—the students of Pagan religion as well as Christian missionaries were bent on discovering more striking and more startling coincidences, in order to use them in confirmation of their favourite theory, that some rays of a primeval revelation, or some reflection of the Jewish religion, had reached the uttermost ends of the world. This was a dangerous proceeding; dangerous because superficial, dangerous because undertaken with a foregone conclusion; and very soon the same arguments that had been used on one side in order to prove that all religious truth had been derived from the Old Testament, were turned against Christian scholars and Christian missionaries in order to show that it was not Brahmanism and Buddhism which had borrowed from the Old and New Testament, but that the Old and the New Testament had borrowed from the more ancient religions of the Brahmans and Buddhists.

This argument was carried out, for instance, in Holwell's "*Original Principles of the Ancient Brahmans*," published in London as early as 1779, in which the author maintains that "the Brahmanic religion is the first and purest product of supernatural revelation," and "that the Hindu scriptures contain to a moral certainty the original doctrines and terms of restoration, delivered from God Himself, by the mouth of his first-created Birmah, to mankind, at his first creation in the form of man."

Sir William Jones* tells us that one or two missionaries in India had been absurd enough, in their zeal for the conversion of the Gentiles, to urge "that the Hindus were even now almost Christians, because their Brahma, Vishnu, and Mahesa were no other than the Christian Trinity;" a sentence in which, he adds, we can only doubt whether folly, ignorance, or impiety predominates.

Sir William Jones himself was not likely to fall into that error. He speaks against it most emphatically. "Either," he says, "the first eleven chapters of Genesis—all due allowance being made for a figurative Eastern style—are true, or the whole fabrick of our national religion is false; a conclusion which none of us, I trust, would wish to be drawn. But it is not the truth of our national religion as such that I have at heart; it is truth itself; and if any cool, unbiassed reasoner will clearly convince me that Moses drew his narrative through Egyptian conduits from the primeval fountains of Indian literature, I shall esteem him as a friend for having weeded

* Asiatic Researches, i. p. 272.

my mind from a capital error, and promise to stand amongst the foremost in assisting to circulate the truth which he has ascertained."

But though he speaks so strongly against the uncritical proceedings of those who would derive anything that is found in the Old Testament from Indian sources, Sir William Jones was really guilty of the same want of critical caution in his own attempts to identify the gods and heroes of Greece and Rome with the gods and heroes of India. He begins his essay * "On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India" with the following remarks:—

"We cannot justly conclude, by arguments preceding the proof of facts, that one idolatrous people must have borrowed their deities, rites, and tenets from another, since gods of all shapes and dimensions may be framed by the boundless powers of imagination, or by the frauds and follies of men, in countries never connected; but when features of resemblance, too strong to have been accidental, are observable in different systems of polytheism, without fancy or prejudice to colour them and improve the likeness, we can scarce help believing that some connection has immemorially subsisted between the several nations who have adopted them. It is my design in this essay to point out such a resemblance between the popular worship of the old Greeks and Italians and that of the Hindus; nor can there be any room to doubt of a great similarity between their strange religions and that of Egypt, China, Persia, Phrygia, Phœnice, and Syria; to which, perhaps, we may safely add some of the southern kingdoms, and even islands, of America; while the Gothick system which prevailed in the northern regions of Europe was not merely similar to those of Greece and Italy, but almost the same in another dress, with an embroidery of images apparently Asiatick. From all this, if it be satisfactorily proved, we may infer a general union or affinity between the most distinguished inhabitants of the primitive world at the time when they deviated, as they did too early deviate, from the rational adoration of the only true God."

Here, then, in an essay written nearly a hundred years ago by Sir W. Jones, one of the most celebrated Oriental scholars in England, it might seem as if we should find the first outlines of that science which is looked upon as but of to-day or yesterday, the outlines of Comparative Mythology. But in such an expectation we are disappointed. What we find is merely a superficial comparison of the mythology of India and that of other nations, both Aryan and Semitic, without any scientific value, because carried out without any of those critical tests which alone can keep Comparative Mythology from running riot. This is not intended as casting a slur on Sir W. Jones. At his time the principles which have now been established by the students of the science of language were not yet known, and as with words, so with the names of deities, similarity of sound, the most treacherous of all sirens, was the only guide in such researches.

It is not pleasant to have to find fault with a man possessed of such

* *Asiatic Researches*, i. p. 221.

genius, taste, and learning as Sir W. Jones, but no one who is acquainted with the history of these researches will be surprised at my words. It is the fate of all pioneers, not only to be left behind in the assault which they had planned, but to find that many of their approaches were made in a false direction, and had to be abandoned. And as the authority of their names continues to sway the public at large, and is apt to mislead even painstaking students and to entail upon them repeated disappointments, it is necessary that those who know should speak out, even at the risk of being considered harsh or presumptuous.

A few instances will suffice to show how utterly baseless the comparisons are which Sir W. Jones instituted between the gods of India, Greece, and Italy. He compares the Latin Janus with the Sanskrit deity *Ganesa*. It is well known that Janus is connected with the same root that has yielded the names of Jupiter, Zeus, and Dyaus, while *Ganesa* is a compound, meaning lord of hosts, lord of the companies of gods.

Saturnus is supposed to have been the same as Noah, and is then identified by Sir W. Jones with the Indian Manu Satyavrata, who escaped from the flood. Ceres is compared with the goddess *Srî*, Jupiter or Diespiter with Indra or Divaspati; and, though etymology is called a weak basis for historical inquiries, the three syllables Jov in Jovis, in Zeus, and Siv in Siva are placed side by side, as possibly containing the same root, only differently pronounced. Now the *s* of Siva is a palatal *s*, and no scholar who has once looked into a book on comparative philology need be told that such an *s* could never correspond to a Greek Zeta or a Latin J.

In *Krishna*, the lovely shepherd-god, Sir W. Jones recognises the features of Apollo Nomius, who fed the herds of Admetus, and slew the dragon Python; and he leaves it to etymologists to determine whether *Gopâla*, *i.e.*, the cow-herd, may not be the same word as Apollo. We are also assured, on the authority of Colonel Vallancey, that *Krishna* in Irish means the sun, and that the goddess *Kâli*, to whom human sacrifices were offered, as enjoined in the Vedas (?), was the same as Hekate. In conclusion, Sir W. Jones remarks, "I strongly incline to believe that Egyptian priests have actually come from the Nile to the Gangâ and Yamunâ, and that they visited the Sarmans of India, as the sages of Greece visited them, rather to acquire than to impart knowledge."

The interest that had been excited by Sir William Jones's researches did not subside, though he himself did not return to the subject, but devoted his great powers to more useful labours. Scholars, both in India and in Europe, wanted to know more of the ancient religion of India. If Jupiter, Apollo, and Janus had once been found in the ancient pantheon of the Brahmans; if the account of Noah

and the deluge could be traced back to the story of Manu Satyavrata, who escaped from the flood; more discoveries might be expected in this newly-opened mine, and people rushed to it with all the eagerness of gold-diggers. The idea that everything in India was of extreme antiquity had at that time taken a firm hold on the minds of all students of Sanskrit; and, as there was no one to check their enthusiasm, everything that came to light in Sanskrit literature was readily accepted as more ancient than Homer, or even than the Old Testament. It was under these influences that Lieutenant Wilford, a contemporary of Sir William Jones at Calcutta, took up the thread which Sir William Jones had dropped, and determined at all hazards to solve the question which at that time had excited a world-wide interest. Convinced that the Brahmans possessed in their ancient literature the originals, not only of Greek and Roman mythology, but likewise of the Old Testament history, he tried every possible means to overcome their reserve and reticence. He related to them, as well as he could, the principal stories of classical mythology, and the leading events in the history of the Old Testament; he assured them that they would find the same things in their ancient books, if they would but look for them; he held out the hopes of ample rewards for any extracts from their sacred literature containing the histories of Adam and Eve, of Deukalion and Prometheus; and at last he succeeded. The coyness of the Pandits yielded; the incessant demand created a supply; and for several years essay after essay appeared in the "*Asiatic Researches*," with extracts from Sanskrit MSS., containing not only the names of Deukalion, Prometheus, and other heroes and deities of Greece, but likewise the names of Adam and Eve, of Abraham and Sarah, and all the rest. Great was the surprise, still greater the joy, not only in Calcutta, but in London, at Paris, and in all the universities of Germany. The Sanskrit MSS. from which Lieutenant Wilford quoted, and on which his theories are based, were submitted to Sir W. Jones and other scholars; and though many persons were surprised and for a time even incredulous, yet the fact could not be denied, that all was found in these Sanskrit MSS. as stated by Lieutenant Wilford. Sir W. Jones, then President of the Asiatic Society, printed the following declaration at the end of the third volume of the "*Asiatic Researches*:"—

"Since I am persuaded that the learned essay on Egypt and the Nile has afforded you equal delight with that which I have myself received from it, I cannot refrain from endeavouring to increase your satisfaction by confessing openly that I have at length abandoned the greatest part of the natural distrust and incredulity which had taken possession of my mind before I had examined the sources from which our excellent associate, Lieutenant Wilford, has drawn so great a variety of new and interesting opinions. Having lately read again and again, both alone and with a Pandit, the

numerous original passages in the Purānas, and other Sanskrit books, which the writer of the dissertation adduces in support of his assertions, I am happy in bearing testimony to his perfect good faith and general accuracy, both in his extracts and in the translation of them."

Sir W. Jones then proceeds to give himself a translation of some of these passages. "The following translation," he writes, "of an extract from the Padma-purāna is minutely exact:—

"1. To *Satyavarman*, the sovereign of the whole earth, were born three sons; the eldest, *Sherma*; then *Charma*; and thirdly, *Jyāpeti*.

"2. They were all men of good morals, excellent in virtue and virtuous deeds, skilled in the use of weapons to strike with or to be thrown, brave men, eager for victory in battle.

"3. But *Satyavarman*, being continually delighted with devout meditation, and seeing his sons fit for dominion, laid upon them the burden of government,

"4. Whilst he remained honouring and satisfying the gods, and priests, and kine. One day, by the act of destiny, the king, having drunk mead,

"5. Became senseless, and lay asleep naked; then was he seen by *Charma*, and by him were his two brothers called.

"6. To whom he said: What now has befallen? In what state is this our sire? By those two was he hidden with clothes, and called to his senses again and again.

"7. Having recovered his intellect, and perfectly knowing what had passed, he cursed *Charma*, saying, Thou shalt be the servant of servants;

"8. And since thou wast a laughter in their presence, from laughter shalt thou acquire a name. Then he gave to *Sherma* the wide domain on the south of the snowy mountains.

"9. And to *Jyāpeti* he gave all on the north of the snowy mountains; but he, by the power of religious contemplation, obtained supreme bliss."

After this testimony from Sir W. Jones, wrung from him, as it would seem, against his own wish and will, Lieutenant Wilford's essays became more numerous and more startling with every year.

At last, however, the coincidences became too great. The MSS. were again carefully examined; and then it was found that a clever forgery had been committed, that leaves had been inserted in ancient MSS., and that on these leaves the Pandits, urged by Lieutenant Wilford to disclose their ancient mysteries and traditions, had rendered in correct Sanskrit verses all that they had heard about Adam and Abraham from their inquisitive master. Lieutenant (then Colonel) Wilford did not hesitate for one moment to confess publicly that he had been imposed upon; but in the meantime the mischief had been done, his essays had been read all over Europe, they retained their place in the volumes of the "Asiatic Researches," and to the present day some of his statements and theories continue to be quoted authoritatively by writers on ancient religion.

Such accidents, and, one might almost say, such misfortunes, will happen, and it would be extremely unfair were we to use unnecessarily harsh language with regard to those to whom they have happened. It

is perfectly true that at present, after the progress that has been made in an accurate and critical study of Sanskrit, it would be unpardonable if any Sanskrit scholar accepted such passages as those translated by Sir W. Jones as genuine. Yet it is by no means certain that a further study of Sanskrit will not lead to similar disenchantments, and deprive many a book in Sanskrit literature, which now is considered as very ancient, of its claims to any high antiquity. Certain portions of the Veda even, which, as far as our knowledge goes at present, we are perfectly justified in referring to the tenth or twelfth century before our era, may some day or other dwindle down from their high estate, and those who have believed in their extreme antiquity will then be held up to blame or ridicule, like Sir W. Jones or Colonel Wilford. This cannot be avoided, for science is progressive, and does not acknowledge, even in the most distinguished scholars, any claims to infallibility. One lesson only we may learn from the disappointments that befell Colonel Wilford, and that is to be on our guard against anything which in ordinary language would be called "too good to be true." Comparative philology has taught us again and again that when we find a word exactly the same in Greek and Sanskrit, we may be certain that it cannot be the same word; and the same applies to Comparative Mythology. The same god or the same hero cannot have exactly the same name in Sanskrit and Greek, for the simple reason that Sanskrit and Greek have deviated from each other, have both followed their own way, have both suffered their own phonetic corruptions; and hence, if they do possess the same word, they can only possess it either in its Greek or in its Sanskrit disguise. And if that caution applies to Sanskrit and Greek, members of the same family of language, how much more strongly must it apply to Sanskrit and Hebrew! If the first man were called in Sanskrit Âdima, and in Hebrew Adam, and if the two were really the same word, then Hebrew and Sanskrit could not be members of two different families of speech, and we should be driven to admit that Adam was borrowed by the Jews from the Hindus, for it is in Sanskrit only that Âdima means the first, whereas in Hebrew it has no such meaning.

These principles and these cautions were hardly thought of in the days of Sir W. Jones and Colonel Wilford, but they ought to be thought of at present. Thus, before Bopp had laid down his code of phonetic laws, and before Burnouf had written his works on Buddhism, one cannot be very much surprised that Buddha should have been identified with Minos and Lamech; nay, that even the Babylonian deity Belus, and the Teutonic deity Wodan or Odin, should have been supposed to be connected with the founder of

Buddhism in India. But we did not expect that we should have to read again, in a book published in 1869, such statements as these: *—

"There is, certainly, a much greater similarity between the Buddhism of the Topes and the Scandinavian mythology than between it and the Buddhism of the books; but still the gulf between the two is immense; and if any traces of the doctrines of the gentle ascetic (Buddha) ever existed in the bosom of Odin or his followers, while dwelling near the roots of the Caucasus, all that can be said is, that they suffered fearful shipwreck among the rocks of the savage superstitions of the north, and sank, never again to appear on the surface of Scandinavian mythology. If the two religions came anywhere in contact it is at their base, for underlying both there existed a strange substratum of Tree and Serpent Worship; on this the two structures seem to have been raised, though they afterwards diverged into forms so strangely dissimilar." (P. 84.)

Or again (p. 32),—

"We shall probably not err far if we regard these traces of Serpent Worship as indicating the presence in the north-east of Scotland of the head of that column of migration, or of propagandism, which, under the myth of Wodenism, we endeavoured in a previous chapter to trace from the Caucasus to Scandinavia."

"The arbours under which two of the couples are seated are curious instances of that sort of summer-house which may be found adorning tea-gardens in the neighbourhood of London to the present day. It is scenes like these that make us hesitate before asserting that there could not possibly be any connexion between Buddhism and Wodenism." (P. 140.)

"One of the most tempting nominal similarities connected with this subject is suggested by the name of *Māyā*. The mother of Buddha was called *Māyā*. The mother of Mercury was also *Maia*, the daughter of *Atlas*. The Romans always called *Wodin*, *Mercury*, and *dies Mercurii* and *Wodensday* alike designated the fourth-day of the week These and other similarities have frequently been pointed out and insisted upon, and they are too numerous and too distinct not to have some foundation in reality." (P. 186, note.)

Statements like these cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed or uncontradicted, particularly if supported by the authority of a great name; and after having spoken so freely of the unscientific character of the mythological comparisons instituted by scholars like Sir William Jones and Lieutenant Wilford, who can no longer defend themselves, it would be mere cowardice to shrink from performing the same unpleasant duty in the case of a living writer, who has shown that he knows how to wield the weapons both of defence and attack.

It is perfectly true that the mother of Buddha was called *Māyā*, but it is equally true that the Sanskrit *Māyā* cannot be the Greek *Maia*. It is quite true also that the fourth day of the week is called *dies Mercurii* in Latin, and Wednesday in English; nay, that in Sanskrit the same day is called *Budha-dina* or *Budha-vāra*! But

* "Tree and Serpent Worship," by James Fergusson. London: 1868.

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Clemens of Alexandria (died 220) seems to have been the first who used the names of Wednesday and Friday, Ἐρμού καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ἡμέρα.

It is generally stated, on the authority of Cassius Dio, that the system of counting by weeks and week-days was first introduced in Egypt, and that at his time, early in the third century, the Romans had adopted it, though but recently. Be this as it may, it would seem that, if Tibullus could use the name of *dies Saturni* for Saturday, the whole system of week-days must have been settled and known at Rome in his time. Cassius Dio tells us that the names were assigned to each day διὰ τεσσάρων, by fours; or by giving the first hour of the week to Saturn, then giving one hour to each planet in succession, till the twenty-fifth hour became again the first of the next day. Both systems lead to the same result, as will be seen from the following table:—

Planets.	Latin.	English.	French.	German.
1 Saturn 1	Dies Saturni	Saturday	Samedi (dies sabbati)	Samstag (Sonntag)
2 Jupiter 6	„ Solis	Sunday	Dimanche (dominicus)	Sonntag
3 Mars 4	„ Lunæ	Monday	Lundi	Montag
4 Sun 2	„ Martis	Tuesday	Mardi	Dienstag
5 Venus 7	„ Mercurii	Wednesday	Mercredi	Mittwoch
6 Mercury 5	„ Jovis	Thursday	Jeudi	Donnerstag
7 Moon 3	„ Veneris	Friday	Vendredi	Freitag

Old High German.	Middle High German.	Anglo-Saxon.	Old Norse.	Sanskrit.
sambaztag	samztac	sæter dæg	laugardagr	Sani-vâra
(sunnûn âband)	(sunnen âbent)		(washing day)	
sunnûn dæg	sunnen tac	sunnan dæg	sunnudagr	Ravi-vâra
mânin tac (?)	mân tac	monan dæg	mânadagr	Soma-vâra
ziuwes tac	zies tac	tives dæg	týsdagr	Bhauma-vâra
(cies dac)	(eritac)			
wootanes tac (?)	mittwoch	vodenes dæg	odinsdagr	Budha-vâra
(mittawechn)				
donares tac	donres tac	thunores dæg	thôrsdagr	Brihaspati-vâra
fria dæg	fritac	frige dæg	friadagr	Sukra-vâra

After the names of the week-days had once been settled, we have no difficulty in tracing their migration towards the East and towards the West. The Hindus had their own peculiar system of reckoning days and months, but they adopted at a later time the foreign system of counting by weeks of seven days, and assigning a presiding planetary deity to each of the seven days, according to the system described above. As the Indian name of the planet Mercury was Budha, the *dies Mercurii* was naturally called *Budha-vâra*, but never *Buddha-vâra*; and the fact that the mother of Mercury was called Maja, and the mother of Buddha Mâyâ, could, therefore, have had no bearing whatever on the name assigned to

the Indian Wednesday.* Whether the names of the planets were formed in India independently, or after Greek models, is difficult to settle. The name of Budha, the knowing or the clever, given to the planet Mercury, seems, however, inexplicable except on the latter hypothesis.

Having traced the origin of the Sanskrit name of the *dies Mercurii*, Budhavâra, let us now see why the Teutonic nations, though perfectly ignorant of Buddhism, called the same day the day of Wodan.

That the Teutonic nations received the names of the week-days from their Greek and Roman neighbours admits of no doubt. For commercial and military arrangements between Romans and Germans some kind of *lingua franca* must soon have sprung up, and in it the names of the week-days must have found their place. There would have been little difficulty in explaining the meaning of Sunday and Monday to the Germans, but in order to make them understand the meaning of the other names, some explanations must have been given on the nature of the different deities, in order to enable the Germans to find corresponding names in their own language. A Roman would tell his German friend that *dies Veneris* meant the day of a goddess who represented beauty and love, and on hearing this the German would at once have thought of his own goddess of love, *Freyja*, and have called the *dies Veneris* the day of *Freyja*, or Friday.†

If *Jupiter* was described as the god who wields the thunderbolt, his natural representative in German would be *Donar*,‡ the Anglo-Saxon *Thunar*, the Old Norse *Thór*; and hence the *dies Jovis* would be called the day of *Thór*, or Thursday. If the fact that *Jupiter* was the king of the gods had been mentioned, his proper representative in German would, no doubt, have been *Wuotan* or *Odin*.§ As it was, *Wuotan* or *Odin* was chosen as the nearest approach to *Mercury*, the character which they share in common, and which led to their identification, being most likely their love of travelling through the air,|| also their granting wealth and fulfilling the wishes of their worshippers, in which capacity *Wuotan* is known by the name of *Wunsch* ¶ or *Wish*. We can thus understand how it happened that father and son changed places, for while *Mercurius* is the son of *Jupiter*, *Wuotan* is the father of *Donar*. *Mars*, the god of war, was identified with the German *Tiu* or *Ziu*, a name which, though originally the same as *Zeus* in Greek or *Dyaus* in Sanskrit, took a peculiarly national character among the Germans, and became their god of war.**

* Grimm, "Deutsche Mythologie," p. 118, note.

† Ibid., p. 276.

‡ Ibid., p. 161.

§ Ibid., p. 120.

|| Ibid., pp. 137—148.

¶ Ibid., p. 126.

** Tacit., Hist. iv. 64, communibus Diis et præcipuo Deorum Marti grates agimus.

There remained thus only the *dies Saturni*, the day of Saturn, and whether this was called so in imitation of the Latin name, or after an old German deity of a similar name and character, is a point which for the present we must leave unsettled.

What, however, is not unsettled is this, that if the Germans, in interpreting these names of Roman deities as well as they could, called the *dies Mercurii*, the same day which the Hindus had called the day of *Budha* (with one d), their day of *Wuotan*, this was not because "the doctrines of the gentle ascetic existed in the bosom of Odin or his followers, while dwelling near the roots of the Caucasus," but for very different and much more tangible reasons.

But, apart from all this, by what possible process could Buddha and Odin have ever been brought together in the flesh? In the history of ancient religions, Odin belongs to the same stratum of mythological thought as *Dyaus* in India, *Zeus* in Greece, *Jupiter* in Italy. He was worshipped as the supreme deity during a period long anterior to the age of the Veda and of Homer. His travels in Greece and even in Tyrkland,* and his half-historical character as a mere hero and a leader of his people, are the result of the latest Euhemerism. Buddha, on the contrary, is not a mythological, but a personal and historical character, and to think of a meeting of Buddha and Odin, or even of their respective descendants, at the roots of Mount Caucasus, would be like imagining an interview between Cyrus and Odin, between Mohammed and Aphrodite.

A comparative study of ancient religions and mythologies, as will be seen from these instances, is not a subject to be taken up lightly. It requires not only an accurate acquaintance with the minutest details of comparative philology, but a knowledge of the history of religions, which can hardly be gained without a study of original documents. As long, however, as researches of this kind are carried on for their own sake, and from a mere desire of discovering truth, without any ulterior objects, they deserve no blame, though, for a time, they may lead to erroneous results. But when coincidences between different religions and mythologies are searched out simply in support of preconceived theories, whether by the friends or enemies of true religion, the sense of truth, the very life of all science, is sacrificed, and serious mischief will follow without fail. Here we have a right, not only to protest, but to blame. There is on this account a great difference between the books we have hitherto examined, and a work lately published in Paris by M. Jacolliot, under the sensational title of "*La Bible dans l'Inde, Vie de Jeseus Christna.*" If this book had been written with the pure enthusiasm of Lieutenant Wilford, it might have been passed by as a mere

* Grimm, l. c. p. 148.

anachronism. But when one sees how its author shuts his eyes against all evidence that would tell against him, and brings together, without any critical scruples, whatever seems to support his theory that Christianity is a mere copy of the ancient religion of India, mere silence would not be a sufficient answer. Besides, the book has lately been translated into English, and will be read, no doubt, by many people who cannot test the evidence on which it professes to be founded. We learn that M. Jacolliot was some years ago appointed President of the Court of Justice at Chardernagore, and that he devoted the leisure left him from the duties of his position to studying Sanskrit and the holy books of the Hindus. He is said to have put himself in communication with the Brahmans, who had obtained access to a great number of MSS. carefully stored up in the depths of the pagodas. "The purport of his book is," I quote from a friendly critic, "that our civilization, our religion, our legends, our gods, have come to us from India, after passing in succession through Egypt, Persia, Judæa, Greece, and Italy." This statement, we are told, is not confined to M. Jacolliot, but has been admitted by almost all Oriental scholars. The Old and New Testaments are found again in the Vedas, and the texts quoted by M. Jacolliot in support of his theory are said to leave it without doubt. Brahma created Adima (in Sanskrit, the first man), and gave him for companion Heva (in Sanskrit, that which completes life). He appointed the island of Ceylon for their residence. What follows afterwards is so beautifully described that I may be pardoned for quoting it. Only I must warn my readers, lest the extract should leave too deep an impression on their memory, that what M. Jacolliot calls a simple translation from Sanskrit is, as far as I can judge, a simple invention of some slightly mischievous Brahman, who, like the Pandits of Lieutenant Wilford, took advantage of the zeal and credulity of a French judge:—

"Having created the Man and the Woman (*simultaneously*, not one after the other), and animated them with the divine afflatus—the Lord said unto them, 'Behold your mission is to people this beautiful Island [Ceylon], where I have gathered together everything pleasant and needful for your subsistence,—the rest of the Earth is as yet uninhabitable, but should your progeny so increase as to render the bounds of paradise too narrow a habitation, let them enquire of me by sacrifice and I will make known my will.'

"And thus saying, disappeared. . . .

"Then Adam and Eve dwelt together for a time in perfect happiness; but ere long a vague disquietude began to creep upon them . . . the Spirit of Evil, jealous of their felicity and of the work of Brahma, inspired them with disturbing thoughts;—'Let us wander through the Island,' said Adam to his companion, 'and see if we may not find some part even more beautiful than this.' . . .

"And Eve followed her husband . . . wandering for days and for months . . . but as they advanced the woman was seized with strange and inexplicable terrors: 'Adam,' said she, 'let us go no farther, it seems to me that we are disobeying the Lord: have we not already quitted the place which he assigned us for a dwelling and forbad us to leave?'

"'Fear not,' replied Adam, 'this is not that fearful wilderness of which he spake to us.' . . .

"And they wandered on. . . .

"Arriving at last at the extremity of the Island, they behold a smooth and narrow arm of the sea, and beyond it a vast and apparently boundless country, connected with their Island only by a narrow and rocky pathway arising from the bosom of the waters.

"The two wanderers stood amazed: the country before them was covered with stately trees, birds of a thousand colours flitting amidst their foliage. . . . 'Behold, what beautiful things!' cried Adam, 'and what good fruit such trees must produce; . . . let us go and taste them, and if that country is better than this, we will dwell there.'

"Eve, trembling, besought Adam to do nothing that might irritate the Lord against them. 'Are we not well, here? have we not pure water and delicious fruits?—wherefore seek other things?'

"'True,' replied Adam, 'but we will return; what harm can it be to visit this unknown country that presents itself to our view?' . . . And as he approached the rocks, Eve, trembling, followed.

"Placing his wife upon his shoulders, he proceeded to cross the space that separated him from the object of his desires, but no sooner did he touch the shore, than trees, flowers, fruits, birds, all that they had perceived from the opposite side, in an instant vanished amidst terrific clamour, . . . the rocks by which they had crossed sunk beneath the waters, a few sharp peaks alone remaining above the surface, to indicate the place of the bridge which had been destroyed by divine displeasure.

"The vegetation which they had seen from the opposite shore was but a delusive mirage raised by the Spirit of Evil to tempt them to disobedience.

"Adam fell, weeping upon the naked sands . . . but Eve, throwing herself into his arms, besought him not to despair . . . 'let us rather pray to the Author of all things to pardon us.' . . .

"And as she spake, there came a voice from the clouds, saying,

"'Woman! *thou* hast only sinned from love to thy husband, whom I commanded thee to love, and thou hast hoped in me.

"'I therefore pardon thee—and I pardon him also, for *thy* sake . . . but ye may no more return to paradise which I had created for your happiness . . . through your disobedience to my commands the Spirit of Evil has obtained possession of the Earth. . . . Your children, reduced to labour and to suffer by your fault, will become corrupt and forget me . . .

"'But I will send Vishnu, who will be born of a woman, and who will bring to all the hope of a reward in another life, and the means by prayer of softening their sufferings.'"

The translator from whom I have quoted, exclaims at the end, as well he might:—

"What grandeur and what simplicity in this Hindu legend! and at the same time how simply logical! . . . Behold here the veritable Eve—the true woman."

But much more extraordinary things are quoted by M. Jaccoliot from the Vedas and the commentaries. In one passage of the Veda we are told that the ancient poet exclaimed :—

“ La femme est l'âme de l'humanité.”

On page 63 we read that Manu, Minos, and Manes had the same name as Moses ; on page 73, the Brahmins, who invaded India, are represented as the successors of a great reformer called Christna. The name of Zoroaster is derived from the Sanskrit Sûryastara (p. 110), meaning “he who spreads the worship of the Sun.” After it has been laid down (p. 116) that Hebrew was derived from Sanskrit, we are assured that there is little difficulty in deriving Jehova from Zeus.* Zeus, Jezeus, Jesus, and Isis are all declared to be the same name, and later on (p. 130) we learn that “at present the Brahmins who officiate in the pagodas and temples give this title of Jeseus, *i.e.* the pure essence, the divine emanation, to Christna only, who alone is recognised as the Word, the truly incarnated, by the worshippers of Vishnu and the freethinkers among the Brahmins.”

We are assured that the Apostles, the poor fishermen of Galilee, were able to read the Veda (p. 356) ; and it was their greatest merit that they did not reject the miraculous accounts of the Vedic period, because the world was not yet ripe for freedom of thought. Kristna or Christna, we read on p. 360, signified in Sanskrit, sent by God, promised by God, holy, and as the name of Christ or Χριστός is not Hebrew, whence could it have been taken except from Krishna, the son of Devaki, or, as M. Jaccoliot writes, Devanaguy ?

It is difficult, nay, almost impossible, to criticize or refute such statements, and yet it is necessary to do so, for such is the interest, or I should rather say the feverish curiosity, excited by anything that bears on ancient religion, that M. Jaccoliot's book has produced a very wide and very deep impression. It has been remarked with some surprise that Vedic scholars in Europe had failed to discover these important passages in the Veda which he has pointed out, or, still worse, that they had never brought them to the knowledge of the public. In fact, if anything was wanting to show that a general knowledge of the history of ancient religion ought to form part of our education, it was the panic created by M. Jaccoliot's book. It is simply the story of Lieutenant Wilford over again, only far less excusable now than a hundred years ago, and decidedly reprehensible on account of the author's unscientific bias. Many of the words which M. Jaccoliot quotes as Sanskrit are not Sanskrit at all ; others never have the meaning which he assigns to them ; and as to the passages from the

* P. 125. “Pour quiconque s'est occupé d'études philologiques, Jéhova dérivé de Zeus est facile à admettre.”

Vedas (including our old friend the Bhagaveda-gita), they are not from the Veda, they are not from any old Sanskrit writer,—they simply belong to the second half of the nineteenth century. What happened to Lieutenant Wilford has happened again to M. Jacolliot. He tells us the secret himself:—

“One day,” he says (p. 280), “when we were reading the translation of Manu, by Sir W. Jones, a note led us to consult the Indian commentator, Kullūka Bhatta, when we found an allusion to the sacrifice of a son by his father prevented by God himself after he had commanded it. We then had only one ‘*idée fixe*,’ viz., to find again in the dark mass of the religious books of the Hindus, the original account of that event. We should never have succeeded but for ‘the complaisance’ of a Brahman with whom we were reading Sanskrit, and who, yielding to our request, brought us from the library of his pagoda the works of the theologian Ramatsariar, which have yielded us such precious assistance in this volume.”

As to the story of the son offered as a sacrifice by his father, and released at the command of the gods, M. Jacolliot might have found the original account of it from the Veda, both text and translation, in my “History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.” He would soon have seen that the story of Suna/sepa, being sold by his father in order to be sacrificed in the place of an Indian prince, has very little in common with the intended sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. M. Jacolliot has, no doubt, found out by this time that he has been imposed upon; and if so, he ought to follow the example of Colonel Wilford, and publicly state what has happened. Even then, I doubt not that his statements will continue to be quoted for a long time, and that *Ādima* and *Heva*, thus brought to life again, will make their appearance in many a book and many a lecture-room.

Lest it be supposed that such accidents happen to Sanskrit scholars only, or that this fever is bred only in the jungles of Indian mythology, I shall mention at least one more case, which will show that this disease is of a more general character, and that want of caution will produce it in every climate.

Before the discovery of Sanskrit, China had stood for a long time in the place which was afterwards occupied by India. When the ancient literature and civilisation of China became first known to the scholars of Europe, the Celestial Empire had its admirers and prophets as full of enthusiasm as Sir W. Jones and Lieutenant Wilford, and there was nothing, whether Greek philosophy or Christian morality, that was not supposed to have had its first origin among the sages of China. The proceedings of the Jesuit missionaries in China were most extraordinary. They had themselves admitted the antiquity of the writings of Confucius and Laotse, both of whom lived in the 6th century B.C.* But in their zeal to show that the

* Stanislas Julien, “Le Livre de la Voie et de la Vertu,” Paris, 1842. P. iv.

sacred books of the Chinese contained numerous passages borrowed from the Bible, nay, even some of the dogmas of the later church, they hardly perceived that, taking into account the respective dates of these books, they were really proving that a kind of anticipated Christianity had been accorded to the ancient sages of the celestial empire. The most learned advocate of this school was Father Prémare. Another supporter of the same view, Montucci,* speaking of Laotse's Tao-te-king, says :—

“We find in it so many sayings clearly referring to the triune God, that no one who has read this book can doubt that the mystery of the holiest Trinity was revealed to the Chinese more than five centuries before the advent of Christ. Everybody, therefore, who knows the strong feeling of the Chinese for their own teachers, will admit that nothing more efficient could be found in order to fix the dogmas of the Christian religion in the mind of the Chinese than the demonstration that these dogmas agree with their own books. The study, therefore, and the translation of this singular book (the Tao-te-king) would prove most useful to the missionaries, in order to bring to a happy issue the desired gathering in of the Apostolic harvest.”

What followed is so extraordinary that, though it has often been related, it deserves to be related again, more particularly as the whole problem which was supposed to have been solved once for all by M. Stanislas Julien, has of late been opened again by Dr. von Strauss, in the “Journal of the German Oriental Society,” 1869.

There is a passage at the beginning of the fourteenth chapter of the Tao-te-king in which Father Amyot felt certain that the three persons of the Trinity could be recognised. He translated it :—

“He who is as it were visible, but cannot be seen, is called *Khi*.

“He whom we cannot hear, and who does not speak to our ear, is called *Hi*.

“He who is as it were tangible, but cannot be touched, is called *Wei*.”

Few readers, I believe, would have been much startled by this passage, or would have seen in it what Father Amyot saw. But more startling revelations were in store. The most celebrated Chinese scholar of his time, Abel Rémusat, took up the subject; and after showing that the first of the three names had to be pronounced, not *Khi*, but *I*, he maintained that the three syllables, *I Hi Wei*, were meant for *Je-ho-vah*. According to him, the three characters employed in this name have no meaning in Chinese; they are only signs of sounds foreign to the Chinese language; and they were intended to render the Greek *Iαω*, the name which, according to Diodorus Siculus, the Jews gave to their God. Rémusat goes on to remark that Laotse had really rendered this Hebrew name more accurately than the Greeks, because he had preserved the aspiration of the second syllable which was lost in Greek. In fact, he entertains no doubt

* Montucci, “De studiis sinicis,” Berolini, 1808.

that this word, occurring in the work of Laotse, proves an intellectual communication between the West and China in the sixth century, B.C.

Fortunately, the panic created by this discovery did not last long. M. Stanislas Julien published in 1842 a complete translation of this difficult book; and here all traces of the name of Jehovah have disappeared.

"The three syllables," he writes, "which Abel Rémusat considered as purely phonetic and foreign to the Chinese language, have a very clear and intelligible meaning, and have been fully explained by Chinese commentators. The first syllable I, means without colour; the second, Hi, without sound or voice; the third Wei, without body. The proper translation therefore is:—

"You look (for the Tao, the law) and you see it not: it is colourless.

"You listen, and you hear it not: it is voiceless.

"You wish to touch it and you reach it not: it is without body."

Until, therefore, some other traces can be discovered in Chinese literature, proving an intercourse between China and Judæa in the sixth century, B.C., we can hardly be called upon to believe that the Jews should have communicated this one name, which they hardly trusted themselves to pronounce at home, to a Chinese philosopher; and we must refer the apparent similarity between I-Hi-Wei, and Jehovah, to the same chapter of accidents, which ought to serve as a useful warning, though it need in no way discourage a careful and honest study of Comparative Theology.

MAX MÜLLER.



A SUGGESTION FOR A NEW KIND OF BIOGRAPHY.

WE must begin by admitting that until within the last hundred years there has been no idea of biography at all. It is a modern attainment, and Goethe and Rousseau have opened the double valves through which the world has arrived at it. These two great autobiographers had to come first, before men could learn how to look at their fellow-man with an interest that terminates simply in himself. The one, with his fiery self-analysis, his shamelessness of candour, his baring of passion to the fascinated eye; the other, with his solid-set and statuesque calmness, his slow and passive and mighty growth, and his enlargement of a many-sided nature through the acquisition of all experiences, and the sacrifice of every man and every woman around him—both lives, differing in so many things, agreed in one point. In each case the man was unmistakeably his own first object; and the book, whatever other things it might treat of, and however interestingly, was before all things a biography. In Rousseau's narrative, the first person, and the second person, and the third person, is Jean Jacques. In Goethe's wonderful book there is no pretence that any other divides the interest; his own life and his own nature are unaffectedly set forth as the central objects, for the illustration of which everything in the century is used. But now

that these two great hands have opened the kingdom of biography, every one presses into it; and though all do not finish their work with the same skill, yet the fundamental lesson has at least been learned. What in an autobiography looks egotistical, in a biography is of course mere portraiture; only the biographer now has learned to pourtray with that single attention to his subject, with that admiration of it in itself and for itself, which was at first secured only in a few exceptional cases by the strong grasp of self-love. But is this not a new thing on the earth—a strictly modern attainment? I think it is. Plutarch's Lives are not biography in the modern sense. Those stately forms stalk across the arena in the interest of virtue and nobleness, as the later Greek mind understood the τὸ καλόν. They are magnificent men—in buckram; grand actors upon a sounding stage. Yet the interest they excite, even when they most take captive the imagination, is not that passionate interest in the individual which we have come to demand as the first and necessary quality. Plutarch's readers study each hero, not for his own sake, but as an illustration of history, or an illustration of virtue. The case of Socrates comes a little nearer to what we want; for the folds of those dialogues have in all ages revealed the outlines and the features of him who stands behind them. Yet even here, and at least as remarkably in the fragmentary records of some other Greek thinkers, the seeker after truth comes out somewhat more than the man. Socrates after all was a teacher of wisdom, and notwithstanding those delicious touches of portraiture which meet us here and there, the great object which his pupils attempt is to render the influence which he exerted upon them, not deliberately and at full length to pourtray the man. And when we come into Christian times the thing is still more striking. Down to the date of the French Revolution, no one wrote biography at all. It seems to have been considered a sin so to do. Augustine was tempted to do it, having his own marvellous history, and his glowing, crystalline, many-angled soul for a subject: but he did not dare. And so what in our days would have been his autobiography, became merely his confessions; a series of pious and passionate apologies to his God for delaying at all over so worthless a subject as his own history is in itself, though God's dealings with him in it may perhaps by the Christian and charitable reader be counted worthy of the record which he scarce brings himself to bestow. The stories of the martyrs were not biographies; each of them rushed *praeceps in ruinam*, and like one of the meteors that lately entered our atmosphere from remotest space, became visible only in the sudden flame that told of its extinction. The *Acta Sanctorum* were lower still. The chroniclers of the Middle Age, like Plutarch (himself one of their objects of admiration), pourtrayed

their knights only in so far as they did great deeds, or were mirrors of chivalry. When the Reformation came, it made no change in this respect. Both that movement, and the Puritanism that succeeded it, were fertile in great men; but the great men had none to whom they were heroes. The doctrine of Luther, Calvin, and Baxter did not produce valets. The intense individualism of conscious relation to God which each man felt, almost incapacitated him from studying the nature and life of another; and the solemn weight, partly of doctrine and partly of devotion, which lay upon himself, prevented him equally from unfolding his own inner life by way of autobiography. Besides, this was the age of doctrine, just as a somewhat earlier time was the age of the feudal king and of the Church, and as the classic time was the age of the State. In the days behind us, the individual was subordinated, first to the commonweal, and afterwards to the civil or spiritual superior. His value as a unit was little or nothing. Puritanism, in the hands of Knox and Latimer, and their continental brethren, rescued man from insignificance; but this was counterbalanced by the supreme position which they (or their immediate successors) gave to doctrine. Henceforth biography of religious men became what in some hands it still continues to be, a mere illustration of dogmas, one or more, and was valuable only in so far as it had a purpose. And down to the Revolution all these lines of influence, converging and mingling as they no doubt did, yet failed among them all to produce what we recognise as biography. The *humani nihil a me alienum* of an old poet was a word spoken long before its time, and we are its legitimate inheritors. The ages past sometimes gave a man's life if he was a great king, or a great philosopher, or a great theologian, or a great saint; but never simply because he was a man.

But what they failed to do we have learned; and what prophets and wise men of old were unable to attain to is now the most easily acquired virtue of every *littérateur*. It is a great question whether this age believes in God; but it is certain that at least it believes in man. "And because we believe in man; because we reason, if not always aright, of truth, of beauty, of perfection, and are full of reverence, full of pity, for the nature in which we find ourselves so fearfully and wonderfully fashioned; because our age, with all its wants and errors, is still a loving, a believing, an essentially human age," therefore, as the rich-thoughted writer whom we quote argues, there is hope for us. Now into the general battle between humanitarianism and dogma we do not enter. It is, as most people come to find, a necessarily endless conflict, extending over the whole fields of history, of thought, of politics, of literature, and of social life; and whatever men's individual leanings may be, in most of the regions

we are forced to admit a practical equipoise between the subjective and objective way of looking at things. But is there not one exception? Is there not one department of literature which in the nature of it is essentially and only humanitarian, and whose excellence is measured by the degree in which it succeeds in being so? Is this not the very meaning of *Biography*? We rather think this is the accepted idea at present—one too in which all the different schools find it possible to unite, and from which it is difficult on any grounds to escape. This is not so wonderful with regard to those (now the great mass of mankind, we should say, were it not that the utterance might draw forth a platoon fire from the Positive camp) who have no delight in the study of either nature or history as mere external fact, and cannot bear to look on them as valuable in themselves apart from the subjective human interest. These outside regions are to most people vast figured curtains, in which they trace remote adumbrations of something like biography.

“Literature and art, even Nature herself, these, which for freer spirits once had a charm of their own, and needed not any other, now breathe and burn in the fulness of a parasitical life; the fever of man’s conflict has passed across them; their bloom and fragrance feeds, and is fed, by fire kindled far down in the central heart. The shadow of Humanity falls wide, darkening the world’s play-ground; and games, be they those of man and demi-god, can no more enthrall us. What is science itself but a gigantic toy, which may delight, but can never satisfy the heart, which, even through its sadness and perplexity, has learnt that it is greater than all that surrounds it?”*

Femininely surcharged with sentiment as this is, it reflects, we are inclined to think, the mood of the manlier manhood of our time, quite as much as the pure thinkers of the school opposed do; and in the great debateable land of general literature, we look for an equal war of most ambiguous event. But even those who think that the purity of science, of thought, and of literature is compromised by any thing but disinterested study, and is smirched by human interests consciously or unconsciously mingling with it—even this school does not seem, on its own principles, to take a different view of biography from that which we have described as the modern one. On the contrary, that modern view is perhaps in special accordance with their doctrine. For in biography the object of study is the man himself; and the same rules which forbid any intrusion of subjectivity into all other pursuits, demand that here nothing else shall have place, but mere delineation and portraiture. All the religious, metaphysical, and even social relations which were at one time supposed to be the chief thing about a man, all here exploded; if we are to have an account of him, the one thing to be desired is that he

* The “Patience of Hope.”

be given us not only in form and manner as he lived openly, but exactly and simply as he was inwardly. Any pretence of preference of one part of his development to another; any impertinence of criticising what the biographer is only asked to pourtray; any distortion of the nature delineated in order to make it grow more to what its chronicler is pleased to call the light, is of course in the eyes of this school a sin of the first magnitude.

But indeed this seems to be accepted generally, and apart from literary sectarianisms. *A biography with a purpose* is held an abomination. And the only variation permitted on the modern idea of the thing is this—you may make the man of whom you write your hero, and be very enthusiastic about him. That is not necessary, but it is permissible. There is, *e. g.*, no better biography, none more characteristic of the modern type to which it belongs, than that of Edward Irving. It is written with enthusiasm, but the enthusiasm is all for the man. Irving had abundance of that sort of thing during his life, but it was unconfessed. His friends and followers loudly protested that the spring of their exertions was not their love and admiration for him, but that they and he lived for the common objects, which, as preacher or as prophet, he passionately set forth. But in his biography all that is dismissed almost contemptuously: and so Irving, who in his lifetime received only disguised incense and diverted offerings, from men who refused to admit that they were his worshippers, stands forth at last an unveiled idol. For he has fallen upon an age when, whatever happens to a man while living, there is nothing permissible to his biographer, but praise of the dead—enthusiasm for the personality which is pourtrayed. And if the life of Xavier or Marat had to be written, the rule is the same and the result would be similar. You must make him your sole subject, and if possible your hero. It is allowable to abstain from moral judgment altogether; but if you do otherwise all the praise must be accumulated on him whom you draw: and in any event he is to be kept the centre of the canvas, and subordinated to nothing and to no one.

Now I am wearied of this way of writing people's lives—wearied, in the first place, of its monotony and falseness. There are innumerable people whose personal histories are intensely interesting, and yet they are not perfect. And I object to treating them in either of the two ways now in vogue—either on the one hand standing up for them as if they were perfect, and attacking all around who do not bow to them; or on the other, making a nice little study of their lives, and abstaining from looking at them in any of the higher relations to the perfection plainly not attained. Is there no more excellent way, no way accordant with that mingled tenderness and

truth which is due to our poor humanity? I think there is; and that without falling back on the old plan of dogmatic biography.

In the first place, is it not certain that for each human life there is a separate and peculiar and absolutely individual ideal? I do not mean the ideal which the man had before his own eyes while living it; but the ideal which he ought to have had, or might have had, or (for we must not exclude the possibility that no man can see his own supreme good) the ideal which was visible all along to "greater, other eyes" than his and ours? And this is not the same thing with the ancient plan of comparing the man with some great common standard of truth or moral beauty. For we do not here speak of an ideal common to all, and to which it is possible for others to approximate—but of the solitary and separate ideal *for him*—the ideal, or rather idea, on which and for which the subject of our biography was originally framed, and by his approximation to which he is to be judged. It seems to be the favourite doctrine at present that, whatever may be the case with the moralist, it is an impertinence for the mere biographer to take to do with this. On the contrary, we hold that this idea of the man's life, unfulfilled or partially fulfilled or broken all away, is the one thing which it is essential for a true biographer to have got some hold of. For it is not something outside of the man—some mere pattern of things in the heavens to which he was destined by an external power to become conformed to—of which we speak. It may be that, but it is also, and it is much more, the inmost thread of the man's whole being: that which runs through all his development so far as it has gone, and which projects itself unseen into an endless future even where that development has been cut short. Of course it is a hard and a high thing to get possession of this—hard for the man himself during his militant life (and impossible unless his habitual attitude be one of dependence), and hard, too, for others outside, even after his fragmentary course on earth is finished. But it is not impossible for either, and what we maintain is that without this it is impracticable to have any biography of the highest and truest kind. And why should biography of the kind proposed be thought inconsistent with any of the best qualities sought after in the modern art? Is our statement of the facts of the man's life likely to be less true, because we have, in the first place, secured some hold of the essential scope of the unequal history and the individual goal to which it streams? Are we likely to be less candid in our narration of incidents, less accurate in our judgment of details? Does not this plan, on the contrary, set us at once free from the continual temptation which otherwise oppresses us, to prolong the development of the history a little more towards perfection than the facts warrant, and to round

off the broken and baffling and disappointing angles which occur in every real life? These broken angles and flaws have their own intense interest, in relation to an unseen ideal which accompanies the man in his progress through them, and which we also, as biographers, may believe in : while, if we refuse to do so, and deal only with the facts themselves, the temptation is practically overpowering to smooth them away, and so make the actual life supply the place of that poem-life which our heart rightly tells us was hidden far beyond it. And if the plan of treating every life as only an approximation to an ideal life is rather favourable to historical truth, is it not equally conducive to that other great biographical quality of tenderness? The biographer is no longer a partisan—no longer a mere admirer—on the contrary, the first thing obvious in his work is that he holds his hero, however loved and revered, to be imperfect. And how can he be other thereafter than infinitely tender? He deals with a man of like passions, compassed with the same infirmities, baffled by the same imperfection ; and this being once broadly acknowledged in the whole conception of the life, there must be a ripple of continual tenderness in the treatment of all details. We have, in fact, only thus got back to truth, and we now deal with the printed life we read as we always deal with an actual life which we remember—with the same mingled admiration and sadness, the same loving acknowledgment of imperfection on earth, and the same transfer of unshaken faith to the ideal which completes itself nowhere but in heaven.

But take the suggestion in another form. Instead of saying anything about ideals, let us say that each human life has all through an individual and separate and personal relation to God, and that its whole course (whether it be according to an ideal plan or not) is a dealing with him in the way of guidance or at least of dependence. The modern idea of biography is essentially opposed to this. The *totus teres atque rotundus* view of life ; that which treats each history as fed by its proper springs, and dependent on nothing outside, and which, if it approves of piety and devotion at all, treats them with much admiration as a beautiful efflorescence of life rather than its fundamental and central condition—this whole view of life tends, as it seems to us, rather to hero-worship than to either tenderness or truth. At all events, it might be possible to have the tenderness and truth while transferring the loyalty to some other use than the worship of the hero. And is this not an experiment worth trying? The result would be almost a new thing in literature. We long to see a biography with a passionate love and an enthusiastic admiration of the subject of it, in which, nevertheless, there should be an equally strong feeling not only of failure in the close, but of imperfection and

dependence at every point—in which, in fact, there should be a double interest, one in the man whose life is narrated, and one in the Supreme Biographer who, as we hold, is mixed up in the plan and in the details of every life of all His children here.

Now, this is not a biography with a purpose, nor is it mere illustration of doctrine under a biographical disguise. We claim—and we are fairly bound to meet the question—that for pure biography, for biography in the strictest sense of it, this suggested view of a man's life as essentially dependent and imperfect, is the best thing. Is it not the view most likely to give a *true* account of what the life actually was? Do you not put yourself on a vantage-ground for understanding your friend by thus viewing him from above? Of course it is an excessively difficult thing to do, even after it is acceded to in theory; you will be continually liable to lapse into the ordinary lazy form of religious biography, and to compare the facts of a real life with the dogmas of a system more or less venerable in idea and more or less practical in application. Or in seeking to avoid this, you will be likely to invent a fictitious theory of the highest and supreme relations of your friend, and to compare the real life once more with an imaginary ideal of it. It is difficult—intensely difficult. But who denies that a first-rate biography is one of the highest and most difficult things that can be attained? Only, in order to even conceiving or planning it, we urge, as a pre-requisite, that we should look at it in connection with its unfulfilled ideal, and not shirk its dependence and imperfection.—But let us concede as much as we can, and instead of demanding that our future biographer shall see the ideal and shall trace the personal connection with the higher leading, let us say merely this: he must *acknowledge* all through that there is such an ideal, that there is such a higher leading, and that the life is an imperfect approximation. Without this much, we honestly do not see how the life is to escape a charge of central falsehood and misrepresentation. On the other hand, if this is heartily done, the man escapes being made a hero, and falls into that true relation to all above him and around him in which our brotherly sympathy for one imperfect as ourselves is most heartily roused. And at the same time all the facts of his life fall into their proper places; each assumes a true and real meaning; and the whole, which was before a fragment of meaningless natural history, or at the best of graceful egotism, suddenly becomes instinct with a divine lesson, a lesson taught by the success and by the failure alike. But indeed, from this point of view, what do we call failure? On the self-centred plan of life and biography, failure meets us almost inevitably. The man is struck down amid the works of his hands, or he totters along that shadier slope of life

which, at its best, is such an anti-climax to the morning's hope. And then in so many of the most precious lives, failure does not wait for the close, but some blow intervenes which throws all into anguish and confusion. It is impossible to escape from it so long as we make the life itself our object and our end ; as impossible for the biographer as it is for the man himself. Our hope for *him*, no more our hero, but our brother, is that, at that close, if not before, he may have finally risen to the position in which there is no failure ; in which the life seen from end to end is known by vision of faith to have been a successful work of God, and as such to be rejoiced in even amid the wreck and imperfection which on the human side have most accumulated upon it. Now why should not the biographer view his work from the beginning in that light which the subject of it at last sees to have been the only true one—the only one in which he could have truly moved through it while it lasted, and in which others can truly understand it now that it has passed ? And if in aught he has failed in a wise humility, while yet that life unrolled itself under human eyes, what nobler task remains for the pen of love than to reproduce the history as he now rejoices to view it, and wishes that he had viewed it ere yet the golden bowl slipped from his failing hands ? *Sero vixi, Domine Deus meus.*

ROBERT GOODBRAND.



THE ENGLISH GIRL'S EDUCATION.

Report of the Syndicate on the Cambridge Examination for Women above 18 years of age. Rivingtons.

Reports issued by the Schools Enquiry Commission on the Education of Girls. By D. BEALE, Principal of the Ladies' College, Cheltenham.

THE University of Cambridge will hold its second examination* for women above the age of eighteen, in the month of July of the present year, at London, at Leeds, and at any other centre which is able to furnish twenty-five candidates, or an amount of fees corresponding to that number. It is desirable that the object and nature of these examinations should be thoroughly understood. Much of the hostility manifested to the movement which has been made of late years on behalf of female education arises from a misconception of what the authors of that movement desire, or what it is likely to produce; and the best means by which such a misconception can be properly dealt with, consists in the dissemination of facts, collected with care, and stated without passion or exaggeration. The question is not necessarily connected with those other questions

* Particulars concerning these examinations can be obtained from the local secretaries:—Miss E. Bonham Carter, Ravensbourne, Beckenham (for London); Miss Wilson, Hilary Place, Leeds; Miss Calder, 49, Canning Street, Liverpool; Mrs. F. E. Kitchener, Rugby; and also from the undermentioned ladies and gentlemen:—Mrs. Robert Henniker, South Charlton, Chatham; Mrs. Fleming, 112, Hayley Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham; Rev. W. Woodhouse, Blackburn; Mrs. Henry Martin, 4, Powys Place, Brighton; Mrs. Myers, Brandon House, Cheltenham; Mrs. Gregory, Trasham Rectory, Bovey Tracey, Devon; Mrs. Bowers, Deanery, Manchester; Miss Keeling, 16, Broomhall Street, Sheffield. Forms of entry will be ready on April 1, and should be applied for at once, as they must be returned to the local secretary by April 30.

about the rights or the wrongs of women which have been discussed with such infinite clamour, and it is unfair and injurious to entangle it amongst them. Considered without prejudice, it really resolves itself into this:—A great number of hours in a girl's life are by common consent spent upon the process of education;—are they used in the best possible way, or are they in any measure wasted, and wasted owing to preventible causes? Many—one is almost inclined to say most—opponents argue as if the promoters of female education were engaged in catching a host of forest birds hitherto suffered to sing and stray in freedom, caging, and otherwise cruelly oppressing and afflicting them. But the schoolroom days of a girl are facts which have long preceded any stir about the possibility of improving them. She is taught, drilled, disciplined, restrained, more or less, better or worse, during no small part of her youth. We do not ask for the “more;” we only plead for the “better.”

It can hardly be seriously supposed, for instance, that there is anything essentially feminine, or particularly beneficial to the health, in learning three or four languages imperfectly, instead of one thoroughly; that bad arithmetic is more modest and becoming than good; or that the remarkable young ladies of whom we have lately read,* who never showed any animation except about the dates of the kings of England, would have lost all their power of charming if their interest in history had been a little deepened and extended. When one hears so much about the injurious effect which an improved education is likely to exercise upon a girl as a member of society, one feels tempted to ask whether the things which she now learns at school do habitually pass into or colour her every-day talk. Does she allude playfully to Mangnall in the pauses of a waltz, or puzzle her neighbour at a picnic (it would often puzzle him very much) with chronological suggestions? Would it deprive her of all chance of a husband if, when she speaks French, it should be as correct in grammar as in accent? or if, when she looks at the stars, she should know something more about them than the bare list of names which she knows now? To take an actual example. Mr. Hammond† tells us that the astronomical lessons inflicted upon a girl whom he describes as “studious and inquiring, and certainly the most highly-educated young woman I have seen at any girls' school,” required her, at the outset, to write several careful pages upon the moon's motion, not one word of which she understood. The word “syzygies” occurred in this exercise several times, was invariably misspelt, and invariably left uncorrected. The “line of nodes” was

* This appears to us to be the lowest point of intellectual languor which has yet been attained.

† Miss Beale, p. 147.

familiarly alluded to ; but as this was the first lesson in astronomy, it is not surprising that the pupil was without any definite idea what it meant. Can we picture to ourselves this young lady, entering upon the delights of her first ball, appealed to by her partner to admire the beauty of a moonrise visible through the window, which should infuse a slight flavour of poetry into the ordinary flow of conversation, and replying to him in her sweetest tone, "True; but how about the nodes?" Would she be more likely to appal him with such a question if she had been so taught that she was able to understand her lesson? The thing intended to be taught would be the same in both cases; would she be more likely to confound him with an avalanche of undesired information in the one case than in the other? The presumption is certainly against any such conclusion. The fact seems to be that a thoroughly well-educated woman is so exceptional at present, that she sometimes appears unduly prominent; make the level higher, and this disproportion will vanish. But even now it is perhaps rather the partly than the completely educated woman to whom the reproach of self-assertion properly attaches. She is surprised to find herself knowing so much, and she *naively* appeals to society at large to confirm her in her opinion of herself. If her acquirements were the natural fruits of her training, she would probably carry them with composure. It is because she is rather *parvenue* than *arrivée* that she flourishes the supposed proofs of her elevation in the face of her friends.

Let us suppose for a moment that the opposition shown by parents, or by the public, in many instances, could be divested of all that is unreal or mistaken, and brought face to face with the simple facts of the case. "I do not want Augusta to be a blue-stocking," says the mamma. What, then, is Augusta to learn? Let us look at the list of subjects now taught by finishing governesses, whether in school or at home. She is to learn reading, writing, arithmetic, needlework, French, Italian, German, music, drawing, mythology, history, heraldry, geography, composition, use of the globes, dancing, and very possibly (these are in the curriculum of many finishing schools) mathematics, physical science, Latin—stop, we are out of breath. The advocates of improved education do not intend to teach her half so much. They will be quite content if, during her schoolroom period, she thoroughly masters the grammar and enters into the literature of one language besides her own. They do not want her to learn more than the elements of drawing. Music she may abandon altogether, unless she has a natural faculty. They are most agreeably surprised to find that her present course of study comprises arithmetic, mathematics, physical science. But here we are interrupted. Let there be no misapprehension here. It is arranged now

that she is to spend a certain amount of time over these pursuits, but she is not really to understand anything about them. The difference consists, not in forbidding her to be taught, but in forbidding her to learn. The whole thing is to be a sham. It is good discipline somehow, it makes a lady of her, it fits her to play her part in society, that she should spend her youth in going steadily and obediently from one lesson to another; but it is necessary to make the subjects of her lessons so numerous, and the manner in which they are imparted so superficial, that when her education is finished it shall be also done with. It is not desirable to leave any seeds in her mind which may take root and grow; let her be content with cut-flowers. But if this is the case, why, in heaven's name, spend so much unnecessary money, and dress up such a list of meaningless names? Let it be openly avowed that she is to be drilled, but not educated, and it can be done at a quarter of the present price. So far as any results in her future life are discernible from the courses of language, science, or arithmetic, through which she has been nominally put, she might have been taught by a nursery governess at a salary of twenty pounds a year. Let it be distinctly understood that no higher grade of teacher is required, and the question is at least left on intelligible ground.

It will perhaps be thought that such statements as these are so extravagantly overdrawn as to be directly in the teeth of our original suggestion that facts should be disseminated without passion. But the extravagance is intentional. We want to make the absurdity conspicuous, because we are quite sure that parents do not in general hold the views upon which they are unconsciously acting. They do not know how incompetent and shallow the system of teaching now practised by the majority of governesses is, and they understand still less what it is that we propose to substitute for it. The present state of things is the natural, perhaps inevitable, result of one simple fact,—namely, that there is no national provision for the education of women. “Conceive,” says Mr. Bryce,* “what schoolmasters would be if there were in England no universities, nor any foundation schools either of the higher or the lower grade, and if the private schools, by which alone education would then be supplied, were to lose the reflex influence and the stimulating rivalry of these public institutions. This is exactly what the state of the teachers of girls is now. The two capital defects . . . are these—they have not been well taught themselves, and they do not know how to teach.” By such as these mothers have been and daughters are being trained; the want of power to teach, or to appreciate the results of teaching, perpetuates itself; but the fault is not with those who suffer from it.

* Reports issued by Schools' Inquiry Commission, Miss Beale's extracts, pp. 67—69.

Let any reasonable woman, who is sufficiently anxious about the education of her daughters to send them to school or to provide them with a governess at home, compare the number of hours spent by her girls in prescribed mental occupation of some sort, with that which her boys are expected to spend in a like manner at school. She will find that a desire to assimilate the modes of teaching does not imply any increase of strain. Let her compare also the number of things supposed to be learned, and she will be inclined to conclude that the boys have a very easy time of it. Let her then honestly examine the condition of her own mind. If she is what is commonly called a "superior woman"—that is to say, if she has a real pleasure in study, and a sufficient amount of information to enable her to enter with interest and intelligence into one or more of those great lines of inquiry which occupy and ennoble the minds of men—can she trace this condition to the ordinary processes of school instruction? Was she not taught by her father, or allowed to learn with her brothers, or helped and guided by some man of ability with whom the chances of life brought her in contact? Or else will she not say (and this is perhaps the commoner case), "I am self-taught; I look back with amazement to the things which were done in my schoolroom days; what I have learned to any purpose I have acquired for myself since." And the result is that, except in a few singularly happy instances, there is a want of system and power in such a woman's knowledge felt painfully by herself, if not always apparent to others. In almost every subject, to use a feminine illustration, there are dropped stitches; and the difficulty of picking them up neatly, affects the quality of the fabric more than one might expect. This deficiency is very conspicuous when she attempts to teach, and it often prevents her from doing justice to herself not less than to her pupils. There is a remarkably complete little narrative on this point in Mr. Fearon's report, brimming over with moral like one of Miss Edgeworth's stories. The principal of an exceptionally good ladies' school, painfully disappointed with the results of an examination which showed that her assistants had failed in inducing the pupils to receive the knowledge which they had laboured to impart, and confident that they really knew what they professed to know, engaged a lady from the Home and Colonial Training College to teach her teachers how to teach! The device was thoroughly successful. The skeins were all there; it only needed Prince Percinet to disentangle them; and the happy Gracioso has been winding away ever since without a single knot.

We wish it to be understood that these remarks are intended to apply to the majority of cases. It would be unfair and ungrateful to ignore the existence of that minority, whether among the teachers

or the taught, to whose labours and aspirations we owe the present movement. They will not quarrel with us for excluding them from consideration in remarks, the object of which is to promote an attempt to raise others as nearly as possible to the level which they have reached; to show that their standard need not continue to be exceptional; and that it is so now because no aids have till very lately been provided towards attaining it. Before we proceed to give a few details concerning such aids as are already provided and such as are only proposed, there are two more misapprehensions, as they appear to us, about which we wish to say something.

First, there is an objection founded upon physical considerations. It is supposed that girls are so constituted as to be injuriously affected by any stimulus to intellectual exertion. Of course this is in a measure answered, if it is admitted that the proposed change is not from less teaching to more, but from bad teaching to good. But it is not entirely answered. Let it be admitted that girls require special vigilance in this respect, and let great care be taken to discriminate among temperaments during the education-age, and not to press too far even those who seem to have exceptional vigour as well as exceptional ability. Let it also be admitted that there may be danger of an occasional oversight, or want of judgment in the teacher, from which delicate pupils may suffer. This is only saying that the system is human and has its weak points, against which all possible barriers should be erected. But there is another way of looking at this objection. That which is unusual, is always more or less exciting, and if a girl were accustomed from the first to take a certain amount of mental trouble, and to encounter the test of a judicious examination, it is probable that she would take these things very much as a matter of course, and that they would not stimulate her beyond a healthy animation. At any rate, those who would withhold her from the exercise and cultivation of her faculties on this ground, should be careful that they do not substitute excitements which can hardly be supposed to be more wholesome. It seems improbable that the girl who can stand without injury the late hours, hot rooms, and mental stress and stimulus of a London season, would be utterly thrown off her balance by the graver attractions of the schoolroom. Emulation is not altogether unknown at balls, nor are they quite without their triumphs and their mortifications, through which some girls pass without a particle of injury, while a great many who get safely through the ordeal suffer more than they would care to avow, and some are unmistakably the worse for it. Something analogous to this may perhaps take place in the intellectual arena, and it should of course be the object of teachers to spare and

strengthen the weak, to encourage the timid, and to eradicate the more serious faults of character which are gradually revealed among the combatants. Miss Beale has some admirable observations on this head in her evidence before the Commission, and also on the interminable question of difference of capacity between the sexes, and on the modifications which any system of stimulants and tests may undergo in order to adapt it to girls, especially with reference to publicity. But whatever may prove eventually to be the truest and wisest view here, we cannot help urging and reiterating that a system of competition and rewards, of public contention and public records of success and failure, is not offered to women for the first time by the advocates of examinations and degrees in education. Why it should injure girls to attend general examinations, to receive certificates of proficiency, to see their names in the papers so placed in a list that they may compare themselves with other students in science, literature, or language, and not injure them to contend in public for archery prizes, to receive the meed of prowess when deserved, and to read in the county paper the record of this species of rivalry and triumph, accompanied perhaps by a few flourishes about costume and appearance, we cannot conjecture. It seems to us that in the one case as in the other there is possible harm which may be prevented by a little care and good taste, and that the more modestly a young lady wears her laurels the better, whether she win them by physical or mental superiority, or only by those moral qualities with regard to which, strangely enough, all schoolmistresses seem to admit that emulation and rewards may be used without danger, though, speaking theoretically, we should have fancied that this was a field from which such notions should be excluded as rigidly as possible.

Another mistake seems to be the idea that those who are anxious to improve the education of women, expect to work a miracle, and to produce a whole generation of Mrs. Somervilles; and that if you can prove this to be improbable, you have confuted and defeated them. We might answer this by asking what are the results of the present provision for the education of boys, which, whatever may be its defects, brings undeniably the means of sufficient cultivation within the reach of all who are willing to use it. Would anybody seriously propose to diminish the number and lower the standard of endowed schools and colleges, because some say that there are a great many ignorant, puzzle-headed, unreasonable young gentlemen going about the world? If this daring assertion be admitted, would it not rather be an argument for trying to improve the course of school education as much as possible? But we prefer to treat the

question on its own merits. We want to make education for women as good and as cheap as possible, in order that all may be enabled and helped to attain the highest point to which their natural capacity can carry them. We want to bring the unspeakable delights of developed and disciplined mental power within the reach of those who are exceptionally gifted, to raise the average, and to do all that can be done for those who are hopelessly below it. Numbers will of course drop out of the race, but we shall think we have gained something, if they reach a fair point of advance before they give up. A good many will perhaps decline the contest altogether, but these will be no worse off than they are now, while the advantage to others will be incalculable. And for this we want a national system, in which, as it is the tendency of human institutions left to themselves to deteriorate perpetually, there shall be tests and safeguards, and in which also defects and mistakes shall be acknowledged and corrected as often as they are discovered. Without entering upon so vast a field as the inquiry how such an education will be beneficial to women, whether they work for their living or not, in what myriads of ways it may tell upon the improvement of society if only by its influence upon the men of whom women are the first teachers and constant companions, we choose one simple ground for our argument, and say that we cannot but believe that every power which God has given is intended by Him to be developed and cultivated in the best manner possible, and that when we see the numerous follies which degrade and deface the world we think that we see one result of our failure in doing His will in this respect.

The first Cambridge examination for women over the age of eighteen,—the sole means of testing an advanced stage of education which we at present possess,—was held in July, 1869. Thirty-six candidates presented themselves. The subjects of arithmetic, English history, language, literature, and composition were not made optional, but those who could not obtain in these an aggregate minimum of marks fixed by the examiners, were rejected. Other subjects were grouped, and selection left to the candidate. On each certificate granted, the subjects in which the candidate passed were enumerated, and special distinction in any branch noted. A committee of ladies, of whom one or two were always present during the examination, undertook the local arrangements in each case, no spectators were admitted on any pretext whatever, and class lists were not published, but sent through the secretary to the homes of the candidates, who were designated in these lists by numbers, no names being recorded. The superintending ladies testify that there was no undue excitement and no over fatigue during the examination. The Syndicate reports that the experiment may be pronounced a success,

great readiness and intelligence having been shown by all the candidates, real ability and careful cultivation by some, and the failures appearing to be traceable to that want of use and preparation which the regular recurrence of such examinations is likely to correct. One lady who passed, has sent an interesting account of the proceedings to the "Monthly Packet" (January, 1870), which is calculated to dispel the fears of any who shrink from the thought of encountering such an ordeal, though they may desire its benefits.

The use of such examinations as this is twofold. They not only serve to maintain a high standard of education and to mark those who have satisfied it (one great benefit to teachers and to all who need their services), but they have themselves an educative power. One of Miss Beale's pupils, after a searching *vivâ voce* examination, said heartily, "I shall know much better how to learn now;" and there can be no doubt that to willing minds the suggestion and instruction derived from a systematic and thorough examination in any branch of knowledge tells upon all. Miss Bonham Carter says truly that no candidate should be discouraged by failure, and that a second trial will probably show how beneficial the failure has been. She adds, that a candidate going up for several years in succession, passing from group to group of the subjects proposed, and concentrating her work so as to enter thoroughly into each in turn, may complete the whole round of a good education. In time we may hope to see all who attempt to educate others provided with certificates by which their qualifications may be really gauged. When it comes to be understood that these helps and tests make no undue demand upon the time and strength of women, that they necessitate no unusual publicity, and neither imply nor encourage anything in the slightest degree unfeminine, hesitation about them will cease, and they will be sought and valued as essential to governesses, and a great boon to all whose circumstances enable, and whose tastes and capacities impel, them to carry their education beyond the limits of school age and school courses of learning. We hope that those who hesitate now, if they feel themselves in any degree re-assured, will consider that the best service which they can do to themselves and to others is to try the question practically. A good increase of numbers at the second examination will cheer the hearts of all who are working for women, and will be a step towards depriving the higher stage of female education of that exceptional character in which we think that its principal danger consists. The more each examination is looked upon as a help and a step, the less it is regarded as an event and a crisis, the more useful and unobjectionable it will become.

Passing from the consideration of tests, and of their influence upon the process of education, we come to the process itself, which of

course these examinations can neither supply nor conduct, though they abound in profitable suggestions. A few months ago arrangements were made at Cambridge for delivering lectures to women on various subjects. The success of the experiment has been so decided that the Committee of Management announce that the lectures will be continued permanently during term time. A lady about to reside in Cambridge proposes to receive students from a distance who may wish to avail themselves of the advantages of the lectures. A fund is also being formed for the establishment of Exhibitions to be awarded partly for success in the Cambridge Local Examinations for girls, and partly for success in the Cambridge Examinations for women. Miss Davies's college at Hitchin is, however, at present the only institution in England at which grown-up women can obtain the same educational advantages which have for centuries been within the reach of men. The terms of residence at this college do not necessitate longer absences from home than are frequently made for the sake of pleasure or amusement. It is probable, however, that home claims and duties may always prevent more than a small proportion of women of leisure from availing themselves of the privilege here offered to them. To professional workers, wherever means allow, there is no such difficulty. It is exceedingly difficult to imagine why any objection should be felt to the existence of such an institution for the benefit of those who can use it, and we have never been able to discover the ground upon which its opponents stand. A hundred reasons may prevent a woman from having recourse to it, but we cannot see one why she should wish to deprive those who are not so hindered of its benefits. We do not find amateur nurses, or home patients, or healthy people, objecting to hospitals; and though the two latter classes are able to dispense with them, they are admitted to be the best training schools for the former.

The question of endowed schools for girls is however more important than all these, because it is of wider extent, while it is at the same time more easily understood and dealt with. It is well known that an endeavour has lately been made, by means of an examining Commission,* to obtain some statistics of female

* A society for promoting the application of endowments to the education of women has been formed since the commissioners sent in their reports. The committee meetings are held in London, but it is hoped that local committees may be formed throughout the country, and that the subject may be so fully discussed, and so much information collected and disseminated, that whenever the reconstruction of endowments allows the admission of girls' schools, there may be such a body of sound opinion and knowledge as will ensure that the step shall be taken in the wisest possible manner. Particulars concerning this society may be obtained from Miss E. Bonham Carter, Ravensbourne, Beckenham.

education as it exists at present. It was natural that when first the commissioners were let loose among the schoolmistresses there should be some ruffling of plumes, and the grave narrative of difficulties encountered and inquiries baffled has its humorous side. But on the whole, much valuable information has been collected and much causeless alarm dispelled. It is creditable both to teachers and examiners that in almost every case after the operation had been undergone, a wish was expressed for its repetition. A conscientious teacher could hardly fail to recognise the vast benefit derivable from such periodical searchings; they that do good, we are told on the highest authority, desire the light. We have already referred more than once to the very interesting and amusing little volume in which Miss Beale has epitomised the Reports of the Commission. From these we gather that while there is much to deplore in the work of the present isolated, irresponsible, untrained, untested, uncertified teacher, there is everything to hope for the future. The peculiar aptitude for teaching which women possess, their patience, their sympathy, and their conscientiousness, assure us that whenever they know what they have to do, they will do it satisfactorily. But the testimony is unanimous that, with a few brilliant and fortunate exceptions, such as Miss Beale, at present they do not know it. Till we have a system of endowed grammar schools for girls, analogous to, though perhaps different in some respects from, that which has long been in existence for boys, the sufficient training of any considerable number of teachers is not possible. Female education, desultory, imperfect, shallow, and unsystematic as it generally is, is exceedingly expensive; and the efforts of a good girl who has to maintain herself or assist her family by teaching, to qualify herself for her profession, not before, but while she is exercising it, are a pathetic spectacle. She begins work very probably at seventeen, either in a school or a family, and if she does not altogether succumb to the difficulties with which she has to contend and sink into a mere asker of prescribed questions and hearer of tasks, she will feel her incompetency at every step, and the burden on her conscience will be great. You will find her getting up at impossible hours to struggle through some sort of preparation for the labours which she cannot intermit, and squeezing half-sovereigns out of her earnings that she may employ her hard-won holidays in getting finishing lessons in studies which, properly speaking, have never been begun. Want of sound and thorough training will hamper her from first to last; if she has a spark of ambition or genuine love of knowledge, these can but add bitterness to her sense of failure, and in many and many a weary hour, when her head is in a puzzle and her nerves in a tumult, and she, perhaps, anticipates that evening

of broken health and mental disturbance which so often closes the hard day of governess-life, you will find her saying in her secret heart, "Oh, that I had been born a man!" We wish that those who doubt whether girls can endure the mental strain of a schoolboy's education would ask themselves a few questions about governesses. What would be thought of the system which should require a boy to undertake the profession of teaching and the entire supervision of his pupils as soon as he attains the age of seventeen? If the moral qualifications of a girl are supposed to be so greatly in advance of those of a boy that she may be safely trusted with such a charge so far as conduct is concerned, what reason is there for supposing her to be physically and mentally fit for it which will not annihilate any argument against her capacity for the same amount of school training?

In glancing at the statistics of the condition of pupils (we have only time for a glance) furnished by the Reports of the Commission, a few points must be noticed. Merely elementary knowledge, such as all women can attain, is more carefully and successfully imparted in girls' than in boys' schools, and speaking generally, whatever women have had the opportunity of learning well, they teach well. But there is an utter deficiency in the groundwork of all those studies which form and strengthen the mind, and notably in those two which would naturally seem to constitute the main part of school discipline of the intellect—namely, the principles of language and the principles of arithmetic and mathematics. Whatever a girl learns is hung about her person as an ornament, not placed in her grasp as a tool.


It is for principles rather than for specialities in knowledge that we wish to contend. We are very doubtful about the desirableness of assimilating at all points the education of the two sexes. But we have not a particle of doubt that girls as well as boys should be taught whatever they learn in the best and completest manner that the wisdom of their generation can command. And we think that a national system should open as many channels as possible, as the course of education advances and individual tastes and talents reveal themselves. We are inclined to think that the commissioners might give a little more latitude here. They seem to be deficient in sympathy with art, and also rather hard upon home influences. Speaking roughly we should say that they look upon pianofortes and parents as the greatest impediments to female improvement now existing. With regard to the parents, it should be remembered, that when the results of a schoolmistress' work are found to be defective, it is very natural that she should throw the blame on the parents, whether they deserve it or not. And as to that *bête noire*, the school-piano, while we thoroughly agree with all that can be said about the absurdity of

compelling girls, without musical aptitude, to waste their precious time in strumming to no purpose; and while we admit the difficulty which "daily practice" throws in the way of class-organisation, we think that very careful provision should be made for the development of so charming a talent, and one which conduces so much to after-enjoyment, where it really exists. Art is a jealous queen who asks for the hearts of her servants. We would have music and drawing taught as arts, not as accomplishments; and where there is decided talent for either we would not grudge it its predominance. Perhaps it may be found practicable in endowed schools for girls of fourteen and upwards, to have art-departments, in which the arrangement of studies should be different from that of the rest of the school. An art-student might join the classes in arithmetic, grammar, history, and literature; but be dispensed from attending those in foreign languages and in science. The time thus obtained should be spent not only in practising, but in mastering the principles of art, and the lessons would become a valuable means of mental discipline instead of being merely mechanical operations.

For unmusical girls, who are not allowed to abandon the pursuit altogether, we would prescribe the smallest doses that parents can be induced to permit. That very clever little machine, the digitorium, will be found a real blessing to commissioners in this respect. It costs less than a twentieth of the price of the cheapest pianoforte; if supplied in sufficient numbers it may be used in class, and ten minutes of it daily are equivalent to an hour of the ordinary five-finger exercises. Supplemented by a very moderate quantity of scale and arpeggio practice, we are confident that it will produce an amount of pliancy in any young lady's fingers which will enable her to attain high powers of execution whenever she pleases, at a small cost of time.

In concluding these very imperfect remarks on a most important subject, we can but say that we hope the work so admirably begun will not be suffered to languish, and that examinations, whether into the efficiency of female schools or the attainments of grown-up women who desire the highest cultivation, will become the rule instead of the exception. To quote some weighty words of Dr. Arnold—used twenty-eight years ago in a private letter—"I do not see how we can supply sufficient encouragement [to girls] for systematic and laborious reading, or how we can ensure many things being retained at once fully in the mind, while we are wholly without the machinery which we have for boys."

MENELLA B. SMEDLEY.



THE SCIENCE OF MORALS.

Physical Ethics: or the Science of Action. An Essay. By ALFRED BARRATT, Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. London: Williams and Norgate.

IF Mr. Buckle had survived some years to complete his work on the *History of Civilization*, he might have seen cause to modify the opinion that moral science makes no progress, while intellectual advancement is so rapid amongst us. Whatever may be said as to Moral Philosophy being stationary, it must be allowed that at least the title of the volume before us is something new. We are certainly moving in some direction, whether it be forward or backward. Old-fashioned plodders in Ethical science must bestir themselves, else at the present speed of progress they will soon find themselves so far behind as to be out of sight of the main body of investigators. The advanced guard are now on as far as a region of *Physical Ethics*. This is certain. It is quite useless for people who have been lounging about in old familiar regions, to rub their eyes, and start up, saying that some accident has happened. It is too late to be suggesting that some fortuitous course of atoms has resulted in a strange mixture, since Physical Ethics is just as ridiculous as Ethical Physics. There may be an absurdity in Ethical Physics. It may sound simply ridiculous to say that there is something Ethical in the combination of the elements of the atmosphere, or in the operations of the law of gravitation. But Physical Ethics cannot involve any similar inconsistency, for here we have before us, a work of three hundred and eighty-seven pages by a Fellow of Brasenose, Oxford, in which the

thing is as clearly made out as the demonstrations of Euclid. There is a science of Physical Ethics, and it is the only Ethical science worthy of the name. If our readers have any misgiving on the matter, we ask them to listen to Mr. Barratt, whom it is as well to invite to speak for himself:—

“Moral science is a section of that division of Physics which treats of animate nature, and its special subject is the relation which exists between the active and passive elements of that nature. The fundamental principle, *therefore*, from which it starts, is the ultimate correlation of the two primary qualities of organized matter, irritability and contractility.” (P. 288.)

This puts the matter quite plainly. Moral Philosophy in the old sense was a delusion, and though we must not altogether despise the men who thought they were building on a solid foundation, we may pity them for toiling so needlessly in those bygone days of darkness and ignorance. The whole thing is embraced in these two words “irritability” and “contractility.” It was mere waste of time on the part of the sages of former times to romance about “conscience,” and “a rational self-love,” and “the fitness of things,” and “free-will,” and “duty.” But let us not write as if the authors of these now antiquated theories could have done otherwise than they did, for as Mr. Barratt well says:—

“Between the early unconscious morality and this ultimate science, mankind has to pass through an era of opinion and mental conflict, in which despotism or anarchy seem the only alternatives. It is not till law comes and produces light in all the dark places of ignorance, and order amid the chaos of jarring authorities, that any true life of morality can begin.”

And then, after a Scriptural illustration drawn from Ezekiel’s valley of dry bones, our author proceeds,—

“Henceforth we may hope that as astronomy rose at the bidding of Newton, so our new science of Ethics shall rise from the dust in which it has lain so long, and show forth its new-born vigour to the world. Yet *it must never forget*, amid the glories of its achievements, that it owes its being to the unrewarded labours of its predecessors; and thus it will look back on the speculations which with our ancestors went by the name of Moral Philosophy, with gratitude rather than with contempt, as astronomy looks back to astrology, or as chemistry to alchemy.” (P. 246.)

Our readers will at once perceive from these extracts how immense is the stride which Ethical science has made in this glorious age of ours. And surely all must be agreed in wishing that Mr. Buckle had only been spared long enough to rectify that unfortunate verdict of his as to the brand of finality being marked on the so-called Moral Science.

There is a certain inconvenience, we admit,—perhaps even a little risk of unfairness to an author,—in pushing forward at once towards the close of a book to ascertain how it is to end. It is well-known,

that what might sound most natural and impressive in the peroration, may sound very bombastical and disturbing in the exordium. In justice to our author, therefore, we must here call attention to the fact that the quotations now made are from the later portion of the work. The somewhat grand utterances are the result of a prophetic spirit, offspring of the philosophic, which sprung into being only after the duller philosophic spirit had done the more serious work of constructing a system of Physical Ethics. With this explanation, our readers will better put themselves in sympathy with the author, in order to estimate at their real worth, the magnificent anticipations. The novelty of the title, "Physical Ethics," will be sufficient to excuse the reviewer for hurrying at once towards the close of the work, in order to give the reader some information as to the nature of the mighty achievement, which, as is now apparent, has thrown all past results into the heap of things hopelessly antiquated.

If now we venture to look at this essay a little more leisurely, so as to present a more detailed account of its structure, and the Ethical science which it unfolds, we would begin by saying in a general way, that there is much in it deserving of high admiration. It is able, scholarly, pleasing in style, with a glow of enthusiasm pervading it, and making it exceedingly attractive. Higher qualities still belong to this essay. It is distinguished by decided power of abstract thinking, and at the same time by a quality which has been often grievously wanting in Ethical writers, we mean systematic power. And withal there is evidence of genuine earnestness everywhere so apparent as to awaken a feeling of regard for the author, which we have experienced in examining the book, even while differing from him completely.

As to the author's position, we cannot think of any single statement which would so accurately describe it as we should do by saying that this new writer is the Darwin of Ethical Science. The development theory is every thing with him. There is no philosophy which can hope to live in these days, according to his view, which is not constructed from the level of the physical sciences in accordance with the law of development. In mental philosophy he is the disciple of James Mill, and amongst the followers who seem now bent on regarding mental science only as a branch of physiology, he is so advanced that Mr. Herbert Spencer, Professor Bain, and Dr. Maudsley are all subject to his condemnation for not having gone far enough. In his view Mr. Herbert Spencer did not see at first the full bearing of his theory, else he would have written "Social Statics" differently; Professor Bain has been guilty of inconsistencies which have endangered the whole position; and even Dr. Maudsley has involved his argument in contradiction. If Mr. Barratt has been under the

teaching of these masters, he has outstripped them all. To his view the goal of philosophy is purely Physical Ethics, and he has reached that goal.

Of previous efforts in Moral Philosophy, and their results, he gives a graphic sketch in metaphorical style, which is so good that we take the liberty of quoting it at length; and which at the same time is so graphic that the author is careful to warn the reader in a note that "what follows is of course metaphor, not history:"—

"The general, rough-hewn conclusions of man's early experience, stored up unconsciously in the minds of generations, and extended as far as possible by analogies and metaphorical fancies, served for a long time pretty well in practical life. But at length the edifice began to show signs of weakness: the foundations were immediately suspected. Man must know how they were made by the good old stone-masons, his fathers. So human intellect began to descend: Socrates came down a step or two till he had left the clouds behind, and come well in sight of the bottom, and Aristotle went on still further: we moderns got down some way lower, and we thought we were getting to the bottom, when, lo! at the top of a very deep step, there was no ladder to be seen; and since then we have been shaking our heads and wringing our hands at the top, and some have even gone up again in disgust, and tried to continue their work among the clouds: but the wisest have been groping about with ropes and drag-irons for the lost ladder. One or two have actually hooked it, and brought it almost to the top, when it has slipped from their grasp: but at last, by watching their endeavours, we have succeeded in securely fastening it, and making a safe passage to the step below. So we have got down from the step Moral Sense to the step Pleasure, and from it we can see our way to the step Physical Law. Here we are on the level with the whole landscape of nature, and below there is nothing to be seen; so we must now be at the bottom." (P. 68.)

How relieved one feels in getting out of the serious plight so graphically described upon that high step without a ladder. And get in reading it all over again, we see the meaning of that well-timed note—"of course, what follows is metaphor, not history." Of course. For it seems rather hard on Socrates to say that he got only a step or two lower than the clouds. Plato we fear must have gone up again into the clouds, and been lost there, for he has no mention. But Aristotle, who wrote so decidedly about happiness, although he put in some awkward words about reason, got lower down than Socrates. We moderns getting lower, lost the ladder. Fortunate it was that we were lower than Socrates and Aristotle when the mishap occurred! But passing the shaking of heads and wringing of hands, which we cannot linger to think of, it is a very happy stroke which makes the transcendentalists rush up again in terror and disgust, to work away in the clouds. But this is not history to be sure,—it is only metaphor. That is really disappointing, after having continued for a time rather fascinated by the picture.

As, however, metaphors are always apt to disappoint, we must come now to the philosophy, and in examining it, our purpose is not merely to describe it, but to apply to it scientific tests, that we may ascertain how it will endure the ordeal.

We may explain that the work consists of two parts, the first of which is occupied with a general derivation of Moral Philosophy from experience, and the second with a special verification by reference to facts, theories, and objections. The first part, consisting of axioms, definitions, and propositions arranged after the mathematical model, is very brief, occupying only twenty-six pages. We shall here treat it with proportionate brevity, doing little more than trace its outlines.

The axioms may be briefly stated thus:—actions are capable of being classified according to their properties; the end of action is a possible object of knowledge; we are capable of being affected by an external object only through our faculties; faculties are known only by their action; the sphere of action lies in the adaptation of faculties to the laws of nature; the constitution of man is an organism, each part having its appropriate function, and the end of each part results from the performance of its functions; approbation is the standard whereby we judge of the moral value of actions. Of these axioms the last is the most curious, and several more must be challenged, while others are matter of common agreement. We do not linger to dispute over them, as we wish to concentrate attention on the professed verification by facts. The only point on which we must give the author's explanation, is axiom third,—“we are capable of being affected by *an external object* only through our faculties.” An external object is thus explained,—“By external, I always mean external to each other, or to our bodies, not to our consciousness. In the latter sense there is nothing external, everything being part of our consciousness. Hence the truth of this axiom is apparent.” (P. 6.) There is something peculiar in this mode of giving explanations. External, means external to each other. That seems to convey that the one thing is not within the other, but out of the other. But is not thought distinct from feeling, so that the one is not in the other? Are thought and feeling then external objects, and are all objects external? The next part of the statement seems only to make things worse. External to our bodies, but not to our consciousness. Does our consciousness go beyond our bodies? If so, does it go out as far as the objects of our knowledge? If so, how does it travel, or what does it do with the object? And if the consciousness of each one goes out to the known object, when the same object is present to many persons at the same time, when the consciousness of each goes to the object, do they become mixed around the object?

and if so, how do they get separated, and how does each man secure what is personal? Besides, if we know only what is in consciousness, what right can there be to say, and even to print in italics, that there *is* nothing beyond? These are some of the things in the explanation which need to be explained, and the "Hence" introducing the last little sentence is a logical curiosity which deserves to be embalmed.

Mr. Barratt's definitions are these:—Good is the object of moral approbation; pleasure is that state of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded performance of its functions by one or more of the parts of our organism. His propositions are these:—The good is relative to our faculties; the good is a state of consciousness; the good is relative to circumstances; the good depends upon the adaptation of faculties to circumstances; the good is pleasure. Here is a complete theory of moral philosophy in twenty-six pages. The good is pleasure, and pleasure is the experience which accompanies the unimpeded performance of its functions by any part of our organism. If a man's limbs only keep strong, the pleasure he feels in walking is part of human morality. But if a man lose his health, what becomes of his morality? Is it violated according to the number of the organs which do not find unimpeded performance of their functions? And what shall we say of the morality of old men who are growing rather stiff in the ankles? When "our new science of Ethics shall arise from the dust in which it has lain so long, and show forth its new-born vigour to the world," may we expect to have such a question as this set to students who are under examination:—"Why is moral approbation withheld from a man who has a headache?" or, "In what consists the immorality of a bleeding nose, or an inflamed eye?" Answering will at least be easier in the grand days of the new science. All such questions will be answered in the one formula,—immorality consists in the impeded action of the part of the organism specially named.

But we have lingered long enough over this preliminary part of the work. It is quite needless to debate over definitions, when our author is willing to come to the test of fact. To that part of the work we now pass, allowing the author to make out his case in his own way, while we undertake to come to his help by watching that no inference be allowed to pass which is unwarranted by the facts. We have been quite impressed by the earnest call for help which comes from our author, and we wish to escape the blame of passing by on the other side. He exclaims, "Come down, you who have good eyes and strong hands, and help to strengthen these foundations of our common building." We are not confident we can quite vouch either for the goodness of our eyes, or for the strength

of our hands, and so we might have continued unmoved by the appeal. But when growing in earnestness, he winds up with this last call,—“Lose therefore no time, but come down and help,” we cannot withhold such little help as we may be able to offer, at least by the use of our eyes.

Let us see, then, where our author is working, and after what manner he is building. Perhaps it may be as well to see first, where he gets his materials, and so we begin with what we can gather as to his doctrine of consciousness. That statement already referred to, in which it is affirmed that there is no existence except in consciousness, is so obviously unwarranted, so clearly self-condemned in utterance, that we pass it for something more satisfactory, of which there is no lack. He acknowledges that in denying an intuitive or ultimate moral faculty, the appeal must be to consciousness. And he says:—

“To the philosopher of experience such an appeal must always be decisive; seeing that whatever argument throws doubt on its finality, must itself rest ultimately upon it. . . . There can be no truth which contradicts consciousness. Whether consciousness itself be true or not, is a meaningless question. . . . If we are quite sure that we are appealing directly to consciousness, the appeal is final.” (Pp. 28, 29.)

These statements are in every way satisfactory, affording common ground, and giving a sure test to which we may turn with every doctrine propounded. Differences will arise immediately beyond this, but here at least there is agreement. Consciousness cannot be logically defined, but we are agreed in regarding it as a term expressive of the acquaintance a man has with the fact of his own experience. As Mr. Barratt says: “If a man feels a headache, he has one, and nobody can prove to him the contrary,” (p. 29). Or again, a state of consciousness is “a union of what we call subject and object,” (p. 8), that is to say, it is the recognition which a man has of a particular present state of experience as his experience. When Mr. Barratt goes beyond this, he does something more than indicate what is understood by the term consciousness. He begins to attempt the interpretation of consciousness, and the first step taken in that direction is a step in which we refuse to follow, for reasons to be adduced presently. When at length he comes to affirm that “consciousness must be considered as an invariable property of animal life, and ultimately, in its elements, of the material universe,” (p. 43), this is not only not an explanation of consciousness, it is not even the product of any analysis of our consciousness, and is an assertion as to which our consciousness can afford no evidence. And again, when he says (p. 63), that consciousness is “an ultimate property of living tissue, and is identical in its

early stages with pleasure and pain," he seems to us to speak in the first clause without any warrant of consciousness, and in the second clause to contradict what we have quoted from page eight, as to the union of subject and object in a single state of consciousness, for two things which are united in one state, being equally essential to that state, cannot be identified.

Taking, however, the acknowledgment that consciousness must be the test of all philosophy, and granting what Mr. Barratt says, that the great difficulty is to be "quite certain that we are not putting in the place of consciousness some subtle unwarranted inference of experience," we shall now follow our author in his attempt to show what consciousness testifies as to the nature of the Moral Faculty.

When just about to start on the investigation of consciousness, Mr. Barratt cannot deny himself the pleasure of a little independent argument drawn from history. Briefly it is this: "No two men would give exactly the same moral verdict on an action or character submitted to their judgment;" "the Greeks would have despised the unpretending virtue of the honest merchant;" "we, in turn, refuse our highest praise to the wiles of Ulysses;" "*hence*, we may conclude that the perception of good, like that of distance, must be derivative, not primary, and therefore liable to like confusions and miscalculations" (p. 32). We think it a pity that our author allowed himself to be turned aside on to this old beaten track, which has been pretty well worn from the days of Locke till now. He must be well aware that intuitionists are pretty familiar with the argument, and do not rank its logical worth very high. The example of it here given has the advantage of brevity; but it does not gain any thing over earlier forms of it, in the consistency of logical texture. Was there any need for such an outrageously extreme assertion as the first, that "no two men would give exactly the same moral verdict on an action," say an act of theft, or cruelty, or deceit? Should we wander through the world in vain to find two men who would pronounce the same moral judgment on an act of theft? Is the whole organisation of law courts an absurdity, the impannelling of juries a farce, because no two men can give the same verdict as to whether theft, or breach of contract, or murder be really wrong, before even dealing with the question as to personal guilt? Is there any gain to philosophy, or to any philosophical school, by saying anything so ridiculous as this? When next it is said that "the Greeks would have despised the unpretending virtue of the honest merchant," we do not linger to inquire whether the assertion could be vindicated from the *Memorabilia*; and whether Socrates made light of justice in shoemakers, and carpenters, and smiths; and whether the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine as to virtue, apart from

philosophy, be properly read ; but we ask, what is meant by saying that the Greeks despised unpretending virtue ? Is it intended that they were largely carried away by the admiration of what brought public honours ? This is true, but it is no proof that they were not agreed as to an act of injustice ; the inference drawn from it is unwarranted ; and the "hence" which ushers in the conclusion must be dismissed to render service elsewhere.

From this we pass gladly to watch our author trace the history of the development of human knowledge as to moral distinctions. The first sentence is extremely general, and looks as if it had fallen into its wrong place, as if by mistake it had got into position at the beginning, when it had been intended for some paragraph towards the end of the book. "All life depends upon adaptation of an organism to external media ;" and by medium is meant "the whole sphere of external phenomena by which animals are affected ;" while what is meant by external has been already explained. Instead of beginning with consciousness, we have an assertion concerning all animal life. Is it not necessary, we would humbly ask as an onlooker, in beginning a building to commence with individuals, and lay one stone at a time ? Is philosophy-building so rapidly conducted that life, organism, externality, adaptation of organism to external media, and dependence of life on such adaptation, can be all piled upon one another just at once ? If so, it will be well to carry up the ladders with us, in case of any shakiness in the structure as it begins to get near the clouds. We are told that "in the lowest animals organization is hardly at all developed," which is no doubt true, but as we are in search of a history of human knowledge concerning morals, we pass meanwhile the animals whose organization is vastly lower than that of many plants. We wish to ask, what of man ? That to trace the origin of knowledge in the individual is difficult, we readily allow. In part, at least, we can agree with the opening words of Mr. Barratt on the subject :—"In our present developed constitution we can hardly form to ourselves an idea of this primordial sensation." Without saying anything, meanwhile, as to the "primordial," it is clearly a difficulty to ascertain what was the origin of our experience. There are two things which need to be taken into account. Either we must have some recollection as to how our experience began, or we must find some power or powers now in use, by the exercise of which it is possible to have reached "our present developed constitution." Now, it must be admitted that we have no recollections affecting the beginning of consciousness, and that our observation of infant life gives us so little acquaintance with the inner experience of the child, as in great measure to deprive us of the means of reaching any definite conclusion in this way. In these circumstances, it seems

to us that we are shut up to look for some power or powers by the exercise of which, in accordance with the facts of experience, we might reach individually such a condition as that familiar to us in our present highly-developed state. When, therefore, in seeking a beginning, Mr. Barratt lays down a "primordial sensation," and at once proceeds to tell us what it is like, we must crave leave to ask a few questions. More particularly, how can we be assured that sensation is the primordial fact in experience? And further, if we grant that this was the beginning of conscious life, how, without any recollection of it, can we succeed in instituting a comparison between it and some fact known in present experience? No doubt sensation is the lowest fact in consciousness; and if we think that experience must have begun with what is recognised as psychologically the lowest element in it now, we may accept the view that the starting point was this "primordial sensation." But if it was, who can tell what kind of sensation it was? or on what authority can it be made out that in the beginning of experience there could not be difference of kind in the form of sensation? Mr. Barratt tells us that "the nearest resemblance to it lies in our organic feeling, which like it is a general sensibility without any organs for discrimination or comparison." (P. 34.) But how is this knowledge of the primordial experience obtained? If the sensation is not now present, and if it cannot now be recalled, how can it be asserted that it is in all cases the same, and that it is like our organic feeling? In saying such things our author does not act the part of "the philosopher of experience;" he is dealing with things *a priori*—he is becoming a transcendentalist after a sort; and if he is not up in the clouds, he is certainly down lower than human consciousness is found to carry us, and by his own admission, consciousness is our final appeal. But suppose Mr. Barratt may be allowed to indulge his imagination so far as to be permitted to say that it is like our organic feeling, by what authority does he say that this organic feeling is "without any organs for discrimination or comparison?" Organic feeling is feeling connected with the use of an organ; sensation requires an organ of sensation. In beginning, therefore, with sensation, we do not begin without an organ, what then does Mr. Barratt mean by saying that the primordial sensation finds its nearest resemblance "in our organic feeling, which like it is a general sensibility *without any organs for discrimination or comparison*"? Organic feeling is a "general sensibility" in no other sense than this, that it is a kind of sensibility incident generally to all the organs under our control. But it is not general in the sense of being diffused over the body irrespective of the distinction which exists between our organs. It may be experienced in the use of our organs in general, but not apart from the use of

some one of these in particular. If then it be sensibility through an organ suitable for the experience of it, what is meant by saying that it is a general sensibility *without any organ for discrimination or comparison*? Is it meant that the organ of sensibility is not also at the same time an organ of discrimination or comparison? If this be meant, nothing can be more clear. If we are conscious of sensibility in a particular muscle, that muscle is the organ of sensibility, but it is assuredly not an organ of comparison. This is plain, but it serves little towards the construction of a theory. If, then, there be in consciousness discrimination between sensibility in a muscle of the leg, and sensibility in a muscle of the arm, must there not be an organ of discrimination? On the same ground this must be admitted, if an organ of comparison is not in the muscle, comparison will at least require some organ to account for its existence. But when Mr. Barratt proceeds to say, that the primordial sensation is "the material of which all the later feelings and faculties are formed," (p. 35), it is an immense bound which is made in a simple clause inserted in a sentence as if it needed no proof. When from sensibility as belonging to an organ, or from sensation as experienced through an organ, we pass to treat of the formation of "feelings and faculties," it is plain as noonday that the critical point in the argument is reached. Merely to say a thing, is of no worth in science. We must be slow, clear, and thorough in presenting evidence or argumentation, else nothing can be gained. At this point everything is lost or won. Let us observe then that all the length we have got as yet is this,—that feeling is connected with the use of an organ,—and that this organic feeling does not carry with it discrimination. In advance of these positions, the one positive and the other negative, it was asserted at least, that this primordial sensation, which is without power of comparison, is "the material of which all the later feelings and faculties are formed." How is this made out? Given general sensibility, we have to account for the formation of all the later feelings and faculties. It is said that the general sensibility affords the *material* of which they are formed. On which we would remark, as simple observers of this interesting process, that the sense of shame and the faculty of reasoning seem so different now, that it will really be a surprise if it turn out that they have been made from the same material. But our curiosity is more excited about the process. How is it done? If we have no recollection of it as it took place in our experience, and if we cannot have the process brought under our eye by the observation of a child, at least we must be directed to some power or powers whose present operations are recognised as sufficient to account for the result. But, *ex hypothesi*, we have only this primordial sensation on hand, and with only that to

begin with, we seem to have a pretty puzzle set for us. Let us watch the procedure in dealing with it. Our author gives the description thus:—

“Let us now notice what takes place, when, in the process of evolution (with the origin of which we are not here concerned), this primordial sense becomes heterogeneous, and its various divisions become localized in different parts of the tissue, thus producing a more complicated organism, and an amplification of the medium to which that organism has to adapt itself. In the *first* place, the changes from one state of consciousness to another are greatly increased in number, rapidity, and definiteness. *Secondly*, the differences among these states are no longer of degree only, but are of that nature which we call differences of kind.” (P. 36.)

We are not sure that we can risk ourselves on the top of this step. We must examine for a little at least. Evolution—heterogeneity of result—localization—production of organism—amplification of medium. There is a good deal of building about this one step. When nothing but primordial sensation or organic feeling is experienced, a process of evolution first begins, with the origin of which it is said we are not concerned, for what reason we do not quite see. It appears to us that the whole theory is very much concerned with it. What is there in an organic feeling which can provide for a process of development? The organ may develop, and in that case there may be an increased degree of sensibility in the organ, so that the sensation which was feeble at first, may become more powerful. But the explanation of the advance would in that case lie in the power of development belonging to the organ, not in the sensibility which is a dependent quality; and this does not suit the theory of our author at all.

It must be kept in mind that no evidence has been given to show that there is a primordial sensation, and as infants are born with all the organs belonging to the fully-developed man, there is no warrant to assume that the first sensation in infant-life must in all cases be the same. There is no apparent ground for denying that the first sensation may be the sensation of sound in one case, the sensation of light in another, and the sensation of pain in another. But if it be admitted that the first sensation is the same, it is likened by our author to organic feeling, and we are thus introduced to the relation between sensation and an organ of sensation. Next we have granted that there may be a process of evolution with an organ, giving an increased sensibility. But the next affirmation is that the “*primordial sense* becomes heterogeneous.” Not forgetting that this is all hypothesis as yet, and not a doctrine read from the testimony of consciousness, we ask how this heterogeneity is brought about. To this natural question our author gives no answer. These four words are the whole treatment of this important assertion. And

as we trace the argument further on, we can only gather that there are changes, which involve differences; and then we get to some details which may help us. "There are not only the broad divisions of sound, sight, and smell, but into these are introduced further variations of pitch or timbre, of colour or pungency." (P. 36.) Taking these examples, they do not seem very favourable to our author's theory of evolution, or development of the "primordial sense." Each one of these three, sound, sight, and smell, is confessedly connected with a distinct organ, and in that case it is not correct to say that the "primordial sense becomes heterogeneous;" but on the contrary it is correct to say that distinct kinds of sensation are experienced by the use of distinct organs of sense, and this is all against our author's theory. A primordial sense does not divide itself, but there are a variety of organs the condition of whose activity is a variety of sensations. And if the primordial sense does not divide itself, there are no divisions of it to be "localised in different parts of the tissue," and as there is no such process made out, unfortunately the process does not end in "producing a more complicated organism," but the organism was there, and the organs of sound, sight, and smell account for the appropriate sensations. That there are changes in consciousness, there can be no doubt, and that these involve differences of kind in the sensations experienced is also certain; but Mr. Barratt has not discovered their development from a primordial sense. In beginning to build, he has merely tumbled his stones together in the most dangerous manner, and has not built them together like "the good old stonemasons, our fathers."

After these divisions of sensation are discovered, though, unhappily for the theory, not shown to be evolved from the same original source, our author proceeds thus:—"In dealing with this varied chaos of sensation, two properties of animal tissue come into play which had before little opportunity of showing themselves;" the first is the property of retentiveness, and the other is the property of acquiring habits; and then come the nerves, ganglia, and nerve centres, as our readers can very readily imagine. Now, in dealing with "the broad divisions of sound, sight, and smell," connected with the several organs, we cannot see that there is a "chaos of sensation" with which to deal; but if it is intended merely that as presented in this theory they are involved in chaos, we can assent to that view of the case. But what is meant by "*dealing* with this varied chaos of sensation?" We can see that the end of the dealing is to make up "feelings and faculties," as indicated on p. 35, but what is this dealing with the chaos of sensation, and what is the power which deals with it? The chaos of sensation cannot deal with itself.

Chaos cannot make order. The primordial sensation cannot bring about order, nor can the primordial sense, if there be such a thing; for, as stated on p. 35, the primordial sensation is "without any organs for discrimination or comparison," from which it follows that the primordial sense, if there be such a thing, cannot discriminate. But if we acknowledge, as belonging to our nature, "the heterogeneity of the special organs of sense," the different sensations are thereby connected with different organs, and there is no chaos to deal with, while sensations are separated for us in so far as they are essentially connected with "special organs of sense." All this is so manifestly a breach on the theory of development, that we do not need to go further with a theory convicted of insufficiency in its initial steps. As, however, our readers must be curious to know how our author gets over the difficulty of originating the higher power of comparison, we shall advance to that point.

"The scattered nerves *become first united* into various ganglia, these again into ganglionic centres, or bundles of ganglia, these again, finally, in the highest animals, into one principal centre, localised in the brain. By the operation of this law (the law of evolution), common meeting-places of impressions *are soon formed*, which serve as clearing-houses and courts of register, where each department has a representative, to which its communications *are sent*. Hence it becomes possible to *compare* different sensations with each other, and by means of Association to *class together* those of the same kind, and so to *arrive* at what we call Perception or Knowledge. When we say we know an object, we merely mean that *we assign* it to a class already formed of those objects similar to it, which we have already experienced." (Pp. 38, 39.)

The early part of this quotation is all very well and very simple, if it is intended only for a statement of the familiar facts of comparative physiology, and ultimately of human physiology with which we are more concerned; but it is useless in a psychological point of view, as it carries no interpretation of consciousness. Will our readers oblige us by glancing back upon the words we have set in italics, and they will see the proportions of the task which Mr. Barratt has before him in attempting to reach perception and comparison? When it is said that the scattered nerves *become united*, these words only indicate what is found when you pass from lower to higher in the scale of being; but they do not indicate anything which is brought about by the primordial sense, or by the special organs of sense. As a record of fact, they only show that additional organs are provided for the transmission of influence; and as thus organs of transmission are needed, as well as organs of sensation, we are face to face with an additional fact, which does not favour a theory of development from a primordial sensation upwards, but shows the need for provided organism as the condition of experience.

The same remark applies as to formation of centres, and departmental messages. We suppose it is not meant that when "the primordial sense is broken up," these are produced. We pass next to the second portion of the statement, which professes, as we understand it, to explain how we compare and classify. "Hence" seems quite as oddly placed in opening the sentence as we have found it several times before. The nerves become united—of the united nerves, centres are formed—and all combine at last in the brain; *hence* it becomes possible to compare different sensations. An inference from the combination of nerves to the possibility of comparison is logically incompetent, for it has not been shown that nerves are organs of comparison, but only of sensation and transmission. If it be meant simply that, with an organ of comparison at our command, the nerves of sensation and transmission afford materials for comparison, our author is on firm ground, though he thereby abandons the development theory. But if he mean to assert that nerves of sensation and transmission generate a power of comparison, he merely makes an assertion without proof; while every previous step has shown that we need an organ to make sensation possible, and so we need an organ, faculty, or power of comparison, in order to compare and classify. With the different nerves we possess different sensations, and so we have materials for comparison if we possess power to conduct the process; but without the power, the greatest supply of material cannot provide for comparison. This development hypothesis fails to satisfy the conditions of a philosophical theory; in failing to reach comparison, it breaks down before reaching moral distinctions at all; and, though we have no faith in a view of the moral faculty which describes it as a moral sense, such a theory may live, when Physical Ethics cannot vindicate for themselves a place in "that division of Physics which treats of animated nature."

We have neither space nor inclination to try this theory by the results to which it leads. We are willing to accept the results if the theory can be made good. If we could have gone further, we should have preferred to test the theory when it comes to deal with moral obligation, which is notoriously the weak point in every system of ethics professedly developed from experience, and which nevertheless our author summarily disposes of in three pages. With a theory which proclaims that "the good is pleasure," and that "pleasure is that state of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded performance of its function by one or more of the parts of our organism," we should have liked to direct attention to the manner in which our author deals with "pleasures that are called bad," which he puts out of his way in three-quarters of a page, finishing the paragraph with the Hibernicism, "No pleasure is bad, except

when it means pain." Those who examine the work for themselves will do well to give some attention to these two last-named sections.

We welcome such an effort as this essay presents, even while we think the essay, able though it be, altogether unsuccessful in establishing its position. It will be well for all science, both mental and physical, that the line of investigation here traced be often tried by those whose convictions, or even opinions, favour the task. We may well hail the attempts of the disciples of physical science to deal with the problems usually described as mental problems. When physical science comes into the region commonly called the region of mind, it will touch new perplexities. It will find scientific appliances more difficult to use; results more difficult to weigh; and conclusions more difficult to harmonise. Progress will neither be so quick, nor so gratifying, nor so impressive to men generally. In these regions science will not find itself at work in the midst of labyrinths little frequented. It comes upon the territory of common experience. And working there, it will not be asked to yield up anything either in procedure or in result to popular prejudice. It need not dread being involved in theological disputes, or being offered as a sacrifice to offended orthodoxy. It will be asked only to be clear, and simple, and successful in providing men with a key of common life. And in attempting this it may discover that the apparent simplicity of the field of investigation is only the first view of a region unusually difficult to work. For those who have a fondness for stiff work, we may venture the assurance that there is a heavy tale provided for those who would resolutely endeavour to reduce moral philosophy to a science of nerve and tissue; a theory of moral evil to a science of pathology, and the cure of such evil to an additional department of the physician's art.

H. CALDERWOOD.



THE REV. DR. ROWLAND WILLIAMS, AND HIS
PLACE IN CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS
THOUGHT.

ON the 18th of January last, there died at a country vicarage in Wilts, a man who, for his learning and character, for his critical and theological writings, for the prominence his name has attained in recent controversy, and for his influence on the Religious Thought of his age, might well seem entitled to demand at our hands a somewhat longer notice than the mere passing announcement of his decease, or the dry bones of the dates and chief events of his life.

Dr. Rowland Williams may indeed claim a high place among the representative men of our time; sharing to a considerable extent its liberal tendencies, occupied continually in the religious questions which are now so keenly discussed among thoughtful men, at the same time re-acting by the originality and power of his intellect on the mental and religious forces by which he was surrounded, he stands before us as an eminent type and product of the liberal, inquiring, progressive, religious movement of our day.

In harmony with our purpose of being a chronicle of Contemporary Thought, it is our intention to offer in the following pages a brief, yet comprehensive, sketch of some of the more remarkable aspects of his life and character, and to determine, at least approxi-

mately, the place which he seems destined to hold among the religious thinkers of his day, and among the various schools and parties of the English Church. Keeping this purpose in view, we need not do more than briefly enumerate the incidents of his earlier life. He was the son of the Rev. Rowland Williams, rector of Ysceifiog, Flintshire, and canon of St. Asaph. He was born A.D. 1817, and at the age of ten years was sent to Eton, where he became Newcastle Medallist, 1835, and proceeded to King's College, Cambridge. For his time and college, his university career was one of considerable distinction. He obtained in his first year Battie's University Scholarship. He graduated in 1840, and became Fellow of King's. For a short time he was Assistant-Master at Eton, which post he was compelled to relinquish through illness. In 1842 he became Classical Tutor of his college, where he remained eight years, until 1850. It was no doubt at Cambridge that his bold, original intellect first struck out the path which he afterwards, notwithstanding all difficulties and obstacles, undeviatingly pursued. It would appear that it was Coleridge who first quickened within him those energies and aspirations which he was destined to exemplify in his own mental career, and to communicate in large measure to the teaching of his day. "Coleridge was," as he once remarked to the writer, "my intellectual father, if any one man can lay claim to the title." And a reader versed only to a small extent in his writings and characteristic tenets, will have little difficulty in discerning the influence of the great master of English Spiritual Philosophy. The works of Coleridge, which seemed to have had most effect on Dr. Williams's youthful intellect, were "The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit" and the "Aids to Reflection." Nor can this influence, which interpenetrated to such a large extent the higher religious thought and culture of our country fifty years ago, seem surprising in the case of Dr. Williams to any one acquainted with his mental tendencies. His mind was indeed essentially of the Coleridgian type: the same reaction against the Materialism and Rationalism of the eighteenth century; the same endeavour to reconcile religious dogmas with the paramount claims of reason and conscience; the same deep conviction of the essential divinity of those guides to the intellect and the feeling; the same profound faith in the truth underlying all largely received religious doctrines; the same instinctive tendency to search for and draw out the ethical and spiritual elements in a religious truth, neglecting or at least laying less stress on its other aspects or its mere formal definition; which distinguished our great religious philosopher, are not less conspicuous in the works and teachings of his disciple. It is, indeed, hardly too much to say, that there is no one of modern English divines who has incorporated so largely into

his teaching the religious side of Coleridge's philosophy as did Dr. Williams.*

But if Coleridge supplied the kindling spark, a good deal of the fuel which sustained the flame came from the works of the older divines of the English Church. Dr. Williams seems very early in his intellectual career, perhaps in this respect stimulated by Coleridge's example, at all events sharing his tastes, to have studied with great zeal and ardour the writings of Cudworth, Hooker, Taylor, Butler, and others of the more learned and thoughtful divines of our Church. Nor was he regardless of the works of Bull, Waterland, &c., which belong to the more formal and technical school of Anglican theology; though from his point of view, he was always a little impatient of mere dry definitions; cold, formal statements of religious doctrines, from which all the life and spirit had been extracted; at the same time he would allow that, in their place, these were also necessary, and in the development of creeds and doctrinal definitions, even inevitable. In a sonnet called the "Army of Witnesses," written probably about 1856, he gives an account of some of his more favourite authors, and the lessons he had imbibed from their teaching:—

"Hooker yet lives, by whom the seeds were sown
Of reason consecrate in freedom's power;
Butler made Nature minister to Faith;
Cudworth in Gentile hearts found heavenly awe;
In Barclay's page still Gospel Freedom stayeth,
And Coleridge taught the Spirit's holier law."

Orestes, and the Avengers, p. 77.

The fruits of this mental training soon manifested themselves. Some sermons which he preached at Cambridge on the occasion of his being appointed Select Preacher in 1854, awakened thought and inquiry, and possibly for that very reason created some little alarm. He does not appear, as yet, to have published anything, with the exception of a volume of poems called "Lays from the Cimbric Lyre," a little work redolent with piety, patriotism, and tolerance, but exhibiting few traces of that mental movement, the throes of which he was, however, even now undergoing.

In the year 1850 he left Cambridge, having accepted, after some hesitation, the post of Vice-Principal and Senior Tutor of St. David's College, Lampeter. That in doing this he improved his brilliant

* His latest expression of the high estimate of Coleridge's religious philosophy, which he maintained to the end of his life, is contained in a MS. note in his copy of the notice he published in the *Fortnightly Review*, Sept., 1868, of the "Life of Bishop Lonsdale," in which, after saying in the text the Bishop "deprecated Coleridgianism," he adds in the margin, "seeming not in the least to suspect how important a part the thing denoted by that term may play in the best defence which can be offered, of the distinctive theology of the Church of which he was bishop."

prospects may be more than doubted. It is, however, certain that his strongly-developed feeling of patriotism was the power which influenced his determination. He wished to do some active work for the Church of his native land, and for the much-needed improvement in the educational position of her clergy. At this post he remained twelve years—years doubtless to him of much anxiety and mental trial, but at the same time full of activity and intellectual energy, as well as of good, honest, hard professorial work. What he accomplished in this dreary solitude among the Welsh mountains is known but to few. It is, however, certain that during his supervision the status of the college attained a higher point than it had ever done before. The zeal he displayed in raising the standard of admission, the reformation he introduced into the internal government of the institution, his unimpeachable integrity in administering its revenues, his indefatigable industry in the dull routine of the lecture-room, and the thought-awakening influence which his teaching had on the more ingenuous and intellectual of the students, are matters well known to all who can boast of any acquaintance with Lampeter during his government there. It was, moreover, during this period that his name began to be known beyond the precincts of his university, and the immediate sphere of his Welsh duties. This was mainly brought about by his publication in 1855 of a volume of sermons, preached partly at Cambridge and partly at Lampeter, called "*Rational Godliness: after the Mind of Christ, and the Written Voices of His Church.*" In this work are contained the first published enunciation of those views which were afterwards identified with his name. Indeed, in varying degrees of maturity of conception and distinctness of definition, we find here all his most characteristic teachings; especially those theories of Revelation and Inspiration for which he was destined in after-life to suffer so much persecution and annoyance. As might have been expected, the book raised a storm, which raged principally among the clergy of the diocese of St. David's, but of which the faint echoes were heard in the English religious press. Some zealous clergymen forwarded a petition against the work to the present Bishop of St. David's, who in his charge of 1857 entered upon a criticism of it, which certainly seems open to the accusation often preferred against it of being evasive, but which is at the same time marked by great moderation and even friendly feeling. It is neither our wish nor our intention to re-awaken feelings of bitterness by raking together the half-dead ashes of a by-gone controversy. But looking at the main issue involved, through the lapse of some fifteen years of great mental progress, as well as of vehement religious agitation, it seems impossible to deny that the theory of Inspiration

then laid down by Dr. Williams is not only that most in harmony with the views of the larger and more influential of the two great parties in our Church, but is also the one most capable of being reconciled with a healthy love of progress and freedom in religious criticism. Put in its briefest form, his theory is this: The Bible is the written voice of the congregation, the record of the spiritual experiences of past time; and by Inspiration is to be understood not the infallibility of such record, but the fact that its authors were moved by that Divine Spirit, who is everywhere and at all times the source of all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works. In this sense, Inspiration is the Divine source and law of *all* truth and excellence; and therefore is not to be limited to any given time, or to any particular Church or nation. We here give the view of Dr. Williams without stopping now to consider it. Those who would see it elaborately stated and considered from every point of view, we must refer to "Christianity and Hinduism," pp. 470-481.*

Many years of controversy followed the storm raised by the publication of "Rational Godliness," and during this time the literary activity of its author was at its height. Smaller works, pamphlets, replies to episcopal charges, were continually proceeding from his pen. It must, however, be conceded that nothing that can be regarded nowadays as a refutation of his opinions was elicited by this controversy—a fact of which he was naturally not unwilling to boast. At this period of his life the bitterness evoked against him came mainly from the Evangelical party, and was produced by his making Scripture *the voice* of the Church. In this respect "Rational Godliness" might fairly claim the title its author often gave it, of being a "High Church book;" and hence it is recorded that the late Bishop Hamilton, who some years after read the work before proceeding to institute its author to the vicarage of Broadchalke, admitted that he could find nothing in it which could justify him in refusing to proceed to that step.

In the year 1856 Dr. Williams published a much more elaborate work on his views of Christian doctrine. This was an expansion of an essay written at Cambridge just ten years before. Dr. Muir, a

* Perhaps the latest exposition Dr. Williams gave of his views on this subject is contained in a drama called *Owen Glendower*, now in the press; in which to the objection of a bishop—

"Stands not the Scripture from the world aside?"

the hero answers—

"It were not Scripture, then, right reverend lord,
Unless it wrote the lives of common men,
Nor written for our health, unless it wrote
Things which were ancient once, but still are new,
Baptized in our experience ever fresh,
And verified in echoes of our soul."

Owen Glendower, p. 183.

munificent and learned Scotsman, well known in literary circles both English and continental, had offered a prize of £500 to each of the two great Universities for the best essay on the comparative merits of Hinduism and Christianity. Dr. Williams gained the Cambridge prize, the Oxford one being unawarded. The essay which came into existence in this manner he subsequently greatly elaborated, and, especially in the latter part, considerably expanded. On the subject of which it treats, this work must be considered Dr. Williams's greatest literary production, and is a valuable contribution to modern English theology. Moreover, the merits of this great work, as regards its main purpose of presenting Christianity in the form best adapted to the highest culture of India or to thoughtful inquirers elsewhere, are allowed to be very great. Baron de Bunsen, as readers of his "Memoirs"* may perhaps remember, who had gone over the same ground for a somewhat similar purpose, was delighted to find the conclusions he arrived at so nearly identical with those put forward in Dr. Williams's essay. Professor Ewald also gave a favourable notice of it in his Review, "Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen" (43 Stück. Dem 22, October, 1862). It has always seemed to us that this work contains the author's teachings in a simpler, more homogeneous, and more digested form, than any other of his works. This is no doubt partly to be accounted for by the method of the book, and the continuous exposition he was thereby enabled to give of Christian doctrine; but it is also to be partly attributed to its didactic style, which was much better suited for his expository purposes than the hortatory style which the form of "Rational Godliness" had obliged him to adopt. In this later treatise, therefore, his teachings assume their due proportion relatively to each other, as well as their proper position in the whole fabric of his system; instead of standing forth in an isolated and therefore disproportionate manner, as they would naturally do in a volume of sermons. It is to this work, together with his later volume of "Broadchalke Sermon-Essays," that we must refer for his most elaborated and most finished exposition of his religious teaching. It is a singular fact, and one which seems to show how much theological animosity may be kindled by the *form* in which religious truths are presented, rather than by their *actual contents*, that this greatest and fullest account of his teachings has never been attacked.

Before proceeding to the next and most important epoch of his life, it will be well to note here a few further particulars in his personal history. He took his D.D. degree in 1857, and in 1859, having made up his mind to resign his post at Lampeter, he gave up his Fellowship at King's, and was presented by his college with the

* Bunsen's Memoirs, ii. 439.

vicarage of Broadchalke, Wilts; about the same time he married Ellen, daughter of Charles Cotesworth, Esq., R.N. As, however, there was no vicarage house in his new parish, he obtained a license of non-residence from the Bishop of Salisbury, and continued his work at Lampeter while his house was building. He finally left Lampeter, and came to Broadchalke in 1862.

We are now arrived at a period of Dr. Williams's life when all former attacks sink into insignificance before the storm that was destined to burst over him. In the year 1860 appeared his contribution to the well-known "Essays and Reviews." The controversy excited by this work, its unparalleled violence and extent, and the harvest of bitterness sown by it, and which we have not as yet done reaping, are too well known to our readers to render any detailed account of this portion of Dr. Williams's life necessary. When asked to contribute to the work, it would appear that he was a little time in doubt whether to write a review of the works of M. Renan or of those of Baron de Bunsen. His decision in favour of the latter was most natural and most just. There was probably no modern German scholar with whom Dr. Williams had more intellectual and spiritual affinity; possibly no man or writer, living or dead, whose mind was in more complete harmony with his own than De Bunsen. He found in him the same love of religious philosophy, the same preference of the claims of reason to those of authority, the same hatred of spiritual tyranny, the same tastes and methods in Biblical criticism and doctrinal investigations, and the same deep fervid piety which he cherished himself. No reader of his review of Bunsen, whatever may be his opinion of the statements laid down in it, can possibly deny that of all English divines of our time it would be difficult to find one better fitted both by nature and acquirements to set before his countrymen an appreciative estimate of the great German than his personal friend Dr. Williams.

"Essays and Reviews" did not attract any attention at first; but by the efforts of a few clerical alarmists, aided by the oft-mentioned article in the *Westminster*, it soon attained a sudden and engrossing celebrity. The issue, so far as Dr. Williams is concerned, is well known. The late Bishop of Salisbury wrote to him in 1861, announcing his intention to prosecute him. Thereupon began a lawsuit which, whatever be its character in other respects, proved to Dr. Williams the source of much anxiety; and though it could neither quell his ardour, nor change his conviction of the justice of his cause, yet it served to embitter his existence for some years. The judgment of the Arches Court was adverse, and he, together with his fellow essayist, Mr. Wilson, was sentenced to a year's suspension. However, on appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,

this judgment was reversed, and the prosecutors were condemned in costs. That the comparative triumph which attended the final result failed to compensate him for the trouble and worry this prolonged litigation caused him is very well known. We have, of course, no remark to make on the conduct of Bishop Hamilton, whose *bona fides* in the matter is beyond question. Still there is no doubt that Dr. Williams felt the prosecution to be a cruel one, especially as it was attempted to make him answerable, not only for his own, but for all the other essays in the volume as well; whereas, as he often observed, there were in reality more points of agreement between himself and his prosecutor than existed between him and some of his fellow contributors. During the progress of this legal conflict, he printed for private distribution a work indicating the line which he wished his counsel to employ in his defence. This work is called "Hints to my Counsel in the Court of Arches," and whether considered as a contribution to the history of the controversy, or as an able defence of the author's positions in his essay, it is invaluable.*

The first paragraph in this work indicates the bold uncompromising manner in which he accepted the conflict, and his determination to fight it out fairly and honestly. It sounds like a trumpet-call before a battle:—

"Dr. Rowland Williams, defendant, leaves the technical part of his case to his counsel, with this remark:—No legal subterfuge, such as enabled a heterodox archdeacon to escape at Bath, must here prejudice the truth. No such plea as the difference between copies of our Articles at different dates must be employed. The defendant accepts the Articles as they are, and claims to teach by them with fidelity and clearness unsurpassed by living man."

And in accordance with this key-note is the whole tone of the work; he accepts readily and fearlessly the responsibility of every controverted statement contained in the essay, and of every unforced and logical deduction from such statements; and urges as his main pleas, the freedom which the Church has ever allowed in matters of Biblical criticism, and the concurrence of many writers of unimpeached orthodoxy in the views he enunciated. But of this part of his life enough has been said; we will pass on with one remark, curiously illustrative of the real relative positions of plaintiff and defendant in this memorable suit. There is now in existence a letter of Dr. Williams, addressed to Bishop Hamilton a few years after the storm of the Essay Prosecution had blown over, for the purpose of disconnecting himself and his own views from certain ultra-Liberal

* One of Dr. Williams's last wishes was that a copy of this work should be presented to all public libraries in South Wales and the West of England. Measures will shortly be taken to comply with this request.

people and periodicals, who had claimed them as coinciding with their own, and so had mistaken and mis-stated them. So that we have here the singular and affecting spectacle of a clergyman appealing to his bishop, who had but recently been his prosecutor, on the ground of large sympathies which, notwithstanding minor disagreements, both cherished in common, not to be classed with extreme men, who wrongly claimed to have kindred opinions with him, and were endeavouring to prove him disloyal to his Church. This letter was, we cannot help thinking unluckily, not sent; but the very fact of its existence shows us how far his sympathies were removed from the more advanced Liberalism of his age, and how correctly he described himself as having more affinities with Bishop Hamilton than with disciples of that school. He often used to say that if the bishop would only disentangle himself from party prepossessions and surroundings, and read his sentiments with unbiassed eyes, so far from stigmatizing him as an enemy of the English Church, he would hail him as its defender; a character which, he added, notwithstanding present prejudice, posterity would most certainly award him. We shall have more to say on this subject, when we come to sum up his position with regard to existing parties in the Church; but we cannot, in passing, refrain from expressing our trust, now that the two parties in this contest have, within a few months of each other, passed away from a world in which such a vast amount of trouble and bitterness come from mistakes and prejudices, that the mists which obscured their earthly view of each other have passed away; and that they are now able to realize how much nearer they were to each other, what a greater amount of common thought, common feeling, common effort, common aspiration, they possessed, than they could possibly have known in this world.

In the year 1862, as we have above remarked, Dr. Williams came to reside at Broadchalke, near Salisbury. His work in this parish, its greatness in the past, and fair promise for the future, has been gladly and heartily recognised by those who were the objects of it. His urbanity and courteous demeanour to all classes, his comprehensive tolerance, his kind and charitable disposition, procured for him the esteem and respect of all his parishioners; and this was further increased by admiration for his thoughtful yet simple sermons, and by the unremitting discharge of all his sacred duties. It may here be observed that in his pulpit teachings at Broadchalke the main features of his doctrine were distinctly perceptible. The same stress on the spirit rather than the letter, on the freedom of the gospel as contrasted with the bondage of the law, on the truths underlying dogmas rather than on formal and elaborate statements of the dogmas themselves, which formed the subjects of his earliest written works, were

also the subjects of his latest vocal teaching.* His parochial career, unhappily cut short by his premature death, was not unfruitful in literary labour. He published, in 1867, a volume of sermons, called "*Broadchalke Sermon-Essays*," which remains the latest hortatory exposition of his theological teaching. He also published, in 1866, the first-fruits of years of industry spent in his favourite field of Hebrew literature and Biblical criticism,—his first volume of the "*Hebrew Prophets*." This work, although another volume is in existence in MS., was, unhappily, unfinished at his death. Nor did he confine himself to those walks of sacred literature which were, undoubtedly, most congenial to his tastes, for he contributed largely to the periodical literature of his time. He was, moreover, throughout life an ardent lover of poetry, and himself no unsuccessful wooer of the Muse. We have referred to his earliest production, "*Lays from the Cimbric Lyre*." Besides that, he published, 1857, "*Orestes, and the Avengers*," an adaptation for English readers of the *Eumenides* of *Æschylus*, and a work which preserves accurately and presents distinctly some of the main features of its classical prototype. His latest as well as his earliest literary effort was poetical. At the time of his death he had in the press a drama on *Owen Glendower*, from which we have already made an extract; and which, as the hero is drawn with elaborate care, and embodies the author's well-known opinions on several subjects, religious and otherwise, is likely to possess considerable interest. This work will shortly be published.

Before proceeding to define the position which Dr. Williams occupies in the religious thought of the age, we may offer a brief account, not so much as a criticism as an exposition of his opinions and his work: considering him, 1. As a theologian; 2. As a Biblical critic; 3. As a clergyman of the English Church.

1. In treating of his career in the manner we proposed, by dwelling on some of the more important portions of it, a good deal of his most characteristic teaching on theology has not unnaturally cropped out, especially the Coleridgian turn of his speculations; his preference for the moral, spiritual, and persuasive, rather than the authoritative, dogmatic, and terrifying aspects of religious truth. We will now glance at his teaching on some of the prominent doctrines of the Christian faith, as illustrative of the spirit and point of view from which he regarded the whole.

Like all great thinkers who have combined metaphysical power with religious feeling, he recognised the importance of the Christian

* The author has discussed this subject more fully in a sermon preached at Broadchalke, on the occasion of his death, called "*The Ideal of the Christian Minister*," and which has recently been published.

doctrine of the Trinity, which seemed to him "to sum up on its speculative side the entire Christian faith" (*Broadchalke Sermon-Essays*, p. 151); at the same time he did not object, while holding it firmly on its Christian side, to allow its expansion into a more universal and philosophical conception, such as Hegel laid down in his identity of Thought with Being. Indeed, he was very fond of finding analogies and illustrations of it, either in the progressive history of thought or in the laws and operations of nature. What he was most averse to was a gross materialising conception, or a narrow one-sided definition of it. Similarly as to the Incarnation, it was to him a truth of deep spiritual and moral significance, though he always deprecated the conduct of some modern theologians who, by endeavouring to disconnect it from the other parts of the Christian system, so assigning a disproportionate value to it, had helped to dwarf other truths of equal or even greater importance. He very much disliked the materialistic conception of it in favour with those who, as he said, "made up by stringency of definition and vividly sensuous explanation what they lacked in religious feeling and keen metaphysical perception." With regard to Prophecy and Miracles, he refused to admit that their only, or their best, significance lay in their mere supernatural or evidential aspects. Each seemed to him to have a moral purpose, and in this he recognised its main importance: "he fastens on the moral element, the goodness in the good works of Christ," the spiritual teaching in the Hebrew prophets, "as more persuasive to the conscience than their strangeness or their power."* Similarly as to the Atonement: according to Dr. Williams, it is not the mere shedding of blood that is efficacious, but the self-sacrifice which prompted the deed; or, to use his own words, "that devotion of the mind of the Son to do the Father's will which Christ exemplified in obedience to death, is the true and real sacrifice of which the victims of the law were but sensuous types." (*Broadchalke Sermon-Essays*, p. 120.) In his statement of this as well as of other Christian doctrines, he was always careful to define them in such a manner that neither the attributes of God nor the conscience of man should be violated; for example, original sin has no doubt often been defined in the Augustinian sense, as the mere imputation of Adam's sin; Dr. Williams, in common with most preachers and thinkers of our day, makes the sin of the race consist in the "universal shortcoming of the mind of God," which characterizes it. In a word, in all the doctrines of the Christian Church, he tried to seize and draw out their ethical and spiritual meaning; the fundamental truth which he asserted to lie in all of them, although often obscured by wrong definition, or evaporated by dry technical treatment.

* "Hints to my Counsel," &c., p. 32.

2. As a Hebrew scholar and Old Testament critic, the merits of Dr. Williams have long been conceded by all whose opinions on the subject are worth having. In this respect, it might almost be said, he has left behind him no English divine capable of filling his place. There are, perhaps, some among us who have an equal or greater command of the language, there are others who may possess superior graces of style, these qualities are not rare in our Church and time; but there are few who can unite with a competent share of such qualities, as did Dr. Williams, such critical honesty, such freedom from prejudice, such a keen, intuitive insight into the writer's meaning, and its just and fitting application to modern times and circumstances. We have already spoken of his views on Inspiration; it is needless to do more than point out their practical effect in giving boldness to his criticism and freedom to his exegesis. This is strikingly exemplified in his translation of, and commentary on, the Hebrew prophets, in which he makes the writers speak not merely their own language in their own day, but the language of humanity in similar circumstances at all times. In this respect, the treatment of the sacred writers by Dr. Williams is not unlike that to which our Reformers and Puritan leaders submitted them, when they saw in every historical event some allusion to the circumstances of their own lives, or found in every historical name some reference to men then living and moving about them; and when every warning and exhortation came home with a personal point of application which, with our different habits of Biblical interpretation, and perhaps the more superficial nature of our religious feelings, we are quite unable to realize. We need hardly add that, as might have been expected from his modern and critical stand-point, Dr. Williams employs this application in the present of the records of the past with much more caution and discrimination than the old Puritan writers for the most part chose to adopt. His own conception of this method of treating the sacred writers he gives in the following forcible terms:—

“The eternal power of the prophets springs ever fresh, not from whatever gift of prediction they may extraordinarily have possessed, but from that which they have *in common with ourselves*, their sight of God, their hatred of tyranny and hypocrisy, their courage in denouncing wrong, their awe-stricken prayerfulness, their poetical fire, their manly generosity.” (“Hebrew Prophets,” I., p. 216.)

[With which the reader may compare the poetic extract from *Owen Glendower*, given above.] The method of Biblical interpretation adopted by Dr. Williams in his “Hebrew Prophets,” is one which, as scholars know, has long had full sway in Germany, though examples of it are rare among ourselves. The example we are now considering has been honoured by the commendation of one who of all living

Biblical critics is probably the best qualified to speak on the subject—Professor Ewald—who said it was the worthiest result of English Biblical scholarship since the days of Archbishop Newcome.* No doubt Dr. Williams's obligations, in this and in others of his works, to German authorities, especially to Ewald and Gesenius, are very considerable, nor would he dream of denying them. At the same time, he was always very jealous of conceding to German what he regarded as the rights of English scholarship. Just as he was unwilling to grant that the freedom of religious thought, gradually obtaining among ourselves, was owing to modern German theology more than to the natural development of principles laid down by the Reformers and Divines of the English Church; so, also, was he equally loath to concede that free Biblical criticism either originated or had its exclusive home in Germany. As he says in his introduction to the "Hebrew Prophets," p. ix. :—

"No student of the method, as well as the opinions of our more critical bishops and archbishops in Protestant days—Jewel, Kidder, Francis Hare, Butler, Lowth, Cranmer, Secker, Newcome—can dream that Biblical discrimination began with Spinoza or depends upon fashion in Germany."

We have not space to discuss here all the interesting questions which suggest themselves in a review of Dr. Williams's Biblical labours; especially his mode of explaining Old Testament Prophecy, his interpretation of the Messianic portions of such prophecy, the *kind* of connexion which he recognised between the Old and the New Testaments, his views of those Biblical books which have been the especial subjects of modern controversy, *e. g.* the Book of Daniel and the Gospel of St. John, his high estimate of the Epistles of St. Paul, &c., &c. We may possibly have occasion to return to this part of our subject another time. It is one which deserves all the consideration that can be given to it, because of all the many and various subjects on which Dr. Williams expended his intellectual strength, there was no one on which he more delighted to bestow his close attention, his keen discrimination, his profound feeling, than on that of Biblical research; and certainly there is no part of his labours which bears more traces of his original and powerful intellect. To the reader who would see the latest results of German criticism, combined with English caution and moderation, and enlivened by a warm glow of piety and religious feeling, we may commend his "Hebrew Prophets" as a work which stands alone in English Biblical Literature.

3. One strongly marked feature in the character of Dr. Williams, which caused surprise and sometimes a warmer feeling to his friends, and elicited incredulity from his foes, was that, in all his teachings, whether oral or written, he never forgot his obligations as a clergy-

* Gött. gel. Anz. 4 Stück., 23 Jan., 1867.

man of the English Church, and, therefore, as bound by her Articles and her formularies. In his prosecution by the Bishop of Salisbury, there was no element of bitterness greater for him than the imputation which it occasioned of his unfaithfulness to his clerical pledges. And there certainly could be no imputation less deserved. We have already quoted the first paragraph in his "Hints to my Counsel," and called attention to its bold declaration on this subject. As the work is unpublished, we will present our readers with a further extract, which shows fully what his views on subscription were, as well as his unusually high opinion of the XXXIX. Articles:—

"Subscription does not imply a claim of divine perfection, or a promise to abstain from suggesting improvements; nor yet can the defendant concede to the present Bishop of London (Tait) that it should be lowered to a mere promise of conformity. He thinks a middle way is open of *studying doctrines in their origin and development, and so eliciting the sentiment which created them.* They will generally be found wholesome as they revert to that sentiment. Guided by the clues which history presents, the thoughtful theologian will find every Article of the Church defensible if stated with moderation. (Comp. "Essays and Reviews," p. 79.) He will therefore feel no insuperable difficulty in a conscientious subscription."

Nor were these statements mere temporary concessions elicited by the storm that was raging around him. Years before his prosecution he had taught in the lecture-room of St. David's College, as well as published in his earlier works, precisely the same views. And years after the prosecution had passed away, and when the tide of opinion in the Liberal section of the English Church was flowing steadily (as, indeed, it continues to do) in the direction of a lax view of subscription, he contributed a paper to the *Fortnightly Review*, [March, 1868], in order, as he said, "to set himself right with the public on the point." This paper advocates as stringent a view of the nature and obligation of subscription as any man of thought and ability would in our days dare to propose. The thesis which he elaborates in that paper is this:—"Contracts or understandings involving the primary duty of good faith to man, cannot become less sacred because they concern our relations to God." Besides this divine and primary obligation, clergymen contract by receiving orders a second obligation to the institution, and a third to the people. He indeed allows that these obligations may be modified by several considerations which he proceeds to state, but he utterly refuses to concede that either of these considerations alone, or the aggregate force of all together, ought to be allowed sufficient weight to abrogate them. We are, of course, not obliged to admit that the theory of clerical obligation so ably set forth in that paper is the only tenable one, but it surely must seem a cruel hardship that when so many of his friends, High and Broad, were for different reasons "sitting loose to the Thirty-

Nine Articles," he of all others should be accused of laxity in a matter in which he was really more stringent than most of them. But this is not the only point on which his opinions have been grossly perverted. Even if it be granted that his views in the matter of subscription were too rigid, yet that very defect is a result and illustration of the honesty and integrity which were the primary components of his character.

With regard to the Priestly office and its ministration, his opinions might be said to tend towards High-Churchism. On the subject of Absolution, for instance, he was not content to interpret the teaching of the English Church in the broad Humanitarian sense in which F. Robertson of Brighton did; he was not satisfied with defining it as an act of the priest performed on behalf of, and in the place of humanity; he conceived that the priest had, as such, a certain power conferred on him by his ordination and moral fitness, to discharge a sacred function, and to pronounce God's message of pardon to those whose pre-supposed subjective state of penitence had qualified them for its reception. The doctrine of the Sacraments laid down by Dr. Williams, will, we think, be allowed by those who have studied it, to have a stronger claim to orthodoxy, in the old-fashioned sense of the term, than the teaching on the same subject of any one of the great parties of the Church. It appears to be, as nearly as possible, the doctrine laid down by Waterland, who is, as Dr. Williams calls him, "the impersonation of Anglican orthodoxy." He was as zealous as any Evangelical could be in denying any supernatural or mysterious efficacy to the outward and visible signs of the Sacrament, and in laying stress on the faith, the religious and moral state of the recipient. At the same time he attached more importance to the rite itself, to the person who administers, and to the form of administration, than most Evangelicals would. With regard to the Sacrament of Baptism he was fond of repudiating all sympathy with a mode of defining its main purpose which has of late years made considerable advance among certain sections of the English clergy, especially among the schools of Maurice and F. Robertson. According to the more recent and Broad view, baptism is a mere authoritative recognition of the Divine paternity. This Dr. Williams granted, but he always added, "and enhanced by a *covenant*." This addition was, he contended, necessary, not only to bring the definition into harmony with the formularies of the Church, but also to preserve the faith and subjective fitness which were with him primary and essential conditions of sacramental efficacy; such faith being, of course, in pædo-baptism, professed by the sponsors on behalf of the child baptized.

We have now set before our readers a summary of Dr. Williams's

main opinions, whether on the subject of Theology or Biblical criticism. We are, indeed, far from claiming any great amount of fulness, still less perfection, for this sketch; no one can be more aware than we are of the danger which brief expositions of other men's thoughts, especially when they are, as in the present case, men of great intellectual power, and accustomed to take account of all the many-sided aspects of religious truth. In such cases there will always be some danger, lest a trifling exaggeration on one point, or an omission of some little detail on another, may detract from the due and proper proportion of the whole. Nevertheless, we hope that the sketch we have attempted, however imperfect in itself, will enable the reader to follow us in the estimate we are now about to make of Dr. Williams's position with regard to contemporary thought.

Dr. Williams's lot was cast in an age of great mental activity, if not of great intellectual power. In all departments of human learning—religious, philosophical, scientific, and literary—we see new speculations, researches, discoveries, hurrying by us, and treading on each other's heels. Surrounded by intellectual forces such as these, it is scarcely possible for any thoughtful man to keep himself from being drawn in, and carried away by one or other of the mental currents which he finds revolving about him. Indeed, the more usual, and certainly the easier, course of many such men now-a-days, both in theological speculation and scientific research, is to commit themselves recklessly to the current which sweeps closest to them, and allow themselves to be borne onward whither it will. That Dr. Williams felt, and was in some degree influenced by the mental and spiritual forces surrounding him, we should not wish to deny; but it is wonderful how little he was moved from his own straight course by such forces; and whereas some have ignorantly imputed to him the failing of blindly following the leaders of one party, ample testimony to the falsity of the charge, and to the massive firmness and independence which marked his intellectual character, is afforded by the fact that he was throughout his after life but little moved from the stand-point which, after due thought and deliberation, he had once taken up. Exposed as he was to the twofold influences—on the one hand of a persecution which might have deterred most men from adopting his position, and on the other, to such a vehement movement of thought as would have loosened their hold on it—he kept on his own way with marvellous fidelity and consistency. We have already spoken of his obligations to Coleridge; it was, no doubt, through his works that he, together with most English thinkers of his younger days, became acquainted with German thought and speculation. In Philosophy, without possessing discipleship to any one system, he came, perhaps, closer to Hegelianism, than to any other modern school;

indeed, his contact with Schelling through the mind of Coleridge, and his appreciation of many of his speculations, had naturally produced a tendency in this direction, which tendency a perusal of some of Hegel's works, and especially of his "Philosophy of History," served to confirm. Dr. Williams was not, indeed, insensible to the danger attending a system of mere dialectical abstractions, which is at any time liable to be employed against its own advocates and warmest friends; but he rejoiced in witnessing the grand evolution of Divine thought in the history of the world, which Hegel consistently, though perhaps not always fairly, elaborated; and which he regarded as the crowning glory of that philosopher's speculations. In Theology Dr. Williams had considerable sympathy with the school of Schleiermacher; as, indeed, might have been expected from one who so fully recognised, as he did, the better sides of our Evangelical and Puritan mode of thought, at the same time he disliked the subordination of reason and inquiry to the mere feeling of dependence, which is the main foundation of Schleiermacher's religious teaching. He shared on this point Hegel's opinion, that "if this were so, then the dog were the better Christian." He, however, delighted in the works of those Germans who treated religious truth with the tender sympathetic feeling which marks the Schleiermacher school. He read with especial approbation the works of Neander, De Wette, Stier, Tholuck, and Lange; the first of these being a prime favourite, not only on account of his Church history, but also of his mode of dealing with doctrinal development, which was very closely akin to that which Dr. Williams regarded as truest and best.

It was, however, in the Biblical criticism of Germany that Dr. Williams found fruit most congenial to his taste. It was in this province that he thought German labour of most use and importance to our own country and Church. True, he was not neglectful, as we have already seen, of the claims of our own scholars and divines in this matter, and always maintained that the best qualities of German Biblical research might be found in writers of our own Church—as, *e. g.*, in the case of Lowth and Archbishop Newcome; but for the further advances of modern Biblical criticism he admitted that he could find no names in our own literature, which stood so high as those of Ewald, Gesenius, Hupfeld, and De Wette, whose works he regarded with profound admiration, and cheerfully admitted his great obligations to them. But though he placed great and especial value on the fruits of German learning in this department, he yet followed the steps of its main exponents with great caution and wariness, and often does his Celtic impetuosity stop short when the native inertia of his Teuton friends marches recklessly forward. If we were to name any one among German critics, besides Baron de

Bunsen, with whom Dr. Williams felt the greatest amount of sympathy, we should say it was Professor Ewald; though no one was better aware of, or more regretted, the tone of infallibility which marks and mars his critical judgments than his friend Dr. Williams. It must not, however, be supposed that in his Biblical investigations Dr. Williams took no account of those German writers who were most opposed to his own mode of thought. On the contrary, he offered free and candid testimony to the labours of Hengstenberg, suggesting him to English writers as an example of the comparative freedom of German Conservatism, and he had the most cordial esteem for the Hebrew and Rabbinical learning of Delitzsch. For the mere negative and destructive criticism, either of the Old or the New Testament which marks some German writers, he always cherished a most cordial dislike. The extreme conclusions, for instance, of some disciples of the Tübingen school seemed to him as arbitrary and as devoid of truth as any conclusion of the extreme opposite side, and infinitely more dangerous to the truest and most sacred interests of man.

Of his relation to the divines of our own Church we have already had occasion to speak. In them he found qualities which, after all, were lacking in modern German theology. In them he found profound religious feeling, regard for truth and tolerance not exceeded in Germany; while these qualities were balanced by moderation, caution, and practical good sense which were only too rare there. The high estimate he entertained of his four favourite Anglican divines, Hooker, Cudworth, Taylor, and Butler, may easily be accounted for by the community of thought and feeling with them which he possessed. Dr. Williams had indeed one great advantage over those great heroes of our Church, for he lived at a time when Biblical criticism had attained a height of which they could have had no conception. But had Hooker, with his instinctive love of law and reason, been acquainted with the philosophies of Kant or Hegel, or supposing that Butler, with his ingenuous love of truth, could have studied the works of Gesenius and Ewald, we should probably have had a result not very unlike that presented to us in the mental character and formation of Dr. Williams. While there are many now-a-days who would bid us cast aside the rich inheritance of thought contained in the older divines of our Church, and loudly protest against the possibility of putting the wine of modern research into such old bottles, Dr. Williams is an opportune testimony both to the possibility and good results of such an attempt. In this respect he has left behind him but few specimens of a combination of excellencies which we would gladly see more common; in which all that is noble, devout, and good in our divines of some centuries ago is mingled

with the learning and culture of our own time. Of him it might be said without much exaggeration that he contrived to combine, though in varying proportions, in one homogeneous mental system, the philosophy of Hegel and the criticism of Ewald with the learning of Cudworth, the rationalism of Hooker, the poetic imagination of Taylor, and the intellect and truthfulness of Butler.

And here we are reminded that Dr. Williams had long been known to his countrymen as a Rationalist; it is therefore well to ask in passing, what such an appellation really means. We are afraid that the terrible associations connected with that term in the minds of average Englishmen are partly due to their profound ignorance of its true significance. Coleridge tells us in a well-known aphorism, "The word Rational has been strangely abused of late times; this must not, however, disincline us to the weighty consideration that thoughtfulness and a desire to bottom all our convictions on grounds of right reason are inseparable from the character of a Christian." ("Aids to Reflection," p. 9.) In this moderate and old-fashioned, but undoubtedly proper, use of the term, Dr. Williams certainly was a Rationalist; and the religion which he taught through life was essentially "Rational Godliness;" but he was no more a Rationalist in this respect than some of the greatest divines of our Church, and notably Hooker and Butler. If to believe in the truth that men are gifted with a divine faculty of reason, which it is their duty judiciously to train, rather than violently to outrage, if to apply this faculty, reverently and cautiously, to the investigation of the truth—if this is to be a Rationalist, then we would not willingly do Dr. Williams the injury of supposing he could be anything else; but, inasmuch as the term has acquired ill associations, and instead of denoting a faculty that constructs and preserves wisely and cautiously what is best and truest in human thought, it is taken to signify what is rash and arbitrary, destructive and negative to the last degree; then indeed he could not be so styled, for it is not too much to say that there was no mental tendency for which he had a more cordial and thorough dislike, nor one which he thought more pregnant with mischief to religion and to morality.*

None of the existing parties of our Church have any exclusive

(*) As an appropriate commentary on the foregoing remarks we may here insert Dr. Williams's own view on this subject. "Rationalism, if by this abused word we mean deference to Reason in religion, has her dangerous wanderings and unreasoning license; but when disciplined by conscience, and sobered by precedent, she finds her justification in the language of the prophets of old, in the primitive freedom of Christianity, and now in saints, now in schoolmen of the Middle Ages; and not least, in the Lutheran Reformation and its fruits; in the history of the Society of Friends, in the ennobling Freedom, and in losses to Nonconformity from imperfect freedom, of our own Church of England." ("Persecution for the Word," p. 5.)

title to claim Dr. Williams as their own. It might be said of him, in common with most great men, that he was at once of all parties and of no party; recognising what seemed good in each, and rejecting all beside. He most certainly was, in a certain measure, what he sometimes termed himself—a High Churchman; though of the school of Hooker, Butler, and Bull, rather than of their modern successors. He was decidedly Evangelical, so far as he recognised the merit of that school in placing due stress on faith, devotion, subjective fitness, spiritual feeling as distinct from religious forms and rites. He was a Broad Churchman so far as he was favourable to the growth of freedom, especially in Biblical criticism; while he disliked the attempts made by some of that party to consider as null and void the articles they had nevertheless pledged themselves to observe. His great care to prevent his being identified with the leading sections of that party is well known to his more intimate friends. Indeed, of the two extremes, between which Mr. Newman and others assure us that the modern intellect is ever oscillating, his repugnance was far stronger to that to which most people supposed him to belong than to the opposite one. He always disclaimed for himself the title of Broad Churchman; and if any one by chance gave it him, he generally corrected the speaker by desiring him to substitute "orthodox." The author once heard him in his own house say to an ultra-liberal friend who had been enunciating his own views, and seemed to claim his concurrence as a matter of course, "My dear sir, rather than hold what you believe, I would go down on my knees to Archbishop Manning and beg for absolution." He has also been known to decline to contribute towards causes whose interests he still had at heart, rather than be identified in the public mind with opinions of which he disapproved. His position in this respect was not unlike that which Ewald occupies with regard to the Tübingen school; and it reminds one of Bunsen, when he thanked God, as he did once in the hearing of Dr. Williams, because, as he said, he believed "there was not a Rationalist left in any of the German universities." The mental position of men of this kind is not difficult to apprehend. Having taken up, perhaps after years of long and arduous struggle, a position which appears to them the most defensible, and at the same time most in harmony with their tastes and feelings, they are not unnaturally impatient of attempts to eject them from this, and to make them occupy others which they think less defensible in themselves, and which are certainly infinitely more at variance with their most cherished sentiments. But this mental stand-point occupied by Dr. Williams will serve to account—

1. For the abuse he has received at different times from all parties in the Church. Evangelicals abused him for being High; High

Churchmen abused him for being Broad; and Broad Churchmen were angry because he was not broader. We need not comment on the manifest injustice of this procedure, or point out the aggravated intolerance of abusing those who differ from us only because they are more tolerant and far-seeing than we are. For the dislike of Dr. Williams to be classed among extreme parties in the Church was the essential product of his singular breadth of view, and his rare comprehensiveness of thought and feeling. The position which he occupied with regard to the religious parties of his day, and his consequent treatment at their hands, might be compared to that which Lord Palmerston in the latter years of his life occupied among political parties on the subject of reform. Supposed from his principles to be favourable to such a measure, but showing much disinclination to follow the bold strides of its leading advocates, he received at once the abuse of Tory, Whig, and Radical; and yet it would surely be going too far to say that he had absolutely no right to take up the position that he did. And, 2. Dr. Williams's position of dignified neutrality will account for the suspicions of retrogression which his advanced liberal friends entertained concerning him during his later years. The steady resistance he opposed to all attempts to move him from the place he had deliberately chosen, would naturally seem to those engaged in the task as moving backwards; but the accusation is easily refuted by only a superficial comparison of his latest with his earliest works, both which, with the natural difference of ripeness of conception and distinctness of statement, teach precisely the same truths.

The position then of Dr. Williams among the different parties of the English Church is essentially one of mediation and compromise—he holds out his hand to each of them, he refuses to identify himself wholly with one of them. It is too early as yet to predict the light in which he will appear to future generations of English Churchmen. He himself used to say that, though he was in these days deemed an advanced heretic, men would before very long regard him as a laggard obstructive. How far the tendencies of our time seem to be pointing in the direction of the fulfilment of this prediction, we will not stop to consider. But one thing is to us clear, if the disintegrating forces at present at work within the Church, and which seem to threaten a breaking up of her system, were ever attempted to be controlled, and their danger averted by the coalescence of existing parties in a central position round which all might rally; some such position as that occupied by Dr. Williams would, we think, be found the only available one for the purpose.

The name of Dr. Rowland Williams is destined, we have no doubt, to live in the annals of our time. True he has left behind him no

school or band of disciples joined together by a common name. Indeed his mind was of far too comprehensive and far-seeing a nature to allow even the possibility of his doing so. Still he has not passed away from us without leaving behind him more than one legacy for which all Englishmen and all Churchmen will owe him their greatest gratitude. As a Biblical scholar he has opened a new era for the criticism of holy writ. The Bible is now an open book for more than merely reading an authorized version; it is open for learned study, for honest and reverent criticism, for truthful research of every kind. As a religious philosopher he has endeavoured to put the most distinctive doctrines of the Christian faith upon the basis of reason and conscience rather than upon that of mere authority; as a clergyman he has shown how much may be done in the interests of truth for the reconciliation of theology with science—the best traditions of the past with the highest culture of the present—without abandoning the position he had honestly taken up within the Articles and formularies of the English Church. These surely are legacies which no English Churchman, having the interests of the Church and the honesty of the clergy at heart, can afford to esteem lightly. He has, finally, left to all of us the great legacy of his life, the unselfish pursuit of truth, the ardent love of freedom, the comprehensive spirit of tolerance, which were its distinguishing characteristics, and which are as well primary features in the life and teaching of Christ.

As a fitting conclusion to our notice, we append some characteristic lines written in his early manhood, the prophecy of which he has now wrought into history, and the divine call they speak of has become the lesson of a finished life.

"But God said, 'All thy gifts to me belong :
Dare not in silent ease thy limbs enfold,
Tell what thou knowest ; so shall more be told :
I bar thee from the dreamy fugitive throng.
Others with happier hand shall strike the lyre,
And courtesy with joyance better blend,
Winning fair woman's love, or men's desire :
Thou for the Truth before the world contend,
And from thy path perplexed, still struggling higher,
Work out for faith with reason happier end.'"

Orestes, p. 78.

JOHN OWEN.



EARLY ORIENTAL HISTORY.

Manuel d'Histoire, Ancienne de l'Orient jusqu'aux guerres Médiques. Par FRANÇOIS LEXORMANT, Sous-Bibliothécaire de l'Institut. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie Française. Cinquième édition. 3 vols. 12mo. Paris. 1869.

THE appearance of this remarkable work, and the reception which it has met, in France, in Switzerland, and in Germany, mark a stage in the progress of historical knowledge and ideas, to which the reading world in England will do well to give its serious attention. Scarcely seven years have elapsed since a leading English critic—the master-spirit of a school which calls itself that of the “Advanced Criticism”—solemnly pronounced a sentence of unqualified condemnation on the entire series of labours whereby it has been sought during the last half-century to gather the history of the East from native sources. According to Sir G. C. Lewis,* all that we should ever know of ancient Oriental history was comprised in the sketches of some half-dozen classical writers and the brief notices of Scripture. The attempt to obtain from the Easterns their own account of themselves was doubly futile. Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, were lost languages, and no lost language could be recovered. Hieroglyphic and cuneiform decipherment were the dreams of visionaries. By the method pursued, or supposed to be pursued, by the decipherers, anything might be made out of anything; and not the least confidence was to be placed in the readings of such

* “Astronomy of the Ancients,” ch. vi.

pseudo-savants. Again, even if the ancient monuments should by any chance be deciphered, nothing of any importance would be gained from them. The Orientals lacked "the historical sense," and any account of themselves which they might give would be worthless. Thus the efforts of such men as Young, Champollion, Lepsius, Brugsch, De Rouge, Birch; and again of Sir Henry Rawlinson, Hincks, Lassen, Oppert, Spiegel, Norris, were contemptuously dismissed as labour wasted—learned and ingenious trifling—endeavours akin to those which, in former ages, had been spent in seeking the philosopher's stone or squaring the circle.

Nor did the advocacy of such views as these expire with their first propounder. The Review which claims *par excellence* to represent the Liberal party, has, from first to last, consistently disparaged the labours of Egyptologists and Orientalists, and has sought in various ways to throw ridicule, both on the studies themselves and on the results obtained from them. The spirit which produced the amusing but most unfair* *jeu d'esprit* of "Hey, diddle, diddle," has continued to animate the *Edinburgh*, though Sir G. C. Lewis is no more; and vials of scorn have been poured upon the heads of all those who have attempted to bring into notice and popularize the new learning.

But the task of repressing progress, whether in politics or in knowledge, is always a difficult one. "E pur si muove." Despite the outcries of opponents, amid the jibes and jeers of detractors, knowledge pursues her stately march undisturbed, in sublime unconsciousness. The chatter of the ignorant and the interested does not trouble her. Δάβροι παγγλωσίη, κόρακες ὥς, ἄκραντα γαρνέμεν Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον, are to her as if they were not. She does not heed them. Her followers, sure that they have solid ground under their feet, go on their way without troubling themselves too much about what is said of them. The delight of discovering truth, the pleasure of making progress, the constantly increasing evidence to themselves as they go along that they are in a right path, pursuing a reality, not a phantom, is sufficient reward for them, and keeps them to their task, whatever the world thinks of it. And the world itself, in course of time, spite of itself, is impressed, grows interested, inquires, and gradually comes to see that there is something, after all, in what it began by ridiculing. Then a reaction sets in. First the more liberal-minded, next the public at large, last of all the detractors themselves, go over to the opposite camp, unsay the hard things that they once said, and welcome with (at least) seeming cordiality the new

* The idea of this curious squib was to take an English nursery rhyme, and by a new and arbitrary division of the words, to make it appear an unknown language, which was then analysed after a fashion, and shown to be a sort of archaic Latin. The *unfairness* of the procedure consisted in assuming that decipherers divided the words of their inscriptions *arbitrarily*, which was untrue.

branch of knowledge which they have not succeeded in suppressing. Honours, applause, something like a general ovation follows. The fresh admission into the circle of the sciences receives all the compliments and attentions usually offered in polite society to a new arrival. It is the "lion" of the hour, and all men pay court to it. For a while perhaps the homage rendered is somewhat excessive; but presently matters settle down and arrange themselves. The new knowledge finds its proper position in the world of science and literature, and is assigned the place to which it is entitled, in the *curriculum* of a liberal education.

Such is the state of things which has been reached in France with respect to hieroglyphical and cuneiform decipherment, and the knowledge derived from them. The various stages of utter incredulity, contemptuous indifference, doubt, inquiry, surprised awakening, have been gone through; and the public at last accepts, frankly and without *arrière pensée*, the new knowledge. The devotion to their subjects of Leemans, De Rougé, Mariette, Chabas, Prisse D'Avennes, Deveria, and, again, of Oppert, Ménant, and Lenormant, has borne fruit, and it is recognised that the key to the languages of Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, has been obtained, and that vast stores of a previously unknown literature have thereby been made accessible to the public. It is allowed that the history of the early world has to be rewritten in this our day—that, in the eloquent words of M. Lenormant, "it is indispensable to introduce a complete reform into our historical teaching and our classic works in all that touches on the primitive period of ancient history, the annals of the early empires of the East, and the commencement of civilization; the immense conquests of modern science require to be made the common possession of all; their principal results ought to enter into that aggregate of necessary learning, whereof no one can be permitted to be ignorant, and which forms the basis of all serious education."* To meet the crying want thus forcibly stated—a want, as he remarks, generally felt and acknowledged by teachers throughout France, M. Lenormant designed the work on which we propose to comment. His object was to present to the French public, in a convenient shape, the primitive history of the East in the form into which it has been brought by the philological and critical labours of the last half-century; to concentrate into a single, not very lengthy

* "Une réforme complète est donc indispensable à introduire chez nous dans l'enseignement de l'histoire et dans les livres classiques, en ce qui touche à la première période de l'histoire ancienne, aux annales des vieux empires de l'Orient, aux origines de la civilisation. Les immenses conquêtes de la science doivent passer dans la domaine de tous, leur résultats principaux doivent entrer dans cette somme de connaissances indispensables qu'il n'est permis à personne d'ignorer, et qui font la base de toute éducation sérieuse."—*Manuel*, Préface, p. xviii.

treatise, the entire mass of the facts of Oriental history obtained by recent research, and previously accessible to the French student only in a vast number of publications of a special character, often voluminous and expensive, and by the apparatus of learning which they display unsuitable to the ordinary reader.

How M. Lenormant has executed the task which he has undertaken we shall consider presently. But first of all, we think it important to call attention to the fact of the extraordinary success which has attended his efforts. His "*Manuel*" was published in 1868. By the close of 1869 it had reached a fifth edition; it had been expanded from two volumes into three; it had been translated into German; it had been in part translated into English; and it had blossomed out into two other works—an "*Abrégé*" for the use of schools, and an "*Atlas d'Histoire Ancienne de l'Orient*," containing twenty-four maps, and representing the changes in the ethnography and the political geography of the various countries during the period covered by the "*Manuel*." The work had also been "crowned by the French Academy."

Such a success as this evidences in the strongest way the intensity of the want which it was M. Lenormant's object to meet. It is clear that, not only the reading public, but the whole body of instructors throughout France, was prepared to welcome a work, which assumed hieroglyphical and cuneiform decipherment to have been accomplished, and proceeded to build up the history of the East on this basis. It is clear, moreover, that the history of the East, and of the early world anterior to the rise of Greece and Rome, is an object of intense interest in France, and one regarded as entering necessarily into the ordinary course of a student's education. Would it not be well if this were more the case in England—if the nation which plumes itself on its Biblical knowledge and its "open Bible," and which is more closely connected with the East than any other nation in Europe, were to interest itself a little more in the history of those times and countries in which the bulk of the Bible scenes are laid, and a knowledge of which is necessary for a thorough comprehension of the Eastern world's present condition? Might not our schools, public and other, add with advantage to the small modicum of Greek, Roman, and English history, which they now teach, an intelligent study of the world's history previous to Cyrus? Might not the universities definitively require, at any rate of the more advanced students, a knowledge of the chief results obtained during the last fifty years from hieroglyphical and cuneiform discovery? At present such knowledge can scarcely be said to receive any real encouragement. There is no certainty that the subject will even be touched in the examination papers. Few examiners are competent to deal

with it. Those who are, seem to their colleagues to be persons who "have a crotchet." Students feel wholly doubtful whether time spent on this branch of historical study will not prove, so far as university honours are concerned, time wasted; and they are thus induced to give the bulk of their attention to the old and well-worn subjects of the histories of Greece and Rome—subjects which are sure to "pay."

The "Manuel" of M. Lenormant, short as the time is since it appeared, has already, as we remarked above, shown itself in two different shapes. Originally it was in two volumes only, and contained, after a brief introduction, the histories of the Israelites, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Medes and Persians, the Phœnicians, and the Carthaginians. After two editions of the original work had been rapidly exhausted, the author enlarged his scheme, and the third edition appeared in three volumes, much new matter having been added to it. The introductory chapter was cancelled, and a fresh introduction written, constituting a "book" of 134 pages, and entitled, "Les Temps Primitifs." The account of the Assyrians and Babylonians was greatly enlarged and altered: its length being about doubled, and its general arrangement improved. But the chief change consisted in the addition of two entirely new histories—those, namely, of the Arabians and the Indians—which were added in two fresh "books," the seventh and eighth of the work, occupying respectively 156 and 388 pages. M. Lenormant states that he appended the "History of the Indians" in consequence of a general regret having been expressed at its absence (*Préface*, p. 35), and that he was asked to add also a chapter on the ancient annals of China. (*Ibid.*, p. 36). This demand he resisted, partly on the ground of incompetence, but also because "it seemed to him that the history of China has always been so completely isolated from that of the rest of the world, that it had no natural place in the scheme of his work, as not entering into the study of those civilizations which have exercised an influence, more or less direct, on the formation of our own." (*Ibid.*)

We think there can be no doubt that in resisting this demand for further expansion, M. Lenormant exercised a wise discretion. It is of the essence of a manual to be brief; and a work of this class, which had already run to above 1,500 pages, could ill afford to increase its bulk still further. Moreover, Chinese history is, as Niebuhr observed long ago,* modern rather than ancient. It is not only detached from the history of the rest of the world in ancient times; but it is a series of events which flows on without any great change or break, from the earliest ages whereto it reaches back, to

* *Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 3.

the present day. Manuals of ancient history have hitherto, and very reasonably, dispensed with any account of the Celestial Empire; and M. Lenormant would have acted very unwisely if in this matter he had deserted the example set him by his predecessors.

It is far more questionable whether he has done as right in admitting what he has admitted, as in rejecting what he has rejected. India, as he allows (*Préface*, p. 35), exercised no manner of political influence upon the rest of Asia during the period embraced by his work, which professedly extends no further than the commencement of the wars between Greece and Persia. It was as completely isolated as China from the Western Asiatic nations until almost the very close of his period, when a portion of it was made a province of Persia. The fact that it had relations with Alexander and his successors, which is alleged by M. Lenormant among his reasons for including Indian history in his scheme, does not justify the introduction of the subject into a manual from which Alexander and his successors are excluded. Even the reason, which M. Lenormant appears to have thought conclusive—that “Aryan India occupies too important a place in the advance of the human mind during the early ages to be omitted from a picture which seeks to represent all the great civilizations of Asia”—seems to us insufficient, since it is history proper, not the history of civilization, which M. Lenormant professes to be writing. Moreover, it is very questionable whether India can properly be said to have a history at all during the period designated by M. Lenormant in the title of his work. Histories of India during this time have indeed been written at great length, as notably the recent “History of India from the Earliest Ages,” by Mr. Talboys Wheeler; but the historical character of any narrative of Indian events prior to the time of Alexander is excessively doubtful, and is disallowed by the best critics.* The only possible basis of such a history is to be found in the “Mahá Bhárata” and the “Rámáyana,” two epic poems of a high antiquity, which are thought by some to possess a historical substance. “These two poems,” as Mr. Wheeler confesses, “comprise the whole of what remains of the political, social, and religious history of India, and may be regarded as the reflex of the Hindoo world;”† and upon these two, consequently, he, with equal confidence, bases his narrative. M. Lenormant, on the contrary, distinguishes broadly between the two compositions, taking the “Mahá Bhárata” as the sole foundation of his “History,” and pronouncing the “Rámáyana” “a pure invention”—“a romance, or fairy-tale, a fiction more or less ingenious,

* Wilson, *Rig-Veda Sanhita*, Introduction, pp. xlv. *et seq.*; Max Müller, “History of Sanskrit Literature,” pp. 18, 30, 37, &c.

† “History of India from the Earliest Ages,” vol. i. p. 3.

composed to charm the fancy, without even any allusion to realities, however distant, and aiming at nothing but to fascinate the strange minds to which it addresses itself."* We confess that we fail to see any ground for separating between the poems, or for regarding the one as a whit more historical than the other. We believe that the real history of India commences with Alexander, or perhaps we should rather say with Sandrocottus, and that to begin earlier is to fail of distinguishing between fact and fiction, history and legend.

The inclusion of Arabian history in the "Manuel," though not open to all the objections which lie against the inclusion in it of the history of India, is yet in our opinion a change which is far from an improvement. Arabia was, no doubt, to a certain extent, in contact with Egypt, Palestine, Babylonia, and Assyria, during the period covered by M. Lenormant's work; and certain facts connected with it are known from the Jewish, the Assyrian, and the Egyptian records. But these facts are far too scanty and too isolated to constitute by themselves even the bare skeleton of a history; and, for the times anterior to Mahomet, it is only possible to construct a narrative which possesses even the outward appearance of an Arabian history, by drawing largely upon the works of post-Mahometan native writers, such as Abulfeda and Ibn Khaldoun. It is from these writers that M. Caussin de Perceval derived almost the whole of his "Histoire des Arabes avant l'Islamisme," and it is from M. Caussin de Perceval that M. Lenormant confessedly draws the great bulk of his narrative. What then is the value of the histories of Ibn Khaldoun and Abulfeda? In other words, what is the value of traditions covering the entire space between Abraham and Mahomet, which are unsupported by inscriptions or other ancient documents, and which first took a written shape in the eighth or ninth century after Christ? If modern historical criticism has proved anything, it is that national traditions of this sort possess scarcely any historical value. They may occasionally embody a certain amount of truth; but there is no touchstone by which the truth in them can be distinguished from the falsehood. They are thus utterly worthless as the *foundations* of history, and have only a value in the rare cases where they either account reasonably for certain known facts, or are in striking harmony with what is recorded in some trustworthy historical record.

On the whole, therefore, we are inclined to prefer M. Lenormant's "first thoughts" to his "second," his original conception of what a "Manuel d'Histoire Ancienne de l'Orient jusqu'aux Guerres Médiques" should contain, to the scheme which he has adopted "at the solicitation of friends." We hold that such a manual may pro-

* *Manuel*, vol. iii. p. 539.

perly embrace, in the present state of our knowledge, the histories of Israel, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Media, Persia, Phœnicia, and Carthage (we should ourselves be inclined to add Syria and Lydia), but that accounts of Arabia and India should form no part of it. We therefore regret that M. Lenormant should have expanded his two volumes into three, thereby inflicting an unnecessary burthen upon the reading public, and giving rise to a suspicion that he is deficient in the power of distinguishing between the historical and the legendary—the most fatal of all defects in an historian who deals with primitive times.

Had the suspicion thus raised been confirmed by the general tenor of the work, we should scarcely have thought M. Lenormant's "Manuel" deserving of our readers' attention. But the fact is otherwise. M. Lenormant not only expresses himself in terms, which leave nothing to desire, as to the proper sources of history,* but with rare exceptions bases his narrative on the solid and substantial grounds of ancient monuments and contemporary, or quasi-contemporary, writers. His histories of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria are derived almost wholly from the native monuments; that of the Medes and Persians is based chiefly on the monuments and on Herodotus; the histories of Phœnicia and Carthage are drawn mainly from inscriptions and from the best authors. Now and then, indeed, M. Lenormant startles us by the sudden intrusion of what strikes us as an alien element into his narrative—we lose the precious vein of sterling metal, and come upon a "fault" of quite another character—one or two of these defects we shall hereafter notice more particularly; but the work is *mainly* what it professes to be, a history of the ancient nations, derived from their own monuments, and from the most approved classical writers. It is only occasionally that our Homer nods. For the most part he has performed his promise of drawing his narrative from "the best sources."

The work thus undertaken by M. Lenormant could scarcely have been accomplished had not his path been smoothed for him by the labours of a host of predecessors. He states, indeed, that "there is no branch of knowledge comprised in his present publication which he has not studied directly and profoundly." (*Préface*, p. xxi.) But we do not understand him to claim such an acquaintance with any of the newly-recovered languages as would enable him to dispense with the guidance of those who have made some one branch of this recon-dite learning their especial, or even their exclusive study. Indeed,

* As especially in the following passage:—"Ainsi l'histoire des plus vieux empires du monde, de ceux chez lesquels la civilisation prit naissance, se trouve désormais accessible à l'Europe dans les conditions aujourd'hui reconnues comme les seules garanties d'études historiques sérieuses, c'est-à-dire, avec l'aide et la connaissance des documents originaux."—(*Préface*, p. xvi.)

he tells us plainly in his preface that his "History of Egypt" is drawn mainly from the "Histoire d'Égypte" of M. Brugsch, and the "Abrégé" of M. Mariette; that of Babylonia and Assyria, from the "Histoire des Empires de Chaldée et d'Assyrie d'après les Monuments" of M. Oppert; that of Judæa from the "Geschichte des Volkes Israel" of Ewald; that of Phœnicia, from the "Phönizier" of Movers. Only he claims in every case to have supplemented these main works by a careful consideration of all that has been written on the subjects by other *savants*; and to have exercised an independent judgment on the data thus furnished to him. In the cases of Babylonia and Assyria alone does he claim to be himself able to speak with authority; here the original monuments have been the subject of his own personal study, and though he is content generally to follow M. Oppert, yet he asserts boldly that he is "nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri." (P. xxii.)

It will be impossible for us to review, within the space to which our remarks must be confined, the mode in which M. Lenormant has performed his task in every instance. We must be content to take specimens, and to trust that such an application of the principle, "Ex pede disce Herculem," will involve no serious injustice. Egypt and Assyria—or perhaps we should rather say Mesopotamia—as being the countries in connection with which modern research has made its most important discoveries, seem to challenge our notice especially; and we therefore propose at present to deal especially with two portions only of M. Lenormant's work, his "Égyptiens" and his "Assyriens et Babyloniens."

M. Lenormant's "Egyptian History," which constitutes his "Third Book," occupies about half a volume, running to 240 pages. It comprises a brief account of the physical geography of Egypt, a section on the principal sources of the history, a sketch of the history itself, occupying about 150 pages, and a chapter on Egyptian civilization, manners, and monuments. It is with the history alone that we shall here concern ourselves.

M. Lenormant is an advocate for the great antiquity of Egyptian history. This history, according to him, covers a space of above 4,000 years, commencing about B.C. 4,600 with Menes, and terminating B.C. 527 with the conquest of Cambyzes. The former date, which exceeds by a 1,000 years the estimate of Baron Bunsen, and by nearly 2,000 years the estimates of Stuart Poole and Gardner Wilkinson, is not stated to rest on any monumental authority, but is gathered wholly from the lists of Manetho. In the opinion of M. Mariette, who is here M. Lenormant's chief authority, the dynasties of Manetho are entitled to be regarded as from first to last successive, and in no case contemporary. If this view be taken

absolutely, and Manetho's numbers, as they exist in the MSS., be allowed to remain unaltered, the commencement of the Egyptian monarchy has to be placed as far back as B.C. 5700 or 5800. M. Mariette, by alterations of Manetho's numbers, and especially by shortening the Shepherd period from 953 to 511 years, reduces the date of Menes to B.C. 5004. M. Lenormant, departing from his great authority on the question of contemporary dynasties, and allowing (p. 308) the ninth and tenth (Heracleopolite) to have reigned at the same time as the eleventh and twelfth (Theban), and the fourteenth (Xoite) to have been parallel (p. 358) with the thirteenth (Theban), makes a further reduction of about 400 years in the time covered by the lists, and brings Menes to about B.C. 4600. With this result he appears to be content. Though the history of Egypt is thus given an absolutely unique character, being made to commence *above two thousand years* before the history of any other nation upon the earth (!), and to occupy the historic field with its single figure during well-nigh half the space over which ancient history extends, M. Lenormant is not startled, he expresses no surprise, no doubt. He does not even suggest to his readers that the principle of contemporaneity, which he partially adopts, is capable of very great expansion, and that by its aid some of the most learned Egyptologists have reduced Egyptian history within a moderate compass, making its commencement run nearly parallel with that of Babylonia, which goes back to about B.C. 2300. He quotes at length M. Mariette's statements, which wholly reject contemporaneity (pp. 323-4); he introduces his own departures from M. Mariette's principle quietly, almost stealthily, without any notice of the important issues involved; and he thus, as it seems to us, slurs over the really vital question with respect to Egyptian antiquity—viz., Were any of Manetho's thirty dynasties contemporary? and, if so, how many, and which?

It is well known that Mr. Stuart Poole and Sir Gardner Wilkinson are of opinion that there is no dynasty in Manetho's lists, from the first to the seventeenth, which did not reign contemporaneously with some other dynasty or dynasties named by him. Sir Gardner Wilkinson says:—"The monuments themselves decide this point by the mention of the years of one king's reign corresponding with those of another, and by the representation of one king meeting another, as well as by various statements in papyri and other documents."* And again more particularly:—"There is evidence of some of the kings of the second Thinite dynasty having ruled contemporaneously with those of the fourth (Memphite) dynasty; the fourth king, *Useskef*, being found together with *Soris*, or *Shuré*, and *Menkheres*, of the

* Historical notice of Egypt, in Rawlinson's "Herodotus," vol. ii. p. 287; 2nd edition.

fourth dynasty, and with *Osirkef* and *Shqfré*, of the fifth; while some of these, again, occur with *Shufu* and others of the fourth dynasty."* Mr. Stuart Poole observes:—"The earlier portion of Manetho's lists seems to represent parallel lines, the later a succession. The evidence of the monuments leads to the same conclusion. Kings who unquestionably belong to different dynasties are shown by them to be contemporary."† And these writers have, conjecturally, put forward a scheme for the arrangement of Manetho's lists, which brings the date of Menes to about B.C. 2700 or 2690, and the date of the pyramid kings—the first monarchs who have left monuments—to about B.C. 2450—2350.

We can with difficulty suppose that M. Mariette and M. Lenormant are not aware of these conclusions of their fellow-workers in the field of Egyptian antiquities. Yet, with these statements before them, or at any rate, accessible to them, M. Mariette can make, and M. Lenormant quote with approval, the following assertion:—"Jamais aucun des savants qui se sont efforcés de raccourcir les chiffres donnés par Manéthon n'est encore parvenu à produire un seul monument d'où il résultât que deux dynasties données comme successives dans ces listes aient été contemporaines" ("Manuel," vol. i. p. 324).

M. Mariette goes even further, and says that "the monuments prove superabundantly that all the royal races enumerated by the priest of Sebennytus (Manetho) occupied the throne in succession, one after the other."‡ This is an extraordinary assertion. It is granted that many dynasties have left no monuments at all. M. Lenormant says of the first—"Aucun monument contemporain de ces princes n'est parvenu jusqu'à nous" (p. 334). Of the period which he places between the sixth dynasty and the eleventh, he remarks—"De la fin de la sixième dynastie au commencement de la onzième, Manéthon compte 436 ans, pendant lesquels les monuments sont absolument muets" (p. 346). Of the Hyksos, or Shepherd, period, which he estimates at 400 years, he says—"Le seul fait qu'il soit permis de donner comme certain, c'est que *pas un monument* de cette époque désolée n'est venu jusqu'à nous pour nous apprendre ce que devint sous les Hyksôs l'antique splendeur de l'Égypte" (p. 360). It is, therefore, evident that if the monuments pronounce at all upon the successive character of Manetho's dynasties, they do not pronounce by means of contemporary evidence, but only by means of compilations made at a later time by authors whose knowledge of the facts may have been very deficient.

* Historical Notice of Egypt, in Rawlinson's "Herodotus," vol. ii. p. 290. ‡

† See article on Egypt in Dr. Smith's "Biblical Dictionary," vol. i. p. 507.

‡ "Les preuves monumentales surabondent qui démontrent que toutes les races royales énumérées par le prêtre de Sébennytus ont occupé le trône les unes après les autres."—*Manuel*, vol. i. p. 324.

But the compilations in question, to which M. Mariette undoubtedly refers, are far from asserting, much less proving, the conclusion which he draws from them. They consist of four, and four only, dynastic lists,* none of which is complete, and in none of which do all Manetho's names, or even all his dynasties, appear. In none, moreover, is any assertion made that the dynasties or kings which are mentioned are consecutive. The most that can be said with fairness is, that they give no indication of the kings which they mention being in any case contemporary. They are thus compatible with the theory of a continuous succession; but they no more prove than they disprove it.

It should also be borne in mind that the compilations were made under the kings of the nineteenth dynasty, after that complete "shipwreck of Egyptian civilization" (to use M. Lenormant's phrase, p. 360) which the Hyksos brought about, when a gulf of 400 years separated Egypt from its past, or as long a period as that which divides us from the reign of Edward IV.

The enormous antiquity which is claimed for the history of Egypt cannot, therefore, be said to rest upon monumental, much less upon contemporary monumental, evidence. It depends wholly upon the question of whether the Egyptians, in the lists which they made, at a comparatively late date, of their ancient kings, were or were not careful to exclude contemporary dynasties. M. Mariette is of opinion that Manetho absolutely excluded them; but M. Lenormant (pp. 348, 358) feels that he cannot maintain this opinion. And, indeed, M. Mariette does not consistently maintain it. We gather from the number of years assigned in his "Table of Dynasties" (p. 321) to the twenty-fifth (Ethiopian) and twenty-sixth (Saite) dynasties, that he regards the first three kings of Manetho's Saite list (Stephinathis, Nechepsos, and Nechao) as contemporary with the last king of his Ethiopian list, Taracus, or Tehrak. But if so, what becomes of his assertion—"Tout montre que le travail d'élimination était déjà fait dans les listes de Manéthon, telles qu'elles nous sont parvenues?"

To the treatment of Egyptian affairs by M. Lenormant from the accession to power of the eighteenth dynasty, when Egyptian history first becomes interesting, down to the conquest by the Persians, we can give for the most part a decided approval. M. Lenormant has not, like too many Egyptologists, confined himself to the native documents, but has carefully collated the Hebrew and the Assyrian records, and has produced a narrative which, in its general features, we believe to be sound and accurate. There are only two or three points in this part of the history to which we feel inclined to take any exception. M. Lenormant, in his desire to interest his readers, by

* The Turin Papyrus, the old and new Tables of Abydos, and the Table of Sakkarah.

putting before them what is striking and strange, occasionally allows himself to snatch somewhat too hastily at the last promulgated theories, and introduces them into his narrative as if they were ascertained and accepted facts. Identifications which scholars have suggested as possible, he assumes and treats as certain; for instance, that of the Rotennou (Rot-n-no of Wilkinson) with the Assyrians, and that of the Remenen, or Lemanen, with the Armenians (pp. 373-4). Now, as the Rotennou are represented with blue eyes and red hair,* they can scarcely be the swart Assyrians of the monuments; and the Lemanen are far more probably the people of Lebanon than those of Armenia, who called themselves, not Armenians, but *Mannai* (Minni), or *Urarda* (people of Ararat). M. Lenormant, we think, unduly extends the military expeditions and conquests of the great kings of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties by means of such identifications, making them not only carry their arms across the Euphrates into North-western Mesopotamia, but penetrate to Babylon and Armenia (p. 385), while by sea they reduce Cyprus and Crete (p. 386), the Cyclades, parts of Greece and Asia Minor (p. 387), and in another direction make themselves masters of the entire north coast of Africa! We can see no sufficient evidence of the extension of Egyptian dominion at any time beyond Mount Taurus† and the River Khabour in Asia, or beyond the oasis of Ammon in Africa; and we think the whole series of nominal identifications on which M. Lenormant builds, in his account of this glorious time, in the highest degree uncertain.

So again in the interesting account which M. Lenormant gives (pp. 428-431) of an invasion of Egypt from the West, by land and sea, in the time of Merenphtah (or Menephthah), the son of Rameses II., we find our powers of belief severely taxed by the list of familiar names, which his narrative brings before us in a very unfamiliar connection. We are told, as if it were quite certain, that in the time of this king (ab. B.C. 1350) an alliance was formed between the Libyans of North Africa and several other nations of the Mediterranean for the subjugation of Egypt. Among these nations are mentioned "the Sardinians, the Sicilians, the Tyrrhenians or Tuscans, the Achæans of the Peloponnese, and the Laconians!" Such a view of the condition of the Mediterranean nations, and the terms on which they stood one towards another at this early period, is a most novel revelation. We are not surprised that it caught the attention of Mr. Gladstone, and furnished him with an exciting paragraph for his Egyptian chapter in the "*Juventus Mundi*."‡ The impression which

* Wilkinson, in Rawlinson's "*Herodotus*," vol. ii. p. 302; 2nd edition.

† The remains at Enyuk, regarded by Mr. Van Lennep as Egyptian ("*Travels in Little-known parts of Asia Minor*," vol. ii. ch. xx.), are decidedly not genuine Egyptian work, but imitations of such work by a comparatively barbarous race.

‡ Pp. 144-5.

we get from Greek literature is, that the races said by M. Lenormant to have been leagued together, and to have made this joint expedition, were at the time scarcely aware of each other's existence, and wholly unapt to unite in the pursuit of a common object. The Achæans and Laconians of the Peloponnese had no acquaintance with either Sicily or Sardinia so late as the time of Homer, and no knowledge of any ships, as using the Mediterranean waters, except those of their own people and of the Phœnicians. Tyrrhenians first appear in Greek literature in the writings of Hesiod* (ab. B.C. 850), and even then are so little known that they are made the inhabitants of certain sacred islands. It is not till about B.C. 600 that we hear of them as possessing a fleet. The Sicilians and Sardinians are described by the Greeks and Romans of a time considerably later than this as still barbarians. They are never represented as sufficiently advanced to build ships. The Sicels cross from Italy to Sicily on rafts† about B.C. 1000; and the native Sards continue to dwell in caves, and clothe themselves in skins, till Roman times.‡ That the Sardinians, Tyrrhenians, and Sicilians should own fleets as early as B.C. 1350—that they should be on familiar and friendly terms, not only with each other, but with the distant Achæans and Libyans, and should unite with them in a common league for a common purpose, and that purpose the reduction of Egypt, is as astonishing a passage of (so-called) history as we ever saw seriously propounded. No doubt there was a combined land and sea attack on the Egyptians at the time mentioned; but we need very strong evidence indeed before we can believe that it was conducted by the nations specified.

The supposed evidence for the story is an inscription in the great temple at Karnac, which has been recently translated and commented upon by M. de Rougé. We have consulted M. de Rougé's memoir on the subject in the *Revue Archéologique* for 1867, and find that the whole question turns on the proper identification of certain names. The tribes who came from the sea to the assistance of the Libyans are, according to the Egyptian literature—1. The *Tursha*, or *Tuirsha*; 2. The *Shakalasha*; 3. The *Shairutana*, or *Shairudana*; 4. The *Kaiusha*, or *Akaiusha*; and 5. The *Luka*, or *Ruka*. These M. de Rougé proposes conjecturally to identify with the Tyrrhenians, or Tuscans, the Sicilians, the Sardinians, the Achæans, and the Lycians. He says nothing of the "Laconians," beyond a vague suggestion that the word "Lycian" is etymologically connected with "Laconian," as also with Lelex, Lycaon, Lycosura, Mount Lyceus, &c. He admits that the identifications are mostly doubtful, that they present phonetic difficulties, and that different suggestions have been made with respect

* Theogon. 1015—6.

† Thucyd. vi. 2. Διίβησαν (ὡς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται) ἐπὶ σχιδίων.

‡ Niebuhr, "History of Rome," vol. i. p. 167.

to some of them. M. Brugsch, for instance, would identify the *Tuirsha* with the Thracians (Θρήκες, Θρήσσαι). He omits to observe that the real native name of the Tuscans, or Etruscans, was not Tyrseni, Tyrrheni, Tusci, or Etrusci, but *Ras-ena* ;* while that of the Lycians was not Lycii, but *Tramele*. He also fails, we think, to account satisfactorily for the substitution throughout the entire list of *sh* for the Greek and Latin *s* ; and his explanation of the final *sh* in *Shak-alusha* and *Akaiusha*, that it is the case-ending of the nominative singular, seems to us harsh and far-fetched. On the whole, we come to the conclusion that M. de Rougé's theory is ingenious, and that if it did not involve historical improbabilities, it might be worthy of a conditional acceptance ; but we cannot regard its ingenuity as entitled to outweigh the grave historical objections which lie against it, or as entitling it at present to a place in a "Manual of Ancient Eastern History."

But it is time to turn to M. Lenormant's "Assyriens et Babyloniens." The account which is given us of these nations in the "Manuel" occupies rather more than half of the second volume, running to 271 pages. Following the example set him in this country in works to which we need not more especially allude, M. Lenormant divides the history of the Mesopotamian nations into three periods, during which the Tigris and Euphrates basins were dominated by three distinct empires. In other words, he recognises as a reality, entitled to take rank among the established facts of historical science, that primitive "Empire of the Chaldees," to which Mr. Loftus and Sir Henry Rawlinson were the first to call attention, and which may be regarded as the special contribution to our knowledge of the East, resulting from the labours of the "Assyrian Excavation Fund." Many critics have doubted the substantial character of this discovery. M. Lenormant, we think, exercises a sound discretion in accepting it. He devotes the first chapter of his fourth book (forty-three pages) to an account of this primitive Mesopotamian empire ; the second, third, and fourth to the Assyrian empire which succeeded it ; and the fifth and sixth to that later Babylonian empire which rose up out of the ruins of the Assyrian. The title which he assigns to the first of these three empires is "L'Empire primitif de la Chaldée."

In his description of the general character of this empire M. Lenormant follows closely the account published in 1858 by Sir Henry Rawlinson,† which has formed the starting-point for all later inquirers. He recognises the existence in ancient Chaldæa of four widely different races—Cushites, Turanians, Semites, and Aryans

* *Tesne Rasne* is found in the Etruscan inscriptions for "populus Etruscus."

† Notice on the Early History of Babylonia, in the first edition of Rawlinson's "Herodotus," vol. i. pp. 432—450.

(pp. 11, 12)—and the political predominance among these four races of the Cushites (p. 17). He accepts as in the main historical the sketch of the history of Chaldæa furnished by the dynasties of Berossus (pp. 19—25), and endeavours to fit the monumental kings as best he can into the series. He differs from Sir H. Rawlinson chiefly in attaching credit to some of the names which have come down to us as contained in Berossus's lists, and in the order which he assigns to the monumental monarchs. The Evechoüs and Chomasbelus of Berossus, who reign respectively 2,400 and 2,700 years, are regarded by M. Lenormant as real Babylonian sovereigns. The former he identifies with the Biblical Nimrod, explaining the Babylonian word as meaning "Man of Cush" (p. 19); the latter, he suggests, was really called Samas-Bel, "Worshipper of Bel," a name which is formed certainly on a Babylonian model. With respect to the order of the Chaldæan monumental kings, M. Lenormant seems guided rather by the presumed ethnic character of the names, than by the more or less archaic type of the legends, or by the position of the bricks in the excavated buildings. Still his arrangement does not very seriously differ from that of Sir H. Rawlinson. He assigns, indeed, a somewhat earlier date to the kings of the *Sin* series, whom he places in the first historical dynasty before the Susianian conquest. And he unnecessarily multiplies monarchs by supposing a first and second Kourigalzou (Durri-Galazu) and Purnapuriyas, whereas the monumental notices naturally indicate, in both cases, a single sovereign. But the order in which he places the more remarkable monarchs is identical with that in which they were placed by the original discoverer; and the dates which he assigns to them are not greatly different. The whole result is that a primitive Chaldæan monarchy existed in Lower Mesopotamia from a time anterior to B.C. 2300 till about B.C. 1300, which was the pioneer of civilization in the East, and which at one time exercised dominion over all the countries lying between the Zagros mountain-chain and the shores of the Mediterranean.

M. Lenormant's Assyrian history is chiefly remarkable for the strong line of demarcation which he draws between the earlier and the later empire, and for the position which he assigns to the Scriptural Pul, whose reign (according to him) separated the first Assyrian empire from the second. Here is one of the places where he suddenly startles us by the introduction into the genuine native history, as recorded on the monuments, of a classic legend*—of a tale drawn from a Greek author of late date (B.C. 390) and tainted credit, Ctesias, which had long since been consigned by writers of

* See above, p. 8.

critical discernment to the *limbo* of historical inventions. Arbaces and Belesis, of whom we had thought to have heard the last when Mr. Clinton was gathered to his fathers, reappear upon the scene (pp. 80, 81), the latter as Pul himself (who, it is suggested, may have been known as *Balazu*, "the Terrible"), the former as commander of the Median contingent in the Assyrian army. Asshur-lush, or Asshur-likhous, the Assyrian monarch of the time, is transformed, with a touch of the enchanter's wand, into Sardanapalus; Nineveh is besieged and taken; Asshur-likhous burns himself, with his wives and his treasures, in his palace; the Medes and Babylonians are triumphant; Nineveh is razed to the ground; and for above forty years (B.C. 789 to 747) Assyria ceases to exist as a state, being absorbed into the empire of Babylon (p. 82).

Now of this wonderful revolution, if it ever took place, we can only say, that the Assyrian records contain absolutely no trace of it. The historiographers of Sennacherib and Asshur-bani-pal put the last year of Asshur-likhous *immediately* before the first year of Tiglath-Pileser, without giving the slightest indication of any gap. M. Oppert, of whose Assyrian views M. Lenormant must be regarded as the mouth-piece, has recently published in the *Revue Archéologique* * a representation of the "Assyrian Canon," in which, while the division between all the other reigns is marked by a single line, a double line is drawn between the years in question. But in no copy of the Canon is there any such double line, or anything to imply a disturbance of the regular order of the chronology at this point. No mention is made of Pul in the Assyrian records; no hint is given of any destruction of the capital at this time; nothing appears of the restoration of its temples or palaces by Tiglath-Pileser. Sennacherib, who repairs and embellishes the city, speaks of an "Old Palace," and a "Small Palace," as still existing there, and ascribes the decay of the buildings, which he restores, not to any foreign enemy, but to the neglect of several kings, his predecessors, to keep them in repair, and to injuries caused during the last sixteen years by the river Tigris.† M. Lenormant, naturally anxious to obtain monumental sanction for his extraordinary narrative, argues that the destruction of Nineveh at this time is indicated by the fact that the researches of modern explorers on the site have failed to obtain a single slab of an earlier date than that which he assigns to the capture (p. 82). But he entirely omits to notice the real reason of this, which is, that the mound of Nebbi-Yunus, the site of the more ancient palaces, has been but very partially explored; and he forgets to tell his readers

* The article alluded to is contained in the November and December numbers of 1868. It has also been published by M. Oppert in a separate shape.

† See Fox Talbot's "Assyrian Texts," pp. 6, 7.

that, if no *slab* of an early king has been disinterred at Nineveh, numerous bricks belonging to a building raised there by Binlikhous III. (B.C. 810—781) have been found, all of them *in situ*, as they were placed by the masons employed under that monarch.*

But if Assyrian evidence for this supposed event wholly fails, what shall we say of the classical evidence on which it professedly rests? We have called it an invention of Ctesias; but here we have done that writer an injustice. *Neither Ctesias nor any other classical authority* ever taught that there had been *two* destructions of Nineveh, or two Assyrian empires separated by an interval of servitude. The question among the classical writers was simply a chronological one—when had Nineveh been destroyed and the Assyrian empire come to an end? Ctesias said 282 years before the accession of Astyages, or about B.C. 875; Herodotus said late in the reign of Cyaxares, or about B.C. 600; Berosus said in the hundred and twenty-third year from the era of Nabonassar, or B.C. 625. All agreed that there had been but one destruction; that the city had been taken by the Medes, or the combined Medes and Babylonians; that the last king had burnt himself in his palace; and that Assyria, having once fallen, had never risen again. The double destruction of Nineveh was a figment of the chronologers, who here, as so often elsewhere, strove to reconcile conflicting testimonies as to dates by repeating the event under the different years to which different authorities had assigned it—a practice which gave rise to the axiom of modern historical critics, "History that repeats itself is to be suspected."

Perhaps our readers will ask, what can have induced M. Lenormant to resuscitate this exploded fable, and to give it so prominent a position in his Assyrian history? We think that we can explain the phenomenon. There is a discrepancy of about forty years between the chronology of the Assyrian Canon and that of the first Book of Kings, as commonly calculated from the years assigned to the reigns of the *Jewish* monarchs.† There is also a difficulty in explaining the absence of the "Pul, king of Assyria," mentioned in 2 Kings xv. 19, from the Assyrian lists. M. Lenormant, or rather his authority, M. Oppert, has thought to meet and overcome both these difficulties by interpolating a reign of Pul over Assyria, lasting above forty years, between the reigns of Asshur-likhous and Tiglath-Pileser II. Of this period, as being a time of foreign domination, M. Oppert supposes that the Assyrians might choose to take no account, and that it might consequently drop out of their chronological schemes altogether.

* *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, vol. xix. p. 166.

† If the years of the *Israelite* monarchs are taken, the discrepancy becomes one of only about twenty years.

Here two questions arise—1. Does not this explanation introduce more difficulties than it removes? 2. Is it compatible with the notice, contained in the Canon, of a great eclipse?

Does it not introduce more difficulties than it removes? It invents a conquest of which no ancient writer ever heard (for even Ctesias only misdated the *final* capture and destruction of Nineveh), of which there is no trace in either the Assyrian or the Babylonian records, and which the nations whereto it is ascribed were at the time quite incapable of accomplishing. It supposes the Assyrians to have been in the habit of elaborately constructing chronological lists, in each of which they introduced consciously a flaw rendering them worthless alike for chronological and for business purposes. The Assyrians dated all deeds, leases, temporary agreements of all kinds, by the years of the eponyms: the authorized lists of the eponyms determined when the agreement was out. Such a flaw as M. Oppert supposes would have turned a lease of fifty years into one of ninety-seven, and have similarly disarranged all the manifold agreements and covenants on which the business of life depended.

It generally happens that if an erroneous supposition is made with respect to a document, the document itself, carefully examined, bears evidence against it. We think this is the case with the Canon and M. Oppert's theory. The Assyrian system allowed the re-appointment, after an interval, of the same person as eponym, just as the Roman system allowed the re-appointment of a consul. There can be no doubt, for instance, that the "Samsi-el, Tartan," whom we find in M. Oppert's list as eponym in B.C. 789, is the same person who appears, under the same name and title, as holding the office in B.C. 816. So we find an eponym in B.C. 839 who re-appears in B.C. 812, and one in B.C. 867 who re-appears in B.C. 854. Of course, these re-appointments fall within a reasonable term of years; the honour is not conferred for the first time except on those of mature age, and is thus not held a second time later than thirty years afterwards. These conclusions we draw from examining the two portions, into which M. Oppert divides the list of eponyms, separately. In order to test M. Oppert's theory, we take the list as a whole, and proceed to examine the names before and after his supposed gap of forty-seven years. We think it is clear that after such an interval no name ought to recur. But what are the facts? In B.C. 743, the second year after the supposed interval, we find Bel-edil-el, a name which has already occurred five years before the interval,] or (according to M. Oppert's dates) in B.C. 796, fifty-three years previously; and the same name appears for a third time in B.C. 733, sixty-three years after its first appearance! It is true that on the first occasion Bel-edil-el is denominated "chief of the eunuchs," and

on the second and third "prefect of Calah;" but this is no indication of a different person, for the "chief of the eunuchs" is always changed on the accession of a new sovereign. Should, however, this case be regarded as doubtful, there is another which admits of no doubt whatever. "Bin-bel-yukin, gouverneur du pays," who is eponym in the ninth year of Asshur-likhous (B.C. 794, according to M. Oppert), cannot be a different person from "Bin-bel-yukin, gouverneur du pays," who holds the same office in the eighth year of Tiglath-Pileser, B.C. 737. This, according to the French *savant*, would be *fifty-seven* years afterwards! According to what we believe to be true chronology—the chronology of the Canon itself—it would be a re-appointment after the reasonable interval of ten years.

The question of the astronomical possibility of M. Oppert's scheme is one to be decided by astronomical science, and on which a non-scientific opinion must of course be valueless. The facts, however, as they at present stand, may be stated. They appear to be these: there was a great (probably a total) eclipse, visible in Assyria, in the month of Sivan, or June, in the ninth year of Asshur-danin-il, the predecessor of Asshur-likhous, whose reign confessedly falls between B.C. 818 and B.C. 753. For this period the tables published by the Abbé Pingré,* which are allowed to be authoritative, show but two June eclipses of importance which could possibly have been visible in Assyria—those of June 13, B.C. 809, and June 15, B.C. 763. The calculations of the same astronomer produce for the course of the total shade cast by the first a line beginning at the Azores, and extending thence through Spain, northern France, Germany, Poland, and Russia, into Tartary, thus leaving Assyria far to the south; while for the course of the second they give a line which commences at the mouth of the Senegal, and proceeds through North Africa, across the eastern Mediterranean to Syria, and thence *through Mesopotamia* to Persia, North-Western India, and Thibet. Calculations recently made by Mr. Airy, the Astronomer-Royal, modify but very slightly the conclusions drawn by the Abbé Pingré, leaving untouched the result that the eclipse of June, B.C. 763, was total in parts of Assyria; while that of June, B.C. 809, was scarcely, if at all, noticeable there. But M. Oppert has found an astronomer of ability ("un habile astronome"), named Oeltzen, by whose calculations the course of the eclipse of B.C. 809 is thrown considerably further to the south, the line of deepest shade being made to pass nearly over Nineveh. Thus the question stands at present with the Astronomer-Royal and the learned author of "*L'Art de vérifier les Dates*" on the one side, and M. Oeltzen on the other.

* *L'Art de vérifier les Dates*, tom. i. pp. 176—181.

We are afraid it will not be generally thought that the balance hangs even.

We must here take leave of M. Lenormant's volumes. It will be gathered from what we have said that while, on the whole, we welcome the appearance of the "*Manuel*" as indicating an important advance in historical science on the Continent—an advance which will, no doubt, in time produce its effect among ourselves—we think the work in many respects disappointing, and far less instructive than it might have been. M. Lenormant, in executing his task, has pinned his faith invariably on particular guides, instead of exercising an independent judgment on the partially conflicting views of early Oriental history put forth in different quarters; he has not always been fortunate in the guides on whom his choice has fallen; he has caught too eagerly at novelties, and embodied in his work, not merely the ascertained results of recent research, but a number of crude and more or less improbable theories; and he has extended the field of Oriental history unduly, including in it narratives which have no real historical character. But he has succeeded in producing a very readable work, and one which will altogether leave on the minds of students a far more correct impression of the ancient world, anterior to the rise of Greece and Rome, than has hitherto been conveyed by the text-books in most general use upon the Continent. For the English public it does not seem to us that his work is suited. It is too long for a manual, according to English notions; and it is too short and sketchy to satisfy those who wish to obtain a real substantial knowledge of the portions of ancient history whereof it treats. We do not anticipate for the translation, on which Mr. E. Chevalier is engaged, the same success that has attended the original work in its own country. But we shall be glad to find that we are mistaken. Even such a view of the subject as M. Lenormant's is immensely in advance of the notions generally held upon it by our countrymen; and every effort to dispel the prejudiced ignorance that has hitherto prevailed but too widely among us deserves a welcome from those who desire to see that ignorance replaced by knowledge.

G. RAWLINSON.



ON A FORM OF CONFRATERNITY SUITED TO THE PRESENT WORK OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH.*

THERE are two popular modes of viewing history which prevent us from profiting as we might do by the lessons of the past. According to one theory the life of mankind may be represented by a straight line, every part of which is equally and finally removed from the advancing race by each fresh stage accomplished. According to the other, our movement is really only in a circle, wide enough to cheat us with the semblance of progress, but inevitably returning to the points which had once seemed to have been left for ever. Both theories represent obvious facts, and so far have a partial value. There can be no doubt that each generation is permanently separated from any one that has gone before by accumulated treasures of thought and action which have been inherited from the interval that lies between them. On the other hand, it is equally true that forms of speculation and feeling and practice recur with a strange regularity, and seem to show that in some relations man is forced to struggle for ever with the same problems, and for the most part with the same results. Thus we may fairly figure to ourselves our common human life under another geometrical image. As a whole it is not like a straight line, it is not like a circle; but it is like a widening

* The substance of this paper was read at Sion College, February 17th, 1870.

and ascending spiral. There is progress without return; there is resemblance without repetition. As we rise into a higher region and find our motion on a wider field, we are successively brought into a close relation with analogous positions of men in former times, and can, if we will, use their experience for our own guidance.

Such a view of life appears to satisfy two imperious instincts. We cannot believe that any labour is lost; and still we turn with eager sympathy to some distant age when we are bowed down with the sense of our own difficulties. It is so in all the separate interests of life; it is so especially in the various attempts to reach that final harmony of all, which it is the prerogative of religion to establish. In this region every effort, taken in connection with the circumstances out of which it arose, is of abiding value; and if the Church of England can be justly charged with having fallen short of the requirements of her mission, it is because she has not hitherto used the power which she possesses of interpreting and applying to her own children one part of her manifold heritage. She has studied faithfully and diligently the lessons of the ante-Nicene Church. She has united with comprehensive wisdom the positive truths which were brought forward on different sides in the Reformation of the sixteenth century; but she has left almost unnoticed, till lately, and even now she has made no systematic attempt to appropriate, what may be learnt from the interval by which those two periods were separated. None the less the examples of the middle ages belong to her; and we must, I believe, seek from them the impulse which will enable us to meet victoriously the crisis in which we are called to do our part.

For it seems to be admitted universally that we are approaching a crisis—an "end of the world" in a most true and solemn sense—such as those which stand out in past history. Such a crisis there was when the visible centre of Divine Revelation was taken away by the desolation of Jerusalem; such a crisis when Constantine raised the Church of the martyrs to a place next the imperial throne; such a crisis when the fabric of the Christianized empire was broken up by internal corruption and barbarian invaders; such a crisis when Innocent III. seemed to have successfully usurped the temporal sceptre; such a crisis when the decaying life of Europe was quickened to a new birth by contact with the natural force of ancient Greece, which opened once again the original records of revelation. And it is evident that the powers around us, which are working towards the revolution thus vaguely anticipated, are more varied, and not less energetic than those of which we can trace the workings in old time. The rapid multiplication of the material appliances of life, the scientific conceptions of action and being, the fragmentariness and isolation of spiritual interests, bring with them momentous conse-

quences which, sooner or later, must extend over the whole area of faith.

It is, then, with these powers that our own Church has to deal; and if we endeavour to apprehend generally the difficulties or evils to which they give rise, these appear to be threefold. There is materially the prevalence of luxury; intellectually, the predominance of dispersive study; spiritually, the practical assertion of individualism in regard to the highest destinies of man. Of these there can be no doubt that it is the intellectual evil—the partial and yet exclusive type of modern thought and research—which gives the special character to the religious conflicts of the age; but the material and spiritual dangers to which we are exposed offer also many peculiar features.

I.

1. Satirists have, indeed, found scope in every period for denouncing the luxury of their contemporaries, and to a certain extent their language is always the same. But socially and morally the luxury of a Byzantine court, or of an Italian republic, or of a French noblesse, was very different from that of England at present, however similar the outward phenomena may be in all. Luxury is no longer one of the natural consequences of privilege, or culture, or birth, but is a common object offered to open competition. It is an expression of wealth; and fortune, as we are often reminded with a most sad complacency, is now within the reach of every man. At the same time ingenious imitations of costly indulgences stimulate the taste for them throughout the whole extent of society, and familiarize men with the idea that splendour and ease and selfish pleasure are the obvious ends of exertion. Even those who are farthest removed from the attainment of such prizes still feel their influence, and feel also that theoretically the struggle for them is one in which they themselves have a part. Thus luxury, instead of being the attribute of a particular class, to be endured, or wondered at, or hated, by those who are disqualified for enjoying it, has become a power permeating all ranks. Each rank affects the mode of life of that which is immediately above it; and the connection between the two is still more closely knit by individuals who pass from the one to the other.

The moral consequences of this levelling power of modern luxury in England are not less important than the social. The obtrusive exhibition of one common method of life, of one general standard of effort, puts out of sight other plans and other aims; and in process of time even deadens the instincts which prompt them. That which appears universal soon appears natural. For, on the other hand, there is no centre round which simpler and nobler types of living may gather and take shape. Even if it be possible for a man to

retain personally a lofty and pure ideal, the value of his example is lessened in itself and lost in its effects. Aspirations which are not met by spontaneous sympathy become indefinite and then fail to move.

In a word, the spirit of luxury with which we have to deal is socially universal and levelling, morally depressing and disorganizing.

2. The intellectual character of the age is not less distinctly marked. In this there are two features, which if not absolutely novel, have yet assumed in our own generation a prominence hitherto unknown—the specialization of study, and the belief in the permanence of observed laws. Both spring inevitably from the circumstances in which we are placed; both correspond to the capacities of similar minds; both are fruitful in good when taken positively. It is only when a particular form of inquiry is exalted into a general type of all inquiry that it becomes pernicious. It is only when the sum of one series of laws is assumed to express adequately the action of all force, that a limited idea of law proves adverse to higher speculation.

This truth, which is of universal application, becomes of more critical importance when there is a general convergence of effort in the same direction. At present our *renaissance* is as distinctly impressed with the marks of physical science as the *renaissance* of the sixteenth century was with the marks of classical literature. Physical methods and physical conceptions are extended over the whole domain of knowledge; and wherever they are shown to be inapplicable, it is said that inquiry is useless and conclusions futile. Past experience, however, cautions us against resting in so simple a theory of the universe. It may be that for the present our most fruitful work will be in the interpretation of nature; but this fact itself makes it more important to remember that what we commonly understand by nature does not exhaust the treasures of human thought. And if we would take our share in furthering the intellectual work of the age, we must anxiously refer our own little fragments of labour at each step to that whole which they go to complete, and that whole again to the vaster sum which answers to the totality of the revelation made to man through the visible and the invisible.

3. Of the individualism of our spiritual life in England it is unnecessary to speak at length. No one can fail to feel the waste of warmth and energy and faith which it entails. We may thankfully acknowledge that we owe to it a keen sense of personal responsibility and a rich variety of energetic vigour; but it destroys in the end the sense of union and the spirit of common life. Not only is the immediate effect of personal effort weakened, but its permanent

power in most cases is still more fatally checked. For nothing perhaps is more remarkable in religious history than the strange inability of the greatest teacher who works through his own individuality alone to produce in others, however devoted to him, the image of his own life. It seems as if it were essential to lasting action that the sum of truth presented in the life of a church, should rise distinctly above the teacher, seen apart from him if through him, while that which he brings must be capable of an outward embodiment, in harmony with the greater past. We, however, in our own Church, from one cause or another, have lost this keen instinct of corporate dependence and devotion. Among laity and clergy alike there is an impatience of control; an eager desire not only to preserve (as is right) personal individuality, but to thrust it forward. Thus the power of obedience is sacrificed together with the power of command; and zeal itself becomes an instrument of anarchy.

II.

Such appears to be the general form of the evils which the English Church has to encounter. They may be met in detail, but since they are closely connected, some comprehensive effort is more likely to deal with them efficiently. In former times similar, though less complicated, evils gave rise to various types of disciplined life. When the old Roman empire had sunk into hopeless corruption, the deserts were peopled with hermits, who, in strange and uncouth ways, vindicated the personal dignity of the Christian, apart from all the material advantages of life, and placed the spiritual world before men as the one great reality. When two centuries later, new races swept over the western provinces and threatened to waste the inheritance of the past, Benedict of Nursia reared a shelter for all that was precious in ancient thought, and established the foundation of social freedom in obedience. When a majestic church had taken the first rank above the kingdoms of the world, and seemed inclined to rest upon her treasures of wealth and art and learning, Francis of Assisi claimed, as the children of her love, the poor and the outcast, and laid the cross over all that men can possess or enjoy. Once again, when the power of natural life was revealed afresh in the restoration of Greek literature, and a divided Christendom witnessed sadly to the power and the weakness of awakened thought, the Society of Loyola endeavoured to conquer all the fields of knowledge and add them to the dominion of the papacy.

Opinions may differ as to many details of the systems of discipline which were thus framed, but at least they fulfilled in a very large measure the office for which they were instituted. The crises which they were designed to meet were more or less successfully passed;

and the several orders failed, chiefly because they made profession of perfection, and aimed at permanence. To attempt to resuscitate them now in England is a fatal anachronism. The very fact that they were fitted for the circumstances under which they arose proves that they are *not* fitted for our circumstances. To speak generally they were in their destination personal, defensive, conservative. But still in the widening range of their scope, we may see, not indistinctly, the law which is suggested for our own guidance. Antony stood alone out of the world as the symbol of the strength of the individual in fellowship with God. Benedict gathered his company together as a garrison to keep securely a common heritage. Francis went forth into the field and into the market, and sought to bring under the control of a spiritual rule every order of society. Ignatius, with unrivalled energy, but faltering truth, asserted the right of religion to the service of every human power.

Still, while we acknowledge ungrudgingly what has been attempted and done by these forms of corporate action, we feel that all fall short of our needs, socially and intellectually. A rule constructed with the individual for the unit can never satisfy the mature wants of humanity. The true unit of society is the family, and not the man. A pursuit of truth conducted with reserved conclusions, as distinguished from co-ordinated principles, can never continue long. If then we wish to be faithful to the teaching of self-sacrifice which our fathers have bequeathed to us, we must carry it forward to some completer shape. If we wish to do our own work we must use our examples, not as copies, but as stimulants to exertion, and as pledges of hope. The ascetic of the East has been realised; the ascetic type of the Romanic nations has been realised. It remains for the Saxon race to realise yet one other ascetic type, and so far fulfil their religious mission, which is as yet unaccomplished, though the time for it is fully come.

Nothing, indeed, is more significant in later history than the persistent recurrence of attempts to deal with the growing evils of life by social organization. Visionary as some of the schemes may seem, they find acceptance where popular vitality is most intense, and among men who are able to lead opinion, and not simply to follow it. Thus they witness in their failure to a want which they cannot satisfy. They force us to consider in new lights the Christian conception of humanity. They establish, like the Greek masters of the fifteenth century, a fresh connection between the wisdom of God and the larger instincts of man. They point us to a rule which shall be suited to a work national or universal rather than personal; progressive rather than conservative; manifold, and yet one in virtue of religious service. The organization which is forced upon our thoughts by past expe-

rience, by present impulses, by our Faith itself, is the same. It must be social, in the truest sense of the word, with the family as its final element: so it will be able to cope with luxury. It must embrace within its sphere of action every subject of human interest in its proper order: so it will win thought. It must habitually connect devotion with labour: so it will harmonize spiritual life.

1. The rule for which we are seeking, and which it appears to be the office of the English Church to embody, must deal with the family as its unit. In this lies its fundamental difference from earlier rules, and out of this springs its power of dealing with our peculiar material disorders. Undoubtedly the disciplined organization of families involves serious difficulties which do not attach to the combination of individuals, but they would be amply compensated by corresponding advantages. The family offers the only complete pattern of life: all other groupings of men or women must in themselves be imperfect, and partial in their influence, though, in dependence on that, they can fulfil offices of inestimable importance. It presents in the most powerful and natural form the relations of essential authority and subordination, and lays the basis of a graduated society. It consecrates the idea of common action as the result, not of arbitrary control, but of the original constitution of our being. It preserves and fosters the elastic fulness and energy of feeling, which must be cramped and enfeebled when taken away from its proper home.

The efficacy of a pattern obviously must depend upon its fitness for imitation. Celibate forms of life cannot be offered for general acceptance. On the contrary, they sanction most injuriously the definite recognition of manifold standards of Christian duty. Thus while they are calculated to act with concentrated power on any special point, they are essentially unfitted to elevate the whole form of social life by the exhibition of a pattern in which its ordinary temptations are seen to be met and overcome. And this defect of celibate rules is the more serious now, when the disorders of society spring for the most part from the disregard of the laws which the family can best interpret; when extravagance and display descend from class to class with a fatal and accelerated speed; when it seems impossible, except by isolation, to modify or even to avoid the sway of fashion which yet finds few open defenders. In all these respects it is easy to see how an organization of families might place openly before all a noble type of domestic life; not so costly as to be beyond the aspirations of the poor; not so sordid as to be destructive of simple refinement; strong by the confession of sympathy; expansive by the force of example.

The value of such an organization is further apparent in the fact that it keeps untouched, and welcomes, as of sacred authority, the relative subordination of men. Other systems may inculcate obedi-

ence as an exercise of will from motives more or less excellent, but in the family to rule and to obey is an instinct, a necessity of nature. And whatever strength may be gained in certain crises by the complete self-sacrifice which casts aside these natural ties for artificial connections, it is evident that in our time it is better to see what is than to consider what we can make. One of our most urgent needs is to realize the existence of permanent differences between men as the foundation of the divine government of the world. The theory of the individual unit has been carried so far that providential relations are in danger of being neglected. The substitution of a material for a spiritual standard leads men to strive forwards to a position socially superior, when external success would enable them to occupy that to which they were born with increased influence. If anything is to be done on a large scale for consolidating and raising the whole fabric of society, no agency could be more powerful than such an organization as would add to the fixity of the outward form of life, the acknowledgment of the permanent reciprocal duties of service and protection, of obedience and command, of trust and truthfulness.

This is seen most clearly in the light which the family throws upon the necessity of common labour. No one in a family can suppose that he works either by himself or for himself. At every moment he must, when he thinks, be conscious that what he contributes to any result from his own proper power is as nothing compared to that which he owes to others by inheritance, or instruction, or impulse. Nothing at which he aims can have a simply personal effect. He sees the subtle influences which pass from himself to those about him, and which become in them fresh sources of power. In voluntary combinations of men, there may be a similar recognition of the social destination of labour, but each member is conscious that the circumstances which determine his action have been self-chosen. His individuality comes into play first, the sense of community afterwards. In the family it is otherwise. There the whole gives the character to the parts, and the conditions of their peculiar energy spring out of the original law of life, whereby unalterable differences are made the foundation of a full and harmonious development.

For, once again, however much a celibate rule may intensify special powers, it sacrifices sympathies, feelings, faculties, which may be disciplined, and which must play an important part in the general life of men. The cloistral character, as such, is beset with inevitable weaknesses and imperfections. The sense of proportion is lost when facts are considered by the way of reflection, and not by the way of experience. A general uniformity of motive and method gradually

excludes from consideration the elements which do not naturally fall within the prescribed range. In the family there can be no danger of such inherent incompleteness: in that there must be constant movement, conflict, growth. The bond by which its members are held together, is not one of personal will, but of Divine appointment; the unity rests not on similarity, but on difference. It may be—every one's experience tells him that it is—difficult beyond measure to use for their highest ends the countless impulses and reactions, and contrasts, and inclinations, which must be called out by the circumstances of family life; but it is most easy to see that every one of them may be made fruitful of good, may be brought into a beneficent relation with the others, may furnish the occasion for that shaping of personal character which will preserve to the full its individual worth in the broader fields of action. Each interest neglected, each natural connection cast aside, so far impoverishes our nature. And though a man may become more incisive in action, in proportion as he becomes narrower, the cost of success is a maimed humanity. There are, no doubt, cases where to accept this mutilation is a true duty; but at present, looking at the relative positions of the Church and the world, we can hardly hesitate to believe that a time has come when faith must claim for herself everything that is human, and justify her claim by taking no longer the man but the family as the unit in the organisation through which she may declare her mission.

2. It has been necessary to dwell at disproportionate length upon this first characteristic of our confraternity, because it is that which may seem at first sight most strange, while it is essential to its effective constitution. The two other characteristics may be treated summarily: the characteristic of systematic study, and the characteristic of systematic devotion.

Study rather than action ought to be for the present the staple of common work. The inversion of order, however unpopular, answers to the essential moral relations of things, and is imperatively demanded now. Theology and physical science are, and it is vain to deny or extenuate the fact, separated for the time by profound jealousy and misunderstanding. We have been reminded very frequently of the errors of theologians as to the office and method, and results of physics; to me the errors of physicists as to the office and methods and results of theology are more surprising; and, if I may venture to express my whole mind, the practical neglect of history—the only record of the complete life of man—by both, appears to be still more wonderful and still more disastrous. The fact, however, remains, that there is a divergence between the two most active schools of thought, and a chasm between them. To

those who grasp the essential character of Christianity, as a historical revelation, the divergence is seen to answer to contrasted subject-matter, the chasm to that potential divinity of humanity, ratified for ever in the Incarnation and the Resurrection. But these conceptions require to be regarded from many sides, and placed in many lights before they can be seen in their true majesty. Meanwhile we must be content to work in a humbler field, with this faith to light us. And nothing less than a combined and sustained effort will restore again the harmony between those fundamental divisions of knowledge which are separated for a time by their very vastness. The science of life, which deals with the whole experience of men, must be restored to its proper place between the science of experiment, which deals with matter, and the science of revelation, which deals with God. Then, and not till then, shall we see how the Gospel is illuminated by our progress, and itself illuminates our darkness.

This fellowship in manifold study, absolutely free and absolutely truthful, would be attended by another advantage. All study so pursued would be penetrated with the sense of life, and therefore witness without reserve to the relativity of every result which can be obtained by limited experience. And it is in this we find the necessary condition of advance, intellectual, social, spiritual. The mode and the measure of the advance must vary according to the facts which are to be dealt with. The phenomena of matter will be grouped in ever-widening generalizations; the institutions of society will be moulded so as to reconcile more and more the completeness of the life of the part with the completeness of the life of the whole; the conceptions of theology will be defined and broadened, not because the facts which they embody suffer any change, but because an expression adequate at one period becomes for that very reason inadequate at another, when the forms in which it was framed have themselves assumed a new meaning. But it is of the utmost importance that in all intellectual labour we should remember that every expression of truth is the resultant of many forces which are perpetually changing, so that an identical formula cannot long preserve its original significance. This thought is consecrated for us in the records of revelation, and in virtue of their belief in it the members of our confraternity would be the natural pioneers of thought in every direction, stimulated by the conviction that every fragment of their work is charged with an abiding value which they cannot yet measure; strengthened to wait patiently for the solution of difficulties which can only be reached perfectly by perfect knowledge; separated in their paths and partial ends, but never overpowered by the temptation to forget the complementary work of other labourers.

3. For underneath these differences of office and of character lies the solid foundation of a common faith. This will show itself in stated and social religious services. Do what we will, we *must* carry our thoughts forward to other regions of personal existence, we *must* think of powers greater than ourselves, and speculate on their action. We must refer all we are, and all we do, to a continuity of being. Till a definite creed, a definite religion, is accepted, reflections of this kind are intrusive, disturbing, saddening. In the light of the Resurrection they are the glory of all thought and all action. So at every point the Christian student will be glad to be forced to dwell upon them. He will not wait for some inward emotion to prompt him to seek an utterance of faith; rather he will rejoice to find it claimed from him as part of his proper work. No one who has not tried, however feebly and imperfectly, the efficacy of systematised religious exercises in the midst of busy occupation, can judge how they tend to concentrate, intensify, increase power. It is obvious, to suggest no other consideration, what it must be to pause from painful endeavours, and for a few moments to lie open and receptive, as it were, before the source of all strength, and knowledge, and love.

Thus the characteristic of devotion will not only give union to our confraternity but also will give it power. Every gift, every effort, every success will be brought into immediate connection with the highest destiny of man. Final conflict will be known to be impossible, when the mind is lifted towards the absolute unity which is the sum of all Truth: individual failure will no longer seem a fatal loss in the prospect of the corporate work which is achieved in many ways, and has a certain promise of success.

III.

But it will be asked how can principles like these, which are theoretically excellent, be embodied practically? It is, indeed, presumptuous to answer, without any actual results to show; but nothing has been proposed which has not been realised again and again under the influence of narrower motives and lower hopes. However, to give distinctness to the ideas which have been suggested, I will indicate the kind of society which seems to me to satisfy the conception of a confraternity answering to the present wants of the English Church.

It would consist, then, primarily of an association of families, bound together by common principles of living, of work, of devotion, subject during the time of voluntary co-operation to central control, and united by definite obligations. Such a corporate life would be best realized under the conditions of collegiate union with hall and schools and chapel, with a common income, though not common

property, and an organized government; but the sense of fellowship and the power of sympathy, though they would be largely developed by these, would yet remain vigorous whenever and in whatever form combination in the furtherance of the general ends was possible. Indeed, complete isolation from the mass of society would defeat the very objects of the institution.

These objects, the conquest of luxury, the disciplining of intellectual labour, the consecration of every fragment of life by religious exercises, would be expressed in a threefold obligation: an obligation to poverty, an obligation to study, an obligation to devotion.

The obligation to poverty would aim at establishing extreme frugality in the material circumstances of living. The type would be absolute simplicity, not ostentatious asceticism. The design, not to suppress but to regulate the physical instincts of man, with a view to the more complete development of his whole nature. Thus, while everything tending to stimulate bodily appetites, or to minister to them as ends, would find no acceptance, ample room would be left for social intercourse, for delicate culture, for the quickening refinement of every interpretation of beauty. The experience of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, not to speak of our own time, shows what was lost in the highest forms of literature and art, when their noblest representatives became splendid companions of the wealthy instead of being their spiritual masters. And there are few among us who do not sadly regret that they cannot enjoy the lessons of genial courtesy, of tender forbearance, of large sympathy, which society can best teach, because they are unable or unwilling to pay the material price exacted for them. Something, no doubt, would be lost of conventional and imposing effects, such as spring from the idle multiplication of similar parts; but all that is vivifying, inspiring, elevating—all that is original and creative—all that has a natural affinity with the eternal and spiritual—all, that is, which is essentially human, in the powers, and desires, and achievements of man would remain, strong in its native strength, and unencumbered, for conflict with baser forms of life.

The obligation to study, which marks the immediate destination of the effort, would be framed with a view to secure the widest possible range of united inquiries, physical, historical, moral, and the most complete personal devotion to special subjects. Students of different orders would be brought into constant connection, and thus saved from the perils which attach to isolated labour. Perfect freedom in investigation would follow from the belief in the perfect harmony of final results. At every point there would be a comparison of methods, a tentative co-ordination of facts, a patient acquiescence in conclusions partial and provisional, shadows and prophecies of a divine unity.

At the same time new forces would be gained for education. The present waste of the educational power of women is one of the saddest and most fruitful of evils. In such a confraternity as we are imagining, women, relieved in a great measure from material cares, would be able to concentrate their inexhaustible moral power on the training of the young. Even now the little which they can do in this work instinctively, casually, vaguely, is of infinite value; and it is difficult to imagine what a change would be wrought in average character, if all preparatory and spontaneous education were committed to their care.

The obligation to poverty would limit the method of life; the obligation to study would define the purpose of life; the obligation to devotion would preserve the idea of life. There is indeed a danger lest this should be lost sight of in the anxious and absorbing competition which marks our modern English society, as the result of our two characteristic evils—an aggressive individualism and a material standard of success. The same religious exercises which would support and deepen the sense of the eternal hopes of man, would keep down the tendencies which at present enfeeble it. While the personal value of each man is consecrated in the Divine presence, it is by each one being referred to his proper place in the body to which he belongs. Nor again can any visible measure of work, or of the results of work, be long accepted, when all is habitually brought within the influence of a faith which looks to another Order for its fulfilment. In this way the religious exercises of our confraternity would be inwoven with its whole life; not checking the energy of interest in anything which belongs to this world, but investing all (if I may so speak) with a sacramental value; quickening our perception of the unseen; visibly presenting to us, and divinely sustaining, our corporate union; tempering, chastening, elevating the obtrusive desire to see the fruit of our own labours.

But it is needless to dwell on these details. I am not concerned to insist on any particular embodiment of the general idea which I have advocated. But I cannot affirm too strongly my conviction that some embodiment of it is one of the most urgent needs of the present age. Such a confraternity, instead of dealing piecemeal with the evils of our civilization, would begin by establishing a solid union of the various powers which may be brought to bear upon them, so that corporate fellowship would never be lost sight of in individual action. It would do much towards actually establishing the truth on the recognition of which the future structure of society must rest: the perfect compatibility of permanent distinctions of class with universal spiritual culture. It would present, in an intelligible though transitory and exceptional shape, the claims of the Christian

revelation to deal with all that man can observe without him or within him. And in all these respects it would meet a vague desire which shows itself confusedly on many sides. Nothing, I believe, is more unjust than to call the spirit of modern English thought irreligious. On the contrary, even in its scepticism it clings to religion. There never was a time when men have had a keener sense of what religion ought to be and to do. There never was a time when the demands upon religion were greater. It is assumed, and assumed rightly, that if it be real, if it be human, it will control and discipline the outward conduct of men; it will welcome and harmonize every fact which represents, at least to us, some one detail of the Divine action; it will unite and employ in social service the manifold powers of every individual. And when it is seen that the Christian society—for the individual Christian life must for the most part be hidden—does not, as such, stand in the van of moral and spiritual progress, doubts arise whether the Christian faith is adequate to meet the requirements of a later age. Such a deduction is not unnatural. The fault lies with us if it remains unrefuted. And if recent inquiries have brought into special prominence the interdependence of man on man, and made it clear that the individual life is but a part of a vaster life, we look confidently for some social manifestation of the energies of our faith which may express, however rudely, its inherent power to deal completely with the complicated problems which are thus offered to us. Christianity is, indeed, in virtue of the facts on which it rests, social, or rather human, before it is individual. St. Paul claimed for the Gospel a universality of application to all creation before his readers could apprehend the full force of his teaching, or feel its necessity. And if now we strive to bring out this side of the whole truth, we do not add anything of our own to the apostolic message, but simply read it in the light of actual experience as charged with a peculiar meaning for ourselves.

For such a social organization as we have considered would make no pretensions to the merits of permanence or perfection. It would simply appear as a form of Christian discipline and activity suited to our national emergencies, and corresponding to the special character of our English Church. If its work were once accomplished, it would yield place to another type nobler and better; but for us this, or something like this, appears to be the form in which our common work can be best done. And it will be enough for us to have endeavoured to connect our creed with our immediate needs. We shall not venture to measure the wants of others by our own wants; we shall not presume to suppose that we have yet reached the last lesson of the Gospel of the Resurrection.

BROOKE F. WESTCOTT.



POPE'S ESSAY ON MAN.

Pope's Essay on Man. Edited by MARK PATTISON, B.D. Clarendon Press Series.

WE must confess to a little regret on first learning that the writer of the essay on the "Tendencies of Religious Thought in England" was occupying himself with minute commentatorial work, devoting to schoolboys powers "meant for mankind." Nor is this feeling entirely removed by an examination of the book, now that it has appeared. While every page shows the refinement and subtlety of thought of the distinguished editor, and his intimate acquaintance, not merely with the literature, but also with the sources of the literature, of our so-called Augustan age, we still cannot help thinking that all this might have been more satisfactorily embodied in an independent work of criticism or philosophy embracing the same period. The immediate object of the volume, as of the others in the same series, is, we presume, educational—to explain Pope to boys and girls. To do this successfully it is, of course, essential to know what would be felt as difficulties by such readers; a special qualification which is perhaps hardly to be looked for in the head of a college. Accordingly, while the editor seems in some places to condescend too much to the supposed ignorance and dulness of his readers, giving explanations which even the proverbial Fourth Form boy could dispense with; at other times, and more commonly, we seek in vain for explanations of passages which would puzzle the most advanced scholars in the Sixth.

In venturing upon these criticisms, it is only fair to Mr. Pattison that we should state fully the grounds of them; and as the book is one which is sure, and which deserves, to be widely used, we may at the same time indulge a hope that we are contributing to the perfection of the next edition by pointing out what appear to us to be defects in the present. We shall consider these defects under the two heads of faults of omission and faults of commission, noticing first those passages in which explanation was needed, but has not been given, and afterwards stating our objections to explanations which *have* been given.

I. 6. A mighty maze, *but not without* a plan.

The editor has on different occasions referred to various readings. Perhaps it would have been better to have given these throughout; but at all events the original reading of this line deserves to have been recorded:—

A mighty maze *of walks without* a plan.

In p. 88 the editor speaks of the small number of words used by Pope in an obsolete sense. He has passed over several which might well have received illustration. Thus, I. 11, *tract* is used for *track* or *trace*; I. 15, *candid* occurs in the sense, not of *honest*, but of *favourable*; I. 116, *gust* is used for *taste*; III. 139, *brood* is used of a single birth. Some words derived from the Latin retain more of their original force than we give to them in our common use. Thus, in the following lines, *rude* is used in the sense of *undeveloped*, *inserted* in the sense of *grafted*, *enormous* in the sense of *unnatural*, *vindicate* in the sense of *claim*, *individual* of one *identical* person:—

II. 4. A being darkly wise and *rudely* great.

II. 162. (fruits) On savage stocks *inserted* learn to bear.

III. 242. The *enormous* faith of many made for one.

III. 38. The birds of heaven shall *vindicate* their grain.

IV. 176. The boy and man an *individual* make.

We think also the use of *cast* for *fused*, and *of course* for *in regular order*, should have been noticed in the lines—

II. 137. So *cast* and mingled with his very frame.

I. 181. Each seeming want compensated *of course*.

Pope is universally praised for correctness; but it is difficult to see in what his correctness consists, beyond a rather mechanical obedience (which, we are sorry to see, the editor would make even more mechanical, objecting to a weak syllable in the accented place) to a few very simple rules of metre. Mr. Pattison himself complains of his inexactness of thought, and has frequently remarked upon his faulty rhymes. But Pope is no less incorrect in his constructions; in his desire to be concise he omits important parts of

the sentence, so that it is often difficult to determine what construction was intended. We shall give a few examples of such sentences which, we think, ought to have been explained.

- II. 49. Expunge the whole, or lop the excrescent parts
Of all our vices have created arts.

The real construction of the second line requires the insertion of *which* after *all*, *arts* being what is called the *oblique predicate*, but this is certainly not the construction which would have first suggested itself to the reader.

- III. 211. 'Twas virtue only (or in arts or arms,
Diffusing blessings, or averting harms)
The same which in a sire the sons obeyed,
A prince the father of a people made.

The meaning of the last line is liable to be mistaken ; the true order is, " (which, viz., virtue) made the father of his people a prince."

- III. 227. Or plain tradition that this all begun,
Conveyed unbroken faith from sire to son.

All in the first line is probably the substantive before the verb *begun* ; but there is nothing to show that it is not an adjective and following the verb. Pope's use of " *begun* " for " *began* " should have been noticed.

- III. 259. (Gods) Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,
And formed like tyrants, tyrants would believe.

The sense is, " and such as tyrants would believe in, because they were formed like tyrants ; " but there is nothing to show what is the case of the second *tyrants*.

- III. 273. For what one likes, if others like as well,
What serves one will, when many wills rebel."

Though the lines read together leave no doubt that " what serves one will," means " what is the use of a single will," yet the ambiguity of each word taken separately would certainly be puzzling to young readers.

- IV. 84. But these less taste them, as they worse obtain.

It is not immediately evident that " worse " means " by worse means."

We add one or two passages where the meaning is clear, but the construction is disguised by the omission of verb or noun.

- I. 36. The reason would'st thou find,
Why formed so weak, so little, and so blind?

- III. 26. The chain holds on, and where it ends, unknown.

- IV. 87. Who risk the most, that take wrong means, or right?

Other examples of difficult constructions unexplained are the following :—

- IV. 514. Merit) Is blest in what it takes and what it gives;
 The joy unequalled, if its end it gain,
 And if it lose, attended with no pain:
 Without satiety, though ne'er so blessed
 And much more relished, as the more distressed.

This is an excellent specimen of what we should call Pope's incorrect style. There is really no subject to the verbs here. What is it which "is attended with no pain?" What is "without satiety?" What is "more distressed?" In the second line "joy unequalled" is in the absolute construction, "it" is plainly "merit;" but we cannot speak of "merit," scarcely of "joy," as "attended with no pain;" the phrase is properly applicable only to "loss," understood from the verb "lose," which precedes. Then in the following lines it is probably "joy" which is "without satiety," and "relished;" while "merit" is blessed and "distressed."

- IV. 113. God sends not ill; if rightly understood,
 Or partial ill is universal good,
 Or change admits, or nature lets it fall,
 Short and but rare, till man improved it all.

The semicolon is in some editions placed at the end of the first line; but taking the reading as here given, the first *or* is equivalent to *either*; then what is the meaning of the third line? Is *change* nominative, or accusative; and, in either case, what must we understand to fill up the construction of *admits*? And what is the "it" which "nature lets fall?" We dare not pronounce with confidence, but we incline to think that Pope's meaning was "nature allows what God sends to fall, or change admits of its falling." The fourth line, again, is exceedingly harsh: "short and but rare" seems to be in apposition to the previous sentence, "a state of things seldom occurring, and not lasting long, till man altered all for the worse."

- I. 195. Say what the use, were finer optics given,
 To inspect a mite, not comprehend the heaven?
 Or touch, if tremblingly alive all o'er,
 To smart and agonize at every pore?
 Or, quick effluvia darting through the brain,
 Die of a rose in aromatic pain?

The general meaning of these lines is plain; but what is the construction of "touch" in the third line, and of "die" in the sixth? We should omit the comma after "touch," and exhibit the construction thus:—"Supposing finer optics were given, what should we gain by inspecting a mite? Supposing touch were tremblingly alive, what should we gain by smarting at every pore? Supposing quick effluvia, &c., what should we gain by dying in aromatic pain?"

- I. 249. The least confusion but in one, not all
 That system only, but the whole must fall.
 Let earth unbalanced from her orbit fly,
 Planets and suns run lawless thro' the sky;

Let ruling angels from their spheres be hurled,
 Being on being wrecked, and world on world;
 Heaven's whole foundations to their centre nod,
 And nature tremble to the throne of God.
 All this dread order break—for whom? for thee?
 Vile worm! oh madness! pride! impiety!

If the reading *tremble* in the eighth line is correct, the lines, after the first two, are exhibiting the consequences of man's transgressing his proper sphere; the smallest disturbance begun in any part of the great order is propagated increasingly through the whole. But the editor's note is inconsistent with the reading in the text, and would require the indicative *trembles*, as he considers that the verbs "run" and "nod" express the consequence of the hypotheses, "Let earth,"—"Let ruling angels." The objection to this is that it is difficult to imagine Pope illustrating "the least confusion but in one" by the high sounding:—

Let ruling angels from their spheres be hurled,
 Being on being wrecked, and world on world.

Again, the ninth line is much more forcible, if the preceding lines from the third are describing the continuous effect of one single cause, man's discontent with his place in creation, than if they describe catastrophes not originating in man. We are not aware, however, that there is any authority for the reading *tremble*, which is essential to this interpretation.

II. 87. Self-love and reason to one end aspire,
 Pain their aversion, pleasure their desire;
 But greedy that, its object would devour,
 This taste the honey, and not wound the flower:
 Pleasure, or wrong or rightly understood,
 Our greatest evil, or our greatest good.

There should have been a note on the construction of the last two lines. "Pleasure" is a repetition from the second line; "or" is used, as it often is by Pope, in the sense of "whether;" "whether wrongly or rightly understood, whether our greatest evil or our greatest good."

Mr. Pattison has corrected the careless punctuation of the older editors in several places; but there are still some passages the meaning of which would be made clearer by an alteration of the stopping. Thus I. 78 and 79 should each have a semicolon at the end; I. 80 should have a mark of interrogation.

There should be only a comma at the end of I. 269 and 270.

II. 11. Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
 Whether he thinks too little or too much.

"His reason such" is equivalent to "such is the character of his mind." This would be plainer if the clause were put in brackets.

IV. 13. Where grows? Where grows it not?

There should be a mark of exclamation, not of interrogation, after the first "grows."

It is not often that the editor fails to explain difficulties of allusion, but we think a note is needed in one or two passages. Thus upon the lines—

- I. 30. Is the great chain, that draws all to agree,
And drawn supports, upheld by God or thee?

There should have been a reference to the Homeric chain, so dear to the later Platonists.

Again, the allusions in the following lines are not immediately obvious—

- III. 102. Build on the wave, or arch beneath the sand.
IV. 24. Some, swelled to gods, confess even virtue vain.
III. 265. Then first the flamen tasted living food.

In this last line the editor gives a note on "flamen," but none on "living food," which stands in much more need of explanation. So shortly afterwards he explains 267, "With heaven's own thunders shook the world below," which it is hard to conceive any one stumbling at, but says nothing of the more difficult 268, "And played the god an engine on his foe."

We proceed now to our examination of the editor's notes. Some of these, as we have mentioned, seem to us unnecessary. We think, for instance, that it might have been left to the reader to find for himself as much information as is given about Catiline on I. 156, or Calvin on IV. 137. It is in rather startling contrast with notes like these, that we read (I. 245), of "the Stoic *ἐμπαρμένη* which comprehended Being as well as Becoming." Again, we see no occasion for such etymological notes as we have on III. 204, 205. "Rill = a trickling stream. The verb, 'to rail' = to trickle, is obsolete. Gr. *ρέω*; Lat. *riens*." "Ravish, Fr. *ravir*; Lat. *rapere*. To seize, to snatch, to carry off. Distinguished from 'ravage,' to spoil, to lay waste." Still less reason is there for the note on "rosary" (II. 280). The word itself does not occur in the text; and if it was to be explained at all, its explanation might at least have been carried further back than the Fr. *roserie*. But our objection here is not so much to what is actually said, as to the absence of any principle on which these particular words could have been singled out as affording material for etymological notes, rather than a hundred others which are passed over in silence.

There are other notes in which we find ourselves dissenting from the view put forward by the editor. Thus, in commenting on

- I. 73. If to be perfect in a certain sphere,
What matters soon or late, or here or there?

he speaks of it as an obscure, hardly intelligible passage, and proposes (apparently for the sake of the rhyme) to transpose "here" and "there." But really the difficulty here is far less than in many of the passages on which he has made no remark. It may be paraphrased thus, "If man is destined to attain perfection somewhere, what difference does it make when it comes? whenever it is, he will be absolutely happy." With regard to the rhyme it might be argued that "sphere" retained a foreign pronunciation, as we have "sphere" and "bear" rhyming in I. 285; but we find "here" and "there" rhyming in IV. 173; "sincere" and "where" in IV. 16, not to mention such rhymes as "great" and "complete" in IV. 287.

II. 2. The proper study of mankind is man.

It seems to us a mistake to suppose any opposition between this and Wordsworth's lines—

"The man whose eye
Is ever on himself, doth look on one
The least of Nature's works."

Pope inculcates the study of human nature, Wordsworth condemns an all-absorbing self-interestedness.

II. 23. "Pope makes it empyreal; Gray, empyréan." Add that each follows Milton in so doing.

II. 34. And showed a Newton as we show an ape.

The editor is in doubt whether this denotes admiration or ridicule on the part of the "superior beings." Is it not surprise at the cleverness of Newton, as we are surprised at the cleverness of an ape?

II. 61. Man, but for that, no action could attend,
And, but for this, were active to no end.

The editor finds a confusion in the second line, because *this* (reason) does not suggest the end, but only guides our action towards it, when it has been already suggested by *that* (self-love). But this is to press too much the words "to no end," which simply mean *temere, frustra*, the general sense being "without reason man would act in vain, or to no purpose."

II. 95. But since not every good we can divide,
And reason bids us for our own provide:
Passions, though selfish, if their means be fair,
List under Reason, and deserve her care;
Those, that imparted, court a nobler aim,
Exalt their kind, and take some virtue's name.

The editor's note on the fifth line here is, "*those, that imparted, i. e.* the passions when reason is imparted to them. Again the fault of obscurity." But, with all Pope's incorrectness, it seems impossible that he would have used the distinctive demonstrative *those* of the

passions just mentioned. If the subject of the verb "court" is the same as the subject of the verb "deserve," the connection between them must have been shown by some such word as "then" or "but;" "these" entirely separates the one from the other. We believe that Pope is here distinguishing between two classes of passions, the self-regarding ("passions though selfish" which "provide for our own") and the social ("those that imparted," which "divide good"): the former may be brought under the control of reason, and will then deserve to have thought taken for them; the latter "court a nobler aim," and develop into virtues.

II. 108. "Reason the card, but passion is the gale."

In the note "card" is explained as "chart" or map. The true explanation is given in the admirable edition of Macbeth, which has appeared in the *Clarendon Press* series. "*The shipman's card*, the circular card on which the thirty-two points of the compass are marked, and on which the needle is fixed. . . . Hence Spenser, *Fairy Queen*, II. 7, 6: 'Upon his card and compass firmes his eye?' " And then follows this passage from the *Essay on Man*.

III. 74. "*As while he dreads it, makes him hope it too.*" The reasons for looking upon death with hope are summed up in one sentence by Jeremy Taylor, '*Life of Christ*,' part 3, 15-19." Surely this note might have been dispensed with.

III. 167. The fury passions from that blood began,
And turned on man, a fiercer savage, man.

The note here is "Fiercer than whom? The context does not supply the other member of the comparison." It is really implied in the word "savage," which means *wild beast*, as in III. 65, *He saves from famine, from the savage saves*. The general meaning is, "men by the indulgence of their passions become fiercer and more dangerous to each other than wild beasts."

IV. 219. "*Macedonia's madman.*" Truth is here sacrificed to alliteration. The overthrow of the Persian empire was not the enterprise of a madman. . . . The conquest had become a topic of national speculation, &c." This seems to us quite beside the mark. It is not the undertaking of impossibilities, but the unquenchable thirst for battle and conquest, which Pope characterises as madness.

IV. 236. *Like good Aurelius let him reign.* What is the meaning of saying that "reign is improperly used of Aurelius?" It would seem that the editor understands Pope to hold up Aurelius as the model of a ruler; but that is not the purpose of the line: Pope merely asserts that the good man is great, whether he succeeds or fails; whether he is in a palace like Aurelius, or in a prison like Socrates.

IV. 349. (Nature) connects in this
 His greatest virtue with his greatest bliss;
 At once his own bright prospect to be blest,
 And strongest motive to assist the rest.

The note on the words "assist the rest" is, "It is not clear whether other motives, or other people are intended." The antithesis of "his own," in the preceding line, should have prevented the supposition that "other motives" could be intended. The idea, expressed with Pope's usual want of correctness, is, that the prospect of future happiness as the reward for right conduct here, joins together the action of self-love and of virtuous feeling, action for the sake of our own happiness and action "to assist the rest," *i. e.*, for the happiness of others.

Having thus noticed what we think to be imperfections in the notes, we are glad to be able to speak with almost unqualified praise of the very interesting and valuable introduction, in which the editor defines the position of Pope as poet and moralist. In doing this he, of course, touches on some disputed points, and we cannot at all times agree in his conclusions. For instance, we think that he exaggerates the effect of the Revolution of 1688 upon literature when he says—"The inevitable consequence (of the introduction of parliamentary government) was that literature was lowered to the level of debate." It would occupy too much space to discuss what was the real cause of the disappearance of earnestness, not only from literature, but from politics, and from religion itself, at the beginning of the eighteenth century; but the fact that the same characteristics are found to prevail under the contemporary despotic governments of the Continent, is surely enough to show that they were not due merely to English constitutionalism. We need not go far, however, to explain the cause of Pope's style of philosophising. As Mr. Pattison says, "the guild of literature was broken up." The humanising, or simplification, of philosophy in the hands of Bacon, Locke, and Hobbes; the court scorn of pedantry, and aversion to sobriety and seriousness; half a century of disillusion after the dreams of the Commonwealth;—these things, together with the spread of education through society, had created a reading public, uninformed and uncritical, to whom the commonplaces of Pope and Addison were the *aufklärung*, the *ne plus ultra* of enlightenment.

Another point in which we cannot quite agree with the editor is in his very high estimate of Pope "as a literary artist." As such, he says, Pope is "surpassed by Gray alone." In no other poet will there "be found that sense of proportion and harmony of parts, which characterise the classic." We cannot think that Mr. Pattison himself would claim this merit for the *Essay on Man*. Here and there we find passages which may be justly described, in Mr. Pat-

tison's words, as "forming an exquisite mosaic work," but as a whole it appears to us absolutely without unity. A great poem should be a natural growth from one root, with all the graceful proportions of nature: Pope in the *Essay* has packed together, as his editor allows, a number of incongruous doctrines; there is no central thought, not even unity of feeling, to connect them. His art no doubt is great; but it is the art which begins by elaborating the parts, and afterwards endeavours to fit them together by diligently plastering over the interstices; the art of a Milton works from within outwards, fusing all the materials into one solid mass by its own central heat.

As Pope appears to us to be praised beyond his merits here, so we think him unfairly criticised in a passage quoted from Professor Bain, p. 15. The subject of the criticism is Pope's use of the argument from analogy to account for man's ignorance—the horse and the ox do not understand the purposes for which man employs them; why should man complain that he cannot understand God's purposes? Mr. Bain says, "Butler would never have gone to the inferior creatures for an analogy." "The comparison is logically unsatisfying," &c. Now, as a matter of fact, we do find Butler on several occasions answering difficulties with regard to man by a reference to the case of animals; and we have higher authority than Butler's for doing this. Independently of authority we hold the analogy to be natural, unavoidable, and satisfactory both to our reason and to our feeling. If a lower degree of reason cannot appreciate the motives of a higher, it is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that the higher will not appreciate the motives of the highest.

We are a little surprised that the Introduction should contain no allusion to Lessing's *Pope ein Metaphysiker*, in which Pope's obligations to King, Shaftesbury, and Malebranche are mentioned, and examples given in which both thoughts and words have been borrowed, especially from the first. In the same essay Lessing points out the difference between the views held by Pope and Leibnitz with reference to the scale of existence, and similar questions, and calls attention to some of Pope's philosophical contradictions. Perhaps the most glaring of these is that in which Pope does away with the effect of the principle that—

"The first almighty cause
Acts not by partial, but by general laws;"

and that "all partial evil" is, therefore, "universal good," by immediately subjoining,—

"The exceptions few; some change since all began;
And what created perfect?"

We may observe that we have noticed two misprints which should be corrected in the next edition. In p. 95, the reference to Hutcheson should be p. 131, not 1317; in p. 102, for "Austen" read "Austin."

J. B. MAYOR.



THE CHURCHES OF ENGLAND.

The Freedom of Opinion necessary in an Established Church in a Free Country. An Address delivered at Sion College, by SIR JOHN DUKE COLERIDGE. Macmillan's Magazine, March.

An Address on the Connection of Church and State. Delivered at Sion College, Feb. 18, 1868. By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D.D., Dean of Westminster. Macmillan & Co.

The Three Irish Churches. An Address delivered at Sion College, Jan. 28, 1869. By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D.D., Dean of Westminster. John Murray.

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Clergymen made Scarce. A Letter to the Bishop of London. By a PRESBYTER. 1867. Second Edition. Hall & Co.

The Present Dangers of the Church of England. By W. G. CLARK, M.A., Vice-Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. Macmillan & Co.

DURING the last two years Sion College has been emerging from the obscurity in which for two long centuries it has lain concealed. When the Dean of Westminster's address on the connection of Church and State was the subject of comment in the daily papers, everybody was asking, Where is Sion College? and very few people were able to answer. The great world of London has migrated without the City, and the few dingy buildings which form the library, chapel, and almshouses of this ancient foundation are scarcely to be distinguished from the shops and warehouses by which they are surrounded. In the seventeenth century it was the favourite resort of the London ministers. In the troubled times of the Long

Parliament and the Commonwealth it was here they met to sign leagues and covenants, and to make ordinances against "Popery, Prelacy, Arianism, Socinianism," and every other conceivable heresy, known or unknown. Even so late as the Savoy Conference the London clergy, who were mostly on the side of the Puritans, had their special meetings at Sion College. Two years ago the Rector of Bishopsgate was President. Besides some other salutary reforms and improvements, he began the custom of "Evening Meetings," which have been continued by his successors in the presidency. At these meetings papers have been read on various subjects. Of these the most important are those which concern the National Church.

From many different quarters the question of the State Church is forced upon the public mind. Outside, there is the Roman Catholic, the avowed enemy of the Church of England, working ceaselessly for its overthrow. The "Liberation" Dissenter is scarcely less active in his opposition to the Church of England so far as it is a State institution. The High Churchman is daily becoming less satisfied with the strong Protestantism of the Church's standards, while the advancing thought of our day is rendering it impossible for some other men to be bound by the rigid formularies of a past age. One other item of antagonism, silent, indeed, but more important than all the others, is the steady and uniform growth of Dissent. It is true that some of the religious difficulties of our time are common both to Churchmen and Dissenters. Which of the two shall best be able to meet them is one of the questions at issue.

The old objections to State churches, as well as the arguments in their defence, to which we have been accustomed for the last thirty years, may now be set aside as irrelevant. It is not a question either of the duty of the State to support the truth, or of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the voluntary principle. In the hands of Dr. Stanley the controversy assumes a new aspect. The State Church becomes not, as it was supposed to be, an institution for the arrest of civil and religious liberty, but for their advancement. The object is not to crush the Dissenter by opposition, but if possible to comprehend him, and where that is impossible, to secure for him toleration and equality. This view of a State Church is not something taken up merely to meet a present difficulty. It is connected with a theology which regards the Divine Being as carrying on His work of education by slow and silent progress in individuals, families, and nations. Its advocates are willing that the State Church principle be examined and tried by the experience of the past, not for a moment denying the many evils and imperfections inseparably connected with it, yet maintaining that it is the best within our reach. The history of the past seems to say that no other was

possible; that the growth of the Church in any State inevitably implied its connection with the State. What the circumstances of the future may be must be left to the future to declare.

When people speak of a State Church they often forget that the connection between Church and State has not always been the same. When we take a concrete Church, as that of England, Scotland, or Ireland, and say that it is to be disestablished, we have immediately to state the items which make up what we consider disestablishment. In the case of the Church of Ireland it consisted mainly in excluding a few bishops from the House of Lords, who, indeed, had not permanent seats, and in leaving the Church to choose its own officers. The deprivation of a third of the Church's property was called disendowment, and reckoned something quite distinct from disestablishment. There was added the public declaration of the Government of the country that the Church in Ireland was no longer a State Church. It was this which constituted it a disestablished Church, so far as it is disestablished. It was left in possession of two-thirds of its property and all its churches, some of which are to be kept in repair by the Government, as in some special sense belonging to the nation. State establishment in its first and simplest form is when the State allows the Church as a corporate body to hold property. The next form is when the State interferes to regulate that property, or to put restrictions upon it. Another form is when the State directly gives property to the Church. The State connection may be where the State simply protects the Church; or where an alliance is made between the Church and the State, with fixed terms of agreement. It may be where the State constitutes the Church; or where the State, as the supreme ruler of all communities as well as of all individuals in the realm, is the final judge of differences in the Church. In one or more of these forms, every sect or religious body in any State is a State Church. There can be no abstract definition of a State Church. In every case it is a question of degree. Disestablishment, therefore, can only mean a re-adjustment of the present relations between the Church and the State.

The history of the Church in England would furnish examples of all, and more than all, these forms of State connection. When the missionaries came to the Saxon kingdoms, they first obtained permission to preach. As they made converts they built churches and began to gather property. In the condition of society which then existed, when a ruler became Christian it would be a great step towards the conversion of his kingdom. Christian kings, by taking the side of the preachers of Christianity, thereby made Christianity the State religion. As centuries passed, and the property of the Church accumulated, the civil power had to devise new restrictions

on property left to the Church, which became equivalent to an assertion of right to control it. As the Papal claims to supremacy increased, so did the antagonism between the ecclesiastical and the civil authorities. The King and the Pope both claimed to be head of the Church in England. Henry VIII. vigorously took possession of what his predecessors had always claimed, but not always with equal decision. He rejected entirely the Papal supremacy. If his daughter Mary brought it back, it was even then in the way of alliance. Queen Elizabeth again exorcised the Bishop of Rome. This time the Papal claims were effectually dealt with, for not only the Pope, but the Pope's religion, was driven out of England. The relations of the Church and State were changed. The Pope's Church was disestablished. A new Church, to speak politically, was created. To speak more accurately, a corrupted Church was reformed. Under Elizabeth the connection between Church and State was of the closest kind. The Church was then moulded into a political institution. Out of the confiscated revenues of the unreformed Church the new Church was endowed. Had the Bishop of Rome been the harmless and politically helpless individual that he is to-day, Queen Elizabeth's Church might have assumed a different form. But with the great power of the Papacy planning for the overthrow of her kingdom, she was compelled to repress with an iron hand the Romanist without and the Puritan within. Liberty of conscience, it is often said, was not understood in those days; but it was impossible that it could be either understood or practised so long as the national life was endangered by the great political power of the Church of Rome. The Puritan felt the oppression of State tyranny, and groaned under it. More freedom might have been given him according to our judgment now, but not so in the judgment of Queen Elizabeth. The Puritan wanted to be under a government distinct from that of the State. He wanted to obey God rather than man, when the divine and the royal commands were not in harmony. But no civil power ever permitted this, when it feared danger to its own existence. Christianity and the moral constitution of man have their foundation in right; but all civil government depends on might. The great "*Leviathan*," to use the illustration of Thomas Hobbes, must first secure its own existence before it can yield protection or liberty to the individual members of whom it is composed. All liberty to the subjects of any commonwealth must be measured by its compatibility with the safety of that commonwealth. This we apprehend was what Hobbes meant when he said that religion, morality, and law have their origin from the State.

Since the time of Queen Elizabeth the connection between Church and State has been nominally the same, yet actually it has been very

different at different times. Under James and the first Charles a great part of the spiritual power denied to the Pope was put into the hands of the bishops. James I. was content that the bishops should be bishops by divine right, so long as he was acknowledged a king by divine right. This confederation of the king and the bishops ended in a revolution. A new Church, politically, was established under the Commonwealth. This Church was as much the creation of the State, and as completely under it, as the Church had been under Elizabeth. The "Leviathan" was again compelled to rule with might. Under the second Charles the bishops regained some of their ecclesiastical power. Under the second James the State Church resisted the State, and obeyed God rather than man. It willingly served the Prince of Orange. It was fostered and strengthened by Queen Anne. Under the Georges it became the instrument of political parties. Since then the State has been gradually receding from interference with ecclesiastical matters. The State connection to-day is very different from what it was in the time of Queen Elizabeth.

The principle on which the Reformed Church of England was established under Elizabeth is sometimes said to have been a comprehension; but this is an ingenious theory rather than a fact. The Thirty-nine Articles plainly speak the language of the Augustinian theology which was adopted by the Swiss Reformers. Many of the bishops, in whose hands Elizabeth placed the government of the Church, had been in exile, and were full of the theology of Calvin. The old priests who had conformed to the Roman Catholic religion under Mary were allowed to remain under Elizabeth, but only on condition of their subscribing the Articles, and teaching the doctrines set forth in the Homilies. The Pope and the Pope's peculiar dogmas were excluded. The Reformers under Queen Elizabeth did not differ as to doctrines, but only as to ceremonies, and in these a rigid conformity was enforced and no latitude allowed. The "comprehension" appears to have been the result of circumstances rather than of intention. It was not till the time of Charles I. that the Church of England was wide enough to admit the Arminians. It was then, too, that the High Churchmen came in, not by permission, but by mere might. New necessities demanded the comprehension of different parties. With the High Churchmen came in such Rationalists as Hales and Chillingworth. At the restoration of Charles II., though the Nonconformists, who had scruples about the ceremonies, were excluded, yet the Church was made wider. It embraced many of the Presbyterians, who were allowed to subscribe with an express permission to make an explanation of the sense in which they understood the formularies. It also embraced the Latitudinarians, whose

views of Church polity and ceremonies agreed with those of Elizabeth's divines, but differed from those of the High Churchmen, and whose doctrines, like those of the High Churchmen, were at variance with those of the Calvinists, which were properly those of the Articles of Religion. As a historical fact, the Church of England has become a Broad Church. Is it broad enough? Or, what is perhaps a more correct form of the question, can it bear to be made broader?

Sir John Coleridge distinctly declares that it is not his wish to change the formularies of the Church of England. His position is the matter-of-fact one, that if the Church is to embrace the thought of the nation some changes must be made.

"An Established Church," he says, "in a free country must take note of and represent the religion of that country, and if the religious opinion of the country is various, the Church must contain a variety of religious opinions. No doubt it is a question of degree in which it is hard to draw the line. It is enough for me to say that the limits must be drawn far more widely than most people are prepared to draw them. It is idle to rave against the intellect, and to endeavour by tests to convert the deductions of clerical theology into necessary Christian truths. It is to my mind as certain as anything can be, which is contingent, that if the Church remains established it will remain so by the sacrifice of its present tests. Do not suppose, however, that this future, which I think inevitable, is what in itself I desire, or that it appears to me all good unmingled with evil."

The history of the Church of England shows, we have said, that it is a Broad Church by the force of circumstances, rather than by choice. The State which, under Elizabeth and James, tried to reduce all to uniformity of doctrine, was afterwards compelled to include all without uniformity. The same formularies remained, and they were subscribed according to the sense which each party put upon them. While the State allows subscription of this kind, it cannot be fairly said that there is any moral obliquity in the act of subscribing. But to him that thinketh it sin, to him it is sin. There are men to whom subscription has been a burden—men who have thought that by subscription they were bound to believe, or to profess belief, in every statement of the Articles, even though it might be something which is now plainly disproved, or which no rational man believes. The usual view of subscription is, that the subscribers are bound by the sense of the imposers. The High Churchmen, who were the first to depart from the literal and grammatical sense of the Articles, yet claimed agreement with them. It was in the time of Laud, and with the object of favouring his party, that "His Majesty's Declaration" was prefixed to the Articles, forbidding any man to put "his own sense or comment" upon them. It was impossible that this deception could be long concealed. The theology of High Church-

men was utterly at variance with the theology of the standards of the Church of England. When the party had reasoned itself into its legitimate position it was avowed that there had been a departure from the Articles. Tract XC. advocated the principle that the clergy are not bound by the original meaning of the Articles if another meaning with which they agree can be put upon them.

It appears that there are men still dissatisfied with subscription. The formularies of the Church are not in harmony with modern thought. The complaint of the bishops of the decrease of candidates for orders increases with every ordination. And those that do present themselves for ordination are not what is called the "good men" of the Universities. The desire of Mr. Clark, the Public Orator of the University of Cambridge, to renounce his orders, and the resignation of Mr. Sedley Taylor, another Fellow of Trinity, are but visible signs of what is invisible to the unobservant world. The progress which has been made in Bible criticism forbids educated men to view the Bible as it was viewed by the Reformers and theologians of the sixteenth century. Are men to subscribe formularies with the proviso that they do not entirely believe what they subscribe, or are these tests to be abolished?

Sir John Coleridge dealt only with one of the difficulties that beset the Church of England. The question of subscription is only a temporary affliction—an acute disease in the body ecclesiastical. But the Church has an old chronic affliction which it has borne for centuries, and with as little hope of being healed as the woman had who spent her all on physicians. This complaint may be called the patronage of Church livings, including, as it does in England, the sale of benefices, and every other conceivable evil that may follow the triumph of mammon in the Church. Such names as Julio de Medicis and Jerome de Ghinucci, among the pre-Reformation bishops, are connected with histories which tell us that the patronage of the Church was not better administered under the Popes than it was after the Reformation. Not better, we say; yet it was scarcely possible to have been much worse. Under Henry, Elizabeth, and James, many of the bishops obtained their bishoprics only on condition of giving up large portions of the episcopal revenues to the king or the nobles. The ordinary mode of obtaining a benefice was by making a bargain with the patron, either to give him a certain sum of money or an annual payment out of the income of the living. "The disease spreadeth," said Archbishop Sandys; "for patrons gape for gain, and hungry fellows, destitute of all good learning and godly zeal, yea, scarcely clothed with common honesty, having money, find ready entrance to the Church." Bishop Jewel says, "The masters of the work build benefice upon benefice, and deanery

upon deanery, as if Rome were still in England." "Non-residences," said John Penry, "have cut the throat of our Church." Dr. Robert Some, of Cambridge, said, "The sale and merchandise of Church livings is cried out against in court, city, and university. It is so common that it cannot, and so shameless that it will not, be hid." The same thing might have been said at every period of the three hundred years that have intervened since the days of Bishop Jewel and Dr. Robert Some. And to this day the sale of livings and making merchandise of the souls of men, is as common and as shameless as ever.

That the traffic in Church livings has not ceased, we are reminded by the advertising columns of almost every daily or weekly paper. A recent number of the *Ecclesiastical Gazette*, which is circulated gratuitously among the clergy, has eight or nine columns filled entirely with advertisements of advowsons and next presentations for sale. Six or seven ecclesiastical agents, in the open blaze of the daylight, advertise for purchasers of "Church preferment," and call attention to their "private registers," forwarded on "confidential application." One agent says that he has "one hundred Church preferments for sale," and that he has registered the requirements of "three hundred clients fully prepared to purchase." Any one curious to be initiated into the mysteries of buying the care or cure of souls, has only to enclose two stamps, and the "private register" is forwarded by the next post. The second step is to enter on a correspondence with them "that sell." The recommendations to the different livings are of various kinds. Some have very aged incumbents; some have pleasant neighbourhoods; some are near watering-places; others have trout streams, small populations, good society, and—the culmination of clerical blessedness—"no Dissenters." For one or two thousand pounds any clergyman may buy himself a Goshen, with the prospect of "immediate possession."

A stranger, that is, a secular person unused to clerical ideas, might suppose, previous to experience to the contrary, that the life of a clergyman was one of entire disinterestedness and self-devotion. He may have heard of Apostles that went forth to convert the world without scrip or purse for their journey, and he may have wondered at their simplicity. But when he knows something of the mode of obtaining a benefice in the Church of England, he will see that the trade of preaching is not altogether foolishness. It is difficult to understand how the English people, so eager for reform, and so deeply interested in all national institutions, should so long have endured the mal-administration of the property of the Church. It has become appropriated by a class. Livings descend with families. A prudent man who sends his son to the university, at the same time

secures for him an advowson or a next presentation. It is one of the profitable ways of investing money. Doing the work of the Church is only a secondary consideration, even when it is a consideration at all. Incumbents are now compelled by law to reside on their benefices; but what comes by compulsion has never the value of what is done with a willing heart. So recent as the early part of this century there was no law to enforce the residence of the holder of a living. In 1810, out of the 9,754 incumbents of livings in the Church of England, according to a Parliamentary return 5,395 did not reside in their parishes. They did no work; they simply received the tithes and rents, leaving their spiritual duties to be performed by stipendiary curates. This represents so many thousands of men becoming clergymen for no other end than to enjoy the honours and the emoluments of their office.

There is another aspect of the preferment purchase question which has not received much attention, because the facts connected with it do not often come to light. Some men have money to buy, or their friends have money to buy for them. But there are other men who merely speculate. Any unscrupulous man may get a living if he has sufficient courage to make a venture, or sufficient want of principle to render him insensible to the results that may possibly follow. The modes of raising money are the same as in other cases where a man speculates without capital. The only difference is that in buying a living he must strive to evade the law against simony. The effect of this law, like that of tests, is to keep out the man who has a tender conscience, while to other men it is no hindrance. The writer of "*Clergymen made Scarce*," who seems to have passed through every phase of clerical life on the unbeneficed side, speaks of a correspondence which he had with an incumbent who was to sell his right to presentation and immediately retire.

"This living was worth £700 a-year, one half from tithe and the other from pew rents. The sum wanted was £5,000, and immediate possession. I said that I was quite inexperienced in these matters; £5,000 was a large sum, supposing I had as much, which I had not, it would be £250 a-year at five per cent., and the capital safe. But if I expend it on a next presentation, when I die I lose all. 'The way to provide against that,' said the rector, 'is by a life insurance for the amount.' 'But it is a large sum,' I repeated with emphasis. The rector replied that it was only what his wife paid to put him there. He wanted to spend a few years on the Continent, and when he returned, to lay out the money again on another living. I put my hand to my head, feeling instinctively, yet vaguely, that there was something more which I ought to say. 'Are we not,' I asked, 'in negotiating about this business, contemplating something illegal? Is there not an oath to be taken by the presentee calling God to witness that he has not used any means, direct or indirect, to get the presentation?' 'There is such an oath,' said the rector, 'but the ecclesiastical agents' lawyer has a

form by which the law can be evaded.' 'Evaded!' I said. 'Nothing wrong,' answered the rector. 'I know excellent, upright men who have done it, and who would not have done it had it been wrong. Good men, both High Church and Evangelical, do it daily. It is quite common; nobody thinks it wrong.'

The private arrangements that are made with patrons rarely come to light. They are not generally creditable to any of the parties, and frequently altogether illegal, except on the "evasion" principle. There are cases where several persons are interested in the patronage, and the only mode of satisfying their claims is by dividing the money obtained for the presentation. The best bargains are sometimes made with clergymen who are themselves without property; but who receive loans by insurance policies and other available means. This sometimes involves them in debts and difficulties which embitter their lives, and bring lasting injury to their parishes. Cases of this kind are known to most clergymen and to all bishops. There are cases publicly known where men have got inducted into the livings, and after possession was obtained there was no money to be found to fulfil the agreement between them and the patrons. This has resulted in sequestration and suspension—with the benefice being served for long terms of years by stipendiary curates.

The livings which are not in private hands are in the patronage of the Crown, the Lord Chancellor, the Bishops, the Colleges, the Cathedral Chapters, and the incumbents of other livings. Of these, the administration of those belonging to the Colleges is the least liable to objection. The men presented may not, in every case, be the best parish ministers; but, as a rule, they always have some appreciable merit. The crown livings are subject to the changes and caprices of different governments. Those in the gift of the Lord Chancellor are proverbially small, and are generally given to men who have been some years in the service of the Church. Dean and Chapter livings are disposed of either by the members of the chapter among themselves, or by presenting them in turns to their friends. Episcopal patronage is exercised in many different ways. One bishop studs his diocese with sons, nephews, and sons-in-law, putting them frequently into parishes for the management of which they have no earthly capacity, and making it a serious business for his successor to buy them out by giving them less important livings with larger incomes. Besides providing for his immediate relations, a bishop has often to remember the friends of the friends who in other days helped him. Until very lately, a Whig or a Tory bishop might be known by the preferment which he had given to members of Whig or Tory families. It is difficult for any ordinary observer to make out the principle on which a bishop acts in the distribution

of his patronage. The probability is that many bishops, in order to act fairly, avoid following a principle at all. The amount of their patronage is too small to enable them to promote all the men whom they may want to promote, while their dioceses are too large to enable them to know the merits of all their clergy. An intercessor is often needed, or a special introduction from some one who has access to the bishop. But this also may fail. There are bishops who give to "every one that asketh," and there are others that turn away just because they are asked. It is said that some bishops, when an important parish is vacant, are very careful in the choice of a clergyman to whom the preferment is to be given. Others reckon it a matter of the merest indifference, acting on the principle that one man, or at least one priest, is quite as good as another. Some of the appointments made by bishops bear evidence that the first names on the list have been taken without any consideration of the special requirements of the parish. Men that are no preachers are sometimes placed over congregations that can only be kept together by preaching. We have known men appointed to churches where it was not possible for them to be heard by one-half of the people; and the sole reason of the appointment may have been that they were the first to ask, or that they had a friend to intercede with the bishop for them. The last form of episcopal patronage is when a bishop promotes the men of his own party. There are many things to be said against this, but it argues that the bishop is doing his best, according to his light, to provide for the welfare of the parishes. In this way some dioceses are filled with "evangelical" incumbents, and others with those of the "High-Church" party. Some men get preferment merely because they have taken up with earnestness the views of some particular bishop.

It is impossible to give the details of the multitude of channels into which Church property and Church patronage may flow. A clergyman who wrote lately to one of the weekly papers on the abuse of patronage, gave an account of seven parishes in the neighbourhood in which he lived. These may fairly be taken as an epitome of the whole system of patronage as now exercised in the Church of England. He says:—

"The parish of which I am now curate was originally a Lord Chancellor's living. It was bought by the wife of the present incumbent. This was a legal transaction; some of the Lord Chancellor's livings were recently sold in expectation that they would be bought by men of property, who would add something to their value. This parish is surrounded by six others. Into the present incumbencies of these I have made inquiries, as far as it was possible to get at transactions, some of which were in secret. The first was an ordinary case of next presentation, which was bought for a few hundred pounds thirty years ago at an auction in London. The second

was a peculiar one. The present incumbent's father had a living in the diocese worth £3,000 a year. The bishop wished to secure this living for a relative. The old rector agreed with the bishop to vacate this living on condition that one worth £900 a year were given to his son, who had just taken orders. The third parish was given to the present incumbent because the income was small, and he was a man of some private property. The fourth was a family living. The fifth was bought by the present incumbent's friends, that is, by himself, while he was curate of a neighbouring parish. The sixth was a new district; the present incumbent contributed £2,000 towards building a church that he might have the first presentation."

The last mode of buying oneself in furnishes an important part of the employment of the ecclesiastical agents. It is looked upon as the least sinful. It is encouraged by incumbents who want new churches built in their parishes, and it is defended by some because of the apparent gain which it brings to the Church. It is said by those who profess to know that, but for this arrangement, many of the new churches in the suburbs of London would never have been built.

The acute disease of a narrow creed and the chronic affliction of abused patronage are threatening the life of the Church of England. Sir John Coleridge and some others ascribe the decrease of "good men" from the universities to the tests required before ordination. There may be some truth in this, but the more probable cause is the uncertainty of the means of existence, not to say of fulfilling one's vocation, without having to deal in transactions from which every sincere and honest mind instinctively recoils. A certain number of men must be ordained, and if the best men of the universities refuse to take orders the bishops must be content with what they can get. If university men entirely fail, their place can be taken by "literate," or, what is worse still, by men who, without a proper school education, have had nothing but the meagre training of a theological college. The result is that the character of the clergy is visibly deteriorating. A few more years of the same downward course and scholarship, gentlemanliness, and refinement will cease to be the marked qualifications of an English clergyman.

According to the last census, about one-half of the worshipping people of England were outside of the Established Church. They had formed themselves into distinct Churches. Alongside of the position of the Church of England it will be profitable to have a view of the actual condition of the religious communities outside of the Church. Among these are included the Roman Catholics, who are not indeed a very numerous body; and, as their adherents are principally imported from Ireland, we may set them aside as not being one of the sects indigenous to England. For the same reason we exclude Presbyterians of all kinds. They are mainly importa-

tions from Scotland. We have left, as the chief sects, the Independents, Baptists, Unitarians, and Wesleyans.

The first three of these sects are the oldest; and, in one sense, the Unitarians are the oldest of the three, but, in another sense, the youngest. As Unitarians, they are modern; but under their other name of Presbyterians they are old. The principles of Presbyterianism were in the Church of England in the early part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, perhaps with the very beginnings of the Reformation. They were chiefly adopted by the early Puritans. The Presbyterians came into power with the Long Parliament. Under Cromwell they gave place to the Independents. They were ejected in 1662 by the Act of Uniformity. The famous two thousand divines are represented to-day historically and lineally by two hundred Unitarian pastors. The decay of Presbyterianism in England is a history full of instruction to the student of religious tendencies. The aristocracy and landowners of the country were once divided between Presbyterianism and Conformity. So late as the early part of the last century the City of London was the stronghold of the Presbyterian ministers, and the city merchants their chief supporters. Their descendants are no longer Nonconformists. They have long ago been re-absorbed into the National Church. Many of the bishops of the last century, as Butler, Secker, and Barrington, were the children of Presbyterians. Even in our own day the successor of the great Puritan leader, Lord Saye and Sele, is a dignitary of the Church. Those who have not conformed are found chiefly among the Unitarians. It was only the other day that the last of the descendants of Edmund Calamy died at Exeter, a member of the Unitarian or Presbyterian Church. The Presbyterians, apparently, had every element necessary to the constitution of a lasting ecclesiastical body. They had numbers, wealth, piety, learning, an honourable history, and yet they went to decay. The sect narrowed as its theology widened. We cannot enter upon reasons, but the simple facts are that the tone of the Established Church and of the Presbyterians became one. Their original principles may have stood distinctly over against each other, but their spirit had assimilated, and conformity thus became easy to the Nonconformist. As Presbyterianism passed into Unitarianism, those of the Presbyterians who clung to the faith of the Trinity found a refuge in the Established Church; while one or two ministers of the Church of England, who had lost faith in the Trinity, united with the remnant to form the community of Unitarians.

The Independents are the most numerous of the old Dissenters. The names of above two thousand ministers are registered in "The Congregational Year-Book." It is difficult to fix the date of the origin of Independency. If we are to credit some of its modern defenders,

it began with Adam, who was an Independent before the creation of Eve. All religious parties seem to think that truth and antiquity must go together. In the seventeenth century the advocates of Episcopacy traced its origin to Adam presiding as a patriarch over his descendants. Milton recommended them to go higher, and begin with Lucifer. Dr. Waddington, who has earned some reputation as the historian of Independency, traces it all through the dark ages up to the Fathers and Apostles. Its first appearance in England was in the person of Robert Brown, a clergyman of the Church of England, whose character, as history records it, is only indifferent. It was taken up by Henry Barrowe, John Penry, and some others who had been Presbyterians. It differed from Presbyterianism in this, that it un-churched the Established Church, denying it to be a Church. Its adherents were called the "Brethren of the Separation," because they separated themselves from the national worship and formed distinct congregations, consisting, as they said, of nothing but elect or believing souls. These old Independents were driven out of England in the time of James I. They fled to Holland, and finally to America. The next appearance of Independency was in the Westminster Assembly, when the "seven Dissenting Brethren" opposed the Directory for Worship and Church Government. Under Cromwell they displaced the Presbyterians. In 1657, Independency was about to be declared the national religion, but Cromwell died, and the Savoy Declaration never became law. The Independents had nearly the same fate as the old Presbyterians. They made little or no progress till the beginning of this century. The present Independents can scarcely be reckoned the descendants of those of the seventeenth century. In the "Congregational Year-Book" for 1870 there are 222 churches registered under London and its suburbs. Of these only 20 had their origin between 1700 and 1790. According to a MS. in Dr. Williams's library, in London within the "Bills of Mortality," in 1715 there were 29 Presbyterian Churches, 21 Independent, and 25 Baptist. In 1773 the Presbyterians were 19, the Baptists 12, and the Independents still 21.

The Baptists, differing from the Independents solely on the question of infant baptism, may also trace their origin to the beginning of the seventeenth century. It was not, however, till the time of the Commonwealth that they were cognizable as a distinct sect. Even to this day there are congregations partly Independents and partly Baptists. There are also two kinds of Baptists differing in doctrine, one following Calvin and the other Arminius. This difference began in Holland at the very beginning of the Baptist sect. The Independents originally were rigid Calvinists, but Arminianism and other doctrines have found an entrance among them. The Baptists

are in numbers about half the Independents. The Particular Baptists have 875 ministers, and the General or Arminian 123.

The great family of Wesleyans, originating in the last century, have nothing in common with the other Dissenters, unless it be that they are in the same company as outsiders of the Church. They refuse indeed to be called Dissenters, for though not conformists, it is not from any objections to the doctrines or ceremonies of the Church of England, but solely that circumstances which they could not control have placed them where they are. In numbers, including all kinds of Wesleyans, they constitute one half of the Nonconformists. They are not, as a body, hostile to the Church of England, and those who look into the future are not without hopes that the bonds between them and the Church of England may yet be drawn closer. The old Connexion has 2,280 preachers; the New Connexion 140; the Free Church 250; and the Primitive Methodists 780. It would throw some light on the past history of the Church of England could we get at the facts that would account for the distribution of different kinds of Dissenters in different parts of the country. The Independents are numerous in London and Lancashire, the Baptists in the eastern counties, while in Lincolnshire, Staffordshire, and Cornwall Wesleyanism is almost the national religion.

Our estimate of the intelligence and religious worth of these bodies, and how far they are likely to rival the Established Church or to supplement it, must be made chiefly from those who are employed among them as preachers. Of the two thousand Independent ministers an appreciable number have taken degrees at a Scotch University or at the University of London. A few have studied in Germany. A considerable number have had no regular training; but the great majority have been educated at one or other of the ten or twelve Independent Colleges or Academies, which by a curiously uneconomical division of labour are scattered over the country. Taking at random a page of ministers in the "Year-Book," we find that two studied at Glasgow, two at Edinburgh, five had not any regular education, and the rest, forty-seven in number, are from the theological seminaries. The Unitarian ministers are understood to have a higher education than the Independents. It appears, however, from the "Unitarian Almanack," that the Scotch and German Universities contribute much the same proportion as among the Independents. The number without regular training is proportionably equal, while the majority are from the colleges of the denomination. The Baptists are below the average standard of the Independents. Many of their ministers are engaged in business, and the number of those who have no education with a view to the ministry is much larger than among the Independents. This, however, is a test of

but limited application, for some of the ablest men in all denominations have been without a regular education. When any man affects to despise "literate" in the Church of England, we have only to mention the names of Richard Baxter, Bishop Warburton, John Newton, and Edward Bickersteth. In some of the sketches of Mr. Spurgeon's life it is said that this great preacher was educated at an "agricultural" College. From his case it is evident that wisdom may be learned even among them "that hold the plough," and "whose talk is of bullocks." The Wesleyans were long opposed to giving their ministers any special training. When they built a Theological College thirty years ago, it was the occasion of a schism in the body. It is now necessary for every minister to spend three years at one of their denominational Colleges before he can be admitted on the itinerancy. The number of men with Scotch diplomas is much smaller among the Wesleyans than among the Independents. This may be accounted for by the steps of the probation which the Connexion prescribes, and partly perhaps by the paucity of Wesleyans in Scotland. At the present time the Conference receives about eighty candidates for the ministry annually. Of these, by an estimate recently made, about twenty are the sons of ministers who have had a good education at the Kingswood or Woodhouse Grove Schools, which were established for the education of the sons of preachers. About ten are the sons of middle-class tradesmen, who have been educated at the Wesleyan Collegiate Schools, established at Taunton and Sheffield. The remaining fifty are men who have previously followed some business, trade, or profession. All these bodies do not seem to have among their 6,500 preachers half-a-dozen of men educated either at Oxford or Cambridge. There is one in the Unitarian list, one in the Independent, and one or two among the Baptists and Wesleyans. It is a fact worth examining that a clergyman of the Church of England rarely becomes a preacher in a Dissenting body. If he leaves the Church he starts for himself, or, what is most frequently the case, joins some anti-clerical sect, such as the Society of Plymouth Brethren.

The first obvious difference between the Church clergyman and the Dissenting minister is, that, as a rule, they come from two different classes of society. Admitting this to be true, which, indeed, it would be idle to dispute, it argues an imperfection, both in the Church and in the Dissenting bodies, that they do not draw their ministers from every class. A Christian Church should be a republic, a leveller of class and caste distinctions, a true "city of God," in which there is

"No high, no low, no great, no small."

The minister of religion should be below no one, and above no one, but capable of all conditions with all men. It is among the humbler classes that the Dissenters have done their work; and just in proportion as Dissenters grow rich and adopt the customs of the higher classes, they conform to the Church of England. This is a great grief to the thorough anti-Church Dissenter. He erects on it an argument against the connection of Church and State, and exclaims against what he calls his "unrighteous exclusion" from the two great Universities. We are not disposed to regard this as more than an imaginary grievance. There is no good reason why he should ever have been excluded from the Universities. The tests which excluded him were meant chiefly to exclude the Roman Catholic. It was no great hardship to an orthodox Dissenter to subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. The old Nonconformists always urged these Articles as the basis of a comprehension within the Establishment. Moreover, if the Dissenters had not a clear course at Oxford and Cambridge, they have had the London University for now thirty years, with all the Universities of Scotland and Germany open to them; or, what would have been better for them than all these, they might have collected the scattered forces of their denominational colleges into a great university, into which they might have imported any amount of learning and culture that pleased them.

But for some years the English Universities have been open to them with some restrictions, and before long even these restrictions will probably be removed. It has, however, been found as a fact that not many Dissenters have matriculated at the Universities, and those that did have generally become Churchmen before they left. The opening of the Universities has not added any university men to the Dissenting ministry. This is a fact which has some meaning, and it is an anxious question for the Dissenter what the future will do. This subject was well discussed by Mr. Neville Goodman in an interesting paper on "The Universities and our Ministers," read last year before the "Autumnal Assembly of the Congregational Union." Mr. Goodman does not reckon the advantages of an Oxford or Cambridge education as much exceeding those of the London University. He reduces them to these three:—

"(1.) A stimulus to high attainments, such as is generated by the association, and from the very atmosphere of these ancient seats of learning. (2.) A definiteness of thought and a precision of language, which is ever the mark of a scholar, and more especially of the gregarious scholar. (3.) Last and not least, a certain social status, which is of some practical value."

Over against these he places as disadvantages—" (1) expense; (2) the absorbing nature of the pursuits; and (3) the danger of defection." The last is a lesson from past experience. It is accompanied with the hope that, though "the storming party" has been defeated,

yet, when the whole army goes up, the victory may be gained. Various schemes, such as erecting Nonconformist Colleges in Oxford and Cambridge, have been proposed to segregate the Dissenters from other students. All these Mr. Goodman condemns, as defeating the very object to be obtained, which is to let Dissenters breathe the free atmosphere of university life. The second disadvantage would withdraw the students from theological study, or involve the necessity of studying theology after the university course was finished. But the matter of expense is the most serious of all. Men who are able to send their sons to Oxford and Cambridge never intend them to be Dissenting ministers. They are not of that class in society which furnishes candidates for the Nonconformist ministry. Mr. Goodman's words are: "Many, perhaps most, of our students are eleemosynary; and I cannot conceive that the community of subscribers will continue to furnish large funds for the benefit of those over whom they have no supervision, either directly or indirectly." The expense of the Universities excludes the Dissenter more certainly than the tests. But it also excludes large numbers of the candidates for orders in the Church of England, so that the Church, as well as the Dissenters, is losing the benefit of what are properly her own schools of learning.

But beyond or beneath all these things there is another difficulty which is equally in the way of the Church of England and the Nonconformist communities, and which seems to baffle them all. That is, how to secure for the ministry men with a sufficient education, and, at the same time, the other qualifications necessary for this office. The great distinction between the clergyman and the Dissenting minister is not, after all, the difference of the classes in society from which they come, but of the mode of their being received as teachers of religion. The Church minister has simply to pass the prescribed course at the University, and if the bishop is satisfied with his testimonials, he is ordained without any reference even to his capacity to read or speak in public. The Dissenting minister, on the other hand, must have given evidence of some special qualification for ministerial work before he is sent to college. The one is trained from his youth with a view to the ministry; the other has passed his youth before his career in life has been decided on, and when it is too late to receive a thorough education. Each mode has its advantages and its disadvantages. The Church system secures regularly educated men; the other plan secures men of good natural gifts, whose way into the service of the Church is not so easy as into the ministry among the Dissenters. It is to be added, that often the work to be done among the humbler classes requires men who originally belonged to them. This would seem to point out the necessity in a really National Church, of divers kinds of men in the ministry,

and if this diversity cannot be obtained in one community, the necessity of Dissent is inevitable until a nearer realization of our ideal of a Church.

The war-cry of the Dissenter at the present hour is "Religious Equality." He supposes that the State does not deal fairly with him while he has to contend with a richly endowed and highly privileged National Church. That he is under many disadvantages is not to be denied. But they are such as Dissenters might overcome without the disestablishment of the Church of England. It is a complaint which we frequently hear from the Dissenting minister, that in social standing the most insignificant curate is preferred before him. The curate is the recognised or legal teacher. The Dissenting minister feels that he is not. Something of this may be imaginary. A multitude of the little grievances of social life would be easily remedied by that Christian spirit which seeks the lowest room. But the clergyman sometimes claims the uppermost seat, on the ground that the Dissenter is an unauthorized teacher. There is a general complaint that the clergy do not regard the Dissenting ministers as their equals. This in the main is true; but it is very doubtful if the separation of Church and State would in any way alter it. The clerical haughtiness towards the Dissenting teacher has various grounds. Frequently it is the mere pride of a man who has studied at an English University towards one who has not. The English Universities nurture the belief that wisdom was born and will die with them. The same contempt which some clergymen show for Dissenting ministers they show also for their own brethren if they have not graduated at Oxford or Cambridge. This feeling, it is true, is most highly developed in the inferior class of university men, who have learned little more by their education at a university than the pride of having been there. When this is the cause of the Church minister despising the Dissenting teacher, it is evident that the separation of Church and State would not change the matter. In Scotland, where Episcopacy lives on thorns and thistles, the Episcopalian minister keeps himself at a greater distance from the Presbyterian than the parish clergyman in England from the Non-conformist. The ministers of the Church of Scotland have ever been willing to treat their prelatic brethren as even more than equals. They have offered them every service, even to the use of their churches; but the minister of Episcopacy, though in aristocratic poverty, has never forgotten that he was the true channel of the grace apostolical. This was the doctrine of the old Independent, when he set up his "gathered Church;" of the old Baptist, who excluded all from the kingdom of God who had not been wholly immersed in the waters of baptism. It is the doctrine of some modern Dissenters, as well as of the disciples of Dr. Pusey, and must be remedied by some other

prescription than the separation of Church and State. Our real difficulty with the social position of the Dissenting minister is to know what constitutes a Dissenting minister. In Scotland the difficulty vanishes, from the fact that all ministers have gone through nearly the same studies, and there is, in consequence, some approach to a natural equality. But in England a Dissenting minister may be anything, from the profoundest scholar to the most ignorant mechanic. If Dissenters, instead of trying to bring down the Church to their level, would make an effort to raise themselves to the level of the Church, religious inequalities, excepting those which are inevitable, would naturally disappear. If the Dissenters continue, as they have begun, to erect buildings that equal and sometimes surpass those of the Established Church, and to fill them with efficient ministers, the Church of England will have more cause to fear losing its power over the upper classes than by the separation of Church and State.

The future of the Church of England, yea, the future of the Christianity of England, depends on the relations that are to exist between the Church and the civil Government. Disestablishment in the sense in which the Irish Church has been disestablished, would put the Nonconformist in a worse position than he is in now, if the Church without the State could continue as one body. It would be a vast combination, with vast property, not controlled by the State—a dangerous empire within the empire. One of the arguments which Dean Stanley urges for the endowment and establishment of Churches is to provide against the evils of ecclesiastical government. The danger to the State is certainly greater from a Church which is connected with a foreign power than from one limited to the English realm. Yet a check is necessary, if only to prevent the undue accumulation as property. It is at this point that Church and State inevitably touch each other. Church property is called specifically national property. It is on this ground that the Dissenter asks disestablishment and disendowment. But this is founded on a simple obliviousness of what is meant by national property. The endowments of the Church of England are not “private” endowments, simply because it is the State Church. They cannot be used as the Church directs, but as the State directs. Mr. Hobhouse has clearly explained the difference between “private” endowments and those given to the State Church. In the former the will of the donor continues through all time. In the latter the State can always interfere to determine how they are to be used. Hence the enormous evils of the “charitable” or “private” foundations in England. Trustees are bound by the wills of men who lived centuries ago, who had no knowledge of the necessities of our times, and whose property has increased to what it is by the labour and

industry of subsequent generations. The amount of property in England bound up by the wills of men long since dead, Mr. Hobhouse estimates at £3,000,000 annually; and the effect of it, in his judgment, is evil rather than good. Church property is reckoned worth £6,000,000 annually, but with all the imperfections of its administration we have something to show for it, in 14,000 churches, with their weekly services and a well-educated body of clergy. The property of the Church is national property, simply because the State has taken possession of it. It did not proceed from the State. The Church's property before the Reformation was accumulated in a great measure out of bequests voluntarily made to the clergy. There have been at different times direct endowments from the State, but what the State gave to the Church has been as nothing compared with what it took away. Even since the Reformation the wealth of the Church of England has been vastly increased by voluntary endowments. But all these, equally with the oldest possessions of the Church, are national property. "At every crisis of change in this country," says Mr. Hobhouse, "the principle that Church endowments are national property has been asserted in unmistakable terms." "The State," says Sir John Coleridge, "has always asserted its right to control and claim ecclesiastical property, and has, with undeviating and inflexible pertinacity, consistently given notice, by statute of mortmain, to all its subjects, that if men give property by will to the Church, it is given to the State, liable to State control and legislation." Mr. Hobhouse wishes that the endowments of private foundations be also made national property. But what does that mean? Simply that the State would take these abused charities and apply them to some useful object, irrespective of the will of the donors. This tacitly supposes that they are already State property. The difference is that the State has long ago felt the necessity of controlling Church property, while it is only to-day that the necessity emerges for dealing with the property of the old "charities." The plain inference is that all property belongs to the State in conjunction with those who hold it, and when any property within a commonwealth is not used for the good of the commonwealth, the civil power may interfere and determine how it is to be used. The Church of England disestablished, with its present wealth, or, as in the case of the Irish Church, with two-thirds of it, would be a greater hindrance to the Nonconformist, and a greater evil in his eyes, than it is now under the control of the State.

But it is certain that the disestablished Church of England would not keep together as one Church. The State acts towards it, to use Richard Baxter's words, as "a unifying head." One element in the State Church question, not to be overlooked, is contributed by the fact that such a Church as the Church of Rome exists. It is

near us as a dangerous and subtle enemy. There is no reason why, in a free country, the Roman Catholic, simply as a citizen, should not have the same freedom as the representative of any other religion. But the past history and the avowed principles of his Church both bear testimony that it claims supremacy over nations incompatible with that freedom and equality which we would give to all Churches. There are times in a nation's history when the benefit of a State Church has been felt by all. Such times have been, and while the Church of Rome exists may be again. But, on other grounds, it is not desirable that the parties now included in the National Church should be divided into new sects. If the kingdom of God were some external organization, and the doctrines of Christianity so fully understood that further progress would be impossible, then we might act on the principle of every man excommunicating every other man who did not believe as he did. But since God has not given the Church any material or outward frame, and since we have yet much to learn ere we reach Christian perfection, we should not willingly dispense with the covering, earthly tabernacle though it be, which the State has thrown over us, and which keeps us together as the Christians of a Protestant nation.

To return briefly to the question of subscription. When Sir John Coleridge read his paper at Sion College, the Dean of Westminster remarked that the Solicitor-General seemed to overlook the modification as to subscription which had been made during the last few years. A clergyman is not now pledged to every statement of the Church's formularies. He only declares his general assent to the doctrines of his Church. This doubtless leaves an open door for dishonest men, but experience teaches that no door, however close, can keep them out. The tests having been found ineffectual, Dean Stanley is in favour of getting rid of them altogether. Before such a step is taken, many even of the most liberal Churchmen will pause. Tests are of two kinds. They may be barriers in the way of progress, or they may be badges of victory in the hard battles of the past. The Church of England has a history, in many respects a noble history. No true Englishman wishes the memory of the struggles of the Reformation to be forgotten. What we do not believe is sometimes as important as what we do believe. The errors of the Church of Rome were renounced at the Reformation by the people of England. The National Church set up the articles and formularies to prevent the return of these errors. If we pull down the barriers that are behind us, our progress onward may be arrested. If we were in no danger of a return of Roman Catholic heresies, it would be right at once to set aside the formularies which condemn them. Like other old errors in theology, they might be left to the pages of the historian. But the Church of Rome still exists. It is

as exacting, as audacious, and as unscrupulous as ever in proclaiming, with the pretence of infallibility, dogmas opposed to the catholic reason of mankind, and the plain sense of the canonical writings. The gulf between us and the Church of Rome is impassable while that Church continues what it is. Tests that secure the territory already gained must not be rashly laid aside.

It is admitted on all hands that the Thirty-nine Articles are not perfect. The eighteenth and the thirteenth seem to deny the possibility of salvation to the virtuous heathens, or that good works can be done by any but Christians. The ninth gives a description of the original wickedness of man at variance with the facts of human life. The fourth speaks of Christ as in heaven, with a body consisting of "flesh" and "bones," while a better authority tells us that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven. The sixth article gives a list of canonical books "of whose authority never was any doubt in the Church," and yet in that list are several which, at different times, have been the cause of great doubt and controversy. These are imperfections, which strike us who live three hundred years after the Articles were written, far removed from the strifes which engaged the minds of those who wrote them: more than a general consent could not now be reasonably required of any man. Yet even with these imperfections, every one of these articles contains a protest against dangerous errors. The sixth article is intended to exclude the apocryphal books from the canon. The thirteenth is aimed at the substitution of ceremonial works for those of the moral law. The ninth, with some that follow, is meant to teach us the necessity of Divine help in the spiritual life; and even the fourth, gross and objectionable as the statement is, has a very valuable meaning when we connect it with the desire which the Reformers had to express their entire opposition to the doctrine of the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist. Better far would it be to bear with the imperfection of the Articles, than to risk losing such express renunciations of the heresies of the Church of Rome.

Sir John Coleridge did not argue his subject from the High Church side. He did not advocate the abolition of subscription for the sake of the consciences of those who ride over the Articles in the fashion of Tract XC. or Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon." His arguments all come from evident sympathy with the difficulties of the Broad Churchmen. The occasion, or, if we may so speak, the *casus belli*, of the paper, was Mr. Clark's letter to the Bishop of Ely. In that letter Mr. Clark stated that he could no longer express his conscientious belief in all the "canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament," inasmuch as "some portions of the Scriptures now seem to him to be of doubtful genuineness, and others to contain erroneous

statements in history, and questionable teaching in theology and morals." The Dean of Westminster expressed his regret that a man of the high character and great learning of the Bishop of Ely did not answer Mr. Clark's letter, and assure him that the very same sentiments were entertained by himself and every clergyman in the country. The Dean's statement rather surprised the audience. It was repudiated by some clergymen, who regarded the Public Orator's letter as putting him, not merely beyond the pale of the Church of England, but of Christianity. The full extent of Mr. Clark's meaning may yet be open to doubt. He put his case strongly, as if he intended a manifesto. Some explanation is required of the sentence, "questionable teaching in theology and morals." As to erroneous "statements in history and doubtful genuineness" of certain books, these are open questions for further study. If Mr. Clark does not mean more than his words may fairly be understood to mean, he has said nothing to bring him in collision with the formularies of the Church in the modified form of subscription. The Bishop of Ely might have shown him that he was only beating against the shadow of a wall which already had been battered down.

Since the greater part of this paper was written we have received Mr. Clark's calm, earnest, and temperate pamphlet. We have admitted that subscription to creeds has its difficulties, but we think that Mr. Clark fails to recognise the inevitable conditions of progress. If our religious knowledge is progressive there must be always of necessity an infinite variety of religious opinions. Are men to divide themselves into distinct sects or churches because of every little difference that may arise? Or are they not rather to remain as long as possible in one church with a general agreement on some common principles? Mr. Clark wishes to resign his orders because he believes the Bible is not infallible, and because he thinks the Church of England requires him to believe that it is. He admits that there is no article, no positive statement in any formulary of the Church which declares the infallibility of the Scriptures. His plea is that this infallibility is everywhere assumed. He refuses to measure the moral obligation by the legal one. In our judgment subscription could be no hardship to Mr. Clark so long as he believes that the Scriptures really contain a revelation from God. No law, either divine or human, binds his conscience to any infallibility but this.

As to patronage and the present saleable condition of Church property, it is impossible that it can continue much longer in the face of the searching inquiry which must soon be made into the condition of all national institutions. If it cannot be stopped, disestablishment is sure to be the other alternative, and disendowment with a far less dowry than was given to the Irish Church. The root

of the evil is not the illegal transfer of livings, but the legalized mode of selling advowsons and next presentations. It would be better for the Church either that no sale was legal, or that no sale was illegal. The restrictions only place difficulties in the way of conscientious men. Let it all be legal, and then men will know what they ought to do. But, better still, let it all be illegal. Let the patronage of all livings be vested, as far as possible, in the parishioners, and laws laid down by which they are to be governed in their choice. The Church of England wants nothing more than to be cast on the people. When the Archbishop of Canterbury said lately that the laity were represented in the Church by having so much patronage in their hands, he seemed to us "as one that mocked." Patronage, in the hands of men who buy and sell, is a strange interest for the laity to have in the Church, as well as a strange mode of dealing with national property. Instead of doing for the people, we must give the people the opportunity of doing for themselves, and when a new church is needed, there will be no necessity for one or two thousand pounds from some clergyman to help to finish, that he may have, in return, the first presentation and all the rights and privileges which are conferred by the connection with the State.

As to the Churches outside the Church of England, let us look at things as they are, and no longer deal in theories. The day for schemes of comprehension, and everything of that kind, is long since past. But there is nothing to prevent the most friendly relations and the freest intercourse among all Christians. It has already been recommended in this *Review*, by the Dean of Canterbury, that Dissenting ministers be allowed occasionally to preach in our churches. The Dean of Westminster has shown that there is nothing to prevent this even under the Act of Uniformity, on condition of subscribing to part of the Thirty-nine Articles. Those who could make the modified subscription now required under the recent Subscription Act, might do this without any alteration of the law. And while the Nonconformist may preach in the Church of England, there is apparently even less in the way of the Conformist preaching for the Dissenter. Few things would tend more to remove the differences and social jealousies that now exist between the Churchman and the Nonconformist than this mutual interchange of their ministerial services. We boast of our freedom in the Church of England, yet some courage is required in an English clergyman to preach even in the pulpits of the Presbyterian State Church of Scotland.

The moral of this paper, if it must be mentioned in a sentence at the end, is, that the Church of England, as it now stands, is a great national institution in the hands of the nation; therefore let it be used for the good of the nation.

J. Fawcett.

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

INSTEAD of noticing the new books every month as hitherto, it is intended after this to give a complete review of all Contemporary Literature once a quarter.

THE EDITOR.



DR. NEWMAN'S GRAMMAR OF ASSENT.

An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY
NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. Second Edition. London:
Burns, Oates, & Co. 1870.

IF the title of this book has led any one to expect a dry and formal treatise on dialectics, he will be agreeably disappointed when he reads it. He will find it full of practical and general interest. It discusses questions of art, literature, historical criticism, ethics, even physical science. It enters, without awkwardness or affected concealment, upon the theological controversies which occupy us most at the present day. To these last especially the motto which Dr. Newman has taken for his book is applied: *Non in dialecticâ complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum.*

Is, then, the title of the volume a misleading or deceitful one? I think not. I find it very instructive, directly and indirectly; as a hint to students of logic generally, as a special key to the character of Dr. Newman's work. We speak of the grammar school. We feel that there is a close connection between the two words. The school, as such, is the place for classes and rules; we refer to it the classifications and rules of speech, because speech is the organ of human intercourse. But in studying the parts of speech, and the arrangement of these parts, we become aware that there must be also parts of that which speech expresses, arrangements of those parts. There must be propositions and terms of propositions, as well as nouns and verbs. There must be conditions under which we assent to

propositions or dissent from them, as well as conditions under which we talk and write correctly or incorrectly. We may like to call the exposition of these conditions "logic;" but that name may have a wider signification. Grammar is a less ambitious word, defining itself by our previous experience, suggesting the necessary relation between words and thoughts. The phrase, "Grammar of Assent," usefully links the boys' school to what we technically call "the schools." It throws a light back on the middle-age culture; on some of the temptations to which it was most liable; on some of the benefits, as well as mischiefs, which we inherit from it.

But more particularly is the title serviceable to us as an interpretation of Dr. Newman's own design. He does not mean to go a step beyond assents; he scarcely thinks it possible to go beyond them. If he can explain them to us—what assent is, how we are able to assent, what constitutes our obligations to assent—he will deem his work as a teacher accomplished. Whatever wealth of illustration may be at his command, however he may seem to touch upon outlying provinces of thought, this one word really determines his object; he never loses sight of it.

The weakness as well as the strength of the book lies, it seems to me, in the persistency with which he pursues this end, and adheres to this name. Assents, he tells us again and again, and I should suppose no one will dispute the assertion, belong strictly and exclusively to *propositions*. Do propositions, then, embrace the universe? Is there no region behind them or before them? Most parents suppose that there is an age previous to the grammar-school age—one in which the child learns to observe things and acts, and to give them names, but in which he cannot yet be initiated into the formulas of Priscian. Most philologists tell us that there is a period *after* the grammar school, a period in which the principles of language that lie beneath mere rules discover themselves to the diligent student. Is there nothing which corresponds to either of these periods in the other case? Is there no time when facts may be observed without reference to propositions, no time when the principles which are indicated by facts may be contemplated out of the fetters of propositions? Judging from the statements of our most popular authors, one would conclude that there is not. Take, for instance, Locke. He is an enemy—most men of our day would say an unreasonable enemy—of logic. He beseeches us to consult our own experience, to look at facts, to beware of the schoolmen. Yet twenty times, at least, in his first book, he uses the words "propositions" and "principles," as if they were synonymous. Because he has proved, with superfluous diligence, that a child does not bring with it into the world the consciousness of such *propositions* as, "Whatever is, is," he

supposes he has demonstrated the absurdity of suspecting that there are any *principles* implied in our human existence which we may be "toiling all our lives to find." And so the great champion of the senses can never do the senses justice. He will not let us have scents or sights or sounds; but "ideas" of scents, "ideas" of sights, "ideas" of sounds. Why? Because scents, sights, and sounds will not shape themselves into propositions; and ideas, according to him, will. There can be no more notable instance how fast bound we are with propositions, and with all which concerns propositions. That eminent thinkers, like Archbishop Whately and Mr. Mill, in their efforts to restore logic to the honour of which Locke had deprived it, should not deviate from his rubric—should rather accept with gratitude his reverence for propositions as a reluctant and inevitable homage to their study—we might, of course, expect. But how is it with Dr. Newman? Is there no beating of his wings against the cage? Desperate beating, I think. "Vexed is he, and screams loud." He has the most intense desire to breathe the open air—to live among facts, not among formulas. But he sees no way of escape. All he can do is to bring Mahomet to the mountain, since the mountain will not go to Mahomet. If propositions will not allow facts any separate existence, they shall live in propositions. All acts of the human senses which point to the visible world, all acts of the human spirit which point to the invisible world, shall be brought within the dimensions of propositions; and so shall be fit subjects for treatment in a Grammar of Assent. How this may be done the present book is to make manifest. I look upon it as recording a series of most interesting experiments conducted with this object. Why the experiments seem to me failures, I can best explain if I notice a few of them, always when it is possible availing myself of Dr. Newman's own clear and exquisite language. But, instead of lamenting that they should have been made, I hail them as quite invaluable contributions to science, to theological science especially; helps towards the discovery of a method which may indeed effect what Dr. Newman is aiming at, a reconciliation of the demands of individual conscience, and of human sympathies, affections, hopes, with the demands of the intellect; of both with the highest claims which a divine revelation has made, or can make, upon them.

I shall begin with an extract from one of the earlier chapters of this Grammar, which will at least justify all that I have said about the beauty of its style, and its freedom from technicalities; it will also illustrate, I think, the main issue which I have assumed to be involved in the treatise.

"If a child asks, 'What is Lucern?' and is answered, 'Lucern is medicago sativa, of the class Diadelphia and order Decandria;' and hence-

forth says obediently, 'Lucern is medicago sativa,' &c., he makes no act of assent to the proposition which he enunciates, but speaks like a parrot. But if he is told that 'Lucern is food for cattle,' and is shown cows grazing in a meadow, then, though he never saw lucern, and knows nothing at all about it, besides what he has learned from the predicate, he is in a position to make as genuine an assent to the proposition 'Lucern is food for cattle,' on the word of his informant, as if he knew ever so much more about lucern. And as soon as he has got as far as this, he may go further. He now knows enough about lucern to enable him to apprehend propositions which have lucern for their predicate, should they come before him for assent, as, 'That field is sown with lucern,' or 'Clover is not lucern.'

"Yet there is a way in which the child can give an indirect assent even to a proposition, in which he understood neither subject nor predicate. He cannot indeed in that case assent to the proposition itself, but he can assent to its truth. He cannot do more than assert that 'Lucern is medicago sativa,' but he can assent to the proposition, 'That lucern is medicago sativa is true.' For here is a predicate which he sufficiently apprehends, what is inapprehensible in the proposition being confined to the subject. Thus the child's mother might teach him to repeat a passage of Shakespeare, and when he asked the meaning of a particular line, such as 'The quality of mercy is not strained,' or 'Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied,' she might answer him, that he was too young to understand it yet, but that it had a beautiful meaning, as he would one day know; and he, in faith on her word, might give his assent to such a proposition—not, that is, to the line itself which he had got by heart, and which would be beyond him, but to its being true, beautiful, and good.

"Of course I am speaking of assent itself and its intrinsic conditions, not of the ground or motive of it. Whether there is an obligation upon the child to trust his mother, or whether there are cases where such trust is impossible, are irrelevant questions, and I notice them in order to put them aside. I am examining the act of assent itself, not its preliminaries, and I have specified three directions, which among others the assent may take, viz., assent immediately to a proposition, assent to its truth, and assent both to its truth and to the ground of its being true together—'Lucern is food for cattle'—'That lucern is medicago sativa is true'—and 'My mother's word, that lucern is medicago sativa, and is food for cattle, is the truth.' Now in each of these there is one and the same absolute adhesion of the mind to the proposition, on the part of the child; he assents to the apprehensible proposition, and to the truth of the inapprehensible, and to the veracity of his mother in her assertion of the inapprehensible. I say the same absolute adhesion, because, unless he did assent without any reserve to the proposition that lucern was food for cattle, or to the accuracy of the botanical name and description of it, he would not be giving an unreserved assent to his mother's word; yet, though these assents are all unreserved, still they certainly differ in strength, and this is the next point to which I wish to draw attention. It is indeed plain that, though the child assents to his mother's veracity, without perhaps being conscious of his own act, nevertheless that particular assent of his has a force and life in it which the other assents have not, in proportion as he apprehends the proposition, which is the subject of it, with greater keenness and energy than belongs to his apprehension of the others. Her veracity and authority is to him no abstract truth or item of general knowledge, but is bound up with that image and love of her person which is part of himself, and makes a direct claim on him for his summary assent to her general teachings.

"Accordingly, he would not hesitate to say, did his years admit of it,

that he would lay down his life in defence of his mother's veracity. On the other hand, he would not make such a profession in the case of the propositions, 'Lucern is food for cattle,' or 'That lucern is *medicago sativa* is true;' and yet it is clear, too, that, if he did in truth assent to these propositions, he would have to die for them also, rather than deny them when it came to the point, unless he made up his mind to tell a falsehood. That he would have to die for all three propositions severally rather than deny them, shows the completeness and absoluteness of assent in its very nature; that he would not spontaneously challenge so severe a trial in the case of two out of the three particular acts of assent, illustrates in what sense one assent may be stronger than another."

Now here we have just what I asked for—a child in the stage before the grammar school, still in the tutelage of its mother. Like a wise woman she takes it out to see "cows grazing in a meadow." She would also, no doubt, if she had the opportunity, show it the actual lucern growing, and also the clover in a neighbouring field. But would all this be merely for the purpose of "enabling it to apprehend propositions which have lucern for their predicate?" Would not the sight of the cattle and of the lucern convey much more positive, more useful, more living information, than any such propositions could possibly convey? Of course the child will accept them on the word of its mother; those or any others. But what good would they do it? What meaning would they have for it? Why should the word of the mother be wasted in the demand for such an act? That is wanted for other purposes altogether; *e.g.*, for distinct commands to go or not to go into such a road or meadow. The other use of it is a vain anticipation of the grammatical age—the age of propositions—when the lucern will be A, and the food for cattle or not-clover will be B, and they will be linked to each other by a copula.

How is it with the passage from Shakspeare? Suppose Portia's sentence about mercy is actually connected, as I think it would be by a judicious mother, with the story of Shylock, either as told by Shakspeare himself or by Charles Lamb, the quality which is not strained would receive its best interpretation from the context. No doubt the child would have much to learn of it hereafter; the experiences of life will give it many an insight into a mock mercy which *is* strained; some, it is to be hoped, into a real mercy which is not strained. But neither its earliest knowledge nor its latest would have much to do with the formal proposition. Suppose Portia's speech were taken out of the story and learnt from a volume of "Elegant Extracts," it might, no doubt, present itself to a child or a man as a series of propositions, and would therefore have little interest for either. Even then the unstrained mercy of a mother might give life to the particular sentence of which Dr. Newman speaks, provided she

did *not* ask her poor child to accept it as a dogma, with the promise that its dogmatic force would be fully appreciated in after years.

But the sting of the passage which I have quoted is undoubtedly in the last clauses of it. The child's belief in the veracity of its mother, for which, if it were old enough, it would die, binds it to assent to all propositions which it receives from such a source. Let us get rid of the difficulty of age. Many of us, I trust, have as much faith in the veracity of our mothers when we *are* old enough to die for it—at twenty, forty, or sixty—as at eight or ten. How, then, if any Scotch or English mother should have told her child, as many must have done, “My dear, the Pope of Rome is that Antichrist of whom you read in the Bible?” A man or woman who remembers to have heard that sentence from the dearest lips in the world, goes to Dr. Newman, and is assured by him that the Pope is not Antichrist, but the Vicar of Christ, the judge of all controversies, the ultimate authority for all propositions. Would he expect to be answered with a menacing look and gesture, “Sir! do you mean that my mother was a liar?” If he did meet with such outrageous Protestantism, would he not explain with great courtesy, but also with great firmness, the difference between faith in the general character of the speaker, which years may have deepened instead of weakening, and assent to a certain proposition depending on evidences with which she may have been imperfectly acquainted? In other words, would he not throw overboard the whole doctrine of this passage? Would he not be compelled to recognise that distinction between *belief* in a person, and *assent* to a statement, which here and everywhere throughout this book he has sought to efface? I do not complain of his being the first to ignore it. I think we have all been ignoring it; he will confer an immense benefit on us if he compels us to recognise it as of all distinctions nearly the most radical in principle, nearly the most important for the business of life.

Still resolute to find life in the terms of a proposition whilst yet they must be contemplated strictly in that character, Dr. Newman proceeds to develop what may perhaps be considered the central maxim of his book. It is that there is a direct and permanent contrast between real and notional assents, though each is necessary for its own purpose.

Real “assents” are grounded on real “apprehensions.” What they are we may learn from the striking passage which follows:—

“1. Real Apprehension is, as I have said, in the first instance an experience or information about the concrete. Now, when these informations are in fact presented to us, that is, when they are directly subjected to our bodily senses or our mental sensations, as when we say, ‘The sun shines,’ or ‘The prospect is charming,’ or indirectly by means of a picture or even a narrative, then there is no difficulty in determining what is meant by

saying that our enunciation of a proposition concerning them implies an apprehension of things, because we can actually point out the objects which they indicate. But supposing those things are no longer before us, supposing they have passed beyond our field of view, or the book is closed in which the description of them occurs, how can an apprehension of things be said to remain to us? It remains on our minds by means of the faculty of memory. Memory consists in a present imagination of things that are past; memory retains the impressions and likenesses of what they were when before us; and when we make use of the proposition which refers to them, it supplies us with objects by which to interpret it. They are things still, as being the reflections of things in a mental mirror.

"Hence the poet calls memory 'the mind's eye.' I am in a foreign country among unfamiliar sights; at will I am able to conjure up before me the vision of my home, and all that belongs to it, its rooms and their furniture, its books, its inmates, their countenances, looks, and movements. I see those who once were there and are no more; past scenes, and the very expression of the features, and the tones of the voices, of those who took part in them, in a time of trial or difficulty. I create nothing: I see the fac-similes of facts; and of these fac-similes the words and propositions which I use concerning them are from habitual association the proper or the sole expression.

"And so again, I may have seen a celebrated painting, or some great pageant, or some public man; and I have on my memory stored up and ready at hand, but latent, an impress more or less distinct of that experience. The words 'the Madonna di S. Sisto,' or 'the last Coronation,' or 'the Duke of Wellington,' have power to revive that impress of it. Memory has to do with individual things and nothing that is not individual. And my apprehension of its notices is conveyed in a collection of singular and real propositions.

"I have been adducing instances from (for the most part) objects of sight; but the memory preserves the impress, though not so vivid, of the experiences which come to us through our other senses also. The memory of a beautiful air, or the scent of a particular flower, as far as any remembrance remains of it, is the continued presence in our minds of a likeness of it, which its actual presence has left there. I can bring before me the music of the *Adeste Fideles*, as if I were actually hearing it; and the scent of a clematis as if I were in my garden; and the flavour of a peach as if it were in season; and the thought I have of all these is as of something individual and from without,—as much as the things themselves, the tune, the scent, and the flavour, are from without,—though compared with the things themselves, these images (as they may be called) are faint and intermitting.

"Nor need such an image be in any sense an abstraction: though I may have eaten a hundred peaches in times past, the impression, which remains on my memory of the flavour, may be of any of them, of the ten, twenty, thirty units, as the case may be, not a general notion, distinct from every one of them, and formed from all of them by a fabrication of my mind.

"And so again the apprehension which we have of our past mental acts of any kind, of hope, inquiry, effort, triumph, disappointment, suspicion, hatred, and a hundred others, is an apprehension of the memory of those definite acts, and therefore an apprehension of things; not to say that many of them do not need memory, but are such as admit of being actually summoned and repeated at our will. Such an apprehension again is elicited by propositions embodying the notices of our history, of our pur-

suits and their results, of our friends, of our bereavements, of our illnesses, of our fortunes, which remain imprinted upon our memory as sharply and deeply as any recollection of sight. Nay, and such recollections may have in them an individuality and completeness which outlives the impressions made by sensible objects. The memory of countenances and of places in times past may fade away from the mind ; but the vivid image of certain anxieties or deliverances never."

Here, on the other hand, is the description—equally distinct and vivid—of "notional apprehensions :"—

"2. Experience tells us only of individual things, and these things are innumerable. Our minds might have been so constructed as to be able to receive and retain an exact image of each of these various objects, one by one, as it came before us, but only in and for itself, without the power of comparing it with any of the others. But this is not our case : on the contrary, to compare and to contrast are among the most prominent and busy of our intellectual functions. Instinctively, even though unconsciously, we are ever instituting comparisons between the manifold phenomena of the external world, as we meet with them, criticising, referring to a standard, collecting, analyzing them. Nay, as if by one and the same action, as soon as we perceive them, we perceive that they are like each other or unlike, or rather both like or unlike at once. We apprehend spontaneously, even before we set about apprehending, that man is like man, yet unlike ; and unlike a horse, a tree, a mountain, or a monument, yet in some, though not the same respects, like each of them. And in consequence, as I have said, we are ever grouping and discriminating, measuring and sounding, framing cross classes and cross divisions, and thereby rising from particulars to generals, that is, from images to notions.

"In processes of this kind we regard things, not as they are in themselves, but mainly as they stand in relation to each other. We look at nothing simply for its own sake ; we cannot look at any one thing without keeping our eyes on a multitude of other things besides. 'Man' is no longer what he really is, an individual presented to us by our senses, but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and contrasts which we have made him suggest to us. He is attenuated into an aspect, or relegated to his place in a classification. Thus his appellation is made to suggest not the real being which he is in this or that specimen of himself, but a definition. If I might use a harsh metaphor, I should say he is made the logarithm of his true self, and in that shape is worked with the ease and satisfaction of logarithms.

"It is plain what a different sense language will bear in this system of intellectual notions from what it has when it is the representative of things ; and such a use of it is not only the very foundation of all science, but may be, and is, carried out in literature and in the ordinary intercourse of man with man. And then it comes to pass that individual propositions about the concrete almost cease to be, and are diluted or starved into abstract notions. The events of history and the characters who figure in it lose their individuality. States and governments, society and its component parts, cities, nations, even the physical face of the country, things past, and things contemporary, all that fulness of meaning which I have described as accruing to language from experience, now that experience is absent, necessarily becomes to the multitude of men nothing but a heap of notions, little more intelligible than the beauties of a prospect to the short-sighted, or the music of a great master to a listener who has no ear."

How heartily one responds to this sketch, coming so evidently from the heart, of the difference between the living experience of individual facts and the lean, "starved" notions of generalities! What words, we are tempted for a moment to exclaim, could make us feel the opposition so forcibly? But are we not obliged to pause before we quite endorse that panegyric? Dr. Newman, it will be perceived, uses the adjective "real" in its strict etymological sense. Real apprehensions are the apprehensions of things. What "thing," then, I must venture to ask one whose whole being is evidently penetrated by music, does "*Adeste Fideles*" recall? It cannot be certain notes upon paper, which one, without any of his perceptions, might decipher. The scent of the clematis brings back to him, no doubt, his impression of the actual flower. But is it the same "thing" which is brought to the man who has lost the sense of smell, who has merely received an impression of the clematis from his sight? The peach has certainly a softness and bloom of its own; but is the "thing" known to the person who has never tasted it? What becomes, then, of this nomenclature? Does it denote or connote that distinction for the sake of which you resort to it? If not, why do you resort to it? The answer is obvious. "I want the term of a proposition. To get it I must conceive a thing, if I do not find one." But to *conceive* a thing is to form a notion. Which was not to be done.

So we arrive, I think, by inevitable steps at the conclusion that apprehensions, when they are contemplated simply as the raw material of propositions, *must* be notional, *cannot*, in Dr. Newman's sense, be real. Not only the scents and the taste, but the music—not only the music, but the hopes, the fears, the memories of joys and deliverances, of which he speaks with such a glow and with such pathos—all become the lean spectres at which he shudders after they pass under the school regimen, after they are subjected to its "starving" processes. They can only be fitted into propositions when they have undergone this terrible metamorphosis.

Supposing this to be the law of a proposition as such, that it is made up of notions, that things give up their nature as things, feelings about things their nature as feelings, so soon as they enter into propositions; the following sections of Dr. Newman, which treat of real and notional assents, lose their direct force, though certainly not their interest, as efforts to break through the meshes in which he and we have become involved. His great anxiety is to shake the doctrine that assents necessarily depend upon inference, and vary in their strength with the strength of the evidence upon which inferences rest. The following passage will explain clearly his estimate of the relations between inference and assent. The reader will

perceive how completely it takes for granted the previous question, that propositions may be real and not merely notional:—

“An act of assent, it seems, is the most perfect and highest of its kind, when it is exercised on propositions, which are apprehended as experiences and images, that is, which stand for things; and, on the other hand, an act of inference is the most perfect and highest of its kind, when it is exercised on propositions which are apprehended as notions, which are creations of the mind. An act of inference indeed may be made with either of these modes of apprehension; so may an act of assent; but, when inferences are exercised on things, they tend to be conjectures or presentiments, without logical force; and when assents are exercised on notions, they tend to be mere assertions, without any personal hold on them on the part of those who make them. If this be so, the paradox is true, that when Inference is clearest, Assent may be least forcible, and when Assent is most intense, Inference may be least distinct;—for, though acts of assent require previous acts of inference, they require them, not as adequate causes, but as *sine quâ non* conditions; and, while apprehension strengthens Assent, Inference often weakens apprehension.”

The other point, whether the amount of assent is measured by the amount of evidence which is produced for it, is discussed in a very elaborate section (pp. 152—180), where Dr. Newman argues, it seems to me successfully, against Locke's theory of degrees of assent, maintaining that the assent, once given, is absolute, whatever may be the steps that have led up to it. One who differs equally from Locke and Dr. Newman as to the identity of assent and belief, who recognises in assent, whether with or without degrees, to any proposition, only the fleshless, hollow skeleton of the Faith which takes hold of Truth and leads to action, cannot compel himself to feel great interest in the issue of the battle, much as he may respect the powers of both the combatants, and glad as he is to perceive the respect and courtesy which Dr. Newman manifests towards an old champion of seventeenth-century Protestantism. I wish that I had never been betrayed into less deferential language when alluding to that *clarum et venerabile nomen*.

We approach now the heart of the question about assent and belief, with all its most solemn applications. I am eager to proceed to the section “On the Belief in One God;” but before I enter upon what I fear must be a debate, I will indulge myself with quoting a passage in nearly every sentence of which I deeply and thoroughly sympathize:—

“4. Let us consider, too, how differently young and old are affected by the words of some classic author, such as Homer or Horace. Passages, which to a boy are but rhetorical commonplaces, neither better nor worse than a hundred others which any clever writer might supply, which he gets by heart and thinks very fine, and imitates, as he thinks, successfully, in his own flowing versification, at length come home to him, when long years have passed, and he has had experience of life, and pierce him, as if he

had never before known them, with their sad earnestness and vivid exactness. Then he comes to understand how it is that lines, the birth of some chance morning or evening at an Ionian festival, or among the Sabine hills, have lasted generation after generation, for thousands of years, with a power over the mind, and a charm, which the current literature of his own day, with all its obvious advantages, is utterly unable to rival. Perhaps this is the reason of the mediæval opinion about Virgil, as if a prophet or magician; his single words and phrases, his pathetic half lines, giving utterance, as the voice of Nature herself, to that pain and weariness, yet hope of better things, which is the experience of her children in every time.

"5. And what the experience of the world effects for the illustration of classical authors, that office the religious sense, carefully cultivated, fulfils towards Holy Scripture. To the devout and spiritual, the Divine Word speaks of things, not merely of notions. And, again, to the disconsolate, the tempted, the perplexed, the suffering, there comes, by means of their very trials, an enlargement of thought, which enables them to see in it what they never saw before. Henceforth there is to them a reality in its teachings, which they recognise as an argument, and the best of arguments, for its divine origin. Hence the practice of meditation on the Sacred Text, so highly thought of by Catholics. Reading, as we do, the Gospels from our youth up, we are in danger of becoming so familiar with them as to be dead to their force, and to view them as a mere history. The purpose, then, of meditation is to realize them; to make the facts which they relate stand out before our minds as objects, such as may be appropriated by a faith as living as the imagination which apprehends them.

"It is obvious to refer to the unworthy use made of the more solemn parts of the sacred volume by the mere popular preacher. His very mode of reading, whether warnings or prayers, is as if he thought them to be little more than fine writing, poetical in sense, musical in sound, and worthy of inspiration. The most awful truths are to him but sublime or beautiful conceptions, and are adduced and used by him, in season and out of season, for his own purposes, for embellishing his style or rounding his periods. But let his heart at length be ploughed by some keen grief or deep anxiety, and Scripture is a new book to him. This is the change which so often takes place in what is called religious conversion, and it is a change so far simply for the better, by whatever infirmity or error it is in the particular case accompanied. And it is strikingly suggested to us, to take a saintly example, in the confession of the patriarch Job, when he contrasts his apprehension of the Almighty before and after his afflictions. He says he had indeed a true apprehension of the Divine Attributes before them as well as after; but with the trial came a great change in the character of that apprehension:—'With the hearing of the ear,' he says, 'I have heard Thee, but now mine eye seeth Thee; therefore I reprehend myself, and do penance in dust and ashes.'"

I am sorry to offer even a single adverse criticism on these beautiful sentences; but it is necessary. I must ask where Job speaks about "his apprehension of the divine attributes?" If he ever *attributed* anything to God, was he not cured of the presumption when God spoke to him out of the whirlwind, and taught him what He was?

Why it is important to make this remark before I enter upon the next section will appear from the first words of it.

"There is one God, such and such in Nature and Attributes.

"I say 'such and such,' for, unless I explain what I mean by 'one God,' I use words which may mean anything or nothing. I may mean a mere *anima mundi*; or an initial principle which once was in action and now is not; or collective humanity. I speak then of the God of the Theist and of the Christian: a God who is numerically One, who is Personal; the Author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all things, the Life of Law and Order, the Moral Governor; One who is Supreme and Sole; like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself, which all are but his creatures: distinct from, independent of them all; One who is self-existing, absolutely infinite, who has ever been and ever will be, to whom nothing is past or future; who is all perfection, and the fulness and archetype of every possible excellence, the Truth Itself, Wisdom, Love, Justice, Holiness; One who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent, Incomprehensible. These are some of the distinctive prerogatives which I ascribe unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being whom I call God."

Here is a series of propositions; assent to these propositions is supposed to constitute Belief in one God. I do not forget—I am most desirous that my readers should remember—that the great object of Dr. Newman is, by some means or other, to make the assent to these propositions a real, and not merely a notional, one. Still, the condition of Beliefs is, that they shall be accepted as propositions.

Now Dr. Newman admits, as strongly as I do, that the Jewish Nation was the steward of the belief in the One God, when other nations were bowing down to many gods. He cannot complain then if I press this question strongly upon him. Were the Jews taught to accept the series of propositions which he has set down? I am prepared for his answer. He will ask, of course,—“What is ‘Hear, O Israel: The Lord thy God is One Lord’ but a proposition?” Nothing else, surely. But the point I want to be considered is this:—Was the *Belief* of the Jews in this proposition? Did assent to this proposition, the fullest assent that could be given to it, imply the belief which Moses and the Prophets called their countrymen to exercise—which they reproved them for losing? I need not quote the bitter irony of the Apostle who was writing to the Twelve Tribes in a later day,—“*Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well; the devils also believe and tremble.*” I would merely refer to the direct language of the Old Testament, to its whole history. The Lord their God is set forth to the Jews as their Deliverer. Acts show Him to be that. He is different from the gods of the Egyptians, because they are oppressors, enslavers. He is to be believed in, to be trusted at all times, in all places, as one who breaks bonds asunder. If anywhere, you would say that amidst the thunders and lightnings of Sinai that Name would be suppressed. He who utters commands must impose a yoke, not emancipate from one. But we are told that there, amidst those thunders and lightnings, the voice went forth,—“I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of

Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have none other gods but ME." And the breach of every commandment, specially of the one against making images of the Lord God, against conceiving Him in the likeness of anything in heaven or earth or under the earth, is set forth in the book of Deuteronomy, and in all the Prophets, as a necessary step towards the captivity of the people, one involving the service of tyrant gods, because they had ceased to believe in the Deliverer. Here, then, according to the uniform testimony of the books containing the history of that which we call the Monotheistic people, is the meaning of their Monotheism. It is not an *assent*—the most complete assent possible—to the proposition, "There is One God: there are not many gods." It is the *belief* in an actual personal Deliverer: the deliverer of the whole land, and of each Israelite who trusts in Him. Dr. Newman speaks with deep feeling of the Psalms, as if they expressed the very principle of Jewish devotion and of all devotion. Is it not this, then, that they express in every mood of sorrow and of joy, of confession and of thanksgiving? Is there a hint in them of assent to a monotheistic proposition, or to a proposition about divine attributes? Is there not throughout belief in a living God, who has made His Name known that all might trust in it, and not attribute any of their notions to Him, not make images of Him after their fancies?

In the light of these observations, or rather in the light of the book to which they refer, consider the following statement:—

"Here we have the solution of the common mistake of supposing that there is a contrariety and antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion. People urge that salvation consists, not in believing the propositions that there is a God, that there is a Saviour, that our Lord is God, that there is a Trinity, but in believing in God, in a Saviour, in a Sanctifier; and they object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all true reception of the Gospel, and making religion a matter of words or of logic, instead of its having its seat in the heart. They are right so far as this, that men can and sometimes do rest in the propositions themselves as expressing intellectual notions; they are wrong when they maintain that men need do so or always do so. The propositions may and must be used, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts, not notions, and they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is ever necessary to denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals, and for our intercourse with others. Again, they are useful in their dogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest. Knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections. We feel gratitude and love, we feel indignation and dislike, when we have the informations actually put before us which are to kindle those several emotions. We love our parents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents; we must know of God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards Him. *Devotion must have its objects; these objects, as being supernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions.*

The formula, which embodies a dogma for the theologian, readily suggests an object for the worshipper. It seems a truism to say, yet it is all that I have been saying, that in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason. Theology may stand as a substantive science, without the life of religion; but religion cannot maintain its ground without theology. Sentiment, whether imaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay, when sense cannot be called into exercise; and it is in this way that devotion falls back upon dogma."

I have italicized one sentence in this passage, which contains the very essence of the controversy between us. "Devotion having supernatural objects must be either represented in material symbols, or set before the mind in propositions." The devotion of the Jews was neither represented in material symbols, nor set before the mind in propositions. Material symbols were prohibited as a hindrance to devotion. It rose directly to a living God, who discovered himself in acts, not in propositions. I appeal from Dr. Newman to the devotions which he loves best in proof of my assertion.

This section is perfectly consistent with the one which follows it, viz., "Belief in the Holy Trinity." The hardness—the grating hardness—of the monotheistic dogma, when it is merely a dogma—when the thought of the deliverer, of the Lord *our* God, has passed out of it—reappears in the account given by Dr. Newman of that which he and I should equally recognise as the characteristic revelation of the *New* Testament, the ground principle of the Catholic Church. In his first statement of it, there is a painful, melancholy iteration of the *one* and *three*; the names of the *Father* and the *Son* seem to have vanished, to be little more than accidents of the numbers. I know that it is not so in the heart of the writer, that it cannot be so. Those names, it is evident from other passages in this very section, are what he *believes* in; their unity in the Eternal Spirit is what he recognises as the supreme and perfect unity. But oh! the miserable, ghastly effect of the confusion between assent and belief in concealing this faith from his readers and from himself! How living objects of trust—to use once more his own burning language, which cannot be improved—becomes "starved" into notions! And these notions are called "Theology," the science of God, while the pagan word "Religion" is used to express all the devotional tempers and habits which are to quicken these notions—to breathe upon the dead bones, that they may come together, and not be for ever rolling and crashing against each other!

Against this perversion of language I would with my whole heart and soul protest. It is not Dr. Newman's perversion; no persons cling to it more fondly than a large body of those liberal teachers with whom he is most at variance. They say much as he says, that theology is a collection of difficult propositions, appealing to the

intellect, and yet setting all the ordinary conditions of the intellect at defiance. They glorify religion at the expense of theology, because they think that most men want some covering, of what material and how manufactured does not greatly signify, to keep out the cold. Against this powerful combination of able men of opposite schools, I must steadfastly maintain that the religions of men have set them at war with each other—have led them into all kinds of cruelty and crime—except just so far as a God of righteousness and truth—a God who seeks to deliver man from their untruth and unrighteousness—has discovered Himself to them, and they have, amidst all their own confusions and contradictions, recognised Him. I hold, as I presume Dr. Newman does, that the discovery of all discoveries—the revelation of a mystery which was hidden for ages and generations—was made when Christ ascended to his Father, and sent the Comforter to dwell among men that they might become citizens of the kingdom of heaven. This revelation I accept as lying beneath all propositions, as being at the root of human existence and of the universe, as binding together the thoughts and aspirations of men in all regions and ages. Therefore the language which Dr. Newman uses in reference to it—his treatment of it as a dogma or proposition, a dogma which the Church is to enforce, and which is to be accepted on its authority—is to me inexpressibly shocking. I have said that I believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his Son, and in the Holy Ghost; *after that* in the Holy Catholic Church. That I have understood to stand in this name, to have no existence apart from it. If I am to believe in the Church first and then in God, I do not know what the Church is; I do not know how it came into existence; or what function it can have. Just so far as it ceases to be a witness for God, and supposes that it has a theology or a religion of its own, just so far I think it proclaims itself apostate. The sentence of other men against it is nothing; its sentence against itself, if not retracted and repented of, must be fatal.

I do not willingly impute this assumption to any man or body of men. Hear these words:—

“Such is theology in contrast to religion; and as follows from the circumstances of its formation, though some of its statements easily find equivalents in the language of devotion, the greater number of them are more or less unintelligible to the ordinary Catholic, as law-books to the private citizen. And especially those portions of theology which are the indirect creation, not of orthodox, but of heretical thought, such as the repudiations of error contained in the Canons of Councils, of which specimens have been given above, will ever be foreign, strange, and hard to the pious but uncontroversial mind; for what have good Christians to do, in the ordinary course of things, with the subtle hallucinations of the intellect? This is manifest from the nature of the case; but then the question recurs, why should the refutations of heresy be our objects of

faith; if no mind, theological or not, can believe what it cannot understand, in what sense can the Canons of Councils and other ecclesiastical determinations be included in those *credenda* which the Church presents to every Catholic, and to which every Catholic gives his firm interior assent?

"In solving this difficulty I wish it first observed, that if it is the duty of the Church to act as 'the pillar and ground of the Truth,' she is manifestly obliged from time to time, and to the end of time, to denounce opinions incompatible with that truth, whenever able and subtle minds in her communion venture to publish such opinions. Suppose certain bishops and priests at this day began to teach that Islamism or Buddhism was a direct and immediate revelation from God, she would be bound to use the authority which God has given her to declare that such a proposition will not stand with Christianity, and that those who hold it are none of hers; and she would be bound to impose such a declaration on that very knot of persons who had committed themselves to the novel proposition, in order that, if they would not recant, they might be separated from her communion, as they were separated from her faith. In such a case, her masses of population would either not hear of the controversy, or they would at once take part with her, and without effort take any test which secured the exclusion of the innovators; and she, on the other hand, would feel that what is a rule for some Catholics must be a rule for all. Who is to draw the line between who are to acknowledge it, and who are not? It is plain, there cannot be two rules of faith in the same communion, or rather, as the case really would be, an endless variety of rules, coming into force according to the multiplication of heretical theories, and to the degrees of knowledge and of sentiment in individual Catholics. There is but one rule of faith for all; and it would be a greater difficulty to allow of an uncertain rule of faith, than (if that was the alternative, as it is not) to impose upon uneducated minds a profession which they cannot understand.

"But it is not the necessary result of unity of profession, nor is it the fact, that the Church imposes dogmatic statements on the interior assent of those who cannot understand them. The difficulty is removed by the dogma of the Church's infallibility, and of the consequent duty of 'implicit faith' in her word. The 'One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church' is an article of the Creed, and an article which, inclusive of her infallibility, all men, high and low, can easily master and accept with a real and operative assent. It stands in the place of all abstruse propositions in a Catholic's mind, for to believe in her word is virtually to believe in them all. Even what he cannot understand, at least he can believe to be true; and he believes it to be true because he believes in the Church."

Yes! So it was at the Reformation; so it is now. That was the Gospel preached to poor Catholics in the sixteenth century,—that is the Gospel which learned and devout divines say is the only one that they are entitled to hear in the nineteenth century. Hence came the protest. It was not, as he supposes, on behalf of men's right to think for themselves, and set at nought the authority of the Church. It was on behalf of their right to *believe* for themselves, to *believe* actually, directly in Christ; not to acknowledge Him at second-hand, not to revere Him in pictures or in propositions. It was the claim to trust in One who had proved by acts that He was a Deliverer of men from sin and from death. As a Gospel it was the

proclamation to men that they might, one and all, cast off themselves and rise up new men in Him. Against that message all anathemas were directed; for a Church—this I fully concede—which identifies faith with assent to propositions must anathematize, ought to anathematize, all faith that is not in propositions. And if it cuts off those who profess it from communion with the heavenly society, it must, so far as it has the power, persecute them on earth; it must regard all deprivation of the power to persecute as an unaccountable treason in states, as an unfathomable riddle in the Divine Providence. I do not limit this language to any communion. Just so far as Protestants confound faith with assent to propositions, they must long for the power of enforcing assent; they will use the power when it comes into their hands in some way or other. And why should not modern Sadducees use it just as much as the Sadducees of Jerusalem or of Rome? If any of their easy, tolerant propositions are disturbed by some great burst of enthusiasm, if their assent to the dogma that there is no resurrection is shaken by some loud cry, "He is risen," there is no reason whatever why they should not follow the precepts of Caiaphas or of the emperors. Indeed, I know not what can keep any man of us from persecuting, when the chance is afforded him, except a message coming, as mightily to him as it did to the Apostle of the Gentiles: "In persecuting any one creature whose nature I have taken, for whom I have died, thou persecutest Me."

Dr. Newman's section on Dogmatic Theology has drawn me further into this line of thought than I intended. I fear I must speak less than I should have wished on the sections which follow. To the one on "The Indefectibility of Certitude" I would earnestly invite the reader's attention. Dr. Newman dwells fondly on the repose which the sense of certainty brings with it; the freedom from the fierceness of contradiction which often characterizes young converts not yet sure of the ground upon which they stand. Of course the peace which results from acquiescence in an authority capable of determining what propositions should be assented to, capable of commanding assent, is that which he holds out to us. It may be very inviting. For practical purposes I think the promise, "In Me ye shall have peace," more satisfactory as well as more invigorating. And if we are busy in thought rather than in action, it seems to me that we do not derive much help from the consideration, "I have *got* certainty; it is packed up safely, properly labelled;" very much help indeed from the conviction, "There is One who is living and eternal truth; He would draw me to seek for ever after His truth; the more I quit my certainty the more I may enter into His; that is indeed indefectible; in it there will not be any variable-

ness or the least shadow of a turning." And because I would aim at this certainty I can care little for that which is described in these words (p. 337):—"Certitude is a mental state; certainty is a quality of propositions. Those propositions I call certain which are such that I am certain of them."

Dr. Newman's sections "On the Illative Sense" contain many ingenious and valuable hints; respecting the necessity of assenting to first principles, "and of ruling that some propositions are irrelevant or absurd;" respecting also the "divination" which he considers (most truly I think) indispensable to a great historical critic or a man of science. All his remarks on these subjects show how sincerely he prefers the concrete to the abstract, how glad he is to leave propositions, when it is possible, for facts. But, alas! his liberty of wandering is sadly circumscribed. He always hears a voice recalling him to the school form. He sits down upon it not without grumbling, not without pleasing and sad reminiscences of the holiday walk, of the glimpses he has had of sea and sky. But to it he is bound; the lesson in grammar must be learnt by heart—must be repeated exactly. He would certainly prefer a poetical repetition. For Dr. Newman entirely differs from Butler and the writers of the eighteenth century respecting the use of the imagination. Butler, the reader may remember, condemns it as a most dangerous faculty. In the opening chapter of the "Analogy" he says that we owe to it the unreasonable impression that death destroys the continuity of our existence; the religious man, the believer in immortality, must turn it out of doors. Our author, on the other hand, appears to regard the imagination as the characteristically religious organ. From some of his expressions one might suppose that he would complete the sentence of the Bishop of Milan—"It did not please God to save His people by dialectics; but it did please Him to save them by exercises of the imagination." I am very little disposed to plead for Butler's doctrine; yet I cannot see my way to the reception of Dr. Newman's. I cannot doubt that the imagination has a great part to play in the whole economy of our life, and, therefore, of course in our spiritual life. But I doubt whether the part is that which Dr. Newman would assign it. I am sure we have an organ for perceiving truth, for taking hold of that which is. The mystery of the kingdom of heaven may be written in parables which we should study and ask Christ to interpret. But He speaks of a time when He will no more discourse with His disciples in parables, but tell them plainly of the Father.

Neither the imagination nor the intellect can surely be treated with indifference by any who think that God has made man in His own image. The conditions under which the intellect combines,

distinguishes, classifies; the forms through which it conceives the matter that is external to it; the machinery of propositions, argumentation, inference; how needful it is that we should acquaint ourselves with these, how certain we are to be entangled with them if we overlook or despise them! Theological propositions may, I conceive, be of great use if they are warnings against the confusions and narrowness into which schoolmen have been betrayed in their theological inquiries by their love of propositions, just as the propositions in the "*Novum Organum*" are warnings against the confusions and narrowness into which they were betrayed in their physical inquiries by the same love. In this way I have found our own Thirty-nine Articles of great service in all stages of theological education. I would bind them upon no one. I think they are only valuable as means of preserving the student from various dangers which are likely to destroy the clearness and manliness of his investigations. When the articles are transferred from the schools, and are made the basis of communion—or when they are used in the schools to prohibit thought, not to suggest a method of thought—they lose their purpose, they become enemies to faith, even more than to reason. The notion of comparing our Articles with the decrees of the Council of Trent, or of making any adjustment between them, strikes me as simply monstrous. We must fence our propositions with anathemas before we can establish any resemblance between the two documents. If we do, what becomes of the reconciliation? Taking them as they are, without any anathemas, they are continual witnesses to me that, unless I hold fast the principles which bind all Christendom together, I shall not recognise clearly and firmly the grounds of my own individual life, or of my nation's life; that unless I am faithful to them I shall lose any real sense of fellowship with the Church universal.

Having a strong desire to find tokens of *this* reconciliation—every other being dismissed as hopeless—I turned to Dr. Newman's last sections, "*On Natural and Revealed Religion.*" The phrase is a popular and orthodox one among Anglican divines. Dr. Newman has treated the subject, with very few exceptions indeed, as most of them would wish it to be treated. There is hardly a sentence of his which might not be accepted by the Committee of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and adopted into one of their tracts. Yet Dr. Newman says, and I am sure most sincerely, that he is exhibiting his own experience, the evidence which has presented itself with most force to his mind. He says that every one should, in speaking of evidence, be an egotist; for what is evidence to one is not evidence to another. I feel the truth of this remark so strongly that I shall venture to show in how very different a way the evidence of

nature and revelation has come to my mind; why I am forced to depart much more widely than Dr. Newman has done from the ordinary Protestant statements about both; why it seems to me that Protestants and Romanists both must abandon the expression, "Natural and Revealed Religion," even though it has the high authority of Butler in its favour, if they would yield to the higher authority of St. Paul.

He speaks very distinctly in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans of God as manifesting His power and Godhead through the things which He has made. I cannot understand the evidence of Nature, when by Nature is meant the external Cosmos, except as such a manifestation. I hold it to be a *discovery*, in the strictest sense of that word—God unveiling something of Himself to the creatures whom He had formed in His image; but not a discovery in the ordinary, less strict, sense which is given to the word when it is taken to mean that men, by guesses about the world, arrived at some apprehension of its Author. I find, again, St. Paul in the same chapter recognising a discovery of God to men in their consciences, and speaking of their "not liking to retain Him in their knowledge." If this is what is meant by *Natural Religion*, the expression seems to me a most unfortunate one; for, according to St. Paul, God taught men in their consciences that acts to which they were naturally inclined were wrong, and they, because they did not like to be so taught, made natural gods—cruel and foul gods—and worshipped them instead of Him.* I fully admit, then, that the nations had, as Dr. Newman says they had, perceptions of God and of His purposes; but I submit to St. Paul's decision that their perceptions came from a *revelation* of Him—a continued, daily, hourly revelation—not from the nature of things or from the nature of men acting independently of a revelation.

In what sense a revelation? Precisely in that sense in which I find the word used in every passage of the New Testament in which it occurs. I cannot see that it is *once* used about a book which completes what nature had left imperfect. I find it *always* used in the sense which St. Paul gives it still earlier in this chapter, where he speaks of an apocalypse or unveiling of God's righteousness to the faith of man—when he speaks of that unveiling being also of necessity an unveiling of wrath against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men who hold down the truth in unrighteousness.

Such a revelation of God, the Apostle affirms, was made, not in a

* I fear that some admirable lectures which I heard from my dear friend Professor A. J. Scott, thirty years ago, on "Revelation," are not reported in the volume of "Remains" published since his death. But the reader will find enough in that volume on the subject to show him how much deeper his thoughts on the subject were than mine.

book, but in His Son. He describes it as a revelation of righteousness to men which they might believe, and so be raised to a righteous state. He speaks of the announcement of the revelation of righteousness as a Gospel to sinful men, as an assurance to them that God would deliver them from their sins, and give them a new and eternal life.

This Gospel of a righteousness, this Gospel of a deliverance, commends itself to me as the full development of that message which the Jews heard, and on which their polity was based—a full development also of that message which the Gentiles had heard in their consciences; had heard, though in less distinct tones, coming out of the rain and fruitful seasons which filled their hearts with food and gladness. That a God of righteousness should set men free from unrighteousness, that a God who cared to give His creatures food for their bodies should be ready to give them better things still—even, as our Lord said, His own Holy Spirit—this was a fulfilment of Jewish promises, of heathen anticipations.*

But yet it would signify little to me that this Gospel met the wants of those who were in the world ages ago, if I did not feel that just such a Gospel is needed to raise the people of England out of their brutality and idolatry; to raise those people whom Dr. Newman deems so happy in their possession of images and traditions, out of theirs; to raise all the people of the East and West to a new and higher life. The revelation of Christ brings with it evidences of its truth in that it was from the first, when proclaimed by His own lips, when proclaimed by His Apostles, a message to the people, a message not concerning "a future state of rewards and punishments," but concerning a Kingdom of Heaven, of which God claimed them all as subjects in this present state; a kingdom of righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, into which they could enter because they were spirits; into which they could not enter by material symbols or by propositions. The revelation of Christ brings with it evidences of its truth to me, because it comes in acts of redemption to the bodies and spirits of men, and because He said of these acts that they were His Father's works, and that they manifested the will and character and continual operation of Him who was and is and is to

* Dr. Newman is willing enough to take account of all Heathen anticipations of a sacrifice. He cannot take too much account of them. But he is not willing to recognise the truth of the protest which such men as Lucretius bore against the horrors of sacrifice, against the crimes which religion had persuaded men to commit. It seems to me that the divine sacrifice which God has made to reconcile the world to Himself—the free offering of the Son to do the Father's will—is as much a vindication of the indignant cry of the poet-philosopher against the sacrifices which were offered to make a mere power propitious, as it was an explanation of the sense of that need of sacrifice—of living human sacrifice—which dwelt in the heart of the people.

come. The revelation of Christ brings to me evidence that it was not the work of priests and doctors of the law, seeing that priests and doctors of the law were the great enemies of it, just because it professed to be the discovery of the Son of Man, the Head of every man—of the Son of God, the perfect image of the Father. This revelation brings evidence to me of its adaptation to men in all countries and ages, because it speaks to dying men of One who has died their death, of One in whose death they may sink their separate deaths; of One who has risen from the dead as their justifier; of One who has glorified their humanity at the right hand of God. Priests and preachers tell them to think upon their own deaths; Apostles point them to His death. Priests and doctors tell them they must assent to the doctrine of a resurrection; Christ says, "I am the resurrection and the life." Priests and doctors talk to them of the degradation of humanity; the Apostles point us to its exaltation. Priests and doctors speak of a God whose purpose is to destroy the great majority of His creatures; Christ reveals to us a God of salvation; His Apostles testify of a day when all shall be gathered up in Him. Dr. Newman speaks of "Christianity" doing this and that. If Christianity is not the revelation of Christ the Son of God, I cannot see what it has done but mischief. If it is the revelation of the Son of God, I am sure it will make itself evident to the sons of men, whatever pains we may take to hide it from them. Wherever sons are, wherever fathers are, there is a ladder set upon earth which reaches to Heaven. The Spirit who guides into all truth has taught and will teach men as well as angels to ascend and descend upon that ladder.

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NATURE-DEVELOPMENT AND THEOLOGY.

On the Physical Basis of Life. By Professor HUXLEY. "Fortnightly Review," Feb. 1869. Chapman and Hall.

As Regards Protoplasm in Relation to Professor Huxley's Essay. By JAMES H. STIRLING, LL.D. Blackwood and Sons. 1869.

The Reign of Law. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. Fifth Edition. Strahan & Co. 1870.

Essays, Philosophical and Theological. By JAMES MARTINEAU. Trübner & Co. 1866.

Das Christenthum und die moderne Naturwissenschaft. Von F. FROBSHAMMER. Williams and Norgate. 1868.

TWO methods of contemplating Nature seem to have existed since the first dawnings of human thought. It would be difficult to say which was the earlier; for, though apparently irreconcilable with each other, they seem to have been contemporaneous. A German philosopher once said that every man was born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. Certain ways of thinking belong to certain classes of men, and methods of philosophy take their character from that of the minds which originate them.

The study of Nature was doubtless the first study that engaged the human mind. The earliest religions, theologies, and mythologies of all nations have been connected with systems of Nature. The most probable interpretation of Pagan worship is that which resolves it into the worship of Nature, making the heathen gods and goddesses personifications of the invisible forces that pervade the universe. The oldest theologians identify God and Nature. The old Brahman said that Brahm protruded the universe from Himself, as the tortoise protrudes its limbs, or as the spider weaves a web from its own bowels. Hermes Trismegistus, the interpreter of the Egyptian theology,

called all created things parts and members of God. Bunsen, describing the religion of the early Egyptians, says—

“ God dwelt
In the piled mountain rock, the veined plant,
And pulsing brute, and where the planets wheel
Through the blue skies, Godhead moved in them.”

The fundamental idea of these religions was Development. The divine substance was evolved into the being of the universe, so that all natures or substances were in their original one nature or substance. This is probably the best key to the meaning of the old Greek philosophers. Their object was to find the first or primordial essence. Thales said it was “water;” Anaximander called it the “boundless,” because, being all, it could not be any one of the things that are finite; Anaximenes called it “air;” Pythagoras called it the “one;” Heraclitus “fire,” or the “eternal strife;” and Parmenides “being.” Aristotle says, “Our ancestors and men of great antiquity have left us a tradition, involved in fable, that these first essences are gods, and that the Divinity comprehends the whole of Nature.”

The other method of contemplating Nature regards it as a work distinct from its Author. It cannot be said that this idea was unknown even to the earliest teachers of Development. The Hindu Brahm, that evolved Nature from His own being, was also Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer. He created, formed, or moulded Nature according to His will. This implied in the Deity a personality which the idea of evolution seemed to deny. The doctrine of a forming and designing mind working in Nature is supposed by some to have been held by Thales and the other Greek philosophers, who made the primal element the chief object of their search. But when Anaxagoras appeared, teaching that “the Divine Mind was the cause of all things, and had arranged them in their proper ranks and classes,” Aristotle said that, compared with the other Ionics, he was like “a sober man.” Socrates, however, who had deeper religious feelings, was not satisfied with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. It was not enough that the Divine Being should construct the universe, and then leave it, like a self-acting machine, to its own laws. Socrates could not conceive of the Deity ceasing from His work, and retiring into undisturbed repose. The God of Socrates sits on no silent throne. He works unceasingly. In the words of Goethe, Nature never lacks his presence:—

“ So dass was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist
Nie Seine Kraft nie Seinen Geist vermisst.”

Or in the words of our own poet Cowper:—

“ There lives and works
A soul in all things, and that soul is God.”

Plato, in his philosophy, combined the "Being" of Parmenides with the "Mind" of Anaxagoras. He reconciled the two theologies which have generally been thought irreconcilable. "The Being" was also "the Artificer of the Universe." "When God," Plato says, "had formed the soul of the world, the soul shot itself into the midst of the universe to the extremities of being. Spreading itself everywhere, and reacting upon itself, it formed at all times a divine origin of the eternal wisdom." The Book of Genesis represents the Creator as working six days, and then resting from His creation. It is not said that He made created things of His own substance, nor even that all things are originally of one substance. "God made the beast of the earth *after his kind*, and cattle *after their kind*, and every living thing that creepeth upon the earth *after his kind*." The creating "Mind" of Anaxagoras, which wrought once and then retired, gives the idea of God and His relation to nature which most resembles that of the Book of Genesis. Whether the Biblical account is a popular conception, or a partial statement adapted to the ordinary understanding, or a full scientific account of creation, is not a question at present to be discussed. The same view of creation is frequently found in ancient authors. Lucretius gives all things a distinct nature of their own—

"Res quæque suo ritu procedit et omnes
Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina servant."

The account of creation with which Ovid begins his *Metamorphoses* resembles that in Genesis:—

"Ante mare et terras, et quod tegit omnia cœlum
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe."

Bayle translates this passage as meaning that before there was a heaven, an earth, and a sea, nature was all "homogeneous." This interpretation has been disputed, as Ovid says, immediately after—

"Mollia cum duris sine pondere habentia pondus."

But there is not any real contradiction. The original chaos consisted of a primary matter, in which things afterwards "soft" and "hard," "light" and "heavy," were blended together. The creating Deity, *Quisquis fuit ille deorum*, formed all things out of this first matter, and gave them the qualities which now they have. This is clearly the Mosaic doctrine of creation. But in Horace we have the development of men from "a dumb and filthy herd" of animals, who at first fought for acorns with their nails and fists; afterwards they forged arms, then they learned to speak, and at last built cities and established governments.

"Mutum et turpe pecus glandem atque cubilia propter
Unguibus et pugnis de in fustibus," &c.

The revival of the doctrine of development in Nature is contemporaneous with the science of geology. That science, even in its first essays, can scarcely be dated earlier than the second half of the last century. It is true that almost three hundred years ago Bernard Palissy pronounced a mine of marl to be a mass of shells deposited by the sea. But even in the last century the marine characters of the shells, and the theories founded on their discovery, were ridiculed by the wise men of Europe. Voltaire said he would sooner believe that "Edith, the wife of Lot, was changed into a statue of salt," than that the ocean once deposited shells in the vicinity of Chablais and Ripaille, or on the top of Mont Cenis. It was more likely that pilgrims to Rome had carried them in their bonnets!

But incipient geologists, from the discovery of the shells so far from the sea, believed that the sea must once have covered the whole earth. There were many things that seemed to confirm this belief. The ancient Egyptians had deified the Nile. Out of water came that abundant fertility which made the riches and the strength of Egypt. Homer and Hesiod traced the origin of all things to Oceanus and Tethys. Thales supposed water the first element of Nature, and the Book of Genesis says that the Spirit of God brooded over the face of the deep. The marine origin of the world, and all that is therein, was set forth by De Maillet, one of the early students of what is now the science of geology. He found, or at least thought he found, the bones of men, animals, and reptiles, with oyster and coral shells, all mingled together and petrified into hard rock. He could only account for their being there by the action of the sea when the masses were soft and liquid. He said that petrified ships had been dug up on the tops of the Alps and the Apennines, and that keels, anchors, and masts had been found among the sands of Libya. On a Swiss mountain there had been discovered the petrified bodies of sixty mariners, who had been shipwrecked in a storm before the beginning of the Egyptian chronology. But unnumbered ages previous to that era the ocean embraced the seeds of all things in one mass of homogeneous protoplasm.

But before man had come to the perfection of his being it was necessary to suppose that he had existed as a simpler organism than he now is. He may have been a mollusc, a star-fish, a flat-fish, a turbot, or a cod. The fins may have lengthened into arms, the forked tails into legs, and so the fish became a man. He was at first, of course, a *sea-man*; for till the gills had been changed into lungs he could not live out of his native element. It was easy for the unbelieving Voltaire to laugh at this doctrine. He could no more believe it than he could believe in petrified sea-shells or basalted "Edith, Lot's wife." "Notwithstanding," he says, "the extreme passion for genealogies which now prevails, there are few

people who would believe that they descended from a turbot or a cod-fish. To establish this system, all species and elements must absolutely have changed into one another, and Ovid's *Metamorphoses* would become the best book of physics ever written."

But "the unlearned man laughs at the philosopher." De Maillet saw a unity of type in Nature. He found correspondences between different organisms. Nature was a ladder of which he did not see all the steps; but he saw some. It was a chain of which he had found some links; but he could not put them together. His first effort was to link together the forms of life on dry land and those in the sea. The ocean still bears witness to its universal fatherhood. "We have sea-roses, sea-lilies, sea-violets, and sea-vines. When the water receded from the land plants and flowers remained. What changes they have since undergone are due to the influences of the sun and fresh water, being nourished by the rains and rivulets that water the earth. Similar conformations are visible in animals. Varieties of plumage and form in birds have their analogies in the shape, colour, and disposition of the scales of fishes. The fins of a fish are arranged like the feathers in its analogous bird. If we attend to the flight of birds we shall discover a likeness to the mode in which the corresponding fishes swim in the water. The same analogies De Maillet finds between land animals and sea animals. When the waters left the land the marine animals had no alternative but to become land animals; and should the ocean again overflow the world, what could they do but again betake themselves to the sea? In the struggle for life many would, doubtless, perish; but some would eat the herb of Glaucus, and when used to the new element, would find a congenial home with their ancient marine relatives, the children of Nereus and Doris."* De Maillet wanted but one link to connect the marine half of creation with that on dry land. This link was a *sea-man*. There were *mer-maids*, doubtless; but the *mer-men* were not so plentiful. Such beings, however, had been seen. There was one caught in Holland, one at Exeter, and one in the twelfth century on the coast of Suffolk. He was taken to Cambridge; but one day, when walking in St. Peter's quadrangle, he eluded his keeper, plunged into the Cam, and never again appeared. In the last century about sixty of these *sea-men* surrounded an English whaler near Greenland. Each of them rowed a little boat. When they saw the sailors in the ship they went under the sea, boats and all, except one who broke his oar. He was caught, but died soon after. His boat and fishing tackle were curiously made of fish bones. They were brought to England, and, for the information of the curious, De Maillet says that they may yet be seen in the Town Hall of Hull.

* Hunt's "Essay on Pantheism," p. 359.

In the second half of the last century the doctrine of development was taken up by J. B. Robinet, author of a once famous work called "*De la Nature*." Nature with Robinet was not God, but it was necessarily and eternally evolved from the Divine essence. "In the beginning," in Genesis, means out of time and in eternity. Creation is the everlasting work of the Deity, who from eternity has been working in and after the manner of Nature. The law which chiefly prevails in Nature is progression. There are no leaps. All things begin to exist under the smallest possible forms. Nature in itself knows nothing of kingdoms, classes, or species. These are artificial, the work of man. All things must have come from a unity, which has been infinitely diversified. This was the prototype of all that exists. Nature has been ever aiming at higher and more complete organizations. This is illustrated by the architectural skill of man, which begins with a hut or wigwam, and rises to an *Escorial* or a *Louvre*. The *ourang* was next to man in the scale of being. All the links of Nature's chain may not yet have been discovered, but ere long, Robinet said, science must discover them.

Lamarck followed Robinet, adding nothing to the theory, but by natural studies bringing it more within the region of science. To him, as to Robinet, Nature had no immutable orders or species. Circumstances and conditions were the cause of diversities and variations, even of those between vegetables and animals, insects and men. Nature is one. A seminal fluid pervades creation, and impregnates matter when placed in circumstances favourable to life. Nature begins with simple forms—"rough drafts"—infusoria and polypi. When life has once pressed in, it strives to increase the organism which it animates. This internal striving, or "sentiment," as Lamarck called it, was the physical cause of the possession of the different senses and organs of the body. The duck and the beaver, having long endeavoured to swim, webs at length grew on their feet; the antelope and gazelle became swift to run because often pursued by beasts of prey; the neck of the cameleopard was elongated through stretching its head to the high branches of the trees on which it finds its food. In this way the "mute and filthy race" mentioned by Horace, after long efforts to speak, became "articulate-speaking men."

The doctrine of development, even though sanctioned by the great name of Lamarck, was still a subject of ridicule. Men could not believe it. They grinned at the suggestion of such an ancestry as it ascribed to the human race. But its history in this century is the history of the science of Nature. Cuvier withstood it to the last; but his great contemporary and fellow-worker, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, only waited till Cuvier completed his classification of the animal

kingdom, that from this very work he might draw arguments in support of development. Cuvier thought to find the natural classification, but confessed that he could not find it. St. Hilaire doubted its existence. The lines which seem to separate between genera and species were to him as imaginary as the lines of latitude and longitude which divide the globe. When this subject was discussed by Cuvier and St. Hilaire before the French Academy in 1830, it is said to have engrossed the public mind even more than the impending revolution. The doctrine of development was made popular in England by the famous "*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*." It is supported by the long and patient labours of Mr. Darwin, and it now numbers among its converts the distinguished geologist, Sir Charles Lyell. The "*Vestiges*" rejected Lamarck's doctrine of the "internal sentiment," making the phenomenon of reproduction the key to the generation of species. Mr. Darwin accounts for the diversities in Nature called species by the principle of "Natural Selection."

The doctrine of development was at first a speculation about Nature. It originated in the speculative philosophy. It is in that region still, however much some of its advocates may exclaim against all philosophy not founded on observation and experience. The human mind has ever had intuitions of a unifying principle which made all one in the midst of diversity. The "one in the many" was as familiar to the old Greek as it is to the modern German. The "Nature producing" and the "Nature produced" of Spinoza, the "Deity in Himself" and in "His other being" of Schelling, were theological ideas which, after uniting God and Nature, led to expectations of a continued unity in Nature itself. Experiment and observation have provided facts which tend to confirm the hypothesis, but which do not prove it. A purely scientific man may say that he believes that it is the probable solution of Nature's secret, yet he must confess the contrast is considerable between the conclusion and the premises.

Mr. Huxley's paper is a discourse on the "*Physical Basis of Life*." He supposes that he has found the protoplasm, or first matter, out of which all things were made. He identifies it with a semi-fluid substance to be found lining the inner surface of the outer case of the hair of a stinging-nettle. He sees in all things a unity of faculty, of form, and of substance. The painter and the lichen he paints, the botanist and the flower which he classifies, Mr. Huxley and the animalcules under his microscope, are all composed of "masses of protoplasm." To the question—is there no difference between a "plant" and an "animal?" Mr. Huxley answers that "plants and animals are not separable, and that in many cases it is a mere matter of convention

whether we call a given organism an animal or a plant." Mr. Stirling denies that Mr. Huxley has found *the* protoplasm. He quotes against him the most "advanced" Germans, who find that the cells which are reckoned to contain protoplasm differ in their chemical ingredients. He denies that either "Molecularists or Darwinians" are able "to level out the difference between organic and inorganic, or between genera and genera, or species and species."

We do not believe that Mr. Huxley has found the first matter of life. We do not believe that he ever will find it, and for this reason, that it is "beyond all the physical forces which man can test and try." It is not to be seen, tested, or handled. It is outside of the grossness of matter. It will ever elude his grasp like the sunbeam through the window, or the phantasmagorian images on the canvas. He may find a stage in its progress from the invisible to the visible, which may seem to be a resting-place. Other physiologists will tell him to move on, and Mr. Huxley's "semi-fluid" of the bark of the "hair of the stinging-nettle" will find a place in the same category with the primordial water of Thales the Milesian, the "eternal strife" of Heraclitus, or the homogeneous "rudis indigestaque moles" of the Roman poet.

It is, however, possible—yea, probable—that such a basis of life does exist; that is to say, that all things are diversified formations from one homogeneous substance. Mr. Stirling thinks that Mr. Huxley has really not said anything remarkable in declaring that there is a protoplasm which is the matter of all organisms. For some time physiologists have traced the origin of all organization to primitive cells; even the popular mind has been used to the belief that man was made of dust. The objection to Mr. Huxley's doctrine is not that he has found a universal protoplasm: that may be left for discussion with other physiologists. But Mr. Huxley is supposed to erect on his physical discovery a doctrine of materialism, and to account for the existence of the universe without the necessity of a forming mind.

The Duke of Argyll calls inferences of this kind a great injustice to scientific men, and refers specially to Professor Huxley's article on Protoplasm, and the unwise criticism of some adverse reviewers. Mr. Huxley is often misunderstood, and we cannot deny that this misunderstanding is sometimes due to his own phraseology, and perhaps even more to a certain tone which suggests more than is said, and in our judgment more than is meant. But within his own sphere there is no man living more deserving the confidence of truth-loving men than Professor Huxley. He does his own work well. To use a homely phrase, he keeps his own doorstep clean. If his opponents did the same they would better

understand Mr. Huxley, and Mr. Huxley would better understand them.

Those of us who for the last ten years have been thinking over these questions, look back with a feeling of amazement to the difficulties, once formidable, that have now disappeared like mountains of mist before the light of the sun. In the Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law," doctrines and positions once denounced as infidel and atheistic are used to support religion, and to confirm men's faith in the divine government of the world. The question of development in Nature should never have been a question of God or no God. The man of science and the theologian should alike have regarded it as simply a question of how the Divine Being works. The study of this is the study of the science of God, and may be the employment of created minds throughout the infinite ages. In the words of Wieland,—

"To think Him will be continually the highest striving of the deep thought
Of every inhabitant of heaven: they will strive for ever."

"Ihn zu denken wird stets die höchste Bestrebung des Tiefsinns
Jedes Olympiers seyn, sie werden sich ewig bestreben."

The Duke of Argyll says, "Whatever may have been the method or process of creation, it is creation still. If it were proved to-morrow that the first man was 'born' from some pre-existing Form of Life, it would still be true that such a birth must have been, in every sense of the word, a new creation." Under the reign of law is defined as under "an agency through which we see working everywhere some purpose of the Everlasting Will." Again, the Duke of Argyll says, "It is no mere theory, but a fact as certain as any other fact of science, that creation has had a history. It has not been a single act done and finished once for all, but a long series of acts—a work continuously pursued through an inconceivable lapse of time."

The development hypothesis is grounded on some facts which must be acknowledged, whatever becomes of the hypothesis itself. The first of these is what we may call a geological progression. The extinct forms of life are found to be connected by an orderly gradation with those which now exist. Creation has proceeded from lower to higher types. The evidence of this progression is not perfect, that is to say, some of the links are wanting; but so many have been found as to render it certain that the others once existed. We quote again from the "Reign of Law:"—"Very recently a discovery has been made, to which Mr. Darwin only a few years ago referred as a discovery of which the chance is very small, viz., of fossil organisms in beds far beneath the lowest Silurian strata. This

discovery has been made in Canada, in beds far down, near the bottom even, of the rocks hitherto termed Azoic. But what are the forms of life which have been found here? They belong to the very lowest of living types—to the ‘Rhizopods.’ So far as the discovery goes, therefore, it is in strict accordance with all the facts previously known—that as we go back in time we lose, one after another, the higher and more complex organisms: first, the Mammalia; then the Vertebrata; and now, lastly, even the Mollusca.”

But before geology was a science, the unity of Nature had become evident to all students of the physical world. Even Cuvier admits analogies among the subdivisions of the four great classes into which he divided the animal kingdom. The Vertebrata shaded imperceptibly into the Mollusca, the Mollusca into the Articulata, and these again into the Radiata. St. Hilaire said that the divisions themselves were but arbitrary, for between each class there were intermediaries which completed the chain of being. Nor did it stop with animals: it passed into vegetables; and by the same continuity the organic passed into the inorganic. The disciples of Cuvier long withstood the doctrine of types; but they were at last compelled to yield. Professor Owen says that on reviewing the researches of anatomists into the special homologies of the cranial bones, he was surprised to find that they all agreed as to the existence of the determinable bones in the skull of every animal, down to the lowest osseous fish. One type serves for the arms of man, the wings of the bat, the forefeet of quadrupeds, and the paddles of the whale. Professor Huxley maintains that monkeys as well as men have the “posterior lobe” of the brain and the “hippocampus minor;” that they are not four-handed, as naturalists commonly make them, but that they have two feet and two hands, the feet consisting, like a human foot, of an *os calcis*, an astragalus, and a scaphoid bone, with the usual tarsals and metatarsals. The ostrich does not fly, yet it has rudimentary wings. In some quadrupeds there is a membrane which covers the eye in sleep; corresponding to this, anatomists find a rudimentary membrane at the internal angle of the human eye. And not only are all animals formed on the same plan, but even the different parts of the same animals seem modifications of other parts. The osseous pouch of the allouat, the organ by means of which it makes its strange howl, is an enlargement of the hyoid bone; the purse of the female opossum is a deep fold of the skin; the trunk of the elephant is an excessive prolongation of the nostrils; and the horn of the rhinoceros a mass of adherent hairs. In some organisms the stomach is but a simple modification of the intestines. Every organ seems to have grown out of some other, by a modification or adaptation necessary for its present purpose. In

the simpler forms of life different functions are performed by the same organs, but in the more complex forms special organs become appropriated to special functions. And even bones are formed after a type. Lorenz Oken saw the bleached skull of a deer in the Hartz forest, and he exclaimed, "It is a vertebral column!" Anatomists are now agreed that Oken was right. The same structure that served for the backbone served also for the skull.

This unity of plan pervades too the vegetable creation. It is remarkable that the scientific doctrine of vegetable morphology was not due to botanists, but to the clear intuitions of a poet. "It was," says Principal Tulloch in his Burnet Prize Essay, "to the fine and subtle glance of Goethe, roaming through nature, with so rich a perception of its harmonies, that typical forms of structure in the vegetable world first revealed themselves." In the "Metamorphoses of Plants" Goethe supposes nature ever to have had before her an ideal plant. Of this ideal every individual plant is a partial fulfilment. Not only are all plants formed after one type, but the appendages of every individual plant are repetitions of each other. The flowers are but the metamorphoses of the leaves. This doctrine was taken up with modifications by Schleiden, and again by De Candolle. It is now established as a certain truth in the science of botany. Lindley says that—

"Every flower, with its peduncle and bracteolæ, being the development of a flower-bud, and flower-buds being altogether analogous to leaf-buds, it follows as a corollary that every flower, with its peduncle and bracteolæ, is a metamorphosed branch. And further, the flowers being abortive branches, whatever the laws are of the arrangement of branches with respect to each other, the same will be the laws of the flowers with respect to each other."

Professor Huxley dwells on a threefold unity of an organic existence. Besides the protoplasm there is a unity of faculty and a unity of form. The definition of man as an animal with a stomach who has to provide for some little animals like himself with stomachs, is a definition that for the most part embraces all creatures below man down to the lowest plant or animalcule. The sum of their existence, active and passive, is to feed, grow, and reproduce their kind. This definition of man is the foundation of all sound philosophy. It was recognised by Goethe when he wrote—

"Warum treibt sich das Volk so und schreit? Es will sich ernähren
Kinder zeugen und die nahren so gut es vermag

• • • • •
Weiter bringt es Keiv Mensch stell'er sich ivie er auch will."

The nucleated protoplasm, which is the structural unit of the human body, is also the structural unit of every body, whether beast, fowl, reptile, fish, mollusc, worm, or polype. The functions and forms of

all bodies are alike. The material of which they are composed is the same down even to the shapes of the protoplasmic cells.

Mr. Stirling denies that the cells are alike. He quotes Stricker for the existence of cells of various forms. Some are club-shaped, some globe-shaped, and some bottle-shaped; some are sharp and some flat; some circle-headed; and if we were to reason from men to the structural units we might infer that some are beetle-headed. The discoveries of physiology only confirm the fact of likenesses more evident than men wish them to be. All bodies are subject to the same laws of birth, growth, decline, and death. The peculiar features of men appear in the faces of some animals, while the faces of some animals reappear among men as if to mock their pride and remind them of undesired relationship. A German physiologist says that a man with a pig's face is common, and with a pig's head probably more common still. Sometimes, as if to confirm De Maillet's doctrine of the marine organ of the race, we see men with the high shoulders and the bulging eyes peculiar to the codfish. It is the recognition of a great fact in nature, and not a mere caricature of the artist, which represents some women as feline, and finds in sundry men the contour of countenance which is the property of the ass. To reconcile us to our lot in having so humble an origin Oken maintains that the human body in intro-uterine life passes through thirteen stages corresponding to the modes of existence of different organisms from a vesicle to a mammal.

The chief theological objection to the development doctrine is the supposition that it conflicts with the theistic argument from the evidence of design in Nature. This has already been answered by the Duke of Argyll in what he says of the creative energy as being equally manifested, whether creation be one act or a progressive work. Mr. Martineau, whose "Essays" we refer to mainly because of a remarkable essay on "Nature and God," gives a similar answer. The materialist can never get rid of that "Force" in Nature which can be due only to mind. To this conclusion both the physical and metaphysical scrutiny of "Force" ultimately come. "This resolution," Mr. Martineau says, "of all external causation into Divine Will at once deprives the several theories of cosmical creation or development of all religious significance; not one of them has any resources to work with that are other than Divine." Every force is convertible with volition. Without this causality nothing can be done. Those who fancy that they can do without it commit "a logical theft" upon it piecemeal. They "crib causation by hair-breadths, to put it out at compound interest through all time, and then disown the debt." Mr. Martineau adds,—

"It is an equal error in the Theist to implicate his faith in resistance to

the doctrine of progressive development—be it in the formation of the solar system, in the consolidation of the earth's crust, or the origination of organic species. That doctrine would be atheistic only if the first germ on the one hand, and the evolution on the other, were root and branch undivine—some blind material force that could set itself up in rivalry to God's."

The objection of leading to atheism was raised against the doctrine of types, and for a long time stood in the way of its reception even by eminent scientific men. Naturalists had hitherto found their best guide to the study of Nature in seeking the final cause, that is, the object or use for which anything was made. Lord Bacon had indeed intimated that this circle was too narrow, and that the first business of the student of Nature was to seek the physical cause rather than the final. He did not say that there is no final cause, no design, but that the purpose or design is accomplished by means of the physical cause. It is this hint of Bacon's which has served not only to reconcile typology and final causes, but to place the whole doctrine in a new form, and to add strength to it as an argument for Theism. Comparative physiology revealed members for the use of which no account could be given. If they were of use in one kind of animal, in others they existed as mere "analogues," "homologues," "silent or abortive members." The use of teats in females is evident, but no reason beyond symmetry can be assigned for their existence in males. The sutures in the head of a child may render birth easier for the mother, but why should the same sutures be in the head of a bird which has only to break the shell of an egg? The ostrich does not fly, yet it has little abortive wings, the "analogues" of the wings of birds that fly, and of the fore-arms of all mammals. A fish has gills to enable it to breathe in the water, yet corresponding bronchial apertures are found in reptiles, birds, and even in mammals, including man. The use is apparently not the first or immediate object, but rather unity of plan. Sometimes the "analogue" is used for different purposes according to the requirements of different animals, as the wing of the bird to fly in the air, or the paddle of the whale to help it through the deep, making a purpose beyond a purpose, or to quote Bacon's illustration, using these members as a wise politician makes other men the instruments of his will without letting them know at what object he aims.

Homology thus opened to human vision a vaster view of the order of the universe. It revealed more of the *mode* of the Divine working. It told us that though man is made in God's image, yet that we must not reduce the Divine Mind to the dimensions of the human. To the intellect of man it is given to know but in part. That knowledge is real so far as it goes, but it does not embrace the Infinite. To do this, in the words of Wieland already quoted, it

"will strive for ever." Of the relation of typical forms to the doctrine of final causes, the best illustration we can remember is that of De Candolle. He supposes a splendid banquet. He is to find out or prove that this banquet is not the result of chance, but due to the will of an intelligent being. The dishes are well prepared, and the selection of them implies a reference to the wants of the guests. So far the anatomist and physiologist have led us. But besides this, it is observed that the dishes which constitute this repast are arranged in a certain symmetrical order, such as pleases the eye, and plainly announces design and volition. If it is found that there are double rows of dishes, some real and some merely imitations which are of no use as to the repast, does it follow therefore that the idea of design must be rejected? De Candolle answers that so far from this he would rather infer that there had been an aim to make a symmetrical arrangement, and consequently the work of intelligence. Symmetry of arrangement is as decided a proof of design as adjustment of mechanism. Beauty and harmony bespeak an author as much as working for an end. Should the doctrine of development ever be proved, theology will have as little to fear and probably as much to gain as it has had from typology and morphology.

There are few things in this world more remarkable than the way in which men—even able and earnest men—persist in misunderstanding each other. Voltaire says that the reason why so few people understand Spinoza is because Spinoza did not understand himself. The Duke of Argyll thinks that Mr. Darwin does not quite understand himself. It is then no marvel that so many people have wrangled about the "Darwinian hypothesis." We read this passage in the "Reign of Law" several times over to be convinced that its obvious meaning really was its meaning. The noble author says:—

"Strictly speaking, therefore, Mr. Darwin's theory is not a theory on the origin of species at all, but only a theory on the causes which lead to the relative success or failure of such new forms as may be born into our world. It is the more important to remember this distinction, because it seems to me that Mr. Darwin himself frequently forgets it."

It seems to us that Mr. Darwin does account for the origin of species by "Natural Selection." That is to say, that in the great struggle for life the strong survive, and those that live become what they are according to the conditions on which life is granted to them. It is difficult for us to account for the Duke of Argyll's interpretation of Mr. Darwin. But a far more remarkable misunderstanding is that of a criticism of the "Reign of Law" in the *Quarterly Journal of Science*. The article was written by Mr. Wallace, one of our most eminent naturalists. He states what one would think is clear and manifest to all men, that the whole contro-

versy between Mr. Darwin and his opponents is simply "a question *how* the Creator has worked." He then advocates a reign of law as if the Duke of Argyll had accounted for creation by "incessant interferences" and the "direct action" of the Divine Mind without law. The Duke of Argyll justly answers that the whole scope and aim of his book were quite the contrary. The idea of "incessant interference" he holds to be essentially erroneous, as involving the idea of natural forces being agencies independent of the Creative Mind.

Mr. Wallace explains and defends Mr. Darwin's doctrine, which is, that the Creator has given to the universe self-developing powers. It has laws by which it is self-regulating, and "the forms under which life is manifested have an inherent power of adjustment to each other and to surrounding nature." The complicated parts of an orchis, to take the example given, were not contrived as a mechanic might contrive an ingenious toy or puzzle. They are the results of those general laws which were co-ordinated at the first introduction of life upon the earth. Mr. Wallace's doctrine simply is, that God made a machine, and left it eternally to spin. This was the eighteenth-century idea of the universe, with only this exception, that occasionally the Author interfered to keep it in repair. The Duke of Argyll finds law always present, but only as a servant, never as a master. It is the Creator who works; but He works by means of law. Gibbon supposed that he was refuting Christianity when he assigned the natural causes by which it gained strength in the world. The whole argument was the assumption that God never works by means, that He is absent from the universe, and that natural agencies are really without God in the world.

The Duke of Argyll's doctrine deserves more attention than it has yet received. It is pregnant with more meaning than the distinguished nobleman is probably himself aware of. It is clear and definite, but scarcely new. It is to be found in the sermons of the most thoughtful, we may say philosophical, preacher that ever adorned the Church of Scotland. Dr. Caird says:—

"A human mechanist may leave the machine he has constructed to work, without his further personal superintendence, because, when he leaves it, God's laws take it up; and by their aid, the materials of which the machine is made retain their solidity—the steel continues elastic, the vapour keeps its expansive power. But when God has constructed *His* machine of the universe, He cannot so leave it, or any the minutest part of it, in its immensity and intricacy of movement, to itself; for if He retire, there is no second God to take care of this machine. Not from a single atom of matter can He who made it for a moment withdraw His superintendence and support; each successive moment, all over the world, the act of creation must be repeated."

The Deity must be present, and *with His laws*. There is some-

thing to think about here. Is not the omnipresence of God enough without His laws? Or, to put the question in another form, are His laws anything else but the mode of His working? Our great difficulty in approaching this question is to banish from our minds the human conceptions which steal in with the analogies. When we speak of laws, a machine and a machine-maker, and apply these ideas to God and the universe, we often forget that we are using metaphors. A man is distinct from the machine he makes, and the laws to which he commits it are laws external to himself. But the Omnipresent can never be absent from the universe. He must be in some way identical with His laws; His working must in some way be immediate working—even when it is mediate. Were we to say that nature is God, the saying would be false; for it would mean that God is not greater than nature. In another sense it would be true; for the most manifest thing in nature is the presence of God. The Duke of Argyll gives five definitions of "law." The first is that it is "simply an observed order of facts." This appears to us the most accurate of all the definitions of law when applied to the natural world. The other forms are really nothing more than observations in detail of particular parts of this "observed order." A law of nature, then, simply means a certain order given in human experience. We are, then, quit of law in every human sense, and are alone with God only, and the mode of His working. We cease to be troubled about Hume's doctrine, that we know nothing of physical causation but the sequence of phenomena. The efficient cause is God. Here, too, we meet Mr. Huxley, who accepts this definition of law, and freeing himself from every possibility of being charged henceforth with materialism, avows that we know as little of "matter" as we do of "spirit." The plain conclusion is, that the first and most certain existence in the world is the existence of the Divine Mind.

The doctrine of "fiats," or divine "interferences," which were once regarded as the sole evidence of Theism, has disappeared from the pages of the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Huxley, Mr. Martineau, and, indeed, of almost every eminent writer on these subjects whose name we can recall. The continuity of nature's work is supposed to speak more of God than a sudden break. It is regarded, too, as a matter of fact, that no "breaks" have existed, that nature has kept the even tenor of her way, making no pauses, but by incessant and progressive working has woven the vast web of creation. Yet the doctrine of "interferences," whether true or not, had a meaning in the wants and cravings of the human mind. While the machine of the universe was regarded as a work left to itself, men thirsted after the living God. If He could not be found in the daily upholding of

the universe, He must be expected at intervals interfering with the ordinary working. It was on this principle that miracles spoke more of God than the order of nature. Thus, while the universe was regarded as a machine, the existence of miracles was declared impossible by those who denied the "interferences." Now, as the Duke of Argyll remarks, it is admitted on all sides that the question of miracles depends entirely on the evidence. This craving for "interferences," or, what is the same thing, this belief in "interferences," has possessed the human mind in every age, and under many forms. It was perhaps inevitable to those who could not realize the presence of Deity in this world of nature and providence. But religious beliefs cannot always be reduced to logical consistency. Even those who saw the "Great First Cause" in the "secondary causes," were not satisfied unless the Deity worked also without secondary causes. And though the world was governed and their prayers answered mediately, they would have called it Atheism to say that God never works but according to the order of nature. This had its root in that craving for absolute certainty which seems to be an original element in the sentiment of religion. It is really a part of the question of miracles, and must end in the simple inquiry of the amount of certainty which is within the reach of man.

Supposing the doctrine of development were true, it would give a hint towards the settling of another question which has been long agitated among theologians. This regards the mode of the Divine working in revelation. Has there been progression there too, or has revelation come only by "interferences?" And with this opens up a wider question, if it has come by "interferences" at all. In the latter case, if it has not, and we retain the idea of the universe as something apart from God, we fall into simple Deism. If we retain the idea which we have already reached, that the existence and presence of God are more certain than the existence and presence of the universe, we get a new glimpse of revelation, and with it a light which would dissipate many difficulties. We must, however, take care lest analogies mislead us. There is an *a priori* probability that the Divine working in the education of the human race will correspond to the order of the Divine working in nature. At the same time, there is something in the idea of revelation which suggests speciality. We cannot prosecute this subject further. There is a correspondence of difficulties between development in nature and in revelation. Mr. Darwin finds his new species in nature, but he only guesses at the mode of their introduction. We find higher waves of truth thrown up at different ages of the world, but the fact that they have come is more obvious than how they have come.

If space permitted, we might draw some more lessons from the

theory of Development. One which, however, is really independent of the theory, though not of the facts on which the theory is built, should not be omitted. If there is anything which Mr. Darwin has certainly proved, it is that qualities acquired by individuals are inherited by their descendants. Habits which are a second nature to those by whom they are first learned, are natural to their children. This seems true of all properties, whether physical, mental, or moral. The dog imparts its fidelity to its progeny. Ducks that have become weak of wing and strong of limb by domestication hatch ducklings with the same properties. What men teach animals they transmit to their descendants. How evident is it in human life that evil descends; and good, too, with many apparent, we dare not say real, exceptions, goes down from father to son. If example be good, it will have its influence; but there is a proverbial saying, verified by Mr. Darwin's philosophy, that good or evil runs in the blood.

There is yet another question which concerns the whole relation of natural knowledge to religious faith. This is independent of Mr. Darwin's theory being true or false. It belongs to the higher generalisation which includes all special inquiries. It is not properly the question of science and Christianity, but rather if science is in any way to determine, or even influence, our views of Christianity. The student of Nature has rightly claimed that he shall be free to follow whatever truth his method reveals. We are not disposed to complain of Mr. Huxley devoting himself exclusively to one field, nor even of the disciple of Comte for saying that we know phenomena, and nothing but phenomena. It is true in an obvious sense that there is a kind of knowledge acquired here which cannot be otherwise attained, and that there is a method available here which is not available elsewhere. What we complain of is the implication sometimes made that this method reveals all that is really knowable by man. Lord Bacon made a compromise between science and religion, relegating the one to the province of knowledge, and the other to that of faith, forbidding them to meet or to influence each other. The same separation was made by the late Baden Powell, and the result which he everywhere offers is that in science we have real knowledge, that here we proceed on rational principles, but in religion we have to depend on some vague thing called "faith." We have no reason to doubt the religious sincerity either of Lord Bacon or of Baden Powell; yet they were subjected to the charge of irreligion—unjustly, indeed, yet not unreasonably. If our faith in Christianity is not founded on some principles of reason, it is a thing of too little value to be worth contending for. When Baden Powell relegates us to "faith" for our grounds of religious conviction, "we certainly feel," Mr. Martineau says, "that the door is rather

rudely slammed in the face of the inquiry, and that we are turned out of the select society of philosophers who know, to take our place with the plebs who believe." It is not to be denied that there is a true distinction between faith and knowledge. It has been made familiar in the words of Tennyson:—

"We have but faith, we do not know,
For knowledge is of things we see."

Yet this faith is mainly founded on knowledge: it is strengthened and regulated by what we know; and knowledge, even natural knowledge, is itself founded on "faith"—it has to assume postulates. A man cannot believe contrary to what he knows. Between science and religion there may be a border-land, unreclaimed, but not irreclaimable: a final or absolute separation is impossible. Whatever Christianity may be in itself, it must present itself differently to different minds, countries, or ages of the world, and the highest evidence of its divine origin will be that as ages advance in knowledge and things now secret become revealed, it will still be acknowledged divine.

Frohschammer is one of the three Munich professors who have distinguished themselves by their opposition to the proceedings of the Council now sitting at Rome. The other two are Döllinger and Hubert. His book treats of the whole question of science and Christianity, but the greater part of it concerns Mr. Darwin's doctrine. This, indeed, is viewed as only a hypothesis; but the facts on which it rests are regarded as of as much theological significance as if the hypothesis itself were established. It is admitted that science and the Bible are not in harmony on such questions as creation, the origin of man, and the relation of man to the lower animals. It is maintained that the Bible must be interpreted by what science teaches; and if so with the Bible, much more with the dogmatic teaching of the Church? Christianity is considered as subject to laws of development like to those which we see in the natural world. The spirit of it remains, but the form is ever changing. It is not remarkable that some of Frohschammer's books have been put into the "Index." His interpretation of what are usually reckoned the chief doctrines of Christianity would not be tolerated in any sect in England. If he is an ordinary specimen of the Roman Catholic Broad Churchman it was quite time that the Pope assembled his "Œcumenical." The modern science and civilization which Dr. Manning denounces as the children of darkness and the devil, are the day-spring from on high to the Catholic Professor of Munich.

J. Hubert



THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH TOWARDS
PRIMARY EDUCATION,
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF RATES AND COMPULSION.*

I.

WHEN our President requested me, some months ago, to read the present paper, I felt on the one hand that Primary Education would by this time be, what it is, the most important public question of the hour; and on the other hand, that in these circumstances it mattered little who should throw the ball into the ring, as there would be no lack of eager and more skilful players to keep up the game. For this reason, I feel the less bound to occupy your time with deprecation or apology. But I cannot refrain from saying further that if anything could enhance the responsibility or deepen the diffidence which I feel, it is the thought of coming after two such men as the authors of the two addresses last delivered in this place†

* The substance of this paper was read at Sion College on the 31st of March. It is printed in deference to the opinion of those who heard it, that it might be a not useless contribution to the discussion to which it relates. Its original scope was purposely general, and in arranging it for publication the passages most easily omitted have been some of those which dealt with details not familiar to the general reader. To have kept abreast of the flood of criticism and suggestion which is being daily poured upon the bill, would have been to rewrite the paper. But these questions must eventually be decided quite over the head of outside critics in Parliament itself. It seems more useful to the writer to bring as much general light as possible to bear on the questions involved. In the main, therefore, the paper remains in the form in which it was originally prepared.

† Sir J. Coleridge and the Rev. Canon Westcott.

—addresses between which it would be hard indeed to decide, whatever we may think about their views, which bore away the palm for keenness of intelligence, force of reasoning, rare delicacy of tone, or grace of style.

Attempting only to follow these distinguished examples in the aim to deal frankly, and to the best of my ability with my subject, I proceed to set before you the far plainer fare provided for you this evening.

II.

Care was taken, in framing the title of this paper, to make room for reference to the duty of the Church towards Primary Education generally, as well as to indicate two points at least in the current controversy which deserved and demanded special attention.

And if any are disposed to object that there is really at the present time of day no need of a recurrence to first principles, and that we have enough to do to discuss the immediate wants and plans of the hour, I reply that I fail to see how we can expect to arrive at a reasonable and practical judgment on the present situation, unless we have very clearly before our minds what we want to do, and why we want to do it: that I think we Englishmen are apt to lose some force and directness in action from our disregard of ideas; and that accordingly, I trust you will agree with me that it is well for us to place a few principles in position beforehand, as a basis of operation.

I. It needs to be affirmed, especially by a clergyman, that the education of the people is the paramount obligation, the first concern, of the civil power, the State. I speak of the State as the symbol and the organ of the totality of the nation, of all citizens. Education is a primary need of all citizens, second only to, comparable only with, the primary physical necessity of food. It is therefore the interest and the responsibility of whatever association or organization of the citizens is large enough to include all smaller or rival interests, is wise enough to moderate or conciliate all conflicting claims, and is strong enough to dominate all authority and influence within the realm by its own. And this power is found only in that highest political combination which we call the State, and its exercise resides only in the Parliament, the great council of the nation. Any philosophical or historical disquisition on this text would be needless and out of place. It is sufficient to proclaim the fact—for fact it is—that the State in the first instance has the right, as the State alone has the power, to devise, to support, to direct, and control the national system of Elementary Education. I am not ignorant of the extravagances, or insensible to the dangerous conclusions to which an idolatry of the State is capable of leading, and seems to have led

some impetuous thinkers both at home and abroad. But surely in presence of the social and moral condition of the lower classes of our population, it is permissible to indulge a modest aspiration after a little "strong government" in that behalf. Such at least is the sentiment which sways a large and an increasing number of the younger citizens of England; and it is one to which large numbers of the clergy are neither strangers nor foes. If experience of repeated failure, and chronic helplessness in dealing with admitted social evils, have made them often doubt

"The providence that's in a watchful state,"

their imagination and their faith still survive to inspire the feeling with which the wise Ulysses drove the recreant Achilles from his tent, back to the battle of life:—

"There is a mystery (with whom relation
Durst never meddle) in the soul of State;
Which hath an operation more divine
Than breath, or pen, can give expressure to."

II. Secondly, this paper assumes that the promotion of education is one of the first interests and obligations of the Christian Church. If I may venture to repeat words that I have used before, education is inseparably bound up with "that religion, whose history is the history of human Education,"—(however much Pantheist or Positivist may grudge it the distinction,)—in every sense of which the words are capable. The assertion is justified by those precepts of the elder Church, itself the schoolmaster of the Christian, which the Talmud distilled from the spirit of the Law, and with which it impregnated the very letter of the Gospel. "Jerusalem was destroyed, because the instruction of the young was neglected." "The world is only saved by the breath of the school-children." "Even for the rebuilding of the temple, the schools must not be interrupted." "Study is more meritorious than sacrifice." "A scholar is greater than a prophet." And so the duty of Education has been the Church's uniform deduction from Christ's injunction, "Feed my lambs." The Christian Church has always represented the opposite theory, the exactly contradictory philosophy to that which had certainly much to make it plausible before Christ came:

"Ætas parentum, pejor avis tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiore."

Progress not declension, culture not ignorance, moral elevation, intellectual and spiritual light, have ever been the creed and aim of the best Christians,—have always been the ends to which the energy of the Church as a whole has tended, in spite of local, partial, personal,

and temporary appearances of an opposite character, and even of many express efforts to the contrary. And these are not times in which it is enough to faintly adumbrate a faith, or leave a conviction such as this to be inferred; nor is Education a subject, in discussing which, it is either politic or possible to do so. Let the sarcasm and reproach to which the profession that we are "a religious people" exposes us, be what they may, there is the idea, there is the desire, and it is the office of the Church to foster and develop them. They embody in a living, however dim and disguised a shape, the human instinct of immortality, the human consciousness of the divine. They raise, and forbid us to trifle with, the question propounded by no mystical religionist, in no spirit of unsympathizing disrespect to science, but in one which admirably combines modern culture with modern seriousness: "What *know we* greater than the *soul*?" It is this one word which represents the Church's interest, and measures the Church's responsibility in the matter of Elementary Education; and no scheme or theory which denies this interest or ignores this responsibility can encounter anything but opposition from earnest Christians.

III. In the third place it is well that reasonable men should compel themselves to put into shape their expectations of what education is to do for the people. (1.) It is to be step number two towards that "revolution by due course of law" which the Duke of Wellington predicted, and to which keen and candid observers of all opinions perceive, with either fear or hope, that "we are now on our way." The vague, but ardent wish, to extend and improve elementary education is part of the widespread and radical dissatisfaction with the present condition of the lower classes of the labouring poor in England, and of a determination to improve it,—not to palliate it, but to alter it,—by any and by every means. It is not that they or we dream of grafting a higher standard of education on to the present social status of the English poor, with which it has and can have no affinity—with which it cannot co-exist. It is not our object to take children from the gutter and the hedgerow, educate them up to Standard III., IV., V., or even VI., and send them back to the gutter and the hedgerow, or even to the same type and the same amount of labour in the factory or on the farm, in the mine or at the mill, as now awaits them; but to make their education, perhaps the forcing of education upon them, a means of dragging them for good out of the gutter and the hedgerow, and making the type of life which I have represented by these phrases henceforth impossible.

Secondly, some of us hope that the extension of education,—not stopping at the mystery of the three R's, but extending to the acquisition of a little knowledge of history and geography, sacred and

secular, the formation of a slight acquaintance with the great men and great minds of other times and other countries, if even only the mastery of the bare fact of their existence,—evoking, as these must, a distinct acknowledgment of the fact that there are other countries besides England, other languages besides English, other tribunals of national sentiment and faith besides those which the British public erects or submits to see erected in its name, other Christian bodies, other Christian confessions besides those represented by their parish church or their own chosen Congregational chapel, and our own set of recognised sects; that there were some, at least in name and by profession, Christians even before the Reformation, and that it is neither sacrilege nor superstition to take some account of what these said and thought, or of what their descendants are saying and thinking now: some of us, I say, are sanguine enough to hope that a little more schooling—very little would suffice for the principal part of it—might let this moderate amount of light into the popular mind, and might moderate some of our religious bigotry, explode some of our religious narrowness, inspire a larger faith, and give a wider outlook upon life.

These considerations will be felt to be not irrelevant if they lead us to the point, at which the very practical consideration of party influences, political or ecclesiastical, on the question, comes in view. I refer to them for the sake of indicating the responsibility which rests, in such controversies as this which concerns education, on the leaders of schools on either side. If they refuse all co-operation except with a set, and scorn all sympathy which is not quite thorough-going, they will have only themselves to thank if it is offered them no more. This is no appeal for forbearance, or bid for assistance, to the fanatic and the partisan. But it is a deliberate protest against fanaticism on this subject—an appeal to the intelligent, the fair, the pious, of all schools, for proof of possessing a wider cultivation and a truer education themselves, and for a more earnest and united effort to extend these blessings, in order to counteract fanaticism, and to mitigate it in general. Those who are capable of understanding opponents, and who dislike to see their own principles caricatured and discredited, should be ready to respond to such an appeal frankly and generously. They should remember that Orthodoxy and Liberalism have been combined before now, and that the Anglican Church is not so flush of friends, abroad or at home, that she can afford to flout any of her earnest sons and supporters. The reference to foreign modes of Christian thought is designed, and is not, I think, inopportune. English Christians may well take notice of, and estimate fairly, the signs of change in a “Liberal” direction in the Continental Church. They may at least

be sure,—and this Hall has furnished them with evidence of it before now,—that many are the Liberal Churchmen at home, who have no fancy, on the one hand, for walking out into spiritual space, and engaging in the interesting process of competition for existence, and whose imagination, on the other hand, is not in the least fired, nor their soul in the smallest degree satisfied with the scheme which the only organized philosophy stands ready to offer them in exchange. Many and many are the confident and hopeful English Liberals, who, on one ground or another, are, at this moment, in the mood, or one of the many moods, covered and expressed by the maxim (which was certainly not that of calculating caution, or even of interested conservatism), “No man, having drunk old wine, straightway desireth new: for he saith, the old is better.”

IV. It is worth while to state the grounds on which, and the extent to which, we hold that the present so-called voluntary system has broken down, and is unequal to the task of dealing with the present admitted exigency. That what it does, it does, on the whole, well; that its results, in the best instances, are satisfactory, and would bear comparison with those of any other country, I, for one, readily acknowledge. Faults of commission it has of course, but its chief faults are those of omission. Further wrangling over figures would be neither interesting nor useful. I am quite content with the conclusion arrived at by Sir J. K. Shuttleworth, in his masterly memorandum of two years ago. “The inquiries of the Committee of the Manchester and Salford Education Bill in 1851-2, and of the Manchester Education Aid Society, and the Diocesan Board of London, in 1865-6, disclose a condition of ignorance and apathy among the poorest portion of great cities which *requires some heroic remedy*.”* That there are not very many children—though there are more than many persons suppose—who have never at any time gone to school, and who do not know the alphabet by sight, few persons are unwilling to admit. But a few weeks, or even months, of fitful schooling, really goes for nothing. And this is the best and the most that many thousands actually get. It is not only useless, but delusive. And it is common enough in the experience of every one practically conversant with schools to give them no difficulty in believing, that certainly no more than half our children of school age, including not a few who are nominally but irregularly at school, are receiving an *effectual* education,—i.e., are “being fitted by education for their future duties.”† The deficiency in this respect is one which points for its remedy to some form or degree of compulsion.

* Sir J. K. Shuttleworth's “Memorandum,” p. 35.

† See Report of London Diocesan Board of Education for 1867, p. 6.

I do not propose to occupy you with any lengthened discussion of the principle of applying compulsion to Education. On no branch of the subject is it easier to carry on a logical and philosophical logomachy, issuing in a drawn battle after all, than on the point of compulsion to attend. I am content to speak of it doubtfully as an *experiment*, but ready to maintain that the experiment *must* be made. It is not lightly, nor rashly, that clauses providing for direct compulsion have been introduced into a Bill, which has been so long in preparation, and so carefully considered by such men as have had to introduce it. And the proposal, once deliberately, if reluctantly, made, can never be absolutely withdrawn. I take it that the adoption of this policy, tentatively and with every caution, by the Government, expresses merely the conviction, already referred to, that it is time the lowest conditions of life in the human rabbit-warrens of that conglomerate of cities which goes by the name of London, and in the lesser Londons of the north, should be strenuously attacked, and forcibly broken through ; that the nation is determined at least to declare, and to try to give effect to its declaration, that children shall not be bred and born like rabbits, and left to live the lives and die the deaths of rabbits, without at least a chance of being moulded into human beings. If this country, boastful of its civilization and its greatness, would not be eaten up of paupers, as Herod was of worms, it must take some action towards destroying the pauper-nests where this ugly monster-mischief is now being perpetually hatched and reared. Two only difficulties—one theoretical, the other practical—present themselves to my mind.

It is at this point that a real question arises, and I know disturbs many genuine and not thoughtless philanthropists, whether this compulsion to go to school is the right end to begin at—whether the question of the homes of the people does not stand first, and the schools of the people second. But it is only a question upon paper. We can do the one at once ; and we cannot touch the other yet. The opinion has been indicated that the enforcement of Education is not only not compatible with several forms of life unhappily known amongst us, both in town and country, but that it has a direct tendency to break them up. And that is just what is wanted. Too well I know the indescribable mischief, physical, mental, and moral, of the state of the homes of the London poor ; too well I know their hopeless helplessness in the matter of obtaining a better supply of space, air, light, and water. But somehow the enforcement of schooling will help them. Boys who have been, even if they have been dragged, through a course of the most elementary schooling, will not contentedly go back to live, and rear their own children, in the dens of Shoreditch, Whitechapel, and Bethnal Green. I do not know where they will go, or

what they will do, but education will give them a new power, and they will be able to contribute to their own deliverance, instead of hanging, as they now do, a dead weight on the hands of their best friends. Let the State supply schools for all at once, and "compel them to come in," and I believe, and am sure, it will soon be encouraged and compelled to lay a strong hand on some of the villainous house-property in the East-end, which at present neutralizes any education, discredits civilisation, and mocks at Christianity.

The second difficulty is wholly practical. I have in my own parish, a typical pauper-plantation. And third-rate as I am sorry to say my present temporary schools are, I should be sorry indeed to have the young "Arabs," who live a precarious life on the coal-wharves, and in the streets (the trade of wood-cutting or begging just furnishing them with a sufficient income for perpetual pitch-and-toss), compelled to attend my school. The respectable parents would, of course, not stand it for a week. Where then are they to be compelled to go? Here, as elsewhere, it seems to me to be the wisdom of the Bill to throw the decision upon the Local Boards, and empower them not only (clause 24) "to pay the whole or any part of the school fees," but also (clause 25), if they can "satisfy the Education Department that it is expedient," to "provide a school at which *no fees shall be required from the scholars.*" In my own neighbourhood, as in many others, such a Board would probably avail themselves of a sufficiently good ragged-school which is already at work: and by requiring conditions of their own, and obtaining its recognition, and consequent regulation by the Education Department, they would probably improve the system and increase the efficiency of the school, and thus confer a double benefit,—on the education, as well as the educated.

These two points cleared up, it can hardly be doubted that the powers to be conferred upon the Local Boards to make bye-laws of a compulsory character,—with the concurrence of the department, and subject always to the approval of Parliament (clause 66),—such bye-laws, so legalised, to be enforced upon penalty of a 5*s.* fine, by such means as the Board might find most effectual for the purpose, will be to make a critical experiment in the safest way, to provide as far as possible against hardship, and for its prompt and easy redress if any arise (by the wise discretion to pay fees given to the Board), and to place in the hands of the safest practitioners, the persons who know the patient's habits and constitution, what bids fair to be a remedy for the sorest spot on the surface of English society.

To return, however, to the shortcomings of the present system.

The next deficiency concerns the machinery of education. It is the failure of an adequate supply of school accommodation in some

places, the failure of adequate means of maintaining that which exists, in others, alas! in most places. As to the deficiency of accommodation, it is, undoubtedly, a local and special defect. All the recent inquiries disclose the existence of *unused accommodation*. The Royal Commissioners made out that where one hundred scholars were in average attendance, there was accommodation for one hundred and forty-six.

With the deficiency of accommodation I do not now propose to deal.

The other form of deficiency in the machinery of education is far more serious and more pressing. The stream of voluntary contributions to the support of education has run thin by degrees, and is running most unbeautifully less, in many, if not most places, and is nearly dried up in some. Sir J. K. Shuttleworth's stringent analysis of the report of the Committee of Council on Education for 1867 abundantly proved that the increased rate of voluntary contributions from local sources to the maintenance of schools has borne no proportion to the *reduction of the grant* in aid from the Council Office, induced by the Revised Code, nor to the *increased number of scholars* educated in the public elementary schools since 1862. The reduction of the grant has been at the rate of 3s. 9d. per scholar! The rate of increase in local contributions has been 1s. 1d. per scholar. The clear loss has been at the rate of 2s. 8d. per scholar! And of the increase of 1s. 1d. per head, no less than *elevenpence* came from the payment of the scholars.* The stimulus to voluntary effort afforded by the Revised Code may therefore be estimated at once, both absolutely and relatively to the increased demand!

An individual instance—which might easily be multiplied—of the failure of the voluntary system—at least of the difficulty of working it—may perhaps count for more than a comparison of average results. It is an illustration of that difficulty and failure, established on the highest authority, and which I select on this account, out of a number of similar cases before me. The following is a quotation from the report of Her Majesty's Inspector on the schools of one of the districts of Bethnal Green, a year or two ago:—"The master's health is failing, and he is consequently unequal to the conduct of so large a school, where there is no assistant. *The managers are in difficulty about funds. If well-supported it would be a good school.*" Defects in the buildings are then specified. "There are no pupil teachers or monitors." My lords thereupon expatiate thus to the poor clergymen upon this text: "With reference to the faults noticed by Her Majesty's Inspector, I am directed to point out to you that schools cannot continue to receive grants or unreduced

* Memorandum, &c p. 14.

grants, except upon the terms annexed to them. The absence of sufficient voluntary effort is not an excuse which my lords are at liberty to entertain. And the grants for next year must be looked for subject to this caution." Comment is needless on this happy illustration of a system which compels its officials, however generous and intelligent, to the naïf cruelty of these futile reflections, and puts no more practical remedy in their power than that of courteously communicating these confessions of their own impotence "for the information" of a still more helpless Diocesan Board of Education. In a word, a radical change in the system of grants is called for. The voluntary supply of funds is inadequate to the existing need,—at least in towns—and the existing system of public aid not only neither stimulates nor supplements sufficiently those voluntary supplies, but it has recently tended to check them by tightening and centralizing government control and narrowing the range of the instruction given, without raising the scale of public assistance; while the tone of its official counsel and correction has been that of certain primitive inspectors:—"There shall no straw be given you, yet shall ye deliver the tale of bricks. Fulfil your works, your daily tasks, as when there was straw."

V. This being the state of the case in general we have to consider the scheme which is now before Parliament for placing our system of national elementary education on a secure footing, and giving it the power of extending itself and adapting itself to our wants.

A very brief indication of the principal provisions of the measure will suffice. It bears upon its face, for the first time in English Educational legislation, the positive declaration and enactment that schools shall be sufficiently and universally supplied (clause 5):—"There shall be provided for every school district a sufficient amount of accommodation in public elementary schools, available for all the children resident in such district, for whose elementary education suitable provision is not otherwise made." It is something to have this assertion of the principle that it is the duty of the State thus to furnish elementary education, recognised and proclaimed by the Legislature.

There follow certain general conditions which are to apply henceforward to all elementary schools.

1. Such schools shall still conform to the regulations of the Education Department.
2. And in particular shall be open to inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectors, excepting only in religious knowledge, unless by express desire of the managers.
3. No scholars shall be required to attend any services or learn any

formulary or lesson to which the parent, on *religious grounds*, objects. This provision must be considered fully presently.

The Act provides for an inquiry, immediately after the date of its passing, into the needs of any neighbourhood, and on the report being made—after a month's allowance for remonstrance and a year's for action on the part of persons interested in the welfare of the neighbourhood—provides for the creation of a local board, with certain necessary powers. It is by no means obvious why this indispensable executive authority should only be called into existence in districts (clause 10) where the erection of new schools is needed. This plan appears to overlook the fact, already, it is hoped, sufficiently established, that the raising of local funds, on a fixed basis, and their application to the maintenance of the *existing* schools, is a function of the boards which is needed nearly everywhere, whether new school buildings are needed or not.

Satisfactory features in the provisions of the Bill are, that all changes in arrangement once made are to have the sanction of the Education Department (clause 18), and that while the Local Boards may delegate the management of a particular school to a body of managers chosen by themselves, so they may also accept the management and control of any existing school, transferred to them by its original managers, subject always to the approval of the Education Department.

The provisions for *aiding existing schools* have been rather thrown into the shade by the interest attaching to the proposals for retaining a religious element in the education to be given, whether in them, or in the wholly new schools. Yet this is, perhaps, the most important feature in the Bill.

Clause 22 provides that the Local Boards may give pecuniary assistance of such amount and for such purposes as they think fit, to any school, "provided that such assistance is granted on *equal terms* to all such schools"—a provision which does not, of course, imply that none shall have aid, unless all ask for it at the same time, but only that the terms on which it is granted shall be "equal to all," these terms to be "approved by the Education Department."

The clauses providing for the payment of school-fees on behalf of poor scholars, and for the possible establishment of a free school, have already been referred to, as have those which enable the Boards to exercise compulsion.

It remains to be remarked, that power is reserved by the Education Department both to *unite* (clause 34) one or more parishes, boroughs, or districts, into one united district, for the purposes of this Act, and also, by an order in "Council" to direct

that one district "shall *contribute* towards the provision or maintenance of elementary schools in another district, provisions which are likely to be put in action, and to conduce to the more effective and easier working of the measure."

Indeed the enlargement of the area or district to be represented by the boards is one way, and perhaps the best way, of obviating the risks which it is impossible not to foresee from the purely parochial composition of the school boards. Vestries and Boards of Guardians are not at this moment in the very highest esteem, and it is most desirable to modify the type of governing body which these organizations present, either by enlarging the electors' area of choice or by direct nomination. Mr. Forster, in introducing the Bill, admitted that the experiment of nominating members of Boards of Guardians by the Poor-Law Board had not been particularly successful. And certainly a plan which might reproduce the conflict between elected and nominated members, which the St. Pancras Guardians have exhibited, does not recommend itself at first sight. And he made a merit of the freedom which was left by the Act to the town councils and select vestries, to select the members of the school boards from any source they pleased. As the number they *must* elect is three, and the highest number they *may* elect twelve, it might be well to *require* them to elect a certain proportion, say one-third of the whole board, from outside their own body, or even from beyond the area of the parish or district—if the idea of members nominated by the Education Department must be wholly given up.

There is much to recommend the amendment, of which I believe notice has been given, that in London, at all events, a general metropolitan Board of Education should take the place of the boards which the Bill, as it stands, proposes to create: should be, in fact, for the Metropolitan Schools, of all sorts, what the Diocesan Board once was, and a few years ago seemed likely to be again, for the schools of the Church of England. The omission of an express provision for the erection of a separate Ministry of Education need only be mentioned as a defect which the course of events is quite certain to supply.

It must lastly be urged again that it is much to be desired that a recognised, permanent, and efficient educational executive should be created in every district, whatever is to be the area of educational authority. To make the possession of this great advantage dependent on the failure of private enterprise to do what is wanted, is surely to put a premium on the voluntary system which it hardly deserves. It has done its best, and is still doing a great work. But in almost every neighbourhood it wants a supplementary agency. A school board would find abundant scope for its energy in subsidising, and,

in a corresponding degree, supervising and helping existing schools, even where new schools are not actually, or not immediately required. It is to be hoped, therefore, that Parliament will find means for bringing the Act into universal operation, as a supplementary, if not as a creative agency.

But our attention must now be directed to the point at which the attitude of *the Church* towards "primary education" is influenced by the proposed enactments.

It will be apparent, from what has been said, that the pressure of the present question respecting education is at the point where the necessity arises for combining the action of a central authority, dispensing imperial funds, and acting in the name of the nation, with a due contribution of support from the localities benefited, or to be benefited; and, again at the point where it is necessary at once to stimulate and to recompense this local interest in the matter, by giving a voice in the management to those who are locally interested in the quality of the education given, or in the cost at which it is provided. The problem has been, in a word, to combine *local contributions* to the maintenance of schools, and *local management* of them, with a grant in aid from the *State* and effective *State control*. The voluntary system, as it is, fails to secure effectually the former point. The denominational system, as it is, fails to secure effectually the latter. The proprietors, residents, employers of labour, do not, as a rule, contribute their fair share to the support of education in their own neighbourhood. The parents of the children, and the occupiers on whom an education rate would fall, have at present neither sufficient interest nor sufficient influence in the schools which exist. In a word, the material key of the education question is the best form of an education rate. The moral key of it lies in a solution of the religious difficulty.

The special question we, as Churchmen, have to consider is how far the adoption of an Education Rate, entailing almost necessarily some enforcement of attendance at the schools, that the rate may not be wasted, will affect education in a religious point of view. I have never been able to understand how any persons—whose wish is of course father to the thought—have been able to persuade themselves that the so-called religious difficulty is unreal or artificial. Appearing, however, to believe honestly that if they kept on declaring there was nothing in it, the difficulty would disappear, they have diligently done their part, but there the difficulty remains—what religious instruction shall be given in schools, supported by a rate drawn from all ratepayers, and how shall the rights of individual parents to have their convictions

respected be secured? Turn religion altogether out of the schools, is the simplest suggestion; let it take care of itself out of doors. This is the real wish of many who most loudly deny or discredit the existence of the difficulty at all. It need not be said that it is no fear of its perfect capacity thus to take care of itself which leads many men who desire the extension of elementary education at all costs to desire also the retention of religious instruction in national schools. They will consent to the strict separation of secular from formal religious teaching; but they desire that the two should be given in the same place, and by the same set of teachers. And those who think the conscience clause in some shape, and by any other name that may be chosen, an adequate security at once for definite religious teaching, and for the fullest liberty of individual consciences, are numerous enough, and strong enough now, to insist on its having a fair trial on a large scale. The points which concern us are, the action of the local committee of ratepayers and others on the government of the school, and the form of "conscience clause" which it is proposed to make a universal condition of aid from the rates. Will this local management act injuriously on the discipline and standard of education in the schools, and in particular, will it hamper the freedom of the religious instruction?

In the first place, it is only contemplated that they should in practice find a third part of the funds of the aided schools. The temptation to cheeseparing, which I do not deny, is accordingly reduced to a *minimum*. And at any rate, it is evident that to whatever extent the pressure of natural parsimony in the local board is felt at first in the administration of the rate, to that extent voluntary effort is not entirely killed, but abundant room and a distinct sphere is left for its action in supplementing the funds drawn from the rate. I cannot doubt that there will always remain intelligent landholders, clergymen, and other friends of education, who will be willing, as they assuredly will be required, to give time, interest, and money, at all events during the first trial of a new national system, to the encouragement of the higher branches of education in our national schools.* At the same time, it is necessary to meet this objection with two distinct and general protests in reply. The first is that the idea of education, in the classes from which the school committee of managing ratepayers is likely to be drawn, is not what it is often made out to be, at all events in London. Intelligence and an aspiration after culture and a desire to extend education to all classes

* "There would be always left a margin for voluntary efforts over and above the bare requisites of the Schools. It is in help of this sort indeed that voluntarism finds a sufficient and proper sphere of exertion." (Rev. T. W. Fowle.)

are by no means so rare among them as is sometimes assumed. And if they were, then labour to extend them, not wait till they are by some other hands and means extended. For, secondly, even if rate-payers were all that they are sometimes called, these are the people who are to pay for the education, and whose children, and whose servants' children, are to profit by it. Enlighten them by any and every means, raise their notions of a good education, enlarge their conception of what it can do for the young, but you will do no good whatever by venting suspicions of their capacity and imputations on their good-will to the cause before they have given evidence of their want of either. Lastly, their functions in relation to aided schools are expressly limited by the Bill to the task of securing the fulfilment of certain specified conditions, known to the managers before they enter into union with, and accept aid from, the school committee. Moreover, the managers will have the fullest liberty to withdraw from union,* unless, indeed, they prefer—and it will be interesting to see how many will gradually do so—to entirely transfer the school to the committee. The question of adding nominated members to the board, or of extending the area of choice to the electors, has been already considered. It is a most important point, and I can only hope that the wisdom of Parliament may work out a sound solution. But it is clear that means must be found of making the ratepayers perceive that the end in view is not to override them, but to aid them in a difficult task; or the jealousies and conflicts of the St. Pancras vestry will most surely be repeated. The conclusion is that the apprehension of mischief to the best interests of education, by the adoption of a *minimum* instead of a *maximum* standard of efficiency, from the management of the persons interested, is exaggerated; and that the true policy for meeting the danger, so far as it is real, is to frankly encounter it, use every means of neutralizing ignorance and bigotry in such bodies of persons, here or elsewhere, and not to anger them, and discredit a system beforehand, which is merely the necessary incident of a method of providing education that, for other reasons, has become inevitable.

But the real interest of the proposal for churchmen, and religious persons generally, centres in the point where what is called the religious difficulty occurs. For it is here that the constraining

* It was expressly provided in Mr. Bruce's Bill of two years ago, that the School Board "should not otherwise interfere with the constitution, management, arrangements, discipline, or instruction of any united school;" and that the managers should be at liberty "after three months' notice to withdraw from union." And there seems no reason why, if the terms of union can be satisfactorily defined, these points should not be expressly stated in the present Bill.

motive of the existing managers of schools is really involved. They care for secular education with more or less earnestness, of course, and probably few of them would endorse the fanatical paradox that secular education alone is a mischief *per se*, and worse than no instruction at all. But they care for *religious* education without any qualification, unanimously, and with enthusiasm. They, and especially the clergy of the Church of England, have made sacrifices for its sake, which they will not see neutralised without a struggle, and which the country is not likely to forget. Indeed the unanimous recognition of these self-denying services of the clergy is one of the most striking and satisfactory features in all recent discussions of the question. The following just and generous words, from a quarter where no specially clerical sympathies are commonly to be detected, may be quoted for fear the authors should forget them, and will probably be found to express the mind of Parliament and of the country:—

“It would be childish,” said the *Pall Mall Gazette*, “to say the least of it, besides being unjust and most ungracious, to treat those who have in fact done what others ought to have done, with harshness and want of respect, because the principles on which they have acted may be in some respects inconvenient, and to some persons appear questionable. Those who have founded, maintained, and taught schools to the enormous advantage of the public, and at a heavy expense to themselves in a great variety of forms for very many years, have as good a title as can be imagined to be treated with every sort of respect, and especially to be treated with tenderness in all that relates to management and religious instruction, the prospect of regulating which was notoriously one of their principal inducements to do what they have done.” *

No less emphatic a declaration in the same sense is found in a moderate and thoughtful article in the *British Quarterly Review* (April, 1868) which probably is much nearer to the real mind of the religious and non-political Dissenters than much which is now being said in their name:—

“It will also be felt by all those who have no particular theory of national education to maintain—and we feel it very strongly ourselves—that the sacrifices and exertions of the clergy, especially during the last twenty years, on behalf of their schools, deserves to be remembered and acknowledged. In the rural districts, though the Hall may patronise the school, the Rectory supports it. † It would be unjust to ignore this generosity, and the service which it has rendered to the country. To destroy the schools of the clergy by suddenly withdrawing from them the

* See *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 16, 1868.

† Some figures which illustrate this point are here quoted from Mr. (now Bishop) Fraser, and need not be reprinted. But they may be usefully consulted by any who are now inclined to exclude the denominational schools from aid out of the rates.

State grants, which alone make it possible to keep them in existence, would be to inflict cruel pain and disappointment on those who have deserved well of the State."

In complete accordance with these generous ideas, Mr. Bruce referred to the matter, on introducing his Bill of 1868 to the House of Commons in the following statesmanlike strain :—

"Mr. Lowe had proposed that aid out of the local rates should not be given to schools except upon 'the secular system.' Now Mr. Bruce objected to this proposal. There was no valid reason why the two (religious and secular teaching) should not be imparted together. Up to this time the State had expended many millions in fostering a system of religious teaching, and, in his opinion, it would be a monstrous thing now to turn round upon persons who had hitherto acted on the faith of the denominational system supported by Parliament, and to say that under the new compulsory system denominational schools should receive no advantage. The adoption of a sufficient conscience clause would meet all reasonable objections."

And this original intention of the first framers of the League underlies the proposals which are now put forward. The proposed admission to the benefits of the rate of the existing schools is an afterthought, unwillingly admitted, and accompanied by terms which it is hard to think are not meant to be impossible.

It is a fact, however, as I have attempted to show, at all events in London, that the chief pressure of the "educational destitution" is in the difficulty of adequately maintaining the existing schools, which are by no means so full, nor so effective, as unfailing funds and good management would make them. To devise a new system which shall only concern itself with building new schools, does not meet the conditions of the problem before us. It would be unjust, because it ignores the claims and services of the religious bodies which all have hitherto been forward to recognise; it would set up beside them rival schools, supported by public funds from which they are to be debarred, either openly or by the action of inadmissible conditions. It would be short-sighted and suicidal, for it fails to see that to exclude the denominational schools from aid out of the rates is to weaken the argument for the taxation of the *whole* community for the support of an education which is, and will continue to be, largely, if not principally, given through denominational schools, whether aided or unaided; and it puts into the hands of opponents a reason which will serve them, more effectually than any of their own construction, for resistance to the whole proposal. And their resistance, I am quite sure, would not be limited to hostility beforehand. Such a plan would be resisted in operation. As an acute clerical friend has written to me, "Half the clergymen in England

would be quite ready to go to prison sooner than pay a rate for the support of secular schools, from the benefit of which rate at the same time their own schools were excluded, either expressly or virtually." I believe him to be right. The point is urgent, and justifies plain speaking. In a word, the denominational schools *must* be retained, and must be aided from the rates; at all events, until experience furnishes reasons to the contrary, which *à priori* arguments have certainly not yet supplied. The terms of their admission have to be determined—not, indeed, *de novo*, but revised—and of course I admit in a liberal direction. To return, therefore, to the religious difficulty. Provision for a free and effectual inculcation of religion is amply made, and the regulations of that religious teaching may easily be made to be intelligible and acceptable to the vast majority of the clergy by some form—by all means the time-table form, if that be agreed upon—of the stipulation which is known by the name of the Conscience Clause. That stipulation, clearly expressed and universally enforced, is capable, I am convinced, of standing the strain of all the pressure about to be put on the work of education in general; of carrying the Church and the other religious bodies through the difficulty of providing for religious instruction in the National rate-aided Schools, and of enabling the denominational system, modified to that extent, to fulfil in a large degree the requirements of the people. It obviates all the difficulties arising from a system of rates, or even of compulsion. For no ratepayer has a real ground of resistance to the application of a rate to a particular school, on account of its characteristic religious teaching, if his own, or any other child, can be exempted, or simply be absent, from any religious teaching whatever. No parent can legitimately object to be compelled to send his child to a particular school, on the score of the religious teaching there given, if he is at the same time armed with the power of withdrawing his child wholly—and without effort, inconvenience, or prejudice—from that teaching. The whole controversy respecting the conscience clause cannot here be reviewed. It is only necessary to draw attention to a single point. Criticism was naturally, from the first, directed to the circumstance that "doctrine" as well as the "formularies" is included in the subjects of instruction from which exemption may be claimed. How, it was asked, is a conscientious clergyman, or schoolmaster, to be on his guard against teaching denominational "doctrine," when he is far enough from any denominational *formula*? The difficulty is a real one, which the Church must face. It is just as real to-day, as the clause stands in the new Bill, as in its original form. I spoke of it several years ago as the "point of honour" involved in the

clause.* And I adhere to the opinion then expressed, that the "honour" of the individual clergyman or teacher is sufficiently protected, by implication, in the express declaration of the original clause, that "the clause shall not otherwise," than by certain specified exemptions, "interfere with the religious teaching of the scholars, as fixed by these presents." Clearly, before the law, he is free to teach what he will, *exceptis encipiendis*. But, in *foro conscientiae*, a question certainly remains. And I see no way out of it, but a general and explicit avowal such as the time-table clause tacitly makes, that the exemption must be limited to expressly religious lessons. The point has been frequently forcibly brought out by Canon Norris, who long ago proposed a remedy, which is virtually the form of clause in Mr. Forster's Bill, which provides that no scholar may be "present at any such lesson or instruction, or observance, as may have been objected to *on religious grounds* by the parent." Clearly, therefore, if any parent had reason to suspect the soundness of the schoolmaster's theory of the cosmogony, or of his interpretation of the tenth chapter of Joshua, or believed his opinion of Mary Stuart or Mary Tudor to be coloured by sectarian prepossessions, he would have the right of withdrawing his child, "*on religious grounds*," from the lesson in History, Geology, or Astronomy, in which such theological considerations might arise.

It may seem a little disproportionate to give so wide a power to the scruples or prejudices, or even the litigious disposition of a few parents, and one which *might* act unfavourably on the discipline of the school, as the concession of a right to withdraw a child from any lesson whatever, so long as a conscientious scruple could be alleged, especially as few elementary schools reach these levels of instruction. And I incline accordingly to such a formal and general understanding, —as a time-table conscience clause would secure,—that, subject to the single concession of exemption by absence from direct religious teaching and worship; all instruction in the aided denominational schools is given by teachers who are members of the Church (or other denomination, as the case may be), and is subject to whatever influences are to be attributed to that circumstance. It is worth remarking, that the point has been clearly apprehended from another side of the question, and is very fairly dealt with in the paper already referred to.†

"No school should henceforth receive any assistance from public money except on condition of accepting an efficient conscience clause! *The form of the present clause for Church of England schools is said to be objectionable*

* "The Conscience Clause," &c., p. 41. London Ridgway.

† *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1868, p. 524.

to many of the clergy who honestly desire to carry out its spirit ; if so, it ought to be amended. We are inclined, however, to think that the most effective regulation would be one requiring that, in assisted schools, of whatever denomination, all religious instruction should be given during the first half-hour after the opening of the school, either morning or afternoon, or during the half-hour immediately before closing ; * and that no children should be compelled to be present whose parents objected."

It is clearly inferred that this is an efficient and sufficient conscience clause, and that all else in the way of religious influence, and even teaching, which is not excepted under it, is to be accepted as a necessary incident of the system. And I have no reason to suppose that this sensible suggestion has been recalled.

I quote the sentence, as much as anything, for the sake of endorsing the assertion that "it is a choice of evils, and we must take the least." It is plain that both forms of conscience clause leave the difficulty, such as it is, untouched, and clear nothing but the teacher's conscience. Proselytism, if a man means to proselytize, is no more impossible than before ; but it is made more difficult, as well as more dishonourable, and that is enough.

Our common object is that which Mr. Gladstone so admirably formulated, "perfect liberty of religious instruction to the teacher ; perfect liberty of withdrawal to the taught." And this, as it seems to me, the conscience clause alone secures, consistently with the retention of real religious teaching in schools ; for which it is, as Mr. Gladstone also declared, the only remaining and the only possible security. It secures equal liberty for all, and should be measured, not by the liberty it affords to those who will work it as *we* might not, but by that which it secures to our own view of truth and mode of teaching. Protected by the clear understanding which is thus secured, it is open to the clergyman or teacher to teach those whom he teaches at all, as fairly and fully as he can possibly teach, while it deprives him of the opportunity of teaching any who are not willing to be taught, and relieves him from any temptation to economize the truth he holds, or to palter with his conscience while he teaches. And no more can the State guarantee, or the Church demand ; no less can the State require, and the Church willingly concede.

But here we are met by the declaration that no conscience clause can give adequate protection to children of Dissenters in very dependent positions ; and the case of these unfortunate people is actually made the

* It is an obvious objection to the suggestion that it might be difficult for a clergyman to arrange to be at the school every day at the particular time required by the "conscience clause" in this form ; but in this matter there is only a CHOICE OF EVILS, and we must take the least. The suggestion is most honestly made in the interests of the clergy themselves.

ground of a demand for a complete exclusion of all religious teaching from our schools. Never was a momentous decision rested on so narrow a ground. Without wishing to reproach the Nonconformists indiscriminately (especially in presence of some who are amongst us this evening), and gladly availing myself of the opportunity of declaring before my brethren, that in the bitterness and jealousy which are surprising some of us in this controversy, we are but reaping the fruits of sustained insolence and still more offensive condescension to Dissenters for many generations, I must venture to put this position in its true light. It may be fairly described as a question not of faith but of flags. Our flag is on every school, in every village, and on many schools in great cities. The provincial Dissenters—it is chiefly they—are very anxious indeed to haul that flag down. My chief objection is, that in almost all cases it is the flag of the majority, and really it seems time to say that majorities have rights, as well as minorities! Where it is not the flag of the majority, it is obvious that the Local Board will build a new school for that majority, if one does not already exist, or enforce arrangements for their protection, if *one* school suffice for the local want. In any case nothing can prevent the Bill bringing advantage to whatever denomination is strongest in a given place.

This point has been clearly apprehended and set forth in a tone of moderation and conciliation by the *Pall-Mall Gazette* (March 26th). "The Bill enables the local boards to subsidize existing denominational schools. . . . It is impossible that this should be done, whatever regulations are made as to the times and conditions of religious instruction, without giving some advantage to the dominant sect in each district." Recognise this fact, and much of the abstract reasoning of the orators of the League collapses at once.

They have *not* got a *tabula rasa* on which to construct ideal schemes. The logic of the question is with the "secularists," I admit; not, however, with the so-called "unsectarians," though they do use so much as they happen to want of each other's arguments. But they also share one fallacy: they criticize the Government Bill as if it were simply a measure for bestowing a bran-new system of National Education on the country. It is this, in a great degree; it is also a measure for utilising and improving the admirable agencies we possess. Distinguish sharply between the "originated" schools to be *created* by the local boards out of the future education rates, and the "aided" schools, to which they are only to afford a subsidy, on certain defined conditions, and many of the difficulties will disappear. The critics of the Bill argue as if its proposals gave them the right to impose totally new constitutions upon the existing

schools. I cannot see that it will do anything of the kind, nor imagine that Parliament will allow them to attempt it.

In fact, the local boards are to be authorised to subsidise existing schools on terms far short of the offer of absorption, and, as the same writer truly says, "In very many districts this will probably be the chief part of their operations."

Taking for granted this broad distinction between these two functions of the local boards of the future, let us see how each of them is affected by the religious difficulty. They are to build new schools, where needed, *and only where needed*; and they are, for the rest, to make use of the existing schools. Theories which do not take account of this ground-plan of the Bill, may be applicable to some imaginary measure, not to the proposal actually before Parliament. The only possible Parliamentary justification of certain objections, would have been a direct negative to the second reading, and a motion for leave to introduce a new Bill.

I. How does the religious difficulty affect the "originated" schools? What religious teaching, if any, can be given in them? The Bill proposes to let the ratepayers and the parents decide. On the whole, I think this the best policy, though far from being free from objection. For let us first dismiss the alternatives. Parliament, we are told, must decide the question once for all. Parliament then has a choice of two decisions. It must proscribe the teaching of any specific religion, or it must prescribe what shall be taught. *Either of these, I fully admit, it has a perfect right to do, in respect of the schools which it is about to erect, ab ovo, with public money.* In the former decision, I should be prepared to acquiesce, so far as regards new schools only, under the general protest, which is not, I believe, without intrinsic weight:—(1) that abstract and general resolutions (for such it would be) on so involved a question as that of the relation of religion to education, would be a rather impatient and unworthy way of trying to solve a great problem; (2) that it would be wholly inconsistent with the settled policy of the nation in both superior and secondary education (as just legislated for in the Endowed Schools' Bill), as well as with the practice which you must, *in some shape*, retain in the "aided" denominational schools, which you are bound by the necessity of the case, and by the provisions of the very same Act, to continue to aid; and, (3) that it will probably, not to say certainly, deteriorate the tone of the system, by throwing it into the hands of masters who are either content to be silenced on subjects and interests which are the highest known to man, or who are themselves ready and desirous to ignore them. To obviate the calamity of an imperial declaration to this effect, I am in favour of its being relegated to the decision of

the persons interested in the particular locality, as best knowing their own wishes, and the practicableness of realising them.

For as regards the second alternative, I do not think Parliament can possibly frame regulations that will meet the cases in question. Any one of the proposed enactments which Parliament is now invited by Lord Russell and others to make as a universal settlement of the religious instruction to be given, the Bible-reading (with or without "teaching"), the Hymn-singing, and the Prayers, might be unacceptable, and even unjust, in many places—to the Roman Catholics here,* to the Jews there, and to the secularists, or to some locally strong Protestant denomination elsewhere; and might not be worth much anywhere. Besides, who is to select the passages of Scripture, or compile the Hymn-book, or compose the Prayers? If it is remembered that in these new schools there will be no question of attachment to a territorial parish and its clergyman, it will be seen at once that it is wholly and solely a question of *the master to be appointed*. And as Parliament cannot universally appoint him, it seems wiser to leave those who can to agree upon what he is to do in this respect. Controversy there must and will be in some neighbourhoods on the selection of this important officer, even if it is expressly declared that he is to have nothing to say upon religion. If Parliament, as I think it must, shrinks from affirming an abstract

* It is impossible not to remark indignantly upon the language held, and the policy proclaimed in reference to the Roman Catholic view of this question. Men, whose mouths were full last year of cries of "Justice to the Roman Catholics," when they wanted to pull down an Established Church which they agreed with the Roman Catholics in disliking, are not ashamed this year to decline to be just in England, for fear of having also to be just in Ireland. The "anti-Catholic reaction" which is now in full swing among so-called Protestant Liberals in Parliament, goes far to stamp the pretentious professions of last session as an "organized hypocrisy" on no mean scale; and has done more to make genuine Liberals and wide-minded Christians draw off from the boasted liberalism of the Protestant sects than anything that has happened for years. Mixed education is a good thing, no doubt, within limits, and short of the point of excluding or emasculating religious teaching altogether. But it is surely an essential condition of its success that the inharmonious elements should be induced to meet and mix at all. Make its circumstances unacceptable, or offer it in insulting terms, and you will frustrate the only chance of good resulting from its adoption. No settlement of the Education question can be solid, no liberal progress or professions can be real, while in this, or in any other respect, the Roman Catholics are dealt with on an exceptional footing, and are only offered, however magniloquently, "*justice*"—with a difference. It is a point on which men who, as the present writer does not scruple to avow, feel keenly the contrast which Roman Catholic morals, piety, and culture often offer to the supposed Protestant monopoly of those advantages, find it difficult to speak quite calmly. But it may be left in this connection to the protest, by which the Bishop of Peterborough, a sufficiently unsuspected Irish Churchman, has again done himself honour. "The no-popery cry has never been more unfairly raised in English History than in this attempt to use it in the Education question against religious, and for irreligious teaching in our schools." (Speech at Leicester, p. 23.)

sentence of banishment upon all religious teaching in elementary schools, I do not see that it can do other than leave its character and method to be determined by the local authorities, *pro re natâ*, in each case.

II. What then will be the position of the Local Boards? They will have precisely the same choice before them. If any kind of agreement is hopeless, or the neighbourhood suggests such a mode of avoiding conflict (as they think), they must of course pronounce that no specific teaching shall be given. The avoidance of all moral and religious *considerations* even in the most strictly "secular" school, I do not believe to be possible. Nor do the best of the secularists wish it. They avail themselves of the new term "unsectarian," a word which I cannot now discuss, further than to say that it would prove exceedingly troublesome to define by Act of Parliament. To such a secular school few of us would offer any opposition. It would be called no names by any one worth listening to, and the best friends of religious education would co-operate* as far as they could, if they came in contact with it. I quite believe such schools must be, and will be, tried in some places.

But the second alternative before the Boards is vastly simpler and easier of adoption in their hands than in the hands of Parliament. If they are agreed that their clients, the parents of the neighbourhood, would prefer that their children should receive some religious teaching, they will but have to consider what master they shall choose, and what instructions they shall give him. Such instructions may, if Parliament pleases, to a considerable extent be enforced by itself. The Bill contains one of such general instructions (clause vii. 3) which has been already discussed, and which gives absolute freedom of withdrawal from all religious teaching to any child, without prejudice to its other interests, but throws the initiative on the parent or guardian. This is now to be corrected, so far as to save them the trouble of formal personal appeal.* Without stopping to argue with the "historical" conscience of those Liberals who now see in the stipulation which they have loudly demanded of the clergy, so long as they resisted it, only an "imposture and a sham," I am quite ready to allow them to cut it into three pieces, and to deny that it is a conscience clause at all. The clause by any other name

* I pass over the objection which has since been set up, that a time-table conscience clause will intensify the sectarian character of the religious teaching given in the time allotted to it. It is possible, no doubt, to argue in support of that, as of most views. But it is an obvious special plea. A conscience clause that requires calling into action is a grievance—then make it self-acting! If this is a grievance too, it is plain that it can only be remedied by what happens to be a still greater grievance to a still larger number of persons—the total exclusion of religion.

will act as well. They may, as it seems to me with perfect justice, stipulate, in all originated schools—if any religious teaching at all is given—that, 1. The *schoolmaster's* teaching on religious subjects shall be given at a fixed and regular time—the last half-hour of morning school, or the first of afternoon school, being, perhaps, the best. 2. That he shall not use the catechisms or formularies of any denomination (though I am sure—and Mr. Bartley's interesting report to the Society of Arts of his conversations on the subject with the inhabitants of East London strengthens the conviction—that large numbers of the parents in whose interests we profess to be acting will be much surprised and not much pleased if this is held to exclude the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed). 3. That in schools in which the master gives any religious instruction, the board shall *be at liberty* to arrange with the neighbouring ministers of religion to attend at days and hours to be fixed by them, and to instruct the children of their own confession, if the parents please. If this three-barrelled conscience clause is considered a more effective "arm of precision" than the old single-barrelled Brown Bess which has so often hitherto, it seems, missed fire, by all means let the transformation be made, and let the managers and masters of all future *rate-provided* schools be armed with it, and taught to use it.

III. But I hope you will follow me when I say that the case is wholly altered when you come to apply it to the existing denominational schools. In that case you are not inventing a new arm, but literally transforming an old and not by any means a wholly ineffective one. You are not (at least so says the Bill) claiming a surrender, but offering terms; you are not in a position merely to dictate those terms; you *must* consider the position, history, principles of the other party to the bargain. You want to use the schools in their possession more effectually than hitherto for the grand object of "educating every child" in the kingdom. This is not really a question between the Church of England and Dissenters. Church of England men, Roman Catholics, Protestant Dissenters, and Jews alike want an arrangement, which, together with the widest liberty to the taught, shall also leave perfect freedom to the teacher, and secure the reality of his teaching to his own voluntary scholars. They are alike content to leave "small systems of Parliamentary piety" and "biblical deism, adapted for the use of schools," to the tender mercies of Mr. Holyoake and Mr. Lowe. The question remains, therefore, whether the three clauses into which it is proposed to split up the conscience clause can be fairly proposed to, or are likely to be accepted by, the "aided" schools. As to the first, I

can imagine no reason of *principle* against the time-table form of conscience clause, were it only as a greater security to certain parents, at once (*ex hypothesi*) scrupulous and apathetic; though some might argue that it would be a real invasion of school discipline for a trifling if not imaginary gain. But it may without unfairness be asked as a measure of conciliation, and by all means let it be conceded. On the second point, as one who thinks that the Church Catechism is often more effective when reserved for its appointed purpose as an instruction for candidates for confirmation; and who knows that its very name is a bugbear to some, and that it is often very mechanically taught to mere infants, I should not myself make an insurmountable obstacle of its formal exclusion from a State-aided day-school, *if a particular Local Board made a point of it.*

It is, however, otherwise regarded by many; and I doubt very gravely indeed the justice of the demand, while I am quite certain of its injustice as a general Parliamentary condition. It is very like a challenge to "haul down that flag!" I think we may safely ask Parliament and the country to believe that the religious teaching in our Church schools is now in a great degree what some good men mean when they use the term *unsectarian*; that is, uncontroversial, simple, and elementary to a degree;—that objection to it is practically unknown, except in the very rarest instances, and that we see no reason for absolutely foregoing a noble and valuable formula, dear to many persons outside the Church of England, as well as inside it, if no one need learn it who objects to do so.

One thing I feel strongly, and the same keen and sagacious friend of education already referred to, Canon Norris, has pointed it out to me only to-day. Our English girls' schools are perhaps unique; they, in the best instances, depend on a strong and real religious sympathy and influence, exerted by the mistress on the scholars. I have known mistresses—I know them now—who must and would have resigned, had any further invasion of their personal liberty of teaching been attempted than a strict conscience clause would perhaps entail. And I trust that not their sex alone would feel the restriction so keenly.

On the third, I confess I can see no possible ground for the *claim* to admit the clergy of other denominations to schools in which all religious teaching is given under a time-table conscience clause, and from which "formularies" may also have been, by agreement, excluded. Such an arrangement *might* allay some jealousies in some places, though it is to be feared that it would excite more than it would allay. As an universal condition of State aid it is not to be thought of for a moment.

And thus, I fear, the limit of our possible concession is reached. A time-table conscience clause for all rate-aided denominational schools;—the disuse of all catechisms and formularies, and the promiscuous admission of other ministers of religion, to be admitted, if at all, only as possible points of arrangement between the Boards and the managers in certain circumstances, but not to be universally enforced by law, and not, therefore, needing to be provided for in the Bill. Beyond this, I can only say with sorrow, I fear the Church's pliability cannot be tried. Certainly the attempt to modify her general position, and to affect her doctrinal standards, under cover of the cry, "Education—free, compulsory, and unsectarian," cannot at the present juncture for a moment be submitted to. The day is gone by when the Church of England can afford for an instant to forget that she is, first and above all things, a Church, and only secondarily a national Establishment.

One thing, at all events, is clear—the controversy has lasted long enough. It is time to act, and to act with decision. Changes, not for the sake of change, but for practical and eminently important purposes, are inevitable. One difficulty in carrying them out arises from our religious differences. Two practical methods of surmounting this difficulty, and two only, have been proposed to us. The one is to banish the teaching of religion from our public elementary schools. To that I believe the mind and conscience of the country to be strongly opposed. But it remains the only possible second of two alternatives. I say no more of the device of retaining a nominal religious teaching in schools which "shall give offence to no one." It is, I believe, impossible on anything like a national scale. I do not say that combination between two denominations for purposes of education is impossible under special circumstances, and in particular districts; and some such arrangement might, by agreement, as I have hinted, be the happiest solution of "one-school" cases. But I am sure that it is idle to dream of constructing a national system on such a plan. The other is to build new schools according to the local needs and the wishes of the inhabitants; and to require every existing denominational school, as a condition of State aid, to receive the children of other denominations, and to give them the freest and fullest right of exemption from specific religious teaching, or even from any lesson remotely involving religion, to which their parents may object. And this plan has been tried, and has been found to answer. All the denominations—Churchmen, Roman Catholics, and Protestant Dissenters—in some degree or in some way, *practise* it. The National Church alone, under a perverted sense of national supremacy, has hitherto scrupled at giving the guarantee. The ice,

however, has long been cracking, and large floes have come, and more are coming, down the stream. It is plain that the Church will gain in all respects, and lose in none, if she realizes her pre-eminent responsibility in the matter, if she arms herself against the risks which may or may not beset the adoption of an Education Rate, and compulsion to attend, by the prompt and cordial acceptance of a conscience clause, and the other terms offered by the Government; if she adopts forthwith, and loyally acts upon, henceforward, the counsel at once of true Liberalism and true Conservatism :—

“ Not clinging to some ancient saw,
Not mastered by some modern term,
Not slow, nor swift to change, but firm ;
And in its season *bring the law.*”

JOHN OAKLEY.



REGULATION—CURE—PREVENTION.

IT is a hopeful sign when people are no longer afraid to acknowledge the fact of an existing evil. The worst state is when they look upon it as so desperate that nothing is to be done but to forget it or excuse it. With regard to the most formidable evil of modern civilized society we may be said to have got thus far. We no longer ignore it; a good many feel that it ought not to be; a few are taking steps more or less blindly to provide a remedy for it. But any who have read Mrs. Butler's eloquent plea for "the lost," which appeared in the January number of the *Contemporary Review*, must have felt something of a pang of shame at the thought of the little which has been done in this direction in our own age, as contrasted with ages which many of us are accustomed to consider inferior to ours, no less in social and philanthropic organization than in scientific discoveries or mechanical inventions. Few, we think, can have read that article without some wish being stirred in them to bear their part in the battle which must be fought if this gigantic evil is ever to be overcome. But then comes the difficulty, in what way is it to be overcome, how are we to begin, what is it right, what is it wise for us to aim at in the first instance? The present paper is intended as a contribution to the answering of these questions, not by the production of any new or startling experience, but by bringing together

into one view the various ways in which it has been proposed to deal with the subject.

We shall first consider the less ambitious proposals, those which aim at circumscribing the evil effects of prostitution without expressly and immediately designing the restoration of fallen women; these proposals may be classed together under the head of *Regulation*. It seems at first sight strange that there should be such jealousy of this inferior movement, on the part of those who entertain the larger schemes of reform, which we have classed under the names of *Cure* and *Prevention*. Our readers are no doubt aware of the animated discussion which is still going on with reference to the "Contagious Diseases Acts," in which we find Miss Nightingale and Professor Maurice on the one side, and Miss Garrett and the Dean of Westminster on the other; and the language used by Mrs. Butler, for instance, in allusion to these Acts, will apply more or less to any scheme of Regulation. She says in the article to which we have referred,—

"No deeper wrong has been inflicted on these unhappy women than that which . . . professes to give her some of the privileges of pure society, while she remains what she is, and to promote the general convenience by the regulation and amelioration of her physical existence in the continuance of her degrading profession; a proceeding, which by the public recognition of her calling, deadens in her the sense of shame, while it extinguishes the light of conscience."

So in the manifesto of the Ladies' Association for the Repeal of these Acts, it is asserted that they "indirectly admit prostitution to be a necessity," and that they take no notice of "remoter causes of sin."

In regard to these objections it seems to us that the really important point to be considered by the advocates of the larger reforms is, whether any particular regulation has a tendency to prevent or to postpone such reforms. No doubt many who advocate minor reforms may do so with the feeling that it is hopeless or even mischievous to aim at more. Such we might suppose to be Mr. Lecky's opinion, from the passage in which he describes "the unhappy being whose very name is a shame to speak—"

"Herself the supreme type of vice, she is ultimately the most efficient guardian of virtue. But for her, the unchallenged purity of countless happy homes would be polluted, and not a few who, in the pride of their untempted chastity, think of her with an indignant shudder, would have known the agony of remorse and of despair. . . . She remains the eternal priestess of humanity blasted for the sins of the people."

However we may dissent from views like these, that is no reason why we should refuse to co-operate with those who hold them, when they endeavour to bring about what we cannot deny to be in itself an improvement—the diminution of suffering, and suffering on the part

of the innocent. We should at least be very sure of our ground for acting before we determine to throw our weight into the scale in favour of perpetuating that feature of English life which Mr. Lecky tells us "appears so infamous in the eyes of physicians and of continental writers," the fact, namely, "that an epidemic . . . which the experience of other countries conclusively proves may be vastly diminished, should be suffered to rage unchecked because the legislature refuses to take official cognizance of its existence, or proper sanitary measures for its repression."

The objections, however, to which reference has been made are such as evidently deserve the most careful consideration. It is alleged that these Acts were passed without any view to the welfare of the women themselves, but only to enable men to sin without risk; that their tendency is to degrade the women, to give a kind of legal sanction to profligacy, and to do away with the natural consequences of guilt. The first appears to us an extraneous consideration; if the *effect* of the Act is to do her good or not to do her harm—it matters not what its original intention may have been—the woman's advocates have no case. Government is surely bound to guard the health of the army, and there seems no doubt that the Acts have already caused a great improvement in this respect. Of course it is not meant that the responsibility of Government stops here; the moral and intellectual condition of the army is a matter which it is equally bound to attend to; and there is, undoubtedly, great room for improvement in both respects. In the latter part of this article we have urged that one change which is imperatively called for, on moral no less than economical grounds, is the shortening of the period of service. Again, when it is said that the Act enables men to sin without risk, or, more generally, that it does away with the penal consequences of guilt, we must remember how slight was the effect previously produced by the fear of these consequences, and how little there is which is elevating to the character, or which can be called truly moral, in conduct caused by this fear. It was with more than amazement we read of some of the ladies who had signed the address, declaring that they made their protest for the sake of their own sons. If a mother places her trust in cowardly and ignominious motives, she may make sure of this, that she will have no influence over a son who has a spark of honour in him.

Can it be said then that the protection against the physical consequences of sin is likely to have an injurious effect upon women? To answer this we must know how many women are now deterred from a vicious life by fear. The calculation of consequences is a thing which is much talked about in books on morality, but we believe it to have extremely little weight in actual life at the age and in the

class from which these women are chiefly taken. Vanity, affection, honour, pity, anger, jealousy, even a passing whim, the sense of humour, which exercises a kind of fascination over some people, tempting them to do odd things as others are tempted to throw themselves down in looking over a precipice—any of these is more than a match for prudential consideration of consequences, especially if they are distant and uncertain. Besides, how are they to know of these consequences beforehand? Other consequences they do know of and think about—a disgraceful leaving of their home, an outcast life—but these latter consequences it is not proposed to alter.

We come now to the objection on which most stress has been laid, the degradation of inspection; but surely this is to impute to the fallen feelings which are the exclusive property of innocence. A woman who does not feel herself degraded by a life of prostitution is scarcely likely to feel herself degraded by submitting to medical inspection. If, however, she is thus awakened to a sense of her own degradation, what better symptom could be desired by those who are anxious for her moral restoration? As a matter of fact, we believe there is no doubt that, whether from dread of inspection, from shame produced by it, from kind treatment in the hospitals, or from the interval of quiet there afforded, and possibly the remonstrances and encouragements of those who visited them there, many have been rescued from vicious courses by the new regulations. In Devonport and Plymouth it is stated that "of 1,775 women brought under the Acts, 550 are pursuing a respectable course of life, while no influx of fresh women has supplied their place."

The last objection which we have to consider, and we think it has great weight, is that these Acts appear to give a sanction to immorality. It is easy to reply to this that the legal status of prostitutes remains what it was; but we think it not an unnatural conclusion for them to draw from the supervision under which they are placed, that Government recognises them as a proper and necessary part of the army system, that they are in fact certificated as belonging to the Queen's service: and so for the soldiers, it seems to us that one important check is removed when the authorities find it necessary to give this sort of guarantee to the female followers of the army. Still, balancing this consideration with those which we have previously mentioned, we think that beyond the physical benefits immediately procured by the Act, there are preponderating moral advantages; provided, that is, that there is very great caution in the selection of the inspectors, and provided also that every facility is given to enable those who desire it to change their mode of life. With a view to this we should wish to see a staff of lady visitors always attached to the Lock Hospital. Possibly, too, some clause might be

devised which would prevent the periodical admission of the same case into the hospital.

On the whole, therefore, this regulation appears to us expedient, but one which requires careful watching. We have no sympathy with the sweeping and violent language which has been used on either side in respect to it. If we altogether dissent from the view expressed in one of the religious prints that the "Act is so thoroughly execrable that no sooner was it unveiled in its enormity, than it sent a thrill of horror through every Englishman's home;" we still more strongly condemn the tone of the letter which the editor of the *Fortnightly Review* has thought it becoming to address to the ladies who signed the memorial. A man who could write the following sentence simply puts himself out of court for the discussion of moral questions, "On the whole it is perhaps not so very much more degrading and soul destroying and fundamentally immoral, to wear away a life in pandering to the coarse appetite of one sex, than in pandering to the ignoble and monstrous vanity of the other."

There are two other regulations which we think less liable to exception than the one which we have just considered. The first is that public solicitation in the streets should be prohibited. The law may not interfere to prevent two persons from making an immoral compact which only injures themselves; but public scandal and nuisance may and ought to be put down in England, as they have been put down in many parts of the Continent. There can be no doubt that there would be a great gain to morality from this removal of temptation out of the way of the weak. Many will fall when they stumble against temptation who would not go out of their way to seek it.

Again, though the law cannot prevent a compact because it is immoral, yet, where important interests are concerned, it is bound to prevent the weaker party being forced or cajoled into a compact, whether the subject of the compact be in itself moral or immoral. Now it is notorious that girls are often brought into bad houses by foul means, and are held there in the most absolute slavery, unable to get away, for even their clothes are not their own. For details on this point we may refer to such books as Greenwood's "Seven Curses of London." It may be said to be a recognition of these houses, to place them under the supervision of the police; but we do not see how this horrible kidnapping is to be put a stop to without some such regulations as follows: that no woman should become an inmate of a house of ill-fame without notice being sent to the nearest police-office; that she should then be summoned before the magistrate to make a declaration that she adopted that course of life

knowingly and of her own free-will; that having done this, she should be allowed to take her own course, but should be told that, if at any time she repented of her decision and wished to reform, she might on application to the magistrate be put in the way of retrieving her lost character and earning an honest livelihood. We cannot but think that such a regulation, accompanied by others of a similar nature, with regard to the periodical inspection of bad houses, would not only put a stop to the slavery of which we have spoken, but that the necessity of appearing before the magistrate would shame many from taking to this life in the first instance, or at least suggest to them a way of escape if they afterwards became weary of it.

It is possible that some may take a general objection to all schemes of regulation on the ground of their interfering with the liberty of the subject. Of all pieces of cant and claptrap this seems to us about the worst; to talk of liberty for criminals and vagabonds is only a cruel irony. What they want is protection, restraint, education, in fact to be made slaves, not for the pleasure of others, but for their own good, with the prospect of a gradual recovery of freedom as they fit themselves to use it.

In passing on to the second branch of our subject, we part company with the secular philanthropists. It is religious philanthropy alone, with its deeper feeling of duty, its more daring hopefulness, its more enthusiastic charity, which ventures upon the arduous path beyond, following its Master into the wilderness, to seek and to save that which was lost. The tone of modern secularism, in regard to this, may be judged from the following passage, which we quote from the letter in the *Fortnightly* already alluded to:—"This sentimental persistence in treating permanently brutalized natures as if they retained infinite capabilities for virtue, is one of the worst faults of some of the best people now living." Fortunately for the secularists, as well as for ourselves, it is a fault which was exceedingly prevalent some eighteen hundred years ago, when publicans and harlots received the message which priests and pharisees rejected; fortunately for the Kingswood colliers, John Wesley and George Whitefield had this same "sentimental persistence" amid the dead secularism of the last century; fortunately even now for England, there are still at work in her parishes, whether contending against the drowsy rudeness of our country villages or the seething and festering vice of our great towns, thousands of men and women, who have simply an unbounded belief in the capabilities of every human soul, who know in themselves the power of the resurrection, who have prophesied to the dry bones, and seen them clothed again with flesh and animated with new life breathed into them by the Spirit of God.

Admirable, however, as is the incentive given by religion, and

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as is the history of Christian charity and it must be confessed that there has been often from the want of care and consideration in We proceed, therefore, to point out generally what we think should be pursued in attempting the plan, and at the same time to notice mistakes to which it seems liable.

It is to provide an easy way of escape for any without saying a word in disparagement of similar efforts of volunteers, we believe this end will be attained by the methods of inspection which we have suggested. Supposing, then, that through a magistrate or woman has made known her wish to reform, there should be no difficulty in providing an immediate refuge should be a general receiving house, superintended by the assistance of a clergyman and a medical officer, each case should be sent, and kept there till there had been some ascertain something of their history and their state, and then, as to determine on their future destination. The refuge should be in connection with all the homes of reformation throughout the country, and would naturally receive communications from private persons who wished to take up the work. In this way we might hope to classify the cases, separating different grades of coarseness and vice, and distributing them among the different homes, according to the degree of each. Possibly some might be sent at once into a reformatory; but this would have to be done with great caution; it could only be into households consisting of females; and even so it would be unfair to expose young and innocent servants to a companionship which might be corrupting. Those who are to be sent to penitentiaries should be fully informed of the life which they would have to lead and the duties expected from them there, in order that there might be no cases such as we have heard of, where so-called penitents have clamoured to be sent off the day after their arrival.

With regard to the penitentiaries themselves, without going into details which may be learnt from such books as Miss Goodman's "Statehouses" and others, there seem to be two capital faults in the manner in which they are generally conducted at the present time. Both may be said to spring (in part, at least) from a good source, the spirit of religious self-sacrifice; but we have no hesitation in saying that they are mainly accountable for the comparative ill success of the Protestant, or, more properly speaking, the professedly non-Roman penitentiaries. The first is, that they are usually built on too grand a scale. We are quite sure that the more simple, quiet, and homely

everything is, the more chance there is of good being done. We do not question the excellence of the motive which led to the expenditure of large sums in architectural decorations; but we say that the inference drawn from this is likely to have an injurious effect, not only on the minds of the honest hard-working poor, but on those of their fallen sisters. In any case where the prodigal is reclaimed through the compassionate efforts of others, there is sure to be heard, in some quarters, something of the elder brother's murmuring at the killing of the fatted calf; but we must, at least, take care that the advantages of a career of guilt are not paraded offensively in the face of struggling virtue. If the Contagious Diseases Act can be objected to on the ground that it does away with a part of the physical evil which sometimes follows sin, there is surely much more ground for jealousy at a reversal of the moral effect of sin, which does not simply restore the sinner to her father's house, but promotes her to a position higher, in outward seeming, than she would otherwise have attained. The occasional bad result of these great establishments on the mind of the penitent herself is not mere matter of conjecture. We ourselves know of instances in which domestic service in small families has been scorned by those who had spent two or three years in one of these institutions. If we do not mistake, it will be found that greater proportional success has been attained in small unpretending homes under the superintendence of a matron, controlled by a committee of management, than in any of the larger penitentiaries.

The second mistake to which we have alluded as likely to interfere with the usefulness of these institutions is the amount of time spent in religious services. To be able to receive benefit from half-a-dozen services in the day, is a mark of a very peculiar organization, or of a very advanced spirituality; yet this is what is expected of souls buried under the thick clay of the coarsest animalism. The majority of so-called penitents are certainly not actuated by religious motives in wishing to change their course of life: no doubt it is right to bring religious motives to bear upon them, to make them feel, if possible, that they have not only made a mistake, but committed a grievous sin: but to enforce this upon them by a constant repetition of services, which to many will be scarcely intelligible, is either to make them hate religion as a burdensome mockery, or to make them look upon the services as so many penances, by the endurance of which they are to work out their sentence and earn their title to be considered respectable members of society. It is, we believe, only a very small minority, of finer fibre than the rest, who approach in any degree to the character of the ideal Magdalen, and really find a solace in them. Connected with these extravagant religious observances is the gloomy SILENCE

which everywhere meets the eye. It is, of course, most important to put a restraint on the sort of conversation which is likely to break out among those who have lived the lives which these women have done: it is important that they should never forget that they have cut themselves off from the pleasures of innocence: but it is at least of equal importance to save them from despair and recklessness, to restore the tone and elasticity of their nature, to make them believe in the possibility of the Divine forgiveness by experiencing the gentle tenderness of human purity and holiness.

As to the question whether large or small penitentiaries are in themselves to be preferred, we should be unwilling to give a positive answer either way. The former need not be externally more attractive than workhouses; and, without any real sacrifice of the inspiring religious feeling, they may be conducted in a common-sense, business-like method, such as exists to a certain extent in Romanist institutions, but which is certainly not encouraged by the self-conscious sentimentalism of the "Anglo-Catholics." Another generation, if it does not shoot off in an entirely opposite direction, may find incense, and vestments, and Gregorian tones, common-place matters, and settle down simply to doing good in the way recommended by experience. At present there is an intoxication in playing the abbess or the nun, arising from that idea of startling the quiet-going people at home, which is the cause of most of our youthful radicalism, rationalism, and ritualism. Perhaps the easiest way of curing this romantic tendency would be to put an old married couple at the head of the penitentiary. If, however, the rule of the "Lady Superior" is still to be continued in the larger houses, she should be under efficient control from the visitor or the managing committee. On the other hand, she will require, if she is not to be over-taxed, the assistance of a competent staff both of ladies and of regularly trained servants, to give instruction to the inmates in every department of household work. But whatever may be the system pursued, the rules should be plain and easily understood, not a mere scale of exercises in "holy obedience," and the work should be enough fully to employ both mind and body.

Miss Goodman speaks of the charge of penitents being almost as trying as that of maniacs. Probably the difficulty would be lessened if there were better classification than there now is, so as to admit of the system in each penitentiary being adapted to a particular class of penitents. Thus the rudest and coarsest would have to submit to a discipline almost as severe as that of a prison, while the highest class might make some approach to Miss Skene's idyllic description of a French penitentiary given in a late number of *Good Words*.

We proceed now to the third branch of our subject, the most

difficult and most important of all—*Prevention*. In some respects there is an antagonism between this and the second, as there was between the second and the first. If the path of reformation is made so easy and inviting that it becomes the natural close of a term of prostitution, the life itself will lose something of the hideousness which properly belongs to it; and while the woman on her part will be more easily impelled into it, the man will be less restrained from impelling her on his part by the anticipations of future remorse. The way to meet this, however, is not to refrain from doing the minor good, but to counterbalance any incidental evil which may flow from it, by further positive efforts to bring about the larger good.

How, then, are we to prevent prostitution? The physical side of this question we leave to medical writers to deal with, merely observing that we believe they might deal with it to good effect by putting out a few simple directions for the use of parents and schoolmasters in the bringing up of children, especially of boys. But as to the moral side: when we look at the present state of things, we seem to have no ground on which to build our hope of improvement, unless we find it, like Demosthenes, in the very depth of our calamities. Like him, we may say—"If, O Englishmen, we had always taught our youths that nothing was more disgraceful and slavish than to be subject to our lusts like the brutes; if this had been instilled into them from their childhood by parents and schoolmasters; if every mother had planted in the heart of her son a noble ideal of womanhood; if all ladies had shown their scorn and hatred for men of profligate character; if no matron would admit such a one to her house, however distinguished he might be for rank or ability; if no maiden would endure to sit by him or listen to words of flattery from his mouth; if a brand like that of Cain were on his brow till he had washed it away by years of penitence and by painfully wrought atonement; if every poet and novelist had proclaimed the glories of true and honourable love and heaped his due meed of infamy on the betrayer and adulterer; if our politicians had upheld marriage and the rearing of good citizens as the corner-stone of national prosperity; if our divines had celebrated faithful love above barren celibacy;—if we had done all these things, and still Philip were triumphant, then indeed we might have despaired; but now we have done none of these things."

Let us consider, then, by what means of moral appeal or what change of outward circumstance we may prevail on our sons to save our country, and stay the plague which now threatens to overwhelm us. The prime great necessity is, that we should ourselves first of all be fully convinced in our own minds that in asking of them to control their appetites, to bring their body into subjection, we ask of

them a thing which is desirable, and a thing which is possible. As long as the elder content themselves with a hypocritical mouthing of phrases, which are not expected to be applied literally to practice by the younger, and which both sides may at last agree in interpreting to mean, "Whatever you do, at all events be respectable; sow your wild oats decently," so long we allow no chance to our young men; professing to grant them indulgence, we deny them the possibility of true liberty. On the other hand, if we leave the subject entirely in the dark, and give no warning to the young of the difficulty and danger of the struggle which awaits them, they are panic-stricken at the appearance of an enemy whose strength they have no means of measuring, and are overpowered and swept away before they have had time to prepare themselves for battle. What we have to do is to confess the strength of the principle which we call upon them to oppose; to tell them honestly that it may tax all their energies to overcome it; but that, except possibly in some abnormal case in which inherited taint has destroyed the balance of the inward constitution, the victory over the flesh is assured beforehand to the God-given power of the human will, ever re-invigorated from its divine source.

But is it worth while to take all these pains? Is it not a useless sacrifice of pleasure, a narrowing of human nature, a mere piece of showy, unmeaning asceticism? We will answer this in no words of our own, but in the lofty words of one of the truest prophets of our time:—

"To burn away in mad waste the divine aromas and plainly celestial elements from our existence; to change our holy-of-holies into a place of riot; to make the soul itself hard, impious, barren! Surely a day is coming when it will be known again what virtue is in purity and continence of life; how divine is the blush of young human cheeks; how high, beneficent, sternly inexorable if forgotten, is the duty laid, not on women only, but on every creature, in regard to these particulars! Well; if such a day never come again, then I perceive much else will never come. Magnanimity and depth of insight will never come; heroic purity of heart and of eye; noble pious valour, to amend us and the age of bronze and lacker, how can they ever come? The scandalous bronze-lacker age of hungry animalisms, spiritual impotencies and mendacities, will have to run its course till the Pit swallow it."

To come down, however, to earth again, we may consider the safeguards which nature supplies against the predominance of one powerful instinct, under the heads of emotions and rational principles, and, again, of habits and circumstances, as conducive to the former. Of the emotions the most important to encourage in this view are natural modesty, reverence, self-respect, generosity, sympathy, affection. The rational principles which may be brought to bear on the matter ascend from selfish regard for health, character, worldly interests, up to the highest considerations of duty and reli-

gion. We will very briefly inquire in what manner habits and circumstances may tend to assist, or to counteract, the working of these principles and emotions.

Natural modesty is of course more powerful in girls than in boys, and, provided there is no counteracting influence, has greater power according as there is more refinement of nature and circumstances. Thus it is entirely killed by a life in the back slums of London, and grievously stunted in the overcrowded cottages and the promiscuous field labour of the country. But it is often hardly less injured in the public and private schools of the higher classes; though in boys' schools the loss is in many instances more than counterbalanced by hard living (where the competition of masters and the foolish indulgence of parents have not combined to destroy this most valuable of our old school traditions,) hard exercise, full occupation, the development of the sense of justice, duty, self-respect, *esprit de corps*, and by the larger moral and intellectual interests which grow up in those particularly who rise to the head of great schools.

One of the greatest dangers to which boys are exposed is that which arises from a perverted ideal of manliness. A seeming independence, the knowledge of good and evil, hardness of tone,—these are what most boys, and some girls we fear, are disposed to look upon with admiration at a certain point in their career; but, happily, in most cases this evil ideal is transformed with the advance of education. Only it too often happens that time is not given for education to produce its elevating effect. And there is no doubt that the army has a most baneful influence in propagating and perpetuating this hard and selfish tone. Military authorities are not entirely responsible for this; it is their misfortune that no good quality beyond courage is thought necessary for the army. Those who are desirous to join the service are too often the least satisfactory boys in a school; their reason for wishing to join being simply that they think there will be less hindrance there than anywhere else to their carrying out their own miserable ideal of a fast life. The army is, in fact, the key of the enemy's position. More would be done to put down prostitution by raising the moral tone of the army than by any other possible means; and this not merely from the actual viciousness of camps and barracks, but from the imitation of these vices elsewhere and from the fatal effect upon the general imagination of what is supposed to be the character of an officer and gentleman. We do not forget that the army, like school, is often, in the long run, an admirable training in virtue, and that no higher example of noble and chivalrous character is to be found than that which is presented to us in the life of many a British officer. But it cannot be denied that the raw material out of which he is made is

not, in the first instance, promising; nor yet that the process which he undergoes before he sees active service is one which would be trying even to the finest natures. Even the authorities have at last come to see that it was necessary to put Sandhurst on a new footing. We are not aware whether the new constitution has been entirely settled, but it is not difficult to say what it ought to be. The greater number of commissions should be placed in the hands of the headmasters of the chief public schools, to be distributed according to intellectual attainments combined with a strict moral test. The period of residence at the Military College should be very much shortened; the system should be the same as that of the public schools, the governor should be a civilian; moral offences should be followed by immediate expulsion. In the army itself, we believe much might be done by requiring young officers to go through a course of study, and pass regular examinations themselves, and also to superintend the instruction of the soldiers, and in general by giving them duties and interests beyond the mere routine of drill. But here comes in one grave consideration, which very much complicates the question, and renders the soldier's life one of exceptional trial. Only a very small proportion can look forward to marriage before middle age. As we have already hinted, there seems no reason why this should be the case with the privates. On every ground it is desirable that the period of service should be shortened, so as to allow of their leaving the army, say, at the age of twenty-five. Still the temptation would no doubt be great, greater probably than that to drunkenness in Ireland. Yet Irish drunkenness, we know, was checked by Father Mathew and the pledge. Is it not conceivable that there might be some form of *sacramentum*, some method of strengthening each other in good resolutions, which would be found equally efficacious against the worse evil which besets a soldier's life?

Few will dispute that the prospect of lengthened celibacy is morally injurious to most men. The poor, in general, marry at an early age, and are therefore exempt from this danger; but as we ascend the social scale there is a continuous diminution and postponement of marriage, rejoiced in by mole-eyed economists, but a cause of well-founded alarm to all true statesmen. Mr. Galton, in his work on "*Hereditary Genius*," has well exhibited the moral and intellectual deterioration of the race, which is threatened by the comparatively slow rate of increase in the more civilized portion of the community. All the truth which Malthus and his followers have blown up into their wind-bag theory of Population is simply this, that a man is bound to maintain himself and his family in independence, and that if he has no prospect of doing this, or does not care to do it, he has no business to marry. Otherwise, in ordinary times and for ordinary people, the maxim holds good that the best service which a good man and a

good woman can do to their country is to marry and bring up children like themselves. To rest this question of population on merely economical grounds, is a thoroughly immoral proceeding; inconsistently to import into it the extreme ascetic views of mediæval church writers, as Mr. Mill has done in his "Political Economy," is a piece of hypocrisy which we grieve to see in a writer who, in many respects, has deserved so well of our generation. The pernicious falsehood of the following sentence can only be paralleled with the quotation above made from the *Fortnightly Review*:—"Little improvement can be expected in morality till the producing large families is regarded with the same feelings as drunkenness or any other physical excess. But while the aristocracy and clergy are foremost to set the example of incontinence, what can be expected from the poor?" The extraordinary ignorance of physiology which these words betray is perhaps even more astounding than their moral obliquity.

Enough of economists: they are responsible for a good deal of foolish talk; but their influence, after all, is limited. The real strength of celibacy lies, not in political economy, but in luxury. People are prevented from marrying by the dread of undergoing hardships, and by another consideration slightly less contemptible—the fear that their children may have to sink into a lower social position. Of the former we say nothing. May Canon Westcott's "Confraternities" grow and flourish, and may the "rule of poverty" help to restore simplicity to English life! But why should not the children of a gentleman turn out good and honest tradesmen, retaining in their new station something of the tastes and refinement of the old? Have we not even now examples of the sons of gentlemen working as day labourers in Australia, and is there the least to regret in this? On the contrary, we would gladly see the movement up and down the scale of society even more uncontrolled than it is, so as to increase the mutual understanding of different ranks, and to distribute to all the virtues which belong to each.

We have dwelt at some length upon the disastrous effects of a false ideal. Mr. Lecky has well spoken of it as "one of the most mournful facts in history," that the character of the passionless seducer, "a character than which it is difficult to conceive one combining more numerous elements of infamy and dishonour, should have been glorified in popular literature, and made the continual boast of those who most plume themselves upon their honour." It is scarcely less sad when we find female writers joining in applause, not, perhaps, of the "passionless seducer," but of the selfish and unprincipled lover, who disregards every consideration but the gratification of his immediate impulse; when we find the heroine represented as rivalling the hero in coarseness and violence, and only saved by some lucky

accident from the last consequences of lawless passion. Ladies might do much, none can say how much, to put a stop to prostitution; but it must not be by vying with prostitutes, till the most charitable can hardly repress the suspicion that it is circumstances, and circumstances only, which have prevented them from taking the position to which dress, manners, language, feeling, and thought have been so carefully assimilated. When the standard of decency is no longer determined by fashion alone; when mothers are as anxious to see their sons married as their daughters; when daughters and mothers have learnt to look upon single life as more honourable than marriage with a profligate; when better education has given back to women their true dignity—then, and not till then, may we hope to see the reverence for womanhood, which still survives in Englishmen, waking up in all its original strength; then will be true of us what Tacitus tells of our German forefathers and their women, “*inesse quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut consilia earum aspernantur aut responsa negligunt.*”

In what we have said in the last few pages we have considered the question of prostitution from the side of *demand*, in what way it may be possible to diminish this. We shall now very briefly inquire how far it may be possible to cut off the *supply*. The moral causes which are in operation here are not altogether the same as those which we enumerated in the case of the other sex. To man's everlasting shame, generosity and affection, which are safeguards against vice in *him*, have been the source of constant danger to woman. The other predisposing causes are vanity, weakness, want of interest and occupation; and, above all, extreme poverty. Something is being done now to remedy the last, in the way of schemes for female emigration, and for the employment of females in various new lines; but this is merely a part of the vast question of pauperism, which we cannot touch on here. It seems to us that one of the most useful of practical reforms would be the institution of homes for unfallen women, such as sempstresses, servants out of work, and, in fact, for all who stand in need of protection. We believe that the superintendence of such homes would be a far more hopeful, and probably a more really useful, occupation for ladies than the charge of penitents. Other quarters in which the moral infection is likely to spread, and in which the help of ladies is invaluable, are workhouses and reformatories, and in general the outcast children of great towns. Surely also more might be done among the latter by police regulations to keep in order the penny “gaffs” and to check the sale of immoral publications.

Much has been said of the degraded condition of the poor in our country villages, as if this were the chief source of the vice of the towns. No doubt there is much coarseness among the country poor;

what may be called decent marriages are sadly the exception amongst them: still they do not neglect marriage altogether, and there is very little of promiscuous vice among them. In these respects they have certainly the advantage over the corresponding class in towns. Country girls who eventually take to bad courses have almost always passed through an intermediate stage of town life, whether in domestic service or in the apprenticeship to some trade. We do not, of course, mean by this to deny that there is work to be done in the country. Probably it will be necessary for the Legislature to insist on improvement in the cottages, and we fear it will even then be a long and uphill struggle before the ladies of the hall and the parsonage have succeeded in imparting much of their own feeling of delicacy and refinement to the wives and daughters of the cottagers.

Before closing, we would say one word upon domestic service. It ought to be, and frequently is, a school of manners and virtue for the lower classes, such as attendance on the nobility was thought to be for the middle classes some centuries ago. It is plain, however, that unless mistresses remember their responsibilities, and feel that they stand in the place of mothers to their younger female servants, there is often much danger for these, especially in large establishments. Young women are there brought into close proximity with young men, their fellow-servants, such as would never be dreamt of between unmarried persons in the class above them. Open and honourable engagements are often discouraged: little opportunity is given for rational amusement and the improvement of their minds; they are left very much to themselves, with hardly any sympathy or guidance from those whom Providence has placed over them. Here then we find a sphere of labour which lies immediately in the way of almost every lady, and the importance of which is perhaps not less than that of the more ambitious and self-denying schemes which we have before considered. Only it must be remembered that, while there is room and necessity for all, this, above all, it is a sin and a shame to have neglected.

We have thus completed our general survey of the different movements which have for their object the diminution and ultimate extirpation of the great plague-spot of modern life with all its train of consequences, moral and physical. We have endeavoured to show that there is no reason why those who sympathize with one of these movements should think it necessary to oppose another, because it may start from a different side, or may direct its efforts towards one portion of the subject rather than another. Each, in so far as it does its own work and does not turn aside to quarrel with its neighbours, is contributing in greater or less degree to the same end: of each it may be said by the others, "He that is not against us is on our part."



WHAT IS MONEY?

AND HAS IT ANY EFFECT ON THE RATE OF DISCOUNT? *

I PROPOSE to speak on a very familiar subject. Money is so well-known a thing that it seems to be an almost wantonly idle occupation to set about explaining it to grown-up men. Yet there is scarcely a word in the whole range of political economy which more urgently calls for an accurate and rigorous definition of its meaning than the word money. Every science in turn has cruelly suffered from the loose habit of attaching many ill-digested, and often conflicting, senses to the same word; but none, I believe, has been so great a victim in this respect as political economy. It borrows its language from common life; it is compelled, as a science, to assign to it a sharply determined meaning; but it is most difficult to impress that meaning on the common understanding of men. The every-day world uses language after its own fashion, with little reflection and no science; it is ever transferring the same term to different objects, often from a fancied similarity which has no foundation in fact. Political economy is thus exposed to perpetual misinterpretation. The mischief, however, would be comparatively slight if it were confined to its hearers; but it spreads even to its teachers, and the ravages which it then commits are disastrous. The loose expressions of common talk are made the foundation of scientific exposition; they are taken as the primary elements of the science; and the inaccuracy they involve becomes the more mis-

* Read to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, April 12.

chievous precisely in proportion as the deductions are drawn with severe and skilful logic. It thus behoves the political economist, beyond all other men of science, to be jealous of the language which he is forced to procure from common life, and to be careful of the exact nature of the first principles which he derives from it. Had this great rule been more faithfully and more generally observed, the word money would not have needed the definition which it requires to-day.

What then is money? Is it a word which belongs to many different things or to one only? Is it a generic term, comprising within its range several substances individually distinct but all distinguished by some common qualities? or is it a name for one special and determinate object? In answering these questions we are fortunately able to take our start from a point on which all are agreed, on which there is no difference of opinion whatever. It is a great matter that there is a sense of the word money which no one disputes, which is equally recognised by the man of science and by every other person in the community. Coin is money. Money may express something else besides, but that coin is included in the expression money is a proposition which none will challenge. The derivation itself of the word proclaims the fact. It comes from *Moneta*, the temple of Juno Moneta, in which the Roman coin was made, the mint from which the stamped pieces of metal were issued which constituted the currency of Rome. The word money consequently is an expression which implies minting, that is, the shaping and stamping those metallic coins which are required for the purposes of buying and selling. So far the political economist is on safe ground—he has a first principle from which he may derive every logical consequence with perfect security. Whatever is true of coin is true of money. Every result which the analysis of coin yields belongs equally to money; science acquires a definite and tangible substance which will teach much about the nature of money.

Let us consider, then, what instruction the examination of a coin can yield us. It is a shaped piece of metal with a mark upon it. The first point to observe is that it is a valuable article; the metal is precious, very expensive to procure, possessed of high value. Whoever has obtained a sovereign, whether on the sale of goods or in payment of a debt, has given twenty shillings' worth of property to acquire it. This is a most important fact. You cannot bear it too constantly in mind; you will find it do good service when we come to deal with City articles and City authorities, who assure the world that it is always an excellent thing to import gold into England, who like the balance of trade, as they call it, to be in England's favour,

and who rejoice when they hear of large arrivals of gold from Australia. The question immediately arises, Why do civilized nations buy this costly metal? It is easy to understand the purchase of food and clothing, of ornaments for house and garden, they are needed for consumption and enjoyment. But it is otherwise with coin; it is not procured for pleasure or ornamentation—nay, it is obtained only to be parted with at the first opportunity. The answer is plain—coin is manufactured in order to effect a service; in other words, it is a tool which has the work it performs as the sole reason of its creation. It is a machine whose end is not in itself, but in the function it discharges; an instrument of the same class as a ship, or a cart, or a railway, a means of conveyance. Who buys a merchant ship or a cart for the purposes of enjoyment, or for any other object than the transport of merchandise? It is the same with sovereigns, they are useless except for the purpose of conveying property from one person to another; only, unlike ships, they do their work by being got rid of—*vitam in vulnere ponunt*. But why is such a tool, such an instrument of conveyance required? Because without its intervention society would be brought to a standstill, for those who wanted to obtain goods would seldom find sellers who needed those which they had to offer in exchange. The tailor might starve before he found a baker who wanted a coat. So as civilization advanced an effective contrivance was invented in coin, which every one consented voluntarily to take in exchange for the goods he had to sell, because he knew that when he himself required to buy he would be able to get other property of the same value as that which he had sold for coin; and the circumstance that every man is willing to sell his goods for coin furnishes the great additional convenience that all property is measured by coin, and, consequently, the values of every kind of goods can be compared easily with one another. The method by which coin discharges its duty of conveying is also clear. It gives to a seller a commodity, a substance of equal intrinsic value with the property it purchases; it places in the hands of a tailor a portion of metal, which is worth to a goldsmith as much as the coat is worth to the tailor.

We see now the nature of coin, and the process by which it accomplishes its function; would only that its several elements were as carefully remembered as they are easily understood when laid before the mind. And thus we learn what money is—for coin is money, and what is true of coin is true also of money. Money, then, is a tool for exchanging property, for enabling a man who has property which he does not want to obtain other property in exchange for it. It thus substitutes an indirect for a direct process, double barter for single barter. Time, however, is not an essential part of the ex-

change; the goods may be given and the delivery of the equivalent of coin or metal may be adjourned, but the transaction remains the same. The man who sells on credit and receives payment in coin at a later period still performs an act of barter and exchanges his merchandise for metal. This function of money, to serve as a ship or cart, or a tool, to convey property from one man to another, is its one and only use, it has none other. So long as the metal remains in the state of coin it is worthless for any other purpose; and again I beg those who preach that a favourable balance of trade which brings in gold is always a good thing, and who measure the value of a trade by the amount of purchases paid in gold which foreigners make of English goods, to remember this cardinal truth, and to reflect on the consequences which it involves.

We can perceive now why it is that sellers are willing to accept coin in exchange for their goods. They obtain an equivalent of property for that which they part with. They no longer possess the same property, but they still hold property of the same value. The essence of that value lies in the worth of the metal, in its worth for buying to gilders and jewellers, and all those who require it for use. That worth is determined for the precious metals by the same causes as govern other commodities, by their cost of production. The tailor values his coat at the cost of his labour and of the materials he has been obliged to procure. Upon precisely the same consideration the miner calculates the remuneration for which he can afford to carry on his search for gold and silver. The seller rests on a solid basis; when he grasps the sovereign he possesses a piece of property of value as real as the value of a sheep or of a pair of shoes; the barter of the goods against the gold is an exchange of two substantial and real equivalents.

We have now reached the second stage of this division of our subject—all coin is money, but is all money coin? Here I am at once confronted by a vast mass of very diversified usage. In the common language of the world bank-notes are almost universally called money. The phrase paper-money has made for itself an established position. It is currently used as an expression of perfect legitimacy. Bills are also, though much less frequently, called money. Cheques are far more largely endowed with this designation. A shopkeeper counting up his receipts, amongst which cheques enter as a large figure, a depositor taking cash and cheques to his bankers, a banker casting up the receipts and payments of the day, all speak of cheques as money. Above all, the means of which bankers dispose, the resources which they lend to borrowers, the commodity in which they are described as dealing, are all pre-eminently styled money. The word reaches its culminating point of

glory in the sonorous and compendious expression, the money-market. There the expressions—money is abundant or money is scarce; the rate for money is high or low; bankers are full of money, or bankers have no money to lend—are on the lips of every merchant and every trader. Even a journal of such high intelligence as the *Economist*, in expounding the situation of the banking world, speaks of its funds, week after week, as money. This marvellous word runs the same course in ordinary as in commercial life. A rich man is said to have so much money, so many thousand pounds in Consols. Another is painted as possessing so many thousand pounds of one railway stock and so many of another. A moment's observation is sufficient to discover the endless variety of objects to which this multiple word is applied.

In examining these various claimants to the title of money, I will deal first with the one whose right seems to be the strongest—the bank-note. It possesses incontestably many qualities identical with those of money. First of all, it is an efficient instrument of exchange; in England the Bank of England note buys property as readily as coin. In the next place, it circulates; and this is a very distinctive and important feature. It is not, like the cheque, extinguished by a single operation; it remains in circulation, it passes from hand to hand, it goes on to perform for the man who takes it the same office as it did for its previous holder. It thus forms a part of that permanent stock of tools, of instruments of exchange, which collectively are called the currency. It seems hard therefore to draw any solid distinction between it and money. Both apparently perform the same identical work. They seem to differ only as a chisel differs from a saw in a carpenter's basket; both are cutting tools, with differences only of detail. Must we infer then that the bank-note is money? To this question I answer that the bank-note is not money, and ought never to be called money. If you wish to see the proof of the truth of this statement, read what is written on the note. It promises to pay five pounds on demand; it undertakes to procure for you so much money; but you must ask for the money in order to have it. A promise to give a thing cannot possibly be the thing itself; the two things cannot be identified without generating mischievous confusion. A bank-note is not a payment; it does not put into your hands a substance of equal value with the property you are selling. And if the Bank of England fails, as so many other banks have failed, you will never be paid at all. You will never obtain the money which has been promised; you will have given away your goods for nothing. It is very true, that so long as the Bank of England is supposed to be solvent, its piece of paper, its printed

words will do for you all that coin could have done; you can take it to the shop where you wish to buy and you will have your wants supplied as easily as if you had carried coin in your pocket. In other words, a good debt, especially the debt due by a strong bank, like the Bank of England, buys as effectively as money; men will give their merchandise for it as readily as they would for money. But that fact does not identify the acknowledgment of debt with the coin due. If it were held to justify the application of the word money to the bank-note, then a spoken promise, which is equally binding in law with the written note, the promise to pay which a purchaser gives when he orders the article he takes away to be put down to his account, must be money also; and the accounts of every tradesman in every shop in the land must be regarded as part of the money of the country. There are persons who would not shrink from accepting such a conclusion; but the only result of their view would be to strip the designation money of all useful meaning, to reduce it to a mere husk, and to render all science of money simply impossible.

The truth that bank-notes are not money has received a remarkable confirmation from an elaborate judgment recently delivered in the Supreme Court of the United States. The question which presented itself for final decision was, whether debts which were in existence prior to the Act of Congress which made the bank-notes called greenbacks legal tender were discharged by the tender of these notes. Nothing could be sounder or more admirable than the doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Chase. He ruled that such debts were contracts to deliver money, and that bank-notes were not money, and could not be forced upon a creditor as a satisfaction of his claim. The distinction that coin alone, the metallic dollar, was money, was most sharply and accurately drawn, and the right of the creditor to payment established. A note was pronounced not to be payment; it did not fulfil the contract entered into by the debtor to deliver money. The case was totally different with debts contracted subsequently to the enactment of the law which declared greenbacks to be legal tender in full satisfaction of the creditor's claim. He had been distinctly forewarned that the word dollar would be understood by the law to mean that particular piece of paper which contained an acknowledgment of debt by the government of the United States. He knew beforehand, when he gave credit and parted with his property for an undertaking to be paid in dollars, that he would receive not money, but the transfer of a debt, expressed on paper, which was due by the government. He did not stipulate for money, and consequently money he had no right to, and would not receive. He would get dollars, as interpreted

by the law of legal tender—not the metallic dollar, which is money, but a promise made by the government to pay that dollar, without any stipulation as to the time when it should be given. It was for him to consider, when he gave away his goods, what the promise of a dollar, when it reached him on a piece of paper, might be worth in the shops.

If the bank-note fails to make good its title to be ranked as money, the chance of success for the bill will be considerably weaker. The power of circulation still lingers in the bill; its existence is not limited to one single act, then to disappear for ever. A good bill is endowed with a certain faculty of travelling about; it may settle several transactions in succession. Nevertheless, its claim to be classed as money is tainted with the same fatal flaw, that it gives only a promise, and not the thing promised itself; and, as before, we repeat that an undertaking, whether written or spoken, to produce a substance, a metal, is not the substance itself. A bill binds its acceptor to furnish on a given day so many coins, called pounds; but it is not itself the coins. It fares still worse with the cheque, for it does not circulate; it has no currency; it has no other feature that characterizes money except the one common to all these instruments, that by its means property may be purchased. It is simply an order to your banker to pay to some other person some coins, pounds, which he owes you. It is no better than a letter; a verbal request would do as well, only that the utterance of the ordering words would be more difficult to prove in a court of law than your handwriting. And this leads me to call your notice to a quality which belongs in common to all these wonder-working pieces of paper, and which constitutes their scientific nature. They are all evidences of debt, available to set the law in motion to compel their writers to make good their promises, and to produce the coins which they acknowledge to be due, and which they undertake shall be forthcoming at the specified time. Their virtue resides exclusively in their power to bring down upon the debtor, the signer, the compulsion of the law. The stipulated pounds may not be produced, and then the creditor who has parted with his property in exchange for this paper remains without payment; so he has recourse to a court of law, which enforces the recovery of what is his due. But it is always essential to remember that verbal evidence of a debt is as valid at law as written; the advantage of writing consists solely in the greater facility of producing a signed acknowledgment than an array of personal witnesses.

We now pass into a different region. We enter into the land of banking, a country full of oracular utterances, and mystical phrases, which the uninitiated are warned not to approach, for it is not given

to the profane to understand the solemn mysteries of which great authorities alone possess the key. Yet our inquiry forces us to ask the question whether the funds wielded by banks are money—whether those all-important resources which are the life-blood of the mercantile community are actually and by their very nature essentially money? I have already treated this subject in Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford;* but I must ask for your kind permission to repeat on the present occasion some of the statements which I then made. I asked myself the question, What is a bank, and what is the article in which it deals? and the answer which I obtained was not that banks dealt in money. Such a conclusion was forbidden by general reasoning which received striking illustration from figures given to the world by Sir John Lubbock. He analyzed the receipts of his own bank, and on a sum of nineteen millions he discovered that three per cent. only were cash. Three parts only in a hundred consisted of coin and bank-notes. Of this amount of cash, one-sixth only was composed of coin, the remainder consisted of notes; and, as we have ascertained that bank-notes are not money, only one-half per cent., or ten shillings in a hundred pounds, can be described as money. What shall we say of the remaining ninety-seven parts of the commodity in which bankers deal, of the receipts obtained by bankers from their customers, and which they afterwards dispense out to traders—are they money? Let us look at the form in which they come into the banker's hands. They reach him as written pieces of paper, as cheques, bills, warrants, and other like documents inscribed with figures. We meet again our old acquaintance the promise, the order to pay, the right and title to demand coins, to receive pounds, but not the pounds themselves. It is still the same tale, the voucher of a debt, but not its payment; a bit of paper, and not valuable metal; a legal proof of coins due, but not money. The bank is a house of passage, through which the cheques and bills travel on their road to settlement; assuredly as to his receipts, money is not what a banker obtains from his customers. Well, but does he not obtain gold, when he presents these cheques and bills for payment? He does not; for though he has the right to demand coin, he does not ask for it, and does not get it. It is the business of a banker to lend to borrowers the sums he receives from his depositors; and these loans in turn are themselves for the most part taken out from him in cheques. Thus, less a certain balance retained as reserve, his advances equal his receipts, and the settlement of both is effected by setting off one against another, so that each cancel the other. In large commercial communities clearing

* The "Principles of Currency," Six Lectures delivered at Oxford. James Parker and Co., Oxford and London.

houses are instituted, at which this mutual cancelment is carried out without the intervention of coin. Where clearing houses do not exist, more cash is required, for the cheques are more frequently paid over the counter; but it circulates so quickly, the sums received by the banker for the cheques he holds flow out so rapidly in payment of the cheques which he allows his borrowers to draw upon him, that practically this extra quantity of money and notes passing is very trifling in quantity compared with the number and magnitude of the transactions effected. What occurs at one bank occurs at all the rest; each settles the paying and receiving of the day either at the clearing house, or by rapid movements to and fro of a small quantity of cash; and collectively they become a universal clearing house for the settlement of mutual debts. This analysis enables us to understand how it comes to pass, that banks deal in cash to the extent of only three parts in a hundred of their business, and only one-half per cent. in coin or money. And further, it furnishes us with a clear insight into the nature of a bank, as well as the nature of the article in which it trades. It shows us that a bank deals in debts, expressed in written acknowledgments, and that its true character is summed up in the definition that it is an institution for the transfer of debts.

But now you will probably ask in wonder, whether you are really to understand that when a merchant borrows a hundred thousand pounds from a bank he receives the loan in debts? To this I reply that the transaction is nothing else than a shuffling about of debts. The borrowing merchant has a credit opened to him by his banker; and he makes his purchases by the instrumentality of bills or cheques which he draws on that credit. He thus contracts a debt at the bank; but how is the banker able to grant the loan? By means of the debts of other persons, the bills and cheques lodged with him by his depositors. The kernel of the explanation is to be sought in the nature and significance of a debt. A debt is a right vested in a creditor to demand a sum of money from his debtor; and it is his power of demanding money from others which enables a banker to make advances to his customers. What he practically does is to transfer to A a power of demanding coin which he received from B. In form and appearance, it is the interposed banker who lends to A; in substance and reality, B is the true lender; and it is power to demand money from some third person which B deposited with the banker that is the essence of the advance which the banker grants to A.

And now I invite your careful attention to an inquiry full of interest and instruction:—How do these debts, these rights to demand coin, which constitute the resources of banks, come into

existence? Who owes them? The purchasers and owners of commodities. The property, the wealth of the community, is responsible for the payment of these debts. A banker receives from his customers a certain number of cheques, bills, dividend-warrants, and the like, which entitle him to claim the payment of coin from the persons designated in these documents. These funds, which place new means in his hands, which augment his resources, and enable him to lend assistance to traders, all imply a sale of goods or other property; all signify that goods have been bought, and changed hands, and that the payment for them has not been completed. The sellers pass on their claims to the bankers for collection; and the settlement of these claims for coin is the fund with which the bankers trade. A Liverpool importer sells a cargo of cotton to a Manchester manufacturer, and is paid with a cheque on a Manchester bank. The drawing of the cheque implies that a banker of Manchester owes a debt to the manufacturer. How came that debt into being? By sales of calico, of which the proceeds had been lodged in the bank, and had generated a corresponding power of buying. By selling his calico to the shopkeeper, the manufacturer acquired the means of purchasing goods of equal value; this purchasing power he does not exercise for the moment, but leaves in the hands of his banker till it suits him to buy the cargo at Liverpool. In precisely the same manner the shopkeeper may have paid the manufacturer with a cheque on a debt due to him by a banker in consequence of sales made to wearers of shirts; and we thus obtain in final analysis that it is with a power of buying created by sales of goods to consumers that bankers are enabled to meet the cheques drawn upon them by their customers, or those to whom they have made advances. Those who consume the goods, the wearers of shirts, supply the means; but the manufacturer, by not buying as fast as he sells, retains an unexpended power of buying, which he permits the banker to use for a season. Without the sales the banker would have obtained nothing, nor would the sales have brought him any resources were it not that the sellers did not purchase as quickly as they sold. The banker collects the debts due to the manufacturer, and lends the proceeds to a dealer in tea or tobacco, and thus, till the manufacturer is ready to buy the cargo of cotton at Liverpool, his calico has placed tea or tobacco in the hands of dealers in those commodities. It is the tea and the cotton which owe the debt, which is ultimately to purchase the cotton in the docks.

It is possible that the purchasers of shirts may pay for them with money—with coin. In that case the shopkeepers will, in England, at least, carry the major portion of it to their bankers; but it will not stay at the banks. The currency would become speedily

deficient if it were to tarry in the strong chests; change would become scarce, and those whose business required supplies of coin would immediately procure them from their bankers, and thus the currency would run its full and perpetual round. But, as I have already shown, and as the facts quoted by Sir John Lubbock demonstrate, only a very insignificant part of the payments due for the purchase of shirts are made in coin; they are liquidated by drafts on the debts due by bankers on the current accounts of their customers; and money, coin, still continues absent, so to speak, from the hands of bankers.

It will have been perceived from the preceding explanation that what banks distribute is not money, but the right to demand money; but it also suggests a question, on which we may linger a few moments with advantage. Do banks possess capital? In many ears the question will sound as puerile and absurd. Banks not possess capital! Why the language of common life overflows with talk about the capital in the hands of bankers. How can any sane man assert that bankers do not possess capital? Well, we must agree with the language of the world; bankers do possess capital; but how much? The coin in their tills is clearly capital; it is made of valuable metal; it can be sold in the metal market as readily as tin or iron. So are their premises and their furniture; no one can refuse these the title of capital; they are actual and real wealth. Is there anything else possessed by bankers which is capital? I am not aware that there is. What! not their bank-notes? No, not their bank-notes; their bank-notes are not capital. If a fire broke out, and all the bank-notes perished in the flames, would England have lost an atom of her capital? Would she be a shilling the poorer? What a burnt-up bank will have lost, the Bank of England will have gained. Vouchers will have been destroyed, and vast will be the difference to the two banks—just as the difference is immense between the two men who have lost and won a fortune at betting. But there is no diminution of property, no destruction of capital. Then come the deposits; the London and Westminster Bank has twenty millions of them; are not these capital? No, in no respect more than the bank-notes. Twenty millions of deposits mean twenty millions of debts due by the bank; and they are covered by a counter amount of debts due to the bank by borrowers, and a reserve of cash in the till of the bank. In truth, with the exception of the reserve, its ledger sums up the London and Westminster Bank; and if by any fortuitous combination of circumstances, by the accident of war, for instance, the ledger was destroyed, and along with it the bills and all other evidence of the transactions effected, the result would be that the depositors would lose their property, and the borrowers would gain it.

But, as in the case of notes, there would be no change in the capital of the country; the loss of one set of men would be the gain of another. What the bank really possesses and can distribute over all the trades of the country is the command of capital, the power of buying, the power of going to shops and warehouses, and procuring the goods they contain. This power resides in debts, in rights to demand coin, which coin is very rarely required, and scarcely ever passes, but whose assumed presence is always felt. The cargo of cotton is sold for a cheque on the bank, and that cheque is settled by being set off against a second cheque, which the seller of the cotton puts forth in the purchase of iron, which he intends to make the return cargo to America; and thus the true and ultimate facts come to light, that the iron of Liverpool has bought the cotton of New York, and that the intermediate agency of cheques, bills, and a trifle of money, has been merely locomotive machinery.

A similar explanation will enable us to penetrate the meaning of the expression that a man possesses so many thousand pounds in Consols. Here again we repeat the former remark, that he possesses nothing of the kind. It cost him certainly these thousands to become the creditor of the State for so much, or, indeed, for rather more money; but he parted with his pounds, his money, when he purchased the Consols, and all he obtained was a title-deed, acknowledging a debt due to him by the State, and pledging the State to pay him these pounds in coin so many times over each year. So long as the State of England is solvent, he acquires twice a year a certain number of pounds, a certain amount of money, paid to him in one form or other; here he touches an actual substance, a positive quantity of coin, if he choose to require payment in that form. But the purchase-money he gave for the Consols is gone, and possibly may never be recovered. The State has subjected itself to no fixed period for the repayment of the debt, and the multitudinous events of human life may bring about for him the calamity that no man will be willing to give him anything in purchase of that debt. Even as the matter stands in the actual world, the Consols which he reckons at one figure this year, he may be compelled by the state of the Consols market to rate at another the next; and this fact alone completely demonstrates that the pounds of these Consols are not in his hands at all, but exist only as an estimate of the sum for which he expects to be able to sell them. A commodity and its price can never be the same thing.

We are now brought to the last memorable use of language,—the darling expression of the newspapers—the money-market. How pleasantly the alliteration sounds; how compendious a phrase for denoting a multitude of things! Yet how much is there of money

amongst them? Look down the list and consider. Consols we have seen to be not money; neither are any of the foreign stocks. They are no more money than the soles and turbot in a fish-monger's list are money. The Stock Exchange list tells us their prices for the day; but if you buy them, no money will be delivered into your hands. Pass on to the long array of railway shares; is a share money? is it not rather a title-deed conferring the rights of partnership in a commercial enterprise? What is the difference, commercially, between a railway and a ship or a stage-coach? Has any one ever called a ship or coach money? Or take the very cream of the expression, money-market, the rate of interest charged by bankers each day on the loans which they advance to traders; we have already learnt that these loans are not money, but rights to demand money, purchasing power, power to buy goods, and that enormous purchases are made with it daily without any money whatever passing. Throughout the long catalogue of the Stock Exchange list I can discover not a single portion of money. I find a great row of prices, but the things on sale are not money. I grant, however, that a common name for these varied objects is eminently desirable; for the demand for such a general designation is real, and men will certainly invent one, or employ the phrase already on their lips, if a better one is not suggested. Loan and Investment Market has been proposed for these purposes, and it appears to me unobjectionable. But I fear any term founded on scientific reasons will have but little chance against the melody and smoothness of the popular phrase. A meeting of newspaper editors might perform a great deed of science, and perhaps impose an improved phraseology on a reluctant public. Such a feat would be pleasant to behold; its probability you can estimate as well as I can.

"But what is the harm," I shall be asked, "of employing the old familiar phrase? why should not all these things be called money? When the term is applied to notes, bills, and cheques, the guilt of some little inaccuracy may be incurred; but popular language is not held down to the strict rules of scientific expression. All these things speak of pounds, shillings, and pence. There is no substance connected with them but money. The man who buys and pays with a cheque raises the idea of money in the mind of the seller; it is against money that the value of the goods are measured by buyer and seller alike; money is present in imagination if not in bodily form; and here the idea is as powerful as the reality. A genus, a common designation, must be devised for all these varieties; what better one can be thought of than money?" The answer to these remarks must be sought from the well-known

law, that confusion of language invariably generates confusion of thought. The misuse of words can never be practised with impunity; some consequent mischief will always exact a penalty for the offence. In the case of money, the disorder created in the thoughts of men entails a severe punishment on carelessness and inaccuracy. Money is not a common term, a logical expression, such as animal or tree, or the like, purposely invented to express a generic likeness in many diverse species. It is a name for a single definite thing, for one particular substance, for coin; and the mischief—and it is immense—consists in leading the mind to transfer to an object entirely different in nature some of the special qualities belonging to the original body designated by the word. There is an end to all science so long as this perverting process of thought continues. Money becomes identified with the order to pay money, with the right to demand it; a material substance with a thought, a metal with paper. No doubt the same confusion happens in other matters also. A merchant who has sent out orders to purchase cotton at New York is often heard to say on Change that he has so much cotton; but there is no danger here of the letter he wrote being taken for cotton. But in the case of money the identification is carried out in the mind between the order to pay coin and the coin itself. Bank-notes are intentionally called money; they are argued about as money; the same effects are assigned to them as to money. Political economy is overrun with writers who speak of the resources of bankers as money. A legal right, a voucher, a piece of evidence good at law, is thus confounded with the object which it serves to claim. The popular commercial mind soon passes on to believe that these small bits of paper, these sums standing at their accounts at bankers, are wealth in themselves; and when the correctness of such a belief is challenged, they are satisfied with replying that it is wealth to them, that they can get wealth with them, and that that is the same thing. They might as well affirm that a title-deed is the same identical thing with the broad acres whose ownership it conveys, that a reversionary interest is wealth as truly as the property which it can obtain only hereafter, or that a creditor still retains the wealth which he has given away to his debtor. It never occurs to those who use such language to ask themselves how much wealth they would possess if the title-deed were lost and could be supplemented by no other evidence, or the debtor became insolvent, or if the reversion consisted of a house or some perishable chattel, and were destroyed. Wealth is thus reckoned twice over,—once, as it exists in the hands of the man who holds it; a second time, as it exists ideally in the mind of its legal owner. The natural consequences of such a jumble could not fail

to make themselves felt. The belief that bank-notes are money could not help generating the inference that an abundance of bank-notes is an abundance of wealth; that the money-market, as it is called, is strong and safe when plenty of bank-notes are in the hands of the bankers, especially in the hands of the Bank of England. Unrestricted issues mean a plethora of resources for loans and discount, till at last the summit is reached in the exquisite idea that the most violent commercial convulsions and the most destructive crises may be cured by a wonderful specific,—the repealing of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, and the enabling the bank to issue more bank-notes. The minds of the commercial community are thus directed to look at the currency as containing the secret of thriving or disastrous trade. They are taught to study gold and notes, their ebbings and their flowings, as the powers which hold the mysterious keys of wealth. A large import of gold fills them with delight and confidence, an export plunges them into panic. Gold is announced by the newspapers as steadily flowing in, and straightway great commercial operations are embarked upon with buoyant feeling; so many thousands of metal were taken out from the vaults yesterday, and bankers put on grave looks, and every merchant hurries to have his bills discounted, and commercial enterprise is stopped at every opening. Are such notions scientific? are they rational? Certainly, if paper is wealth, and abundance of paper much wealth, the ideas and the conduct which springs from them befit thoughtful mortals; but if these views are built on a foundation of illusion, the harm created may be enormous—speculation constructed on a radical ignorance of the nature and the laws both of wealth and trade may easily become ruinous.

These remarks bring us to the second division of my subject—the question, Whether money has any effect on the rate of discount? I need hardly remind you of the distinction between the terms interest and discount. Interest is the generic expression; discount is the interest demanded and paid on a particular class of securities. You are familiar with the fact that discount may vary over a very wide range of rates, whilst the rate of interest in other markets, so to speak, may have its waters scarcely ruffled by the commotion which prevails elsewhere. The bank rate of discount may hurry wildly up to ten per cent., whilst at the same time attorneys may be obtaining ample supplies on loans secured upon land at scarcely disturbed interest. Our present inquiry relates to the special form of interest denoted by discount, to the charge made by bankers and other lenders to traders on the security of bills and other commercial pledges; and the question is, whether money exercises any influence in the way of

augmenting or lowering this charge. I will speak first of true money, the only money—coin.

Coin, we know, is formed of a valuable metal, which costs much to procure. The gold coinage of England has been frequently estimated at some eighty millions sterling. It is clear that, if this country had to purchase this mass of gold all at once for the first time, an equal diminution of the other forms of the wealth of the country would be the inevitable consequence of the purchase. The gold-miners would take away goods of equal value from the nation's stock; and manifestly there would be an equal amount of those kinds of property that would be no longer available for being lent to borrowers. The effect would be exactly the same as if an equal quantity of drainage, or railway-making, or of building of mills and factories, had been carried on. Food, clothing, tools, and other commodities of many various kinds, would have been destroyed, and in their place the nation would have obtained tools and implements of great efficiency for the production of wealth, but still tools only, expensive to procure, and as yet yielding nothing. The purchase of the gold would unquestionably be a wise purchase, because coin is an indispensable instrument for a civilized country; but the acquisition of the coin would necessarily involve the loss of the property for which the miners gave it in exchange. Such an event, therefore, would terribly re-act on the rate of discount, as well as on the practicability of procuring loans. A nation compelled to buy a vast quantity of a particular commodity must have less to lend for other purposes. No one, I presume, will dispute the truth of this conclusion, when stated in this form. Let us move on, then, another step. It will be granted, I conceive, that if the stock of coins is procured in smaller portions, the action on discount will continue, though to a more limited degree. The same cause will be at work, and the same effect must follow. Is there any one of you who challenges this deduction? No one, I imagine. Yet are you quite sure that you accept the inference which it irresistibly imposes upon every thinker? Are you willing to declare, that when merchandise is sold to foreign nations, and the balance of trade is in favour of England, and payment is made by the foreigner with gold which is imported into the country, the real significance of the act is that a metal has been purchased with England's wealth, and that the wisdom or the folly of the purchase must depend for judgment on the purpose and the use to which the metal can be applied? Do you assent to the statement, that if the gold is actually needed for doing the work of coin, that if the supply of these tools is deficient, and trade suffers impediment for the want of sovereigns to carry out buying and selling, the purchase has been

wise ; but that if the gold is not required for use, and is lodged in the cellars of the Bank of England, wealth has been given away to acquire a metal which is as useless as a cargo of stones, and that the purchase has been unwise, and, considered by itself alone, has brought loss to England ? I do not mean that it is a foolish deed to sell your goods abroad against payment in gold, if only you re-export it from England with all possible speed ; but the pinch of the question is this—whether payment in gold, as compared with payment by a return cargo of merchandise, does not involve loss, when there is already a full supply of coin to enable buying and selling to proceed smoothly and efficiently. That metal cannot be capital so long as it continues in a cellar ; it can give no aid in the production of wealth ; it might as well have remained in its native mine, so far as serving any useful end for England's benefit is concerned. I confess that I have never been able to understand how sensible men could ever bring themselves to believe that the transfer of a metal from a dark hole in Australia to another dark hole in England is a beneficial or even a rational act. One can easily comprehend how the great Emperor Napoleon should store up some fifteen or twenty millions of silver at the Tuileries to be ready for instantaneous use on a sudden outbreak of war ; that is a perfectly intelligible proceeding ; it was a spare stock to provide for an unforeseen emergency. But the delight of City men and City articles is to know that the gold is in the vaults—in the thought that it is there, and going to remain there ; and its removal for use is precisely what they deprecate. They like to hear the bank return recording each week a large accumulation in store ; they conceive that it does good by continuing in that state ; what that good is, I cannot, by the highest effort of imagination, conceive. It is not idle, some exclaim ; it renders useful service to trade ; it is represented by notes. To this I am obliged to reply with a confession of ignorance. I do not know the meaning of the word represent in matters of currency. I never use it myself ; and when it is employed by others in discussion, I always experience the feeling as if the road one travels by ended in a jungle. If the meaning be that it is an excellent thing for England to give away a million's worth of her property in order to procure a million pieces of paper expressing acknowledgment of debt, the assertion is so amazing that I have not the heart to disturb its wonderful brilliancy by refutation. It must stand as a conspicuous example of the altitude which the human mind has reached in the nineteenth century.

But now look at the reverse of the picture. Suppose your exported merchandise to have been re-paid with foreign goods instead of gold, England now acquires capital by the exchange, which replaces the

products that she has sent to distant lands. She obtains food for her workmen, or wool to make clothing for their backs, or timber to construct dwellings. She has incurred no loss of capital by the exchange: wealth has replaced wealth on precisely the same principle that the coat of the tailor replaces the wheat of the farmer. Foreign trade thus becomes a rational and intelligible operation: the prolific principle of division of labour is carried out between nations as at home between individuals; and gold is reduced to its proper place as a metal useful for making coins with, but useful—I am not speaking of its employment in the arts—only so far as coins are needed.

“Exactly so,” popular sentiment will reply. “Gold is coined into money, and money can be lent: it is the thing which merchants seek to borrow; and the more money there is, clearly the more will bankers have to lend to trade.” The argument seems sound, unanswerable; nevertheless, it is nothing but a fallacy. Follow it out to its conclusion, and you will perceive at once that it must contain a flaw. Therefore, to go on to get as much money as possible is the true course for trade to pursue. Let all the export trade bring back gold. Buy all the gold of the world with England’s wares, and then merchants will find a maximum of money available for loans and discounts. By the operation, no doubt, England may have been disabled from importing food for her people, or clothing, or tools; but then she will have all the gold, all the riches of the world in her grasp; and no borrower will be told that there is no money to be lent, and discount will rule at one per cent., and every Englishman will be happy and prosperous. The absurdity of such a deduction is transparent, for then many Englishmen must go naked or starve; yet it is logically derived from the general proposition expressed in the doctrine, that gold creates money to be lent to traders. That absurdity shows that the proposition is not absolute; that it is subject to limitation; and that limitation we shall find ruins the statement as an argument for the importation and accumulation of gold. Facts explain this conclusion. The imported gold is not lent; that is a clear and undeniable certainty; it is lodged at the bank and remains there. Whatever else borrowers may obtain, they do not receive money; coin is not placed in their hands; the imported gold is not the thing lent. Look at the gigantic masses of this metal in Threadneedle Street and the Bank of France, and you cannot escape the inference, that somehow there is a most palpable superfluity. The explanation is easy; it rests on a principle of the most obvious kind, but which is constantly ignored when people speak of money. Coin, money, is a tool contrived for a specific purpose, to be used for paying both purchases and debts; and the

same rule applies to the quantity required of this tool, as to every other tool whatever. How many merchant ships are needed? as many as there are freights for. How many hats? as many as there are heads to be covered—all beyond this number, whether ships, hats, or any other instruments, cannot be and are not used. How many sovereigns then are wanted? as many as are demanded by that paying and buying, in which they are actually handled, and pass from one man to another. You cannot grasp the truth too firmly, that the quantity of money needed and capable of being employed in a country bears no proportion whatever to its wealth, to the amount of business done, to its banking and discounting, or to any other object than the transactions which employ it as their instrument of payment. The assumption of the existence of such a ratio is a capital error in Mr. Mill's "*Treatise on Political Economy*;" but as I have discussed it in my Oxford Lectures, I will not repeat the argument here. It is enough to state that the quantity needed of a tool is determined always by the number required of its products. The product of coin, of money, is a purchase of goods or a payment of a debt; find the number of these purchases and payments which is effected by coin, and you will obtain the quantity of money which the community can use. We have seen that in the business of banking only half a sovereign in a hundred pounds is required for the payment made by a bank in money; or only three pounds in one hundred, if cash is spoken of, that is, money and bank-notes. The extension of banking wonderfully reduces the quantity of money employed by a nation, for payments are then carried out by cheques and the setting off of debts against each other. The country saves the expense of purchasing money; in every other respect there is no change. If once the mind is thoroughly penetrated with the knowledge that money is only a tool, invented for performing one specific purpose, the heavy cloud of obscurity, may I add, of repulsiveness which lowers over currency will vanish away. High authorities and great governments long preached up the mercantile system as the essence of a flourishing trade; and the consequence has been, in the words of Archbishop Whately, that "it has for centuries done more, and, perhaps, for centuries to come will do more to retard the improvement of Europe than all other causes put together." Adam Smith exposed its folly: yet it survives in full vigour in the doctrine that an exchange which brings in gold is in favour of England.

It follows from the preceding statement that surplus gold, arriving in England, when the currency is full, and there are sovereigns enough to supply all the country with change, must necessarily pass into the cellars of the Bank; it cannot come out into circulation; no one wants it, and as no one keeps it, it has no other

possible home than the dark caves in Threadneedle Street. "But it enables the Bank to lend," it will be said. Yes, only so far as it is a security. It can act only as a security; a box of diamonds would perform the same service equally well. "Not so," I shall be answered: "a banker is under covenant to pay gold, and there it is, to be delivered if demanded." Again I reply: A casket of diamonds, a dock warrant for tea, timber, wine, or any other saleable goods, would furnish the Bank with the same quantity of gold if required, or, which is the same thing, would enable the Bank to meet the same demands upon it. The sole advantage in this matter which the gold possesses, is that it requires no margin; it is a security to the full extent of the pounds it contains, and which of course it will sell for, whereas merchandise requires a certain margin to guard against possible variations in its selling price. But this is a mere detail, which does not affect the general principle. The essence of the matter lies in the fact that gold, when the currency is full—and it is always full in England—acts solely as a saleable commodity, and that any other saleable article will procure for the Bank the same means of satisfying any requirement made upon it by its creditors. The wool which is brought to England by the Australian ship that imports the gold does as much for the Bank as the metal; for it is sold, and the cheque given in payment is as effective a resource for the Bank as the sovereigns expended upon it would have been. But on the other hand, the wool does much for the country, and the gold does nothing. The wool is worked up as capital, and becomes a portion of the active wealth of the country; the gold is like a diamond, a pretty stone to look at, but no more capital so long as it is unemployed than a pebble picked up from the sea shore.

We are now in a position to give a direct answer to the question, whether money exercises any influence over the rate of discount. Our analysis yielded as its first product the principle, that coin is only an instrument of locomotion, a machine for conveyance: it is the cart, and not the goods carried by the cart. Its one function is to give a seller the power of buying where he pleases, instead of taking the goods of the man who purchases his wares. What a borrower on discount seeks is, not money for its own sake, but the commodities which money can purchase. It might seem that much gold, many sovereigns, furnished means for much lending: but it is a matter of dry and certain fact, that the surplus gold is not lent, does not come out from the Bank. But the true issue, the point to be decided is, whether the common commercial axiom is well-founded, that the special commodity money furnishes any greater supplies for loans than the valuable commodities would have furnished, which were sent out to buy the money. We have seen that money does

not provide greater resources for bankers than these other articles of value; and indeed, how could the importance of money for discount at banks be maintained in the face either of the fact that ten shillings is the only money contained in a hundred pounds of a bank's receipts, or of the other fact, that cash, money and notes, only constitute three parts out of a hundred? Suppose a balance of trade to bring in five millions of gold, about one-sixteenth part of the number of sovereigns used in England—and that would be a vast import—would an increase of one-sixteenth on every ten shillings held by the Bank of England, compared with the enormous magnitude of its lendings effected by cheques at the clearing house, lower the rate of discount by one per cent.?

And secondly, we appeal to the grand staple of the banking business. The ninety-seven parts of the means of banks which are not money, and are never converted into money, will put the finishing stroke to the judgment to be pronounced. It is manifest that this element must be investigated, if we wish to discover what it is that bankers have to lend to trade. When this portion of their resources becomes enlarged, banks, it is clear, have much accommodation to grant; when it dwindles away they have small supplies to distribute to others, whatever may have happened with their small change of gold and notes. I have shown you that these were debts due by those who purchased commodities, by the holders of the wealth of the country. What causes render those debts many? Excess of production over consumption, sellers buying less than they have sold, contributions to the stock of commodities in shops and warehouses without an equivalent taking away of other goods for use and destruction. And what are the causes which render these debts lodged with bankers few? The reverse of those which swell their means: excess of consumption over production, bad harvests which have not replaced in summer the food, clothes, and tools destroyed by agriculturists in winter and spring, purchases by farmers in the towns beyond the value of the corn and meat which they have carried in, diminution of wealth created by the construction of drains and railways out of other funds than savings. These, and influences similar to these, are the means which contract the figures in banking ledgers, and overcloud the faces of merchants with anxiety, and sometimes with alarm; and that is exactly the result which the study of the natures of money and of banking ought to have prepared us to expect. Increase of wealth ought to lead to augmented stores for lending, and diminished wealth must necessarily suggest the idea of fewer means available for borrowers. Were facts to proclaim a different result, and show that wealth might dwindle away and yet borrowers find means more accessible by the help of purchases of gold

abroad and its importation into England, the mystery would be so overwhelming that all science would have to be despaired of, until some mercantile Newton rose to discover the law of the commercial universe.

But let me guard against a misconception. I do not deny that an inflow of gold into England is often accompanied by ease in the loan market. What I deny is the relation of cause and effect between these two phenomena. I have discussed this subject elsewhere; on the present occasion I need only remark that sales to others, unbalanced by corresponding purchases from them, indicate generally an easy state of circumstances, a stock of spare wealth, so to speak, an increase of capital; and ease in the loan market is the natural consequence of such abundance. The opposite effect is generated by the opposite cause. A large export of gold, denoting an excess of buying abroad, reveals speculative purchases of foreign goods, which is for the time a real annihilation of capital by its conversion into unused wealth, or far more commonly, the failure of some important commodity at home. Thus the strongest and most lasting outflows of gold usually spring from the failure of the harvest in our fields. The nation is then impoverished by the unreplaced consumption expended upon tillage, and a poor country necessarily generates a poor fund for lending. On the other hand, I must declare my conviction, that the export of ten millions of the gold now lying unemployed in England, even if it were sent out as a foreign loan, and not in exchange for commodities, would produce no effect on the rate of discount, so far as the mere fact of exportation is concerned. Who the exporters were, however, is a question which might act very powerfully on discount; but time fails me to investigate this topic here.

So much for money, for coin, for the valuable metal which serves for payment and for purchases; but what shall we say of bank-notes, those close imitators of money, those performers of most of the functions of money, and yet which are not money—do they act on the rate of discount? is their abundance or their scarcity a cause of variations in the discounting of your bills? Assuredly not: if money does not touch discount, must less can the mere acknowledgments that money is due, the vouchers for debt, the mere legal evidence that will set a court of law in motion to procure money, exercise such a power. Yet popular feeling is deeply persuaded that bank-notes can assist traders and arrest crises far more than even money itself. A dim consciousness lurks in the mind that gold has to be paid for, and therefore that to seek relief from an additional supply of gold is virtually to ask bankers, whose means it is the eager wish of the moment to strengthen, to diminish those very means by the purchase of an expensive metal. It is felt that there is plainly no increase of

resources in such an operation. But bank-notes are the darlings of the commercial mind. They pay debts, and buy goods, and place large sums to the credit of banking accounts; and, best of all, whilst they perform these wonders, they cost the banker nothing. Here is, as all the world may see, an inexhaustible fund for making advances to commerce. And if it is an augmentation of resources, then clearly it must render borrowing more easy. What blessed relief may not be expected in the periodical agonies of the City, if only the present legislation of Parliament can be swept away, and the repeal of the Bank Act of 1844 allow bankers to supply the world with unlimited piles of bank-notes! These are delightful visions certainly; yet they are nothing but dreams—mists that are swiftly dispelled by the penetrating rays of reason. Such language betrays a radical ignorance of the nature of currency, and of the manner in which bank-notes play their part in the social economy. Like money, they are tools; and like all tools, they cannot be used further than there is work for them to perform. Bank-notes undoubtedly confer a power on bankers to lend; but to what extent? Every bank-note is a debt contracted by the issuing banker: the question is, how many of these debts will the public buy of him without calling upon him for repayment? When he puts forth a note, he acquires five pounds from the public; and if the note remains in circulation, he can lend a part of or all these pounds to his customers. The public has a certain demand, a large demand, for these notes, these instruments of exchange. Their superior conveniences are many as compared with coin; but the demand, nevertheless, is not unlimited. The point to learn is the cause which determines the number of these debts which the public will retain in its hands for use, and that cause is identical with that which governs money. The number of notes which the public will keep is the number required for those transactions which are carried out by the instrumentality of notes: all beyond that quantity speedily find their way back to the issuing bank. It is therefore against sense and reason to look for help in panics to an expanded circulation of notes; for, unless there is an enlarged number of transactions effected through notes, an increased issue is impossible. Before 1844 the Bank of England found its issues as really and as thoroughly restricted by the nature of bank-notes as they are said to be now by the statute of that year. Facts confirm the theory; for they do not show an increase of circulation generally in seasons of great commercial pressure. It is probable that on the famous 9th of May of 1866, for a few hours the circulation of banks was immensely increased; for crowds were hurrying along the streets of the City, calling for immediate payment of their debts, and removing accounts from suspected to unsuspected

banks; but when eventide came the transfers were completed, the notes had done their work, and they flowed back to their source, the Bank of England, from which they had issued. Obviously, if the Bank had issued these notes as advances on loan, it would have had to pay them the same evening out of its general resources; and thus the conclusion becomes clear that the Bank did not, and could not, derive a means for lending from these notes. Much passionate clamour has been poured forth in loud strains all over the kingdom, demanding unrestricted issues of Bank of England notes, as the salvation of trade in the hour of difficulty; but till it is shown that a single additional note will be taken by the public and not sent in to the Bank for payment, it is nothing better than empty declamation. The suspension or the abolition of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 would not bring the slightest relief to discount, because it would not multiply those transactions in which notes are used for settlement, and consequently would confer on the public no additional power or inclination to hold notes.

Mercantile men are led astray by these unfounded notions as to the action of currency on discount, thus suffering their attention to be diverted from studying the real forces which regulate the ease or difficulty of loans. It would be just as rational to estimate the yield of the coming harvest on any farm by reckoning up the number of waggons which the farmer has under his shed. Many of you are engaged in vast commercial operations which require a long space of time for their completion. It is a vital matter for you to be able to form a reasonable forecast of the charge which the discounting of your bills may entail upon you at a distant day; you will never be able to predict the coming commercial weather by thinking about currency, nor will you obtain succour in the hour of need from increased issue of bank-notes. It behoves you rather to watch the forces which are at work in augmenting or diminishing the national wealth; to calculate the prospects of the harvest, not in England, but all over the world; to reflect whether an excess of the public wealth is not expended on costly creations, such as railways or machinery, of which the restoration will require years; nay, moreover, it is sad to be obliged to add, to take into account the influence of ignorance and prejudice on the enactment of protective tariffs, and similar contrivances for the diminution of capital. It is in these regions that commercial storms are generated; here are the mighty powers which may make or undo fortunes.

BONAMY PRICE.



THOMAS ERSKINE OF LINLATHEN.

THE following delineation of the character of a remarkable man has been attempted in accordance with the suggestions of some among the friends of the late Thomas Erskine, who have thought that those who knew him personally would value any sketch, however slight, which would serve to remind them of intercourse they valued. The present writer could not attempt to address a larger audience than that implied in these words. No doubt a true picture of his life would possess interest for many besides his personal friends, for he lived through a time of great mental development, and his influence on it in his own country has not been trifling. His books, all written about forty years ago, are the expression of a spirit with which the religious mind most characteristic of our day is strongly in sympathy; and in looking back now we can see that it was a lofty peak that reflected the morning light so early. An estimate of his influence in transmitting that light would form an interesting contribution to the history of religious thought; but it demands powers I do not possess and a space which could not here be accorded it. What follows is written for his friends, and cannot justify itself to those who are not already interested in him.

There are special difficulties in thus addressing those who share with the writer the sense of loss. It is difficult to speak without

exaggeration at such a time, it is also difficult to avoid the opposite danger of dwelling too much on limitations. I should have been silenced by the sense of these opposing temptations and some others, but that the hope afforded of, in some degree, deepening and giving shape to recollections so precious to his friends, seemed worth the risk of putting forth what may possess little interest for others. The attempt to give some record of a striking personal character when the chief material for that record is the impression left on the memory of friends, is often mistaken, yet it is natural that it should be made, and where the form is fugitive, failure is of little importance.

If Mr. Erskine had died thirty years ago, it is possible that any such memorial as is attempted here might have taken a different form, and been addressed to a wider audience. The volumes which appeared from his pen during the second and third decade of this century, went through many editions (one of them reached a ninth in a few years), and exercised, no one can doubt, an appreciable influence on the course of thought in his own country. But in the thirty-three years which have elapsed since the last of these books—the volume on Election—was given to the world, that thought has taken other forms, and it is difficult now to put ourselves back into the position of those whom he then addressed. If we review the most striking movements of the thought of our day, we shall find that at the period here spoken of they were all in their infancy. Forty years ago the High Church party did not exist, and all that upheaval of thought which we associate with that movement, though a great deal is in direct antagonism to it, was only just beginning to be apparent. To be religious then meant to be an Evangelical. It must strike every one who turns back to the memoirs of this period, that people were then almost entirely divided into “the world” and “the religious world.” They either took an interest in religion as something specific and technical, or they did not regard it as a subject of thought at all. We meet with active and sympathetic minds, during this period, full of interest in all that concerns humanity, and many of them no doubt finding something valuable in the outward practices of religion, who yet, as far as their most characteristic utterances go, might have been Pagans. On the other hand, the language of all distinctly religious persons in this early part of the century, so far as we can judge from books, has in it always something that would need translation, if it were to be made intelligible to ordinary people. Now no one would say this is true of the present day. Any one who has any religious truth to communicate, endeavours to express it in ordinary language; and, on the other hand, the kind of distant respect to religion, as a valuable set of technicalities with which the lay world

need not intermeddle, has also completely passed away. It is difficult for us, therefore, to appreciate the influence of volumes which were among the first to protest against this divorce of thought as concerned with the ground of our being, and as concerned with every other subject of interest. We can hardly imagine the effect, at that time, of utterances that told of a redeeming love embracing all mankind, not in some vague technical sense, but in the literal meaning in which it is applicable to a mother's love for every one of her children. The discovery that love has not one meaning for God and another for man, that religion is not a web of legal fiction, that the powers exercised in the study of all history and all science find their highest exercise in the study of the relation between God and man—this is not an experience probably which a seeker of the present day would associate with the sense of relief. To feel through vital experience the truth of these things, must be about as great a deliverance from evil at one time as at another; but so far as they can be presented to us in words, the ideas are familiar. Forty years ago the ideas were not only unfamiliar, they seemed presumptuous heresy. It was said of the one of Mr. Erskine's books which has been mentioned above, by a Scotch clergyman, himself a great friend of Mr. Erskine (Sir Henry Moncrieff, who wrote the life of his uncle Dr. Erskine), that "it ought to be burnt by the common hangman." How far Mr. Erskine was himself an agent in breaking through the hard Calvinism which was then thought orthodoxy, I have said that I am quite unfitted to investigate; but there can be no doubt that his writings were a channel through which many of those convictions, which are now common property, have entered into the spiritual life of our time.

It is not altogether easy to say why the last thirty-three years of his life produced no successors to these volumes. He was not only constantly occupied with the subjects therein dealt with, but was always ready to express the results at which he had arrived, and the circumstances of his life, unshackled by either professional or domestic ties, or those bonds of party which are felt by all who associate themselves with any ecclesiastical movement, would have seemed peculiarly favourable for giving a literary form to this expression. While bound to all mankind by a peculiarly vivid sense of all that is common to humanity, and bound to those with whom he had any spiritual sympathy by a special delight in this sympathy, he yet might have uttered his convictions as the convictions of an individual without considering whether any one else was compromised by so doing. He was free from even the bonds of an adhesion to his own uttered belief, and one instance of this fearless inconsistency is so characteristic of him that it may be given here. In the year 1830

some remarkable manifestations of what was supposed to be a supernatural influence took place in the west of Scotland, and Mr. Erskine was so powerfully attracted to those among whom they appeared, that he (though a most fastidious man in his personal habits) took up his abode for a time among the uneducated persons who formed the medium of this strange excitement, whatever it might be. In his "*Brazen Serpent*" he thus speaks of these manifestations, "I cannot but tell what I have seen and heard. I have heard persons, both men and women, speak with tongues and prophesy, that is, speak in the Spirit to edification and exhortation and comfort. And I am compelled to regard these things as strong confirming signs of a great approaching crisis, which I believe to be no less than the reappearing of the Son of Man upon the earth." To this declaration he refers in an appendix to his book on the "*Doctrine of Election*" in the following words: "Since writing," the passage quoted above, "I have come to think differently, and I now do not believe that the remarkable manifestations which I witnessed in certain individuals about eight years ago, were the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of the same character as those of which we read in the New Testament. To some it may appear," he goes on after a tribute to those in whom these manifestations appeared, of whose character his first opinion had remained unchanged, "as if I were assuming an importance to myself by publishing my change of opinion, but I am in truth only clearing my conscience, which requires me publicly to withdraw a testimony I had publicly given, when I no longer believe it myself." I think the humility and courage of these words will make every reader who cared for Mr. Erskine thankful to have them quoted here, as recalling to their memory qualities which they can hardly ever have seen more strikingly illustrated; but they are given in this place to exhibit his perfect freedom from that demand for consistency with an expressed opinion, which is quite as much an entanglement as the bonds of party. That with all these exceptional advantages he published nothing during the last quarter of his life, after having been the author of works which had a considerable influence during his earlier years, was by no means to be ascribed to any satisfaction with these works, or to a sense that he had said all he had to say. The truth was very much the contrary. He spoke of them in his later years with a great distaste, and never would allow them to be republished, while he was interrupted by illness in an attempt to give his latest thoughts to the world. He very much exaggerated, I believe, the extent to which the earlier works failed to represent this latest thought, but it is true that he had in this last period of his life entered on a new region, in which all that he had to say would have taken a very different form. It is

hardly an exaggeration to affirm that every opportunity of intercourse, in the last years of his life, was used by him as a means of pouring into another mind the convictions which filled his own, or at least of attempting to do so, and what follows is an endeavour to reproduce the impression made on an individual mind by these conversations.

The starting-point of his train of thought was, to use his own words, that Christianity should be associated, "not with history so much as with science." That it took its rise in a certain set of events notified to us by trustworthy witnesses, no one could believe more distinctly than he; but he regarded it so much more as a revelation of laws than as a revelation of facts, that at times he seemed to lay very little stress upon the facts. His interest in all historical criticism was feeble, whether a particular event had or had not happened always seemed subordinate in his mind to the question, which most persons would consider must come afterwards—Whether it illustrated any great principle?—a question, indeed, which seemed with him almost a test of fact. On the other hand, he was specially anxious to give his speculations a form which might commend them to scientific men, evidently feeling that, however different their conclusions, his method was much nearer to theirs than to that of any biblical critic. For the invisible world appeared to him to be the subject of laws just as open to investigation, and far more permanent than those by which the outward universe is governed, these laws forming the object of revelation, while the events by which they were illustrated, however important in themselves, might be accurately remembered without any real understanding of what was intended by them. He thought that those were hardly in a right attitude with regard to Christ who approached Him from the side of His historical manifestation in this world; at all events, this was not the side on which he discerned the full meaning of His presence and of His work. It was not as a particular person made known to us through an authenticated narrative, but as an Eternal Being, revealed through the very conceptions we were forced to form of our Creator, that we were to be led to the Son of God. He was a being witnessed by the conscience, quite apart from his revelation in history. There was a demand continually pressed on us by the conscience for qualities which, unless we believed in a Son of God, must be peculiar to humanity, and have nothing Divine in their nature. Now it was to him as impossible that we could possess any kind of goodness which had not been first in God, as it is that in the world of nature force should be originated; and the constant demand on us for the filial virtues—for that attitude of spirit which, whether we call it

obedience, submission, or faith, he regarded as the one sole necessity of our being—amounted with him to a positive demonstration of its existence in our Creator. The God in whom there was no place for submission, for humility, for obedience, seemed to him no object for our worship. We needed a Divine pattern or type—needed not in the sense of wanting it for our help or government—but needed as the plant needs a root. Apart from this Divine root, the idea of virtue would, he thought, present a contradiction—an actual superiority in man to his Creator. If man alone could obey and trust, then the highest range of our goodness would be something separate from the goodness of God. The eternity of filial existence was to him a law of that higher world of which the world of nature was a kind of parable, and the manifestation of this filial existence in time was a matter entirely separable from it, however closely the two were connected.

Now, starting from this idea of the filial God as a being made known to us through the conscience, it seemed to him that man's life on this earth took a different aspect from that which it usually bears in the eyes of religious persons. The phrase which elicited his strongest antagonism was the description of this world as "a state of probation." "A state of probation!"—he exclaimed in one of his outpourings—"God looking at us to see what we are going to do! What nonsense that is." The belief that we were under the education of a Father, seemed to him wholly irreconcilable with any relic of the other view. God could not be both trying us and educating us; He could not be both a Judge and a Father. No one could both take up the attitude which was demanded by his being on his trial, and enter into that calm confidence which was the appropriate spirit of a son. The laws of something much more permanent than nature testified to him of a Divine Being, who exercised in its fullest extent all that filial spirit which the Scriptures sum up in the word Faith. We, as springing from this root, were called upon to admit fully to every part of our being the whole efflux of this spirit, which needed our mere recipiency in order to fill it all. But this was impossible while we retained any notion of being on our trial. So far as we were under probation, we were cut off from Christ. Indeed, the first approach to this life of Faith consisted in laying aside every feeling of being upon trial. The doubt, the anxiety, which were a part of the one condition, were positive hindrances to the other, barring the passage to that faith which, fully manifested in Christ, would manifest itself also in all who would accept his attitude, and in them alone. The sense of being upon trial was an obstruction which must be removed before the sap would rise from the root into the branches, and apart from that sap

the branches could bear no fruit. He did not, of course, suppose that "the judgments of God" were words without meaning. But the fact that these judgments were a part of our training, that their object in all cases was the education of the person judged and not the vindication of an abstract justice, or the result upon any other mind seemed to him to remove them from all the associations we have with the office of a Judge, and to make that word unfit to express the relation of God to his creatures. It need hardly be said (but any suggestion of his train of thought would be very incomplete without it) that what we call death was in his belief no interruption to this Fatherly training of our spirits, or that he believed that in any case it could be finally ineffectual. He felt that to limit education to the range of our short life in this world, to suppose that what we see here is a complete exhibition of the training which fits us to enter into the Righteousness of God, is, in fact, to give up altogether the idea of education, and return to that conception of a Divine love distinct from human love, a Divine justice distinct from human justice, against which his whole utterance was a protest.

It was the perception of this purpose in God which he associated with the word Faith. He thought that those grievously misinterpreted the whole meaning of the Bible, and specially the writings of St. Paul, who regarded Faith (as I suppose many did in his own country) as a kind of substitute for righteousness, appropriate to a fallen and imperfect condition, but different from that goodness in which we had been originally created, and in which we should be hereafter restored. *Pistis*—he liked to use the Greek word, to displace the fallacious associations which had gathered round its English equivalent—was simply the right condition of a creature. There never could have been in the past, there never would be in the future, a time when we should be "set right" by any other act than the awakening of this receptive spirit within us. When Habakkuk declared, "The just shall live by faith," or, as Mr. Erskine liked to read it, "He who is set right by trust shall live," he was not making a kind of prophecy, or a declaration of a certain tribute which was rewarded by salvation, he was enunciating the great law of the dynamics of the moral world. And this dim vision of the old prophet, awakening to a moral Cosmos governed by fixed laws, was echoed with a fuller meaning by St. Paul when he declared that his "good news" was the "dynamic force which set men right;"—thus Mr. Erskine liked to translate the words which he thought had lost their meaning for us as the "power of God unto salvation." The apostle took the place of the Newton of the spiritual world, declaring to us the one mighty principle corresponding to gravitation in the visible universe, which kept all things in order. And this

great principle, declared by St. Paul, had been demonstrated when Christ, the man who lived entirely by faith, arose from the dead, because in Him the power of life was strong enough to overcome the principle opposed to life. His resurrection was the exhibition of the perfect triumph of Trust over Death.

It is not very easy, in a small space, to exhibit the wide divergence of this view of faith, as a knowledge of the laws of the invisible world indispensable to any successful action in that region; and the common view—especially, I suppose, the view common in Scotland—of the miraculous effect of a certain set of opinions, as title-deeds to eternal blessedness. Mr. Erskine was never weary of trying to enforce the difference of the two. He would again and again recur to the inappropriateness of mere effort to produce that condition which was demanded by the conscience. A man might as well desire midnight to become mid-day, he would say, as endeavour to exchange spite or mortification for love. To see that we ought to love did not help us one step on our way towards loving. But this exhibition of love as the law of life, existing in God apart from the act of creation; of righteousness in God as identical with a love for every individual soul, and a purpose to communicate that righteousness to every individual soul quite distinct from the soft, good-natured indulgence which is so often associated with the word *love*, had, it seemed to him, an actual power to kindle in the perceiving heart the love we could never awaken by any exertion of will on our part while it was demanded by a voice no human being could ignore. This once perceived, everything fell into its right place. We were “set right;” our efforts were based on a knowledge of the laws of the unseen world, and ceased to be futile.

Such were the utterances which linger in the memories of his friends, with strangely varied associations of solemnity or oddness, with quiet fields and the shadow of waving trees, or with the little bustle of a dinner party, and the inappropriate accompaniment of clattering plates and desultory small-talk. The inner associations are as varied as the outer. Sometimes his words came home to his hearers like the resolution of a discord; sometimes amusement at the quaint inappropriateness of the occasion chosen disturbed the hearer’s attention; sometimes weariness at the monotony of the theme was the uppermost feeling for the moment; and sometimes his eagerness for some instantaneous expression of delight made one feel that he expected words to take the place of things. “Ah, you are not understanding me!” was his frequent exclamation, when his hearer, perhaps, let the often-repeated exposition pass in silence; and few traits of character recur with a more penetrating sense of moral beauty than the sweet playful smile with which on one such occasion

he received his hearer's confession that the sympathy, which had at first been abundant, was exhausted by incessant repetition. The same feeling manifested itself in a playful criticism on Socrates, after reading a new translation of the "Dialogues of Plato." "I delight in his unblushing tedium!" he exclaimed, with a humorous glance at the person who had confessed to being weary of his own outpourings. "Such impudent repetition as he allows himself!" The radiance of that sense of drollery that sparkled in his eye cannot be recalled, and the mere words are meagre. But it would be impossible to speak of him at all without dwelling on this sense of the humorous, which gave relief to the intensity of his demand for spiritual sympathy. I well remember how he would suddenly modulate from his deepest tone of feeling into his peculiar enjoying laughter, when, after his usual protests against the theory of "life as probation," he would repeat, with indescribable relish, a piece of natural theology from a sermon he had once heard. "And what were rocks made for, my brethren? Even that mariners might avoid them." "That is my belief," he would add, with a full appreciation of the Irish proceeding thus ascribed to the Creator; and his frank acceptance of the absurdity lingers in the memory like some subtle perfume, so closely does it bind the deepest and the lightest parts of his nature.

Perhaps it will seem to some readers that the manner in which Mr. Erskine's views are brought forward implies a somewhat exaggerated view of their originality. He was not a very wide reader, and I sometimes thought he over-rated the extent to which his views were peculiar. Nothing gave him greater pleasure than when he discovered that he had done so. He read with the greatest delight a tract by Mr. R. H. Hutton, in the series of "Tracts for Priests and People," containing the views which were substantially his own (though arrived at quite independently of him, and at a time when I believe Mr. Hutton had never heard his name), and I vividly remember the expression of relief in his voice, when, after listening to something of the same nature, he said, like one who felt a heavy weight grow lighter, "Ah, now I care less that what I write should be published, since I see there are others who feel it." He was urgent in season and out of season in impressing his views on any one who came in contact with him, because he believed them to contain the medicine for all the ills of humanity, but that they should be remembered as *his* views was a matter of absolute indifference to him.

If I were to venture on the natural though perilous attempt to indicate the kind of position he occupied by reference to some name better known than his, I should, though with much hesitation, select that of Coleridge. It would be of course absurd to compare the two men, but in some ways their influence was

analogous. Each gave out his thoughts in what seemed the fragments of some magnificent whole, and were never more than fragments, and each occupied a position of sympathy with cherished beliefs which he approached from a side quite unknown to those who had been accustomed to cherish them. Each, I imagine the parallel might conclude, exercised an influence over thinkers of their day (of course in a very unequal degree), of which their published writings afford no measure. The name, at all events, is mentioned here to suggest at least superficially the kind of place Mr. Erskine occupied towards those among the thinkers of his day—and they were not few—who came at one time or another under his influence. But it was not so much by communication of thought—it was by a kind of manifestation of the invisible world—that he laid hold of those who came near him. “Everything that reminds me of God reminds me of you,” was said to him in a letter by one of the deepest thinkers of our day, and one least prone to such expression, the late A. J. Scott. An unwise friend once repeated the words to him long after they had been uttered, and he turned away almost with horror, but it was an assertion that might have been echoed, I believe, by every one who ever knew him intimately. “My soul is athirst for God,” could have been said more truly by no man than by him, and it is difficult now ever to think of that after which he thirsted without recalling him.

His life recurs to one’s memory like the sigh of an exile. He never took root in this world. All the power of suffering, all the exercise of thought, which most men spread over the varied intercourse of human life, and the hopes and fears of its “business and desire,” were with him concentrated upon that side of our nature that looks towards the unseen world. It was not that he did not feel deep and lively affections; his friendships were all very deep and permanent. Two persons, both his contemporaries, and both of whom passed away in the early prime of life, were familiar to all who entered into any deep communion with him. One was his elder brother, of whom he used to speak with a change of voice and countenance that made one feel as if it could have been but a few weeks since the two were separated. “Fifty years have passed since he went,” he said, a few years ago, “and it seems to me as if it were yesterday!” This young man must have made a strong impression on others than his own family, for, many years after his death, General Elphinstone, our commander-in-chief in the Affghan war, on hearing Mr. Erskine’s name, asked if he were brother to Captain Erskine, of such and such a regiment, and, on being answered in the affirmative, said, “He was the best soldier and the best man I ever knew.” I shall never forget the voice in which Mr. Erskine

repeated these words. The other person whose influence upon him was so deep and permanent that it was impossible to know him intimately without receiving a strong impression of her, was Madame de Staël's daughter, the saintly and beautiful Duchess de Broglie, whom he described as "one in whom the world could find nothing to lay hold of." He knew her at a later period of his life, and her influence over him had therefore a more mature character to work upon, though in other respects his brother was the exception when he spoke of her as having set almost the deepest mark on his life. These two strong affections are mentioned here as an indication of the permanence of all strong feeling in his nature. Since these two persons had passed away from this world, generations had come and gone, new interests had arisen, and old ones had grown dim. But the impression they had left on his mind had not grown dim; they were still distinct, living influences to him, always emerging from the depths of tender memory whenever he revisited the past, and recalled those types of divine love by which his life had been enriched and enlightened. There was something peculiarly appropriate to the impression made by him, moreover, in the fact that those he loved best should have entered very early into the unseen world, and that his love for them should, during the greater part of his sojourn here, be steeped in the awe with which we think of that unseen world, whenever it is turned into a living reality for us by the presence of those who have entered into our heart of hearts.

There were many others whom he loved—not in the same degree, but with the same kind of enduring, imperishable love—and the bond of a common humanity was so strong with him that it did not seem to need *preference* in order to bring out much of what we generally suppose the result of personal friendship. His most prominent interests lay in the region below all individual idiosyncrasies, and were shared with all. Nor must it be thought that he was incapable of appreciating others than those who responded to his demand for spiritual sympathy. His sense of humour, and his taste for all that was original and racy, was a bond with many whom this demand, of itself, would have repelled. "He is a *vernacular* man," was one of his most frequent and characteristic expressions of eulogy, and he would ask, as a kind of test of a common understanding, "Do you know what I mean by a vernacular man?" He himself afforded an instance, in no common degree, of the character which he indicated by that word—that which avoids conventional forms of thought, and speaks its own dialect. His reminiscences, for instance, of the Scotch Bar in the early part of this century, when he was an advocate, led him into a sympathetic recollection of some men who were anything but saints, and he never referred to them with that sense that

between him and them was a great gulf fixed, which sometimes makes the allusions of religious people to men of the world so jarring. There was in him nothing of that hard exclusiveness which we associate with the word narrow, there was the very opposite extreme to that spirit. He had an absolute confidence of the highest blessedness for every human creature which I never saw in any one else, and which was no mere doctrine in his mind, but its most vivid, animating principle. And yet with all this range of sympathy it would be untrue not to add that there was a sense in which he was narrow. Except where his sense of humour was touched, he too exclusively regarded his fellow-men as pilgrims towards eternity. The most solemn aspect of human life was too invariably before his eyes. Sin, and the deliverance from sin, were too constantly (though with the exceptions above-mentioned) the objects on which his gaze was intently directed. He was at times aware of this conflict between the varied interests of a complete life and his view of the aim of that life. "Falstaff and Mrs. Quickly," he murmured once, more to himself than his companion, "one does not see how to think of them and of the Cross together." He would never have excluded the Shakesperean element; in his earlier years it engaged a very large proportion of his interest. But it was a decreasing proportion, and in his old age, when the mind most needs rest from arduous thought, he suffered from the want of light and varied interests. His friendships, tender and enduring as they were, were not of a kind to supply this kind of refreshment. His friends were precious to him, as has been said, as types of the love of God; the environment of earthly interests which gives a kind of intellectual exercise to love, had very little place in his feelings about them. If they suffered, his thoughts passed at once to the purpose with which that suffering was sent, he could never linger in the region of events and circumstances, and though it is true that he thus escaped much pain, yet the suffering of an intense strain on one part of the nature was probably greater than that of sympathy with the vicissitude of human fate, which he escaped. His friends could not but lament this unvarying strain. They sometimes thought that even the truths on which his mind's eye was ever bent would have gained in force and distinctness if they had been seen against a background of commonplace interests, and been more largely illustrated by the accidents of this transitory life. But now to wish this had been the case seems like wishing to lose the recollection of one of the most striking individualities we have known. This preoccupation with the interests of another life seems like the glass tripod that isolates the electric fluid; to imagine him brought into the circle of average wishes and expectations and occupations, is to remove in

thought what made himself. He would have been a happier, he might perhaps have been a more useful, man if it had been otherwise ; but he would have been altogether another being from the man we knew.

He is one of those it is most natural to think of in the mysterious world that lies beyond the grave. He was never at home in this world, there was something in him that demanded a different atmosphere from ours. His realities all lay in the region we are tempted to consider unreal, the visible and tangible universe seemed to have no soil in which he could take root. There is a rest in thinking of him as having escaped from it, not only in that sense in which we trust it is to all the summons to a higher stage of development, but in that more special sense in which we may give thanks that one who long endured an ungenial climate is recalled to a region after which he has long panted and where he feels himself at home.



THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN.

The Subjection of Women. By JOHN STUART MILL. London:
Longmans.

TO any one who regards the genius and character of Mr. Mill with such serious homage as the writer of these lines, it is a task of peculiar difficulty, and also of considerable pain, to express, and especially to express in public, strong though qualified dissent from his opinions upon an important question. In the present instance the difficulty is certainly not lessened by the fact that the dissentient person heartily agrees with a large portion of what the author has written upon that question, and would most likely be found, in practice, on the same lines of action with him. There is yet another difficulty. Mr. Mill—brought up at home under the care of his illustrious father, I believe, and not in a public school*—has preserved, in spite of extensive contact with the world, that exquisite bloom, I was going to say blush, of the sense of justice which is so painfully rare a qualification for discussions such as his upon "The Subjection of Women." To write but a word against any serious utterances of a man who possesses this precious and exceptional sensibility, and suffuses with it every page he writes, and every sentence he speaks, appears almost a crime. But, earnestly believing that Mr. Mill, now almost venerable by his years, and certainly

* That there may be no mistake about my meaning here, I take leave to say that I think education in a large school, though favourable to the cultivation of the sense of social "fairness," does tend to take the bloom off the sense of justice.

occupying by his achievements a place second to that of no living man, has actually not seen some things which in this matter it was vitally important to see, I ask leave with sincere and even deep-seated pain, to make a few comments upon his last book. One of the warmest and ablest of his students, a well-known disciple of Bentham, has said that this volume is written with less than Mr. Mill's usual "candour"—at least upon one point, namely, that of the intellectual equality of men and women. Whatever force was intended to belong to the word "candour" in this situation, it certainly does appear to me that the essay is written with less than its author's usual temperance. Not that most of the allowances made in the course of this *plaidoyer* are not, strictly speaking, adequate in themselves, but that you have to look narrowly for them, and that when you have found them they are bare. Mr. Mill would say, as in fact he distinctly implies, that he is not bound to more; standing in the position of an advocate for the losing and oppressed side in a desperate case. Be it so. Those who do not think the case so desperate, and, above all, those who fancy that the side taken by Mr. Mill is going ahead too fast for its own interests, may fairly seek to supply any qualifications they think needful. Let me be permitted to hope that what follows may not be altogether the less fitted for its purpose that it is a little desultory.

I. The point into which the public discussion of women's rights tends to run up, is that of their claim to the suffrage. In political, as in all other matters, I hold that the bare rights of men and women, considered as separate human beings, are of necessity equal. Nor does it appear anything less than absurd to introduce into the question any consequences that may follow from ecclesiastical speculations about what is called the *unitas carnis*. I believe with Mr. Mill, that civil society must be based upon the assumption of equal rights all round, and that neither the morality of power, nor that of chivalry, nor that of convenience, but that of justice is here our ultimate. It is absurd to maintain, as Dr. Horace Bushnell does, that the right of women to political power is a *mere* question of expediency. Excluding the point of direct injury, no human being can justly be called upon by another human being to part with one fraction of his liberty of action, except upon his own consent. But in civil society we all agree to part with some portions of our liberty of action, simply in consideration of a greater common good in which every one shares. All this implies that every member of the community may justly demand some voice in the making of the laws by which he is to be bound—what voice, or what kind of voice, is another question. How are women in a different position, abstractly, from men in this particular? Really I can see no difference whatever. But surely

Mr. Mill would be the last man to deny that considerations of divine expediency must carry weight in social and political practice. Representative government is, in my opinion, only a very humble step forward in the path towards true self-government; and considering the gross ignorance of most women, the fact that they are numerically the majority, and the fact that they now are (as they always, in my opinion, will be) "intellectually" the "inferiors" of men, I can well understand the dismay with which the majority of men flinch from the bare idea of giving them votes. There are many more considerations besides those which I have mentioned; for instance, the peace of families; the greater openness of average women to bribery in the shape of "influence;" and, not least, the very serious consideration that they may be, *as they have been, and are, to some extent*, made in obscure ways the instruments of bribery of the least resistible kind. Nobody can possibly hold higher opinions of the correctness of the majority of women than the writer of these lines; but if the suffrage were immediately granted to them, I should expect—society being what it is in other respects—that this particular change would be followed in certain circles by particularly intricate forms of collusion and corruption. As to those "other respects," I feel and think with Mr. Mill about most of them, but we cannot suddenly control them, and must guard ourselves as we can. If the advocates of female suffrage will for the present be content with the admission that women are as much entitled to political power as men, and as free to seek it by any kind of advocacy as men to seek any other right,—but that the how and the when are questions of public expediency involved in a still higher question, which is even now knocking at the door, namely, that of reconstituting political self-government upon a basis other than merely "representative," *cadit questio*, for Mr. Mill, and the ladies, and the humble unit, myself, are heartily agreed. Let no one say that this admission is just offering a pinch of the empty air—it is made sincerely, and would, in such a reconstruction of civil government as many thinkers have in their minds and believe to be not very far off, cover all that women want. Indeed, this reconstruction could not be made without giving them a share of political power.

II. While we are upon this question we can scarcely overlook the fact that some of the women's advocates—and, I fear, Mr. Mill, amongst the number—are, to say the least, very near to raising a false point in relation to certain differences made by the progress of civilization. It seems quite impossible to deny that the ultimate right of control, in other words the power, must rest with that side which takes the responsibility and risk of protecting the other. It is a right of martial law seldom to be seen in full flower; but can it be excluded? It

belongs to "the *penetralia* of the constitution;" but can we help, or should we try to help, its natural reactions? Now, we are constantly being told that the progress of social order has changed the old regimen in this particular, and that man has now lost the position which, in former times, it might have been plausibly said nature had assigned to him. But how is that made out? I cannot see. Civil society still rests upon a basis of force. There is more or less of order, but who guards it? The soldier, the policeman. "If you do so-and-so, we will shoot, stab, hang, fine, or imprison you." That is the last resort. And so long as it remains true, that the average man is twice as strong as the average woman, it will remain true that every woman who pays taxes, or has taxes paid for her, is as much protected by masculine force as if she had a knight told off and sworn in her behalf.

The physical force of a mature man, as tested by the dynamometer (I am now thinking of the results of some experiments of Que-telet) is emphatically more than double that of a woman. Is all this to be altered? Mary Wolstonecroft could and did frankly admit that the mere difference in what is called "physical" power must for ever make a difference, to the advantage of the man, in the effective force of the two sexes; and it seems no more than a simply honest admission. But in some of the later forms of the advocacy of the Left, we find cases thrust forward of women who make mighty Alpine ascents, and nurses who go through more fatigue than a London physician in full practice. But all this proves nothing. Certain women may do these things, but, before we draw any decisive inference from the facts, we must look into all the connotations, and consider what appears to be sacrificed (if anything) as well as what appears to be gained. Nobody desires that women should be weak, and there must be much variety within whatever limits are supposed; but half-a-dozen Amazons or epicene beings prove no more than half-a-dozen infant prodigies. Did such matters lie at all within the compass of the will, I should say that it is the first duty of a woman to be lovely. If a woman must either be ignorant of history, for example, or acquire a knowledge of history at the expense of a set lip and a bloodshot eye, we men boldly declare that we shall greatly prefer the ignorance to the ugliness. I know very well the outcry that some people will make over this, and the fine things that will be said about civilization, progress, culture, and what-not. But our answer is ready, and we are inexorable in this matter. I do not care a straw for "civilization," when the question is of antecedent matters; of the primitive strata of life. Here we fall back upon ideals unaltered hitherto, all history and biography being witness—and unalterable for ever,

as I believe; and we say that we can no more spare the influence of female loveliness from our lives than we can spare that of hills and stars and seas. We are not entitled, in my opinion, to restrict liberty of action, whether in woman or in man, in order to seek to compel conformity to any ideal we may hold, however well verified it may be; but we *are* entitled to look with jealousy upon whatever seems ever so remotely to threaten those ideals which are dearest and which lie closest to all that we hold most lofty and most precious in our lives.

III. This brings us, by a natural gradient, to another point; or rather, we have already touched it. Mr. Mill seems—I say *seems* with emphasis, because he can hardly mean it—to think that the chief check possessed by a woman upon the arbitrary power of her husband lies in what he calls the “power of the scold, or the shrewish sanction.” I know full well that Mr. Mill will agree—at least I cannot bear to doubt that he would agree with what I am about to say; but the point is far too much kept in the background in these discussions. The normal power of a woman is something far different. It consists in being what Milton calls being “loving and *prevalent* ;” because, in fact, as Adam told the archangel guest, all fair things else appear “mean, or in her summed up :”—

“Neither her outside, form’d so fair, nor aught
In procreation, common to all kinds,
(Though higher of the genial bed by far
And with mysterious reverence I deem)
So much delights me as those graceful acts,
Those thousand decencies, that daily flow
From all her words and actions, mix’d with love,
And sweet compliance, which declare unfeign’d
Union of mind, or in us both one soul;
Harmony to behold in wedded pair,
More grateful than harmonious sound to the ear.”

How a man affects a woman, no man can do more than remotely guess; but if a man has ever in his life felt, he had better die at once than ever lose the feeling that the—what phrase shall I use?—that the luminosity or *aura* of the woman is a part, and the loftiest and sweetest part, of

“The presence that disturbs us with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things—”

I say it is scarcely possible to doubt that Mr. Mill and some of the

advocates on the Left would feel with me in those matters; but, at the same time, it is hard to understand how a man who *does* so feel could write what occurs upon page 133 of Mr. Mill's book:—"I believe there will [eventually] not prove to be any natural tendencies common to women and distinguishing their genius from that of men:" hard to understand, because a peculiar set of qualities would seem naturally, not to say necessarily, bound up in the woman's power of thus affecting the man.

IV. Upon the passage quoted I might observe that it appears hardly consistent with some other portions of the volume; for example, with the position which I understand Mr. Mill to take up, that women have peculiar faculties for governing. Confining the expression of opinion to literature as a test of the relative powers and qualities of the two sexes does not shift the question an inch. But how *can* any man look even the most unwomanly woman in the face, and hold the opinion in question? Every woman is not a wife or mother, and no woman is bound to be either; indeed, a good many women drift into marriage who have no vocation for either the conjugal or the maternal life. But, after all, the distinctive peculiarity of the woman is that she is capable of wifehood and motherhood; and it has been said, with I believe perfect truth, that the addition in her case of the delicate organism which confers the capacity, is virtually endowing her with a second brain, heart, and conscience. This point has been overwrought, in his usual efflorescent way, by Michelet, but it is stated with sacred moderation and much force by M. Ernest Legouvé, in his "*Histoire Morale des Femmes*"—a book that was handed to me by a living woman of genius of the highest character; which I purposely mention before adding that it would be a happy thing if every intelligent man and woman in Britain had read it. It is well known that some American ladies, not wholly unworthy of respect, however we may shrink from some of their procedure, have maintained that the additional complex endowment in question makes the woman, by all analogy, the superior being. However, that is not the question; and I speak not of added power, but of immense inscrutable differentiation. That this exists is staringly true, even of the healthiest and strongest woman. How *can* any one consider the immense physical differences—the unspeakable physical contrasts between a man and a woman, and then write as if there were no "sex in souls?" It does not so much surprise me, when women of a certain order do it; but that men who have been husbands and fathers should do it, does, I confess, stagger me.

It is almost necessary in these discussions for a man to disclaim any personal reason for believing in what is called the intellectual

inferiority of woman ; and I fully believe that no contested question of a mixed character is completely discussed until the woman has contributed to its discussion her proper peculiar wisdom ; while on moral and spiritual questions the suggestive power of the normal woman is indefinitely greater than that of the man. It is, indeed, sad folly to talk of the superior virtue of women as some persons do, for, when allowance has been made for conventional exaggeration, it is still either ignorance or dulness not to recognise, frankly and fearlessly, the fact that each sex has its own peculiar moral difficulties (to be overcome, not succumbed to) ; and that on one side, a peculiar difficulty does, in the majority of cases, arise from the natural distinctions which make that side the initiating and pursuing side. We are all grateful for any word enforcing the duty of purity, but it would save some mischief if one or two lady-writers, and one or two men of high character and ability, but very ill-posted up in facts, would leave facts alone. I have now in my possession some writings of a most able and excellent man, in which the estimate of the *facts* was brought to me as a *mauvaise plaisanterie*, and that by a man whose estimate of the *duty* was as high as his or as mine. But if we do not believe in the superior *merit* of our sisters, yet on the other hand, it is to the woman that, in the intercourse of love, the sacred function of moral and spiritual impregnation especially belongs, all experience being witness ; and a womanly woman, however inferior she may be in culture and bare intelligence, can instantly bring to bear upon a subject a peculiar, tender wisdom that is so utterly *sui generis*, that it seems impossible not to look upon it as bound up with the whole circle of the points in which a woman differs from a man.

In dealing with the general question of the "intellectual inferiority" of woman, I have already observed that one of Mr. Mill's most ardent disciples (a well-known barrister and publicist) finds him less "candid" than usual. Mr. Mill always means to be nobly candid ; but here he beats me. To begin with, if women are "subjected," so that they have less than their natural share of culture, how did this result come about ? Surely, from an immense complication of causes in which they themselves must count ; not because a man has a larger biceps and twice the lumbar force. No human being can strike the balance and exactly divide whatever blame there is in the matter. But, again, supposing difference of culture and opportunity has made all the difference ; and, again, supposing women are in future—as I devoutly hope, and I have done my humble best, during many years, to help them to it—to have better culture, and freedom of vocation ; supposing all this, what is to happen ? The men are now, *ex hypothesi*, in advance of the women. Well, are the

men to stand still *now*, while the women alone go ahead? Or are the men still to move onwards with all the benefit of a reaction from the improved culture of the women? And if the latter, which seems, to say the least, rather likely, at what point are our sisters to overtake us in the race?

In dealing with the achievements of women in the higher walks of art, Mr. Mill strikes me as being far from satisfactory. That while women have shown, in music and the drama, executive ability at least equal, and perhaps superior to that of men, while, nevertheless, they have never shown high original capacity in either, is a fact so striking that it might well have claimed more of his attention than it has apparently been able to secure. Two or three (so many?) comedies by women keep the stage; but where is there any considerable dramatic work by a woman? As to music, Mr. Mill suggests that women have done as good musical work, *en amateur*, as men. Well, Mrs. Jordan wrote "The Blue Bells of Scotland," and Queen Hortense "Partant pour la Syrie." There is a place in Beethoven's mass in C, where, after a passage of symphony by the horn, the E, which looks as if it were the third of C, is laid hold of, so to speak, by the second violin, and treated as a chord of suspension in B. Mr. Mill's comment upon the difference, in musical powers, between men and women, is that women have been educated only as amateurs, while men have been educated scientifically. I know that I am not putting an exhaustively fair contrast, but will any sane man look me in the face and maintain that *any such* difference as that between the capacity to compose the "Blue Bells of Scotland," and the capacity to compose the sublime passage in Beethoven which I have referred to, is a matter of education? Was Beethoven or was Mozart—was even Gounod or Wallace—other than an "amateur" because he was taught music scientifically; or is not this a case of putting the cart before the horse? Under almost any conceivable conditions Mozart and Beethoven would have been great musicians; and it was their extraordinary capacity which got them the training they received. Mr. Mill, as a man of the world, must know that the incalculable majority of ladies "in society" cannot even read notes at sight. To be able to "transpose," even deliberately, is thought quite an "accomplishment;" while most "musical" men can do it at a glance—without thinking about it, in fact. Now, ladies in society have ample leisure, deny it who may; they are taught music at great pains and expense; the book of musical knowledge is open to them; and yet not one in a thousand of them is an *unintelligent* amateur. The difficulty with respect to the drama is, to say the least, not less arresting: for women have succeeded in general literature.

But, in fact, the same *kind* of difficulty meets us everywhere in this part of the subject. Mr. Mill claims for women the merit of suggesting to men original ideas which they afterwards work out. Here and there exists a woman who can and does help a man in this way; and a base, ungrateful heart has he who does not acknowledge the help. But I still affirm that the one startling peculiarity of the typical woman, is want of originative or inventive power. It is nothing new to say—though Mr. Mill appears, by a quotation from an unpublished work of some celebrated lady writer, to think it is—that whatever women do is done at odd times; or that the care of a household is a great and splendid task. There is an old rhyme which runs—

“From rise of morn to set of sun
Woman’s work is never done.”

It is true. But, in spite of this, women in the upper ranks have always had immense leisure as compared with men. And what have they done with it in the way of “invention” in the true sense? While half-starved, overworked men—shepherd-boys, cobblers, book-binders, bond slaves, and what not—have moved the world, what woman ever “invented” anything, *even in her own special line*? Which woman was it that “invented” a needle, a loom, a shuttle, a stocking-frame, a fire-stove, a new saucepan, a new dish for the table, a new chair, a new baby’s bottle, a new kind of bread, a new sauce, a sewing-machine, or what not? Have women, as a rule, been the inventors or initiators in even the early education of the young? In fashion, however, doubtless the women reign supreme? Quite the contrary. Shameful to say, it is true also, in female dress, that the men are the inventors or originators, sometimes behind the scenes and sometimes openly. So utterly wide of the facts is any claim of originative or suggesting power for women, that I assert, on the contrary, that it is rare even unto marvel, to find a woman who can be driven by any amount of pressure, to follow the most obviously advantageous initiative set by a man in her own peculiar walk.

V. In the general spirit of Mr. Mill’s work, let it be repeated, I heartily sympathise. Here is a passage which especially demands to be quoted:—

“A female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right, and is considered under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the wife; however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to—though she may know that he hates her, though it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impossible not to loathe him—he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of

a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function, contrary to her inclinations."

With the drift of this criticism—addressed as it is to the infamous suit for "restitution of conjugal rights"—I have the profoundest sympathy. But so complex are the reactions and interactions in such matters, and so influential the compensating powers with which nature has armed the woman, that I believe the existing laws, theory, and customs, in these matters bear nearly if not quite as hard on the man as on her. It is all very well to say that the law is so-and-so; but, in fact, owing to ineffaceable natural distinctions, the power of the woman is immense. She has, in fact, though not in law, the custody of her own person nearly as much as the man has the custody of his. The precise particular pointed at is one with which the law does not even pretend to deal (*Forster v. Forster*, 1 Hagg. Cons. 154);* however, it may and does (as Mr. Mill and others, among whom I count, think), to the great injury of society and the degradation of the married state, help to foster foolish and injurious customs and brutalities of social opinion, which are worse than law. Whether women do not bring the suit for "restitution of conjugal rights," as it is called—that is, a suit for compelling what cannot be compelled—as often as men, is a question. I am inclined to think they do. On the whole, I feel, and deeply feel, that throughout the book Mr. Mill has forgotten, as too many of the advocates on the Left forget, the immense compensations there are in the powers with which nature has armed the women. Nevertheless, these remarks of mine are addressed solely to the question of *practical* hardship, and I think, as strongly as Mr. Mill does, that the whole scheme of law and custom in these matters is erected on a false basis.

VI. While we are speaking of the degradation of the ideal of marriage (in which I have the honour of being at one with Mr. Mill as to the terms in which it is to be expressed for legal and social purposes), let me be forgiven for a word upon a point as to which some of us stand very far off from him and from some ladies on the same side. We others repudiate with scorn the notion of glorifying anything (but where is that something?) that is merely animal, or of sacrificing the higher to the lower in any department of life. But we also repudiate, with scorn and disgust, the sort of language with which the distinctive peculiarity of the conjugal relation is too frequently spoken of by writers on the Left; and indeed, also, by the majority on the other side. Only here and there some honest, poetic soul speaks the truth. What we complain of is the violent discord which the language in question makes between things which "God

* See also the ludicrous case of *Brown v. Brown*, 1 Hagg. 524.

hath joined." Why will people persist in treating as naturally unmoral or "animal" that which is, in all normal human experience, deeply moral? Is Fouqué's "Undine"—a story which Sir Walter Scott admired as much as Coleridge did—an "animal" invention? I suppose the pleasure a mother feels in caressing her child is as purely "animal" as anything can be. But, after all, *is* it "animal," or is not all this phrase-mongering mere trash? Can a mother caress her child and, at the same time, harbour cruel and irreverent thoughts? I say no. Her *whole* nature is bettered by that caress. And I will only add the words in which Canon Kingsley describes in "Yeast" the "love" experience of Lancelot Smith's youth:—

"Love had been to him, practically, ground tabooed and 'carnal.' What was to be expected? Just what happened—if woman's beauty had nothing holy in it, why should his fondness for it? Just what happens every day—that he had to sow his wild oats for himself, and eat the fruit thereof, and the dirt thereof also."

I would give something to see some approach to a more general sense of the "solidarity" of normal human experience in this respect; but I begin to fear the hope is vain. On the Right and on the Left, men, and women too, write of these matters in such terms that, if they were consistent, they ought to be ashamed of their parents, ashamed of the ineffaceable mark of "solidarity" which every human being bears about in his body, and ashamed to look their own children in the face.

Very unwillingly, I must just mention a topic which so readily lends itself to clap-trap, that a writer who respects himself and others may naturally flinch from referring to it against a man like the illustrious author of "The Subjection of Women." Mr. Mill is a wise and good-tempered propagandist, and particularly cautious in "delving" his "approaches" to any fortress which he attacks. But it is easy for any one who reads him frequently and carefully to discern that his policy in the treatment of *this* question is partly influenced by his views on the population question. I shall not do him the injustice of referring to that, except for the purpose of saying that the mass of women are the very last persons among whom his policy in the discussion of their "subjection" is likely to be successful. "Among the barbarisms which law and morality have not yet ceased to sanction, surely the most disgusting is the idea that one human being can have a *right* to the person of another." With this expression of opinion, which occurs in the "Political Economy," I heartily agree; but where is the stronghold of this "disgusting barbarism"? Among the women themselves. How many women does Mr. Mill think there are in England who would understand Mr. Browning's "Pompilia?" About as many as he would find able to

understand his own picture of the ideal married state. The amount of enlightened, self-respecting sentiment that exists among women upon such matters is, to quote Beatrice, "just so much as you might take upon a knife's point, and choke a daw withal." Here, indeed, I know I am on strong ground, and if it were not for making an enemy with every stroke of my pen, I could, out of my miscellaneous reading, make out a very black book against women—women of culture, novelists, poetesses, and others—in this matter; such a black book of worldliness, conventionality, rootless virtue, artificial "indignation," placid ignorance, and smiling dictation in matters of which they have, from the nature of the case, to let superstition stand for knowledge, as would startle, I do verily believe it, even Mr. Mill out of some of his hopefulness. How women come to be like this is another question; but it would be a very bold man that said, in the face of the evidence I should produce, that the men had made them so.

If advice were not rude, we would, indeed, earnestly beg of women, that they will not allow themselves to be betrayed into blaming men, as men, for their disabilities and the injustice with which they are in some respects treated.* They cannot have it both ways. They have been responsible agents from the beginning of the world; they have wielded an immense moral power; they still wield such a power. If a man knocks a woman down, it is something to allege and prove; but a woman, without uttering a quotable word or doing a single provable act, can rouse to fury the latent devil in a man, and sting him with a suffering of which years cannot wipe out the memory. Besides, there are the numerous particulars in which the woman is privileged by exemptions which must, in the nature of things, continue to be granted to her—unless the axis of the globe is altered. Of course, with Pangenesis all things are possible—"we *have* been fishes, and we may be birds—delightful, is it not?" But, for the present, it looks as if we had all been rowing in one boat for thousands of years, making mistakes, and alternately injuring and helping each other. At the present moment, our mutual relations have come up for revision.

* And also, that they would be less perplexing in their appeals. One moment, they demand "work," in tones which make a man exclaim, "Am I God, to kill or make alive, that thou sendest Society to me to recover it of this leprosy?" Next, they cry, "You immoral rascals! We shall starve out your vices directly. With the help of heaven, the police, and the Dialectical Society, we shall cut off the supplies; and then, instead of leaving us poor wall-flowers to pine alone, you will be glad enough to marry us on any terms." But before long they are sniffing the air, and saying, "Go to! We shall decline marriage till you are higher and holier beings." Meanwhile, six hundred rude fellows, suffering under the stigma of the sex of Moses, Paul, Plato, Shakspeare, and Garibaldi, stand silent, fronting certain death, while the women are lowered into the boats: and down goes the "Birkenhead."

And revised they will be. If women in mass were to demand the franchise, I do not see how we could with justice refuse to give it to them; but I devoutly hope they will *not* demand it; and why they should be so anxious to play a part in the solemn farce of representative government by party is a puzzle to some of us men—especially to those of us who never vote at all. Mr. Ruskin says he never votes; I am sure I never do; and what on earth is the difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, that people should be so eager to “vote” about it? Under a system of true self-government, it would be a very different matter, and under such a system, as I have said before, the women *must* come in. Not, however, to vote for Mr. Tweedledum or Mr. Tweedledee, but for *laws* themselves.

Holding that we cannot, if pressed, refuse women these unspeakably precious “votes,” I would also maintain, in their behalf (as in behalf of men), perfect freedom of vocation and of culture. What my own ideal upon these matters may be is one thing, but I have no right by law, custom, or otherwise, to dictate ideals to any one. Here, as elsewhere, to parody the well-known canon of oratory, the first part of justice is; Hands off! and the second, Hands off! and the third, Hands off!

But this is not a lesson which women in general are quick to learn. Their leaning is strongly towards protectionism, police, and incessant small compulsion. We have lately had to admire their self-sacrifice in addressing public words of disapproval to the tendency of legislation in a certain very unpleasant particular. Passionately sympathising with the indignation of the women in this matter, and willing to help them to the utmost, I cannot help saying I think the kind of legislation condemned is precisely after the pattern (I speak of principles) which most women delight in. And it is only too probable that if they had votes, they would immediately add the weight of their superior numbers to the miserable impetus which has for some time past been driving us, and is now driving us with accelerated force, to a Fool's Paradise of Police under the ignorant tyranny of the Universal Cad.

In the “Political Economy” Mr. Mill refers, in terms such as might be expected from him, to the (shall we call it?) Anti-Malthusian influence of the clergy—of the Roman Catholic clergy in particular among the working classes, over whom he thinks, and with some reason, the other clergy have not much influence. It struck me a little oddly the other day to find him, at a public meeting, accounting for the influence which the clergy have over most women by alleging that they are almost the only class of men who have systematically appealed to women as having souls of their own—or

something of that kind—the exact phrase has escaped me. This is a purely fanciful theory: medical men have nearly as much influence over women as their ministers; but scarcely, I suppose, because they treat them as independent spiritual creatures. The truth is, the reasons are very different; and that women as a rule have a superstitious feeling for experts, specialists, and accredited functionaries of every kind, from the clergyman and the doctor down to the policeman. At all events, the clergy of all denominations cannot be accused of teaching women that they are not divinely “subjected” to the men; and what Mr. Mill calls a “disgusting barbarism” they would and do, for the most part, treat as the Archbishop in “Pompilia” treated it when Pompilia fled to him because “he stood for God.” And, of course, the Archbishop, not being a man of delicate textual discrimination, and not seeing the difference between stating an ideal, and making a compulsory law, would think himself fully justified by Paul:—*Ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀνὴρ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει, ἀλλ’ ἡ γυνή.* If Mr. Mill should see these lines, and if he possesses Canon Kingsley’s poems, it is, I would respectfully say, worth his while to turn to the poem on page 61, which I wish had been omitted, beginning—

“Oh, thou hadst been a wife for Shakspeare’s self!”

Mr. Mill will find a million women to profess sympathy with that poem for one who will understand his ideal of marriage, or who will see that there is a vast difference between privilege and obligation.

There is one other point, and it is radical. Just as an Experiential thinker *must* be a Utilitarian, so he *must* be a disbeliever in necessary permanence of types. The Experientialists are always saying to the Axiomatic moralists, “You do not understand—we believe in Conscience just as much as you do; only we say it is a growth from a seed, namely, fear of punishment.” To this, we, on the other side, make answer (though quite vainly at present), “Yes, gentlemen, we perfectly understand; but we assert that, take Conscience at whatever point of emergence you please, there is something in it *sui generis* which could not be evolved from any such seed.” And just so upon the woman’s question. The Experientialist is bound to believe that a woman may at some time or other be any mortal thing you please. We, on the other side, say, that we believe we discern the existence of a certain type in Woman, which type is essentially unchangeable. Of course the fact is not directly provable; is only provable by the convergence of certain lines of analogy and indication upon one point. But the convergence being, in our opinion, amply made out, we rest on what we think we see not less certainly than we see the sun in the sky overhead.

MATTHEW BROWNE.



THE CHURCH AND THE AGE.

The Church and the Age: Essays on the Principles and Present Position of the Anglican Church. Edited by ARCHIBALD WEIR, D.C.L., Vicar of Forty Hills, Enfield; and WILLIAM DALRYMPLE MACLAGAN, M.A., Rector of Newington, Surrey. London: Murray.

Ecclesia: Church Problems Considered, in a Series of Essays. Edited by HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS, D.D., President of Cheshunt College, Fellow of University College, London. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

IT cannot be doubted that this is an age fertile in groups of Essays. First we had "Oxford Essays," and "Cambridge Essays:" then the too celebrated "Essays and Reviews:" then the antagonistic "Aids to Faith:" then the ritualistic "Church and the World," in two series: then the Evangelical "Principles at Stake:" and now, almost together, appear on our table two more portly volumes, from very different quarters of the ecclesiastical compass, "The Church and the Age," and "Ecclesia."

It may perhaps be thought that, considering the family is so large, the poverty of names is somewhat notable. It is almost like the old imperial brotherhood, Constantine, Constantius, and Constans. But there is meaning beneath this, as beneath all phenomena of names. It testifies to the prevalent wish to have Church subjects discussed, and to have them discussed in this peculiar form. Curiously enough, in the department of history, our age thinks no book too long, no scale too extended. Already, a battle occupies a volume: there is no saying how soon it may spread over many. But when a treatise is required, we shrink from anything like a full discussion, in the unity of one work, of the various portions of a subject. Heavy reading is our dread. Light monographs of forty or fifty pages, with the rounding

off, and somewhat of the jaunty character of a review article—these we can digest: these just serve for the journey up to town and back, and set the frame of thought for the leisure hours of one day.

Nor is this wholly without its advantage, even after we have admitted its almost necessity in a busy day like ours. Not only are these Essays very convenient, as exponents of special lines of thought, and as being far more easily accessible than if they formed only chapters of a larger work, but they are undoubtedly more likely to ensure the bestowal of adequate and watchful thought on the part of their writers. They have this advantage even over sermons, which like them are special expositions of some one line of thought,—that whereas a sermon, for its purpose, requires the admixture of rhetoric; and rhetoric, while it advances feeling, interrupts thought,—these Essays need never be rhetorical: nor do we remember a single example among all those which we have mentioned, where a writer has so far forgotten his *métier*, as to indulge in fine writing. The Essay, as we have it in these volumes, is a direct, plain, common-sense form for the expression of a man's thoughts on a subject which has interested him.

Let us then hail it as a good, and be thankful that we have it in such rich abundance.

The former of the volumes now before us is the exponent of what may be called sober High Churchmanship. We do not by that name mean to imply any community with the "Old High and Dry" school, but a holding of what are now known as distinctively High Church tenets without any apparent disloyalty to the Reformed Church of England. The authors of these Essays are, for the most part, men who honestly believe that they can hold the high sacramental system in the Church of England without being carried off their feet by the stream which has set towards Roman doctrine. We are bound to say that in some of the Essays that system is very little, if at all, protruded, though it evidently underlies the whole. The general object of the volume is "to illustrate the position of the Anglican Communion as a Reformed Branch of the Catholic Church; and to vindicate her power of self-adaptation to the intellectual and social conditions of the age, without sacrificing her primitive principles of Evangelical truth and Apostolical order." We find appended to this statement in the preliminary notice the following caution: "Beyond a general concurrence in this object, each author has written in perfect independence, and without knowing the contents of the Essays of the other writers. Each is responsible for his own contribution, and for that alone." This is somewhat amusing, after, first, the persistent refusal of the school to which these writers belong, to allow the least weight to a similar caution prefixed to "Essays and Reviews:" and,

secondly, the fact now brought to light by the Bishop of Exeter's own speech, that they were perfectly right in so persistently refusing: that although it was literally true that he had never seen the other Essays, yet the scope and design of the book were well known and approved by him, and responsibility accepted, not for his own Essay alone, but for the general tendency of all the Essays. "Mit gegangen, mit gehalten," says the German proverb: and so it will be, in spite of prefatory disclaimers, to the end of the chapter.

No such perilous consequences, however, need be feared by the body of writers here found associated. If, in one Essay in particular, some trains of thought are indicated which, logically followed out, would land us on the wrong side of conventional belief, care has been taken to do no more than indicate them. Whether any passengers are travelling on the roads thus pointed out, and if any, who,—it would baffle the keenest inquisitor to discover.

The volume is opened with an introductory Essay on "Anglican Principles," by the Dean of Chichester. In its statement of those principles this Essay is very outspoken. But its way of arriving at them is not a little curious. All men's opinions, it tells us, are at first prejudices, adopted from others before the mind has the power of judging for itself. These are, in due time, tested, and subjected to examination: and if after that it is held,—

"The opinion is no longer a prejudice: it has become a principle. By a principle we mean an opinion formed after a minute inquiry and investigation. . . . A principle is a fixed opinion, a fundamental truth; a rule, an axiom, a *propositio præmissa*; it is an unalterable opinion, by which all other opinions, all the prejudices, in their nature changeable, are to be tested: it is a standard by which to measure, it is a plummet by which to fathom every opinion suggested to the mind, or which a wayward mind may, on thinking, evolve. . . . We may refuse to read any work the professed object of which is opposed to our principles, unless we are officially called upon to refute it: for bigotry does not consist in a firm adherence to our principles, but simply in an inconsiderate and obstinate adherence to our prejudices. To suffer for our prejudices may be mere obstinacy, but for our principles we should be prepared to die."

This is preliminary to stating that the *principle*, which ruled our English Reformers as distinguished from the foreign Reformers, was, the continuity of the Church: that the post-Reformation is only a development of the pre-Reformation Church. And this principle Dr. Hook holds to be "still the mark of distinction between the Church of England and Dissenters, whether Romish or Protestant,—the two last mentioned parties deriving their doctrine and discipline from foreign sources, and taking the foreigner, Calvin or the Pope, for their authority."

The *naïveté* of this last sentence is delightful. What would the

larger half of English Dissenters say to their being charged with having taken their doctrine and discipline from Calvin? And what, conceded the principle of the continuity of the Church, would the Romanist say to being called a Dissenter? It is strange that so able a man as Dr. Hook does not see that if our Anglican Reformers were anxious to keep continuity with the pre-Reformation Church, the Protestant Dissenters had for at least their professed principle, the keeping continuity with a Church far more ancient and pure—that of the apostolic age itself: and that so, all this preliminary overture about principle, being common to both parties in the controversy, might have been altogether spared.

We are not especially in love with the term Protestant: yet we confess to a kind of reaction in its favour since the younger types of Anglican among ourselves have, without knowing its true meaning, loaded it with opprobrium. We own we little expected to see so venerated an authority as the Dean of Chichester simply repudiating it.

“The right of private judgment is a tenet of Protestants from Luther to Socinus—and for a Protestant to call any one whose private judgment differs from his own a heretic, is sinful, because it can only be done for the purpose of giving pain. In the mouth of a Catholic the word has a definite meaning.” (Note, p. 12.)

It is impossible not to feel that all this is singularly out of place at the time in which we now find ourselves. It is a mode of speech which has reached, indeed, in our day a very definite and logical issue: but that issue is to be seen in the documents emanating from the so-called Ecumenical Council in the Vatican. It was on account of passages like this, and of the general spirit of Dean Hook's *Essay*, that the clever critic in the *Spectator* suggested for this volume the slightly altered name of “The Church without the Age.” So little idea is there shown, on the majority of its pages, of the wants and tendencies of the day in which God's Providence has placed us.

The proposition, that what did for the days of the Reformation will do for us, is self-refuting. Our thoughts, habits, wants, are all different. The Reformation Church was fitted to an hypothesis into which the thought of toleration never entered: our whole Church-life is based on the conceded axiom of the freest and fullest toleration ever known. Judged by any imaginable requirements of coherence and congruity, the modern life of the theoretical Anglican is the new patch on the old garment, daily making the rent worse. But we may be thankful that we do not in this land judge by requirements of coherence or congruity. We cling to our old habits and ways, however illogical they may be, and maintain powerful ana-

themas for the sake of the good that listening to them does us; and sensible men never think of driving home the various conflicting tenets to which we have pledged ourselves, so as to make themselves perforce hold to the one set and reject the other. It is impossible to be a sober and loyal Englishman, without holding infinite couples of conflicting propositions.

And so it is that the good men who write and believe in books like the one before us, tolerant and kind as summer in social and practical life, yet nurse their favourite theories in their closets and on paper, totally regardless of their logical consequences. Of this we have no reason to complain. Want of logic is the secret of England's place among the nations. She owes her Church, as well as her polity, to abstention from doctrinairism. A persistent logician, working on the Athanasian Creed or the Canons, soon works himself out of the Church of England. We believe we have received during the last forty years some dozen of pamphlets, written by men of purest motives, but unable to see their way to compromises;—"Reasons for ceasing to minister," &c.,—and then followed analyses of our Prayer-Book offices, &c., &c. We fully believe that the effect of sound judgment, and practical wisdom, will be to keep a member of the Church of England where he is: but a blind following of logical necessity will of a certainty carry the High Churchman to Rome, and the Low Churchman to Geneva.

I. And the Broad Churchman, whither? The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol's Essay in this volume has tracked a good many of his sidepaths and temporary aberrations. But while we recognise in what the Bishop has written the thoughtfulness and care manifest in all he does, while we feel that we are in the hands of one whose cautious reverence is a safeguard against our being landed in any realm of strange doctrines, we also feel on closing the Essay that we have bought these pleasant things somewhat dearly, if we are to get no more for our pains. It does seem to us, that the Bishop has not in any of his very pleasant and sympathizing sketches of the history of modern thought, gone to the root, or nearly to the root, of the matter.

Let us take as an example his observations on the spirit of the famous *Essays and Reviews*, in what is called free handling of the Bible.

"Their thesis," he tells us, "is correct in the distinction it implies between the Divine and human elements which coexist in the Holy Scriptures; but it is incorrect in denying the mysterious interpretation of these elements, and the resultant unity in that which, thus considered (?), is rightly defined as the Word of God. It is one thing to recognise the existence of the two elements, it is another thing to claim a diagnostic power which may not only separate, but rectify. The recognition of the two elements leads, by way of natural deduction and inference, to the

further and more important recognition of the organic unity of the Scriptures, and enables us more completely to realise both their authority and their sufficiency. The claim laid to a rectifying faculty, and to the consequent right to use it, leads us certainly in a contrary direction." (P. 52.)

As far as we can understand this (and we are not quite certain about the two last sentences), we will try it by an example, which may serve to test its correctness. Take the words, "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon." We suppose there would be no difference between the Bishop and ourselves in the interpretation of these words. But how has that interpretation been got at, but by a rectifying faculty? If this term have a meaning, it surely imports the power in our minds of judging of the contents of Scripture by some rule or other extraneous to Scripture. We happen to believe in the Copernican system of astronomy. To the test of that belief we bring these words; and we decide that they express, not the nature of a physical fact, but the belief current among men when they were written. It will be said, perhaps, that the example is worthless: that it is simply on a par with that of our own phrases of sunrise and sunset, and that no one would think of inferring physical exactitude in its terms. Precisely so: and this is exactly what we are maintaining. Here is a case in which the application of the "verifying faculty" is so simple, that the Bishop and ourselves, and ninety-nine hundredths of living men, perform it almost unconsciously. And so it may be in some few other instances. But will he, or will any one, draw for us a hard and fast line, which shall bound these very plain cases, and prescribe to us "Hitherto, and no further?" If current belief influenced one expression having relation to physical science, why not another, though the interpretation may not be so easy? If in relation to physical science this be so, why not in other departments of knowledge which may be acquired by human research and in the process of ages? And where shall we be in the due and reverent performance of our duty towards Scripture, if we cause not such research to minister towards the interpretation of it? Let it never be forgotten that our service of God is to be not only with all our heart, but also with all our mind, consecrating to Him, not immolating before Him, whatever knowledge He has been pleased to bestow upon us or our age.

How again are we, without this much-decried verifying faculty, to treat the numerous instances of anthropomorphism with which Scripture abounds? Here again, some are so plain as to meet with all but universally consentaneous treatment by the verifying faculty. When we read that "the heavens are the work of God's fingers,"—when we are told that "the Lord smelled a sweet savour,"—it is impossible that there can be two opinions as to what in each case is

really meant. But is this so in all cases? It is not quite so obvious how we are to understand that "the Lord God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life:" the figurative and the literal here are somewhat difficult to disentangle. It is still less easy to say what is meant when "Adam heard the voice (or the sound) of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day." Are we still on the ground of anthropomorphic æconomy? and if so, where exactly does it stop in this primæval history? The culminating instance will perhaps be found in the very difficult narrative of the confusion of tongues. Are we to be told that to the less obvious of these no verifying faculty must be applied, when the Bishop himself and all of us agree in applying it at once and without hesitation to the easier ones? And if to single expressions, who is to stop it there? Why should we be refused the application of it to the character of whole passages or whole books? The danger to the Bible is surely not in the direction to which the Bishop's anxious look is directed. It is not the exercise of a verifying faculty which it has to fear, if only the best and wisest men will contribute to the training and perfecting that faculty: but what it has to fear is, the withholding of truth, the concealment of difficulties: not so much the free handling, as the deceitful handling, of the present day.

Again, in another matter it strikes us that the Bishop's careful Essay has not reached the end of controversy. He has gone on to trace as an effect of the free handling which he so much deprecates, the character of recent thought as employed on the Person of our Blessed Lord. Very much of what he says is most true. But a great deal also is true which he has not said, nay which he has almost excluded from being said. He has discovered in the "free handling" of the nature of the living and eternal Word, a character far more repulsive than the early Arian views, and in some respects even more dangerous than the original teaching of Socinus: he has doubted whether or not to refer its very general reception among the intellectual and the cultivated, "to some sort of dreadful pessimism lurking in the dark background of a self-satisfied spirit, that unconsciously sympathizes with this bringing down of an ideal to a lower and more accessible level." But has it never struck him that, little as we in the Church of England can find to sympathize with in the dogmatic result of the Humanitarianism of which he complains, the tendency to regard our Blessed Lord on this side did not arise without a cause? Was not this (we protest against the word even while we borrow it) "pessimism" the reaction against a long reign of dreary optimism, which had (we speak it with all reverence) so hedged about that Sacred Character with divinity as almost to fence from view His human sympathies? What vast and glorious realms

of the Gospel history are almost without meaning to the common orthodox mind of England, because it has been the fashion to invest the self-emptying and humiliated Saviour, on every occasion in His earthly course, with the present and consciously exercised attributes of his Divinity! The Bishop notices, as none can fail to have noticed, the remarkable and total collapse of the once popular volume on which many of his remarks in this part of his Essay are made. His words are on several accounts worth quoting.

"In the work above-mentioned, modern English thought in reference to our Lord's life found itself most clearly and felicitously reflected. There was just the infusion of Socinianism, not a drop in excess, that could be gratefully assimilated; just that amount of the depedestalizing process which flattered without startling the modern thinker; just that frank recognition of ultra-human excellence which reassured any disturbed sensibility. It was essentially the book of three years ago, and a remarkably useful index of the amount and direction of the drift of thought in reference to Christology. That it has produced no effect on the thought of which it was the mere index need hardly be added. It is a book that may in many respects be compared with the once notorious '*Vestiges of Creation*,' the book of a mere epoch, the intelligent epitome of current thoughts; just the book to read, to be interested in, to be delicately flattered by, and to forget."

Will the Bishop forgive us for saying, that we demur to this description, and that we should be disposed to give an altogether different account of the collapse of the book? To us it rather seems that *Ecce Homo* has ceased to be popular, simply because it never was, in any worthy sense, an adequate or self-justified account of the human character of our Lord. Had it been, as the Bishop maintains, an index or mirror of modern Christology, would not that school of thought have cherished it as such? But *Ecce Homo* satisfied no one. Its own preface carried its own extinction. To speculate on our Lord, setting aside what Apostle or Evangelist has said respecting Him, is simply impossible, and has no root in reality. The speculation was a plausible one, and its literary garb was attractive and brilliant; but there it ended. We admired the glittering fabric of confectionery, but we craved for the meal. *Ecce Homo* has faded out of memory, for the very reason for which its author has not found it worth his while to complete it.

Into another matter on which the Bishop enters, we will not follow him at length—we mean the painful question, for such it really is, of the eternity of evil. On that he has thought much and deeply: aided by that which his exegetical habits ensured for him, a manly and honest interpretation of the few mysterious passages of Holy Writ which most nearly bear on the question. His conclusion is to us hardly satisfactory. It seems to be, that we have not on this point in Scripture a simple contradiction (or as he chooses to veil it,

antinomy), but that the passages which speak specially and absolutely of the condition of the lost, must outweigh those others which seem (and as far as we know, are) opposed to them. We should be sorry to accept such a "deliverance" on any other question where various Scriptures are in apparent conflict: and were this the place, we think we could shew that there is, in this case too, a "more excellent way."

We may be thought to have given undue prominence to the Bishop of Gloucester's Essay. But the prominence is its own. It challenges the greatest amount of attention, because it ventures to chronicle modern religious thought, as to its recent movements and its probable consequences. We must be more brief in our treatment of those which remain.

II. Dr. Irons contributes a very able and lucidly arranged Essay on the Church, the State, and the Synods of the Future. This latter portion of his title is somewhat delusive, it is true: for he deals much more with the Synods of the Past. But the whole is well worth reading. Its tone is temperate and sensible, and the tracing out of the relations of Church and State has seldom been more boldly and honestly done. It was a real pleasure to read such words as these, when we remembered all the airy stuff which has been written and spoken in the sense repudiated by them.

"Nor is it less obvious, that the material and present interests of Christians, as citizens of this world, are equally subject to the civil power, and in the same absolute sense, as their persons. The State could not rationally act on any other view. The Church, as such, received not on the day of Pentecost any power to possess, hold or transmit any property independently of earthly jurisdiction: and so, if ever the Church accept an acre of this world's land, it only accepts it under and entirely subject to this world's laws. The State would abdicate its function, if it forgot this. It is for the State to consider from time to time whether the Church, like any other special society, may advantageously be allowed to hold and transmit, under the protection of worldly laws, a portion of the property of this world. Experience seems to have taught, that civilization effectually hands on certain of its advantages by facilitating for the next generation the enjoyment of the benefits of the past. Endowments may be the transference of civilization, and, held thus by this world's laws, they are under the responsible control of the State. Gifts offered to 'the service of God and the Church,' at any time, are individual gifts; no individual can give that which he has not; and no individual has the future in his power. If he be permitted by the State to destine his present property for future uses, and the State protects him in it, it is because, from experience, the State finds it good; and the State, from its own point of view, is not to preserve such disposition of property any longer than it thinks it right and good for the community at large; which alone the State has to consider."

In dealing with Synods, Dr. Irons maintains, *à l'outrance*, the principle that with Bishops alone has ever rested the power of teaching and guiding.

"Rightly or wrongly (as man might say) the fact is so, that to the chief pastors of the Church, and some others, the solemn work of definitive decision in Synod on all matters of faith then pertained. 'Feed my sheep,' 'Teach all nations,' such was the supposed warrant for this. So far as we know, there is no exception."

"It never seems to have occurred to any one that the people, even if present, ought there to begin to teach, or to pronounce sentence, or take to deciding matters of fact."

And this is not only mentioned as the practice of early times, but is upheld and enforced as being the only lawful method in Church assemblies.

"But the unvarying custom had prevailed for bishops alone to be the teachers or guides in those Councils; and presbyters and deacons, at most, only lent their assistance in debate. Those assemblies simply testified their own faith; they brought together such as could be had of the prelates and their friends in contiguous localities on each emergency. To this we must add, however, that it could hardly have been accidental; it was too uniform for that. As surely as the Holy Ghost led the Church, He led it thus. It was then the *only* public fulfilment of 'Lo, I am with you always;' and 'He shall lead you into all truth.'"

It is at least remarkable that Dr. Irons makes, in thus reasoning, no allusion whatever to the first, and incomparably the greatest Church Council ever held: that one which, we should have imagined, would be uppermost in every one's mind who seeks for a pattern for the Synods of the Future. We mean that which assembled at Jerusalem to decide a question even greater, if possible, than the one which was decided at Nicæa. This latter was, whether the faith of the Son of God should be held in its integrity; but that other was, whether that faith should be held at all. For one who was present at it, and judged by it, testified: "If ye be circumcised, *Christ shall profit you nothing*." Now who pronounced sentence, who took to decide matters of faith, on that memorable occasion? Let the narrative, and the synodical canon, bear witness. The former tells us (Acts xv. 22), "It seemed good to the Apostles and elders, with the whole church." The latter runs, "The apostles and elders [and*] brethren, send greeting," and so forth. "Forasmuch as, &c., to whom *WE* gave no such commandment. . . . It seemed good unto us (the technical and diplomatic *ἔδοξε ἡμῖν*) being assembled with one mind, to send, &c. For *IT SEEMED GOOD TO THE HOLY GHOST AND TO US*," and so forth. And if we wish to see how much care has been taken in the sacred narrative to register faithfully the part which all took in this decree, it is introduced by "Then it seemed good (*ἔδοξε*) to the apostles *AND* the elders *AND* the whole church."

* The probably more correct reading, without the *kai oi* before *ἀδελφοί*, in fact, amounts to the same thing. For it classes the *πρεσβύτεροι* who issued the decree among the *ἀδελφοί*, i.e., makes them representatives of the general body mentioned above in ver. 22, and not a separate class.

It is at least curious that no room should be found in Dr. Irons's Essay for this first and pattern Council, no suspicion that in this great matter of decision in matters of faith and obedience there is something greater than Nicæa to work by. The omission is characteristic rather of the school than of the individual. No one who has studied this Essay can help being struck with the fairness, independence, and ability which are manifest throughout it.

III. "Fresh fields and pastures new" are offered us in the next Essay, by our old friend and contributor, Mr. St. John Tyrwhitt. It may be thought that from a church synod to a work of art is a distance with whose terms only an astronomical mind can grapple. Yet even into the Jerusalem Chamber art has penetrated; and so we have in the midst of essays such as we have been treating, Mr. Tyrwhitt "On the Religious Use of Taste."

Those who are conversant with Mr. Tyrwhitt's writings, will know what to expect here, and will find it. He advocates strongly the ministration of art to religion in our own Church and country. In so doing, of course he has to furnish a good deal of explanation, and to remove many false impressions. He traces the decline of art, from the period when it really did subserve the purposes of religious instruction, and suggest the highest ideas of beauty, to the fatal degradation which it has suffered at the hands of modern Romanism, by which it is prostituted to pander to idolatrous worship by means of gaudy plaster saints and madonnas standing to be adored. He shows well and convincingly how much the Reformation owed to art; how Dürer and Holbein worked for and with Luther.

"The Roman Catholic revivalists felt that they, too, must use the weapons of the painter and sculptor; and it is not too much to say that their patronage of art was one part of its degradation and destruction. The Protestant had used it in appeal to truth; they used it in appeal to excitement and sentiment. Holbein had argued, with his grim, if well-drawn Scriptural woodcuts. They persuaded, entreated, invited, with their soft oil-paintings of saints simpering, saints crying, smiling, gesticulating, languishing—always presenting their luscious or delicately pallid faces for the spectator's adoration. In the view of the Roman revival, religious art was not the expression of imagination rejoicing in faith, but one means among many for enforcing dogma;—the painter had to serve in the great host under a discipline which amounted to slavery. But he had the helot's privilege of sly indulgence, and might introduce almost as much nudity, and meretricious charm, and theatrical horror, as he or his patrons liked, into what passed for sacred work."

The dread of the use of art in aid of English religion has been mainly owing to this historical degradation. But that dread is at present not consistently followed out. To allow any amount of colour and design in church windows, and object to their presence on church walls, does seem puerile and inconsistent.

"And as our Church's main appeal is to Christian antiquity, she may stand on the example of all these, who died in faith, for that liberty in religious art, limited by doctrine, which she has given her children. As has been said, the principle of using fresco or mosaic in churches is admitted by those who use illuminated windows or illustrated Bibles. But we think the object of all such illustration should be instructive, so to speak, rather than devotional. From the fresco to the woodcut, Sacred Art should cling to the awful Facts and History which it is her office to record. Excepting in necessary symbolism or permitted allegory, every representation should be felt to be that of an event, a development of God's will for man; a record of His work. 'This hath God done.' This principle at once removes that apprehension about idolatry which many thoughtful persons may still feel. Pictures of Saints doing something are not like pictures of meretriciously beautiful Saints standing to be adored. No one could worship a Saint of Tintoret's; none of them presents himself as an object of worship; he is himself worshipping or ministering, and is employed on his Master's work. The Church's appeal through art should be to thought and not to sentiment—and all the power of beauty may be brought to bear upon the mind, without pictorial appeal to passionate or excited devotion—which is at best an exceptional state of mind, and which cannot be played or calculated upon without great moral risk. Truth, we said, is the leading note of Taste or choice in art. Represent the Facts of the Gospel, and let them tell their own tale to the believer; consider your pictures as the plain narrative printed in form and colour. Let beauty and sentiment alike wait on truth of teaching, combined with skill of representation, which is technical truth: and let devotional feeling 'as heaven shall will it, come and go' in the personal spirit of the spectator."

The reader will have seen that Mr. Tyrwhitt's Essay does not stand committed to the distinctive principles of which the rest thus far have been exponents. It might have been a chapter in his "*Ancilla Domini*," formerly published in our own pages. Nay, in the manly and common-sense adoption and vindication of Protestantism, he raises a protest against Dean Hook's not very wise repudiation of it, quoted some pages back.

IV. The next Essay, by Professor Burrows, "*On the Place of the Laity in Church Government*," is a sensible and carefully written plea for that which few Churchmen are now indisposed to grant. But it is here again curious, how one writer within the cover of this book controverts the position of another. We had just now to point out the inaccuracy of Dr. Irons's assertion that never, in the history of Church Councils, have the laity taken part in their decisions. We might have spared ourselves the trouble, and left Professor Burrows to do our work. Not only does he recognise fully the part taken by the laity, but he calls in a witness whose testimony all will respect, the present Bishop of Salisbury, in his Bampton Lectures.

"In his third Lecture he shows how this principle relieves us of all difficulty as to the question of the inspiration of Scripture. The whole Spirit-bearing body received it as God's word at the time when alone its pretensions could be judged. St. Paul speaks of 'the gospel which ye have received.'"

In his fourth Lecture he shows how this principle was recognised in the transactions of the primitive Church. The apostles and elders 'with the whole Church' send the Decree of the Apostolic Council. Tertullian's language 'strongly confirms the idea that he would not have regarded the lay voice as altogether powerless in matters of Christian counsel and joint decree.' St. Cyprian resolved to 'do nothing without the counsel of the clergy and the consent of the lay people.' Lay people were present at the Councils of Eliberis (A.D. 305) and Toledo (A.D. 398) as well as at the comparatively modern Councils of Pisa and Constance.

"In thus touching the relation of the laity to the clergy in early times, it is interesting to observe how different a view may be given of the same events by two equally honest and competent students: the greater part of Dr. Pusey's book on 'The Councils of the Church' being devoted to the proof of the nonentity of the laity in Christian assemblies from the earliest times. Dr. Moberly, on the contrary, sums the question up by saying that 'their influence on the counsels and decisions of the Church was neither small nor insignificant. They had an unquestioned voice in the selection of the bishops, and, even, as there is reason to suppose, of the presbyters; so that even those who sat in council were the men whom they had concurred in choosing. They were present, often, if not always, in the same sort of position as the ordained deacons at the consultations and debates of Councils.' 'I am at a loss to discover the beginning of the doctrine that the truth was in such sort delivered to the bishops as that they alone (or even along with the presbyters) have the absolute and final right to consult or judge respecting it' (p. 124).

We find in Professor Burrows's Essay an element which is present in considerable mass and vigour in all speculations of Churchmen of his way of thinking, but which, we own, fairly baffles us as to what it can import, and at what it can be aiming: we mean the putting forward on all occasions of synods, and synodal action, as the great desideratum of Church life in our times. We are quite mindful of the strong things which even he, in his sober way, has said of us by implication, when we set down the remark, that of all things which we should have thought the Church would be wise at this time to avoid and discourage, synods, chapters, and congresses, were among the foremost. It may be, as he maintains it is, impolitic for the Evangelical party, as a party, to keep aloof from the congresses; but surely every one who has been present at any of those much-vaunted gatherings must have come away convinced, if he would let his own heart speak its quiet testimony, utterly dissatisfied with the sort of spirit shewn, and with the manipulation of the whole for the honour and glory of one party. The writer of these remarks had to take a part in the Norwich Congress in 1865. What he saw there determined him never, if he could help it, to witness another. The vociferous applause which greeted every word having a certain party tendency,—the correspondent uproar which hooted down every attempt to argue in the other direction,—both of these constantly overpassing the bounds of decorum, made it appear clearly enough what was to be the issue of

the proceedings : nor has the record of any subsequent congress tended in any degree to remove the apprehension then conceived.

And what is it that is proposed to be done by all this synodal action which is thus put forward as the very beating of the life's heart of the Church ? How will she be the better for multiplying to an infinite extent the amount of public talk which her wiser sons even now regard as her bane ? Wherein is it that her work is most prominently defective ? Is it, in that her clergy do not appear enough in public, or that they do not devote themselves to her service in private and at their homes ? To our, we fear, ill-informed mind, all this fuss and bustle about synodal action is one of the signs that the Church in England does not and will not recognise the solemn duties which God's Providence is in this day laying upon her. While thousands are looking to her for an example of that great charity for which the heart of mankind is yearning,—while she, if any church ever was, is put on vantage-ground for casting away pious frauds, and fighting God's battles with the weapons of sincerity and truth, her well-skilled sons are spending the precious time and their own fleeting energy in evoking and perfecting a cumbrous machine, whose long-tried office it is to forge the bonds of exclusiveness anew, and to deaden the whispers of awakening conscience by the din of its working. Let all that Professor Burrows so ably pleads for be obtained, and it is still a question, what one parish, what one pulpit, what one parsonage, will be the better for it ? Were the office of such synods in any measure to help to *govern* the Church, as Professor Burrows seems often tacitly to assume, the question would wear a different aspect : but even then it might be doubted whether, with all our present facilities for communication, that government could not be much more effectively provided for by one central deliberative body, acting on its own responsibility, than by a complicated system of Diocesan Synods and Ruridecanal Chapters.

V. The sixth Essay, On the Private Life and Ministrations of the Parish Priest, by Mr. Walsham How, is as to its subject-matter, rather than in its tone and spirit, a singular contrast to the fifth. It contains that, the defect of which we have been lamenting in Professor Burrows's paper. It is written with a quiet (shall we say with a sombre ?) seriousness ; sententious and somewhat Herbert-like in style ; finding its way to the heart, and wakening echoes therein. At the same time, we are not afraid to face the deeper echoes,—which wake as those others subside, and tell us that the very still and somewhat ascetic figure which Mr. How has so admirably posed before us is not, cannot be, the Parish Priest of whom the Church is now in search : that many a man from whom his sketch

might have been taken, has let his work drift by him, a pattern of sanctity, but a warning for want of knowledge how to deal with men. Most blameless in inner life, surrounded with an atmosphere of purity and simplicity, the very ideal of a kind and bold counsellor where great spiritual issues are concerned, such a man somehow is the last thought of in a very large proportion of cases where practical good may be done. We very well know the result where the habits and discipline which Mr. How recommends have been carried almost to perfection: the thoroughly finished example of personal holiness not uncommonly to be found in the Roman Church. Admirable as such characters are, decisive and concentrated as must in certain cases be their influence for good, we are free to confess we do not desire to see the mark attained among our parish pastors. The work which they have to do can, we are persuaded, be better done by men who are less abstracted from the rough joltings and unsatisfactory compromises of which ordinary life in the world is made up. All practice teaches us that not the very best and brightest tools, but those which will best bear knocking about and use, accomplish the most work. And, with every reluctance to part with the charming picture which Mr. How has drawn, of this sort we own is our conviction with regard to the present need of the Church in this land. She does not want men of the Herbert and Farrar stamp, no, nor even (with every reserve of reverent admiration be it spoken) of the Keble stamp in her parishes, half so much as men of practical common sense, grounded of course on unfeigned personal piety, but less careful than Mr. How would have them to present the "angel on earth" kind of character, and more careful to be "not unwise, but understanding what the will of the Lord is." The Church which they serve was framed, as to her outward rules, for other ages and habits of life from ours: and it must be the aim of the Parish Priest who would be careful in her present work, not so much to carry out the ideal of the reformers of three centuries back, as to take into account the changes of society, and varied aspects of secularity and nonconformity, in the midst of which he now finds himself; and to seek how, within the limits of his registered pledge of obedience to the rules of the Church, he may so adapt his own habits and ministrations, as to do the greatest amount of work for God and for good.

If it be replied, that this is precisely the end aimed at by Mr. How's Essay, we can only say that we differ from him as to the means of attaining it. It may not be amiss, without entering into particulars, to indicate, by a citation or two, some of the lines of divergence.

"We have said that holiness of living is at the root of the whole matter. But there is something at the root of holiness of living. We may go deeper down still. The surest way to gain a higher stage of spiritual life is by an

increase in habits of devotion. 'He that has learned to pray aright,' says Bishop Wilson, 'has got the secret of a holy life.' Longer prayers, more fervent prayers, more frequent prayers, the habit of secret ejaculatory prayer many times in the day, greater particularity of intercession, the use of manuals of prayer, the conquest of indolence, sleepiness, wandering of mind in prayer, all these will be aimed at by him who longs after holiness of living. It is not forgotten how differently men are constituted, and how much more difficult devotional habits are to some than to others. This makes it difficult to lay down rules. Yet it seems desirable not to omit to mention the extreme importance of securing at least some regular time for devotion in the early morning, while the mind is in its calmest and least distracted state. A very simple rule has been given, and may help some, though many will think it scanty in requirement. Let the Parish Priest always secure forty minutes in the early morning, twenty for devotional reading (which must never be chosen with a view to his other work) and twenty for prayer. Devotional habits will mark and influence everything else. They bring down a sure and direct blessing from above. All work will be the better and truer for their acquirement. Great activity is very common without devotion. Devotion without activity of work is very rare. The true aim of the Parish Priest should be to combine the two, to sanctify and elevate his daily labours by his secret devotions, to embody and enshrine his secret devotions in his daily labours; 'neither diminishing,' as St. Gregory says, 'his care for internal things through the occupation of external, nor neglecting his interest in external things through anxiety for internal.' It is Angels' life, this blessed interblending of acts of devotion with acts of loving ministration. Who could behold an Angel without feeling that he had come straight from the presence of God, with all the radiance of the heavenly worship still streaming around him? In his degree it should be so with the Parish Priest.

'Angel he calls you; be your strife
To lead on earth an Angel's life.'

As the servant of God comes down from the Mount—from the presence of the All-holy One—bearing His Law in his hands to teach it to His people, let them see on his countenance the shining of the heavenly glory; let them feel that the grace and love and meekness and earnestness and zeal which are in him, were gathered in the hour of secret prayer. Again and again let it be said: the Parish Priest must be holy; he must be spiritually-minded; he must be living the inner life of the Spirit of God; and he must be *felt* to be all this."

"Might it not also be well if, without parade or ostentation, the Parish Priest were not ashamed to take out and read his book of private devotion in a railway carriage? In this respect the Roman Catholic Priest certainly puts the English Clergyman to shame. It is a high standard which is set before the Parish Priest. For the matter of that, it is a high standard which is set before us all. But '*he goeth before them.*' Surely, if all, much more he, should have his conversation in heaven. His conduct should at all times and in all places be that of one who is a guide of souls to heaven, and whose study it is to give 'no offence in anything, that the ministry be not blamed.'"

We should have thought of this last proposal, that the concluding sentence of our extract would have been sufficient answer to it.

It is really painful to be ranged on the side of finding fault, where

all is so beautiful, and pitched in so high a spiritual tone, as in this Essay. But it is for that special reason that we have criticized rather than eulogized. No two persons could be more anxious to serve the same great end, than Mr. How and ourselves. But the question for us is, not which delineation of the Parish Priest looks most attractive and blameless in the eyes of the Church now, but which will be found to have answered best the Master's purpose in the evening, when the Householder shall take account of His workmen. And we are quite content, even with our less perfected and more worldly parson, to abide that issue.

VI. Mr. Haddan's Essay on the English Divines of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, though written in a cumbrous and wearying style, is a valuable contribution towards the completeness of our present churchmanship. He very properly lays claim, on behalf of that unrivalled body of men, to having impressed, in a special sense, their spirit and character on the Church of England: to having saved her from the excesses, in both directions, to which some would have carried her. It may be well to specify the particular merits which he asserts for them, abbreviating his own statement on the point. "They have formed a school," he says, (1) "which has given us the only theology we have worthy the name, learned, thorough, and systematic:" (2) "which has furnished us with an ideal of holy life, thoroughly identified with the characteristic good points of the English character (*sic*):" (3) "which originated our first missionary efforts, and our first attempts, in the way of guilds and brotherhoods, to stem the growing current of vice at home:" (4) "which has ever kept itself large-minded and vigorous, by looking up to no one great name, and trammelling itself to (*sic*) no merely human system:" (5) "which has furnished us with the expositions of Pearson and Jackson, the doctrinal defence of Bull, the evidential Compendium of Leslie, the *Ductor Dubitantium* of Taylor, the *Eirenicon* of Bishop Forbes: the still-read sermons of Andrewes and Beveridge: the Polyglott of Walton, and the Patristic learning of Pearson, Thorndike, Beveridge, and Cave: the beginning of our native antiquarian lore in Hickes, and of an Oriental school in Hyde and Powell: our best native Church historians in Collier and Wharton: our most solid defence against Rome in the tough and vigorous sense of Bramhall, and Laud's too-little studied conference with Fisher: and the mine of thought, learning, and honest research which lies buried under the involved and repulsive English of Thorndike:" (6) which never has spoken as a school, and rarely in any one instance, in a virulent, uncharitable, or even vulgar tone: which, lastly, (and we give this sentence entire as a specimen of Mr. Haddan's own English)—

"While it has made all other schools in the Church, more or less

plainly, 'outsiders,' it has itself survived the drain of its own noblest blood in the political Nonjuring secession, and contrived to outlive the corruption and immoral scepticism of the days of Walpole, and revived even after its terrible loss of earnest piety in the Wesleyan schism (itself in Wesley's person drawing its inspiration, so far as it was for good, from High Churchism), and after the unhappily too narrow and subjective (so called) 'Evangelical' movement. And it lives still, after the unprecedentedly long duration (for any human school of thought) of three centuries, to supply the names which, if any one is asked to signalize the English Church, come spontaneously to every one's lips."

Mr. Haddan is with all this eulogistic disposition not quite insensible to the faults of this same school. He confesses that its divines worked too exclusively for the learned, and half admits that their writings and the spirit fostered by them helped to lose the middle classes for the Church of England. "Baxter's *Saints' Rest* and Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* came from other than Church sources." He confesses also, but with considerable qualifications, that this school taught us by their imperfections, "that compulsion and minute domineering inquisition are no instruments for furthering, but are the surest and most effectual methods of defeating, the acceptance of religious truth." He admits again (but in this case his after-thoughts turn the defect into a merit), that their theory of the relation of Church to State may be thought to demand revision. But on this matter we must refer our readers to the Essay itself. They will find in its concluding pages some very thoughtful and able paragraphs on the tendency of the present reactionary movement towards Roman doctrine. We regret that we have room only for his closing sentence.

"I add only, in conclusion, that if (as it seems) the only way of even hoping to bring about a reunion with other Churches be to revive in our own Church a living belief in her own Divine office and powers, in the reality of her Sacraments, in the Divine authority of her Creeds, in the authority and right office of her ministers, then the surest method of defeating such a result is the revival in her of errors long since rejected, and of practices deliberately laid aside. To be simply like Rome will not satisfy Rome, even could it be right to be like her where she is wrong. And to identify in men's minds the cause of Church authority and of dogmatic belief with Rome as she is, can only disgust and alienate intelligent and honest minds from the truth itself. In this present age they who will preserve faith must needs keep faith unburdened by accretions of error, and free to fight her battle with all the advantages of a good cause and of sound reason. We have held our position now for three centuries. And though it is not the position any Church would choose (for it is a position of isolation, although involuntarily so), yet it is not to be surrendered unadvisedly, or without any other changes in those who have isolated us than such as aggravate the unhappy facts that compelled isolation. And certainly, on the abstract merits of the controversy, reasons have yet to be produced sufficient to set aside the teaching of the old, and manly, and massive school of our great English divines."

VII. To the next Essay, Mr. Sadler's, we should be disposed to adjudge the palm, for clear and perspicuous demonstration of the thesis, among the contents of this volume. Mr. Sadler distinguished himself, even before the present currents of Church thought had set in, by several publications on ecclesiastical subjects displaying considerable originality and power. To his present inquiry "Is the Order of the Administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion, as set forth in the Book of Common Prayer, agreeable to the Mind and Will of the Divine Institutor?" he brings a very full acquaintance with his great subject, underlying a most painstaking and careful examination of all the materials for a satisfactory reply. We can only state in very few words his manner of proceeding, and its result.

Laying down, and supporting the position by proof, that the Holy Communion *is sacrificial*,—that there is in it no actual sacrifice in the sense of immolation, or surrender,—that the sacrifice in no way depends on the nature or the mode of the Presence,—that the sacrificial character depends on the proper interpretation of the word *ἀνάμνησις*, as implying a memorial BEFORE GOD rather than to man,—he goes through the ancient Liturgies, examining their sacrificial expressions: and on coming to the Roman, shews that there is in it an utter and hopeless confusion between two acts of sacrifice,—that of the unconsecrated element in the ordinary of the Mass, and that of the Body and Blood in the Canon. This confusion he traces to the attempt to confine the Sacrifice to the action of the celebrant alone: and finds it most strikingly illustrated in the fact that in the Roman liturgy the unconsecrated and the consecrated bread are offered in the same terms, and for the same ends. Lastly he examines the English Liturgy, and shews that it agrees in the matter of sacrifice with the account of the institution;—that it fully recognises all the Scripture aspects of the Eucharist;—and embodies all the leading features of ancient liturgical worship: not recognising Holy Communion as a means of bringing amongst us Christ as an object of worship,—and attributing the sacrificial character not to any one particular portion of the ritual, but to the whole ordinance.

We regard this Essay as a very valuable contribution to the right understanding of the greatest of Christian ordinances. And this is giving it no mean place. For it may be taken as certain that in whatever outworks of the Faith, and to whatever degree in each of them, future conflicts may rage,—however religious society and religious literature may seethe and ferment here or there, it is in this central place of Christian belief and worship that the main battle will have to be fought. It is here, whatever may be the

subjectivities of individual believers, that we give utterance to the fact and tidings of Christ's Death (*καταγγέλλομεν*, wrongly rendered "*shew*"): whatever outposts may have been forced in, here is the citadel. And above all, it is here, in the purity and majesty of our estimate and fulfilment of our Master's great command, that will be rested our ultimate triumph in vindication of our position as against Rome. It is not the first time in Church history that by certain ministrations men have been made to abhor the offering of the Lord: not the first time that He has shewn His intervention, in raising up a faithful priest to do according to that which is in His heart and in His mind. May we not, in the midst of many things that are discouraging, look, in this conviction, for the fulfilment of His promise, that He will build such His servant a sure house, and that he shall walk before His Anointed for ever? At least, in building such an anticipation on the ground which we have been specifying, we are at one with our Essayist.

"The Communion Service of the English branch of the Church Catholic seems marked out by God's providence to be the expression of the devotion of the foremost races of the earth in their highest act of divine service. It is the rite of that branch of the Church which, whatever be its shortcomings, or scandals, seems to hold its own in the face of the spread of civilization, and of the progress of natural science, and of the utmost latitude of thought."

VIII. The Eighth of these Essays is one no less remarkable, on a subject widely different;—"What are our Missions doing in India?" by Sir Bartle Frere. The main points of interest in the Essay are, the view which is given of the great breaking down and inevitable ultimate extinction of distinctive Hindoo thought and life by our Christian habits, and, which will at the present time be an important contribution to a judgment which we are called on to form, the distinguished writer's opinion respecting that remarkable movement of Brahmoism which was lately treated at length in this journal. The living apostle of that movement is at present in this country, and speaking for himself and his cause. It will doubtless be seen how far he may be able to meet the charges which Sir Bartle Frere brings against the movement; charges pointed by a shaft from its own quiver. He alleges, that whereas it professes to be founded on the necessity of the Church of India being a strictly Indian Church, not that of England or any other European country,—on the acknowledgment and adoration of God in a strictly national and Indian style,—all its theological statements are vague and illogical, except where they are borrowed bodily from the Bible:—and "its most striking peculiarity is, the almost entire absence of any genuine Hindoo element in the theology. There is not a sentence which might not have been written by a deistical reader of

moral philosophy in an European university, who had never heard the name of any Hindoo Deity." And he proceeds:—

"This clearly is not the sort of material which can either cement together the disintegrated particles of Hindoo society, or which, if it did, could long withstand the shock of hostile criticism. It lays no claim to any authority or standard stronger or more accurate than the believer's conscience, and is therefore liable to infinite variations, not only at different times and in different people, but in the same individual at different periods of his life. It might satisfy an enthusiastic dreamer as long as he could live in a cloud-land of his own invention; but to men struggling in practical life it offers no guide or support, and there is scarcely a page of the New Testament which would not be more acceptable than the whole body of Brahmoist divinity, to one oppressed by the difficulties of this world, or by doubts regarding the next."

Among the remarkable facts adduced by Sir Bartle Frere, facts which the universal and hardly undeserved discredit thrown upon missionary journals has much obscured, we may venture to cite one, which will surprise those unaccustomed to deal with such matters.

"In one instance, which I know was carefully investigated, all the inhabitants of a remote village in the Deccan had abjured idolatry and caste, removed from their temples the idols which had been worshipped there time out of mind, and agreed to profess a form of Christianity which they had deduced for themselves from a careful perusal of a single Gospel and a few tracts. These books had not been given by any missionary, but had been casually left with some clothes and other cast-off property by a merchant, whose name even had been forgotten, and who, as far as could be ascertained, had never spoken of Christianity to his servant, to whom he gave at parting these things with others of which he had then no further need."

IX. Dr. Barry's Essay on "The Church and Education" has, shall we call it the good or the ill fortune, of dealing with a subject now uppermost in every patriotic mind. Of necessity, much of its contents has become already too well-worn to attract any attention. The line which he takes on this much-vexed question is that in the main which we venture to think must be taken by every Christian man. As matters in dispute have been brought out into sharper and sharper outline in the course of discussion, it seems to us that one necessity, for us,—I will not say of the Church of England only, but for us of the Christian Church,—has ever become more and more plainly marked; that, I mean, of insisting on THE RELIGIOUS BASIS FOR ALL SCHOOL INSTRUCTION. For it has become clearer and clearer that this, and no other matter, is that about which the central conflict is being waged. Even at the risk of deferring for a year, or for more, a much-needed national measure, this point must be inflexibly maintained. And the more so because we all happen to know, that in *practice*, there is hardly any "religious difficulty" at all. We are learning to trust one another: the proselytizing element is

falling more and more into discredit, and shrinking in extent. The difficulty arises when we come to put practice on paper. We cannot prescribe by Act of Parliament that men shall act, "reasonable regard being had to the feelings and scruples of others;"—though we are happy to know that such will almost universally be the case. The law must be made for unrighteous men in this matter—for men who will tamper with the susceptibilities of children, and the consciences of parents. This is at present our problem—an immensely difficult one, but at all events narrowed almost to a mere exercise of ingenuity, as having to face, when advanced to a solution, hardly any real occasion of action. Meantime, let not either party in the strife, and least of the two that one which is the jealous guardian of liberty of conscience, be taxed with vexatious conduct, if by its objections it seems to be putting hindrance in the way of speedy legislation. This is a matter in which an unsuccessful national experiment would be fatal. It would be rash to say, that we are drifting towards one: but when we find the American system being pressed upon us in spite of Mr. (now Bishop) Fraser's reports of its total want of success,—when we find the "League" placarding our walls with conspicuous appeals to working men whether they will have education for nothing or be compelled to pay for it, in the face of the acknowledged discouraging effect of every form of gratuitous benevolence,—we do deeply feel that it would be better to wait until some of the would-be educators get themselves instructed, than to risk passing a bill representing such crudities.

We noted a valuable remark in Dr. Barry's Essay, which may be new to those who have not had the good fortune to read it. He observes on the somewhat injured tone which many of the clergy are adopting,—setting the disproportioned sacrifices which they have hitherto made in contrast with the supposed maltreatment which they are about to receive,—that the fact of such disproportionate sacrifices may be correctly stated, but that perhaps they will do well not to parade it too much, considering that in many cases such sacrifices have been the price paid for an exclusive maintenance of their own power of governing and visiting the schools. Had they been of a different mind, willing to give their people due share of power in the schools, help might have been more freely forthcoming.

We have been obliged to pass over so summarily Dr. Barry's careful Essay, that we feel it but fair to give his conclusion in his own words:—

"The conclusions to which I come are these. Whatever system be adopted, it will be the bounden duty of the Church to labour still for the religious education of the whole people; and it is certain that under any

system the power of the Church, and even the influence of the clergy, will be immense, so long as Christianity is a living faith, and the Church a living body. But the maintenance of the present system—extended, supplemented, reinvigorated—is the course which best meets the exigencies of the case, and represents the real opinions and feelings of educated Englishmen. It is the course which economizes the national resources, likely in any case to be very severely taxed, and preserves institutions which have been raised at great cost and sacrifice, and which have proved their usefulness and capacity of development. It is the course which best provides for that religious element in education, which, even in an intellectual point of view, is immeasurably the highest, and which cannot be deposed from pre-eminence by those who would educate the whole man. It is the course which best secures religious liberty, to believers and unbelievers, to the advocates of definite and indefinite religious teaching alike, and by the very diversity of its system represents the diversity of thought."

X. The two remaining Essays, on "The Church and the People," and "Conciliation and Comprehension," are by the editors: and though *from the point of view assumed by the volume*, the subjects are fairly set forth, there is nothing in their treatment calling for especial remark on our part. We fairly own that the short-comings of both Essays are to our mind so great as to leave us but little to treat of in that which they have advanced. For instance, in "The Church and the People," we have not a word about the real reasons why the Church has lost her hold on the multitudes who stand aloof from her. There is much about *going to church*, but it never seems to strike the writer that there are more important things even than that: that men will not come within churches where their consciences are to be set asleep and their doubts ignored. In their Sunday newspaper they find, or they fancy they find, themselves treated as men and rational beings: and, finding this, they won't come to church to be treated as children. Set before them there something which enters into their real state of mind and actual feelings and anxieties, and then if they will not come you may have ground of complaint. But as long as our sermons deal with matters of which the working man knows nothing, and in words which might for all he understands of them be a dead language, one is almost inclined to suspect the regular attendant, and to honour him that stays away.

XI. The "Conciliation and Comprehension" of the last Essay is, as might have been expected, a case of "*tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum*." It is all "bringing back to the Church of their Fathers:" dangerous work, one would think, when that Church, as we would have them understand it, hardly reaches back beyond the fourth or fifth generation. The writer quotes with approval the late Archer Butler's somewhat humorous but just adaptation of St. John's narrative, remarking that when Our Lord crossed the Sea of Galilee in his ship with the disciples "there were with Him, besides, other little ships:" but this

is all the trace we find of it in the Essay. Whatever be the state of the water, the freight of all the little ships must be put on board the large one—a doubtful method of ensuring safety for either.

Our readers may perceive that our estimate of this volume is, in the main, a high one. Some portions of it we regret: none more than the introductory Essay. It is out of tune with the rest: its spirit is reactionary, and must do harm. And the two concluding Essays do little more than swell the bulk of the book. But in every one of those which lie between, the thoughtful reader will find that on which he will ponder, and to which he will gladly return.

We reserve the volume of (no less remarkable) Nonconformist Essays for treatment on a future occasion.

HENRY ALFORD.



THREE BROAD CHURCH CATHOLICS:

DÖLLINGER—"JANUS"—FROSCHAMMER.

Kirche und Kirchen, Papstthum und Kirchenstaat. Von JOH. JOS. IGN. DÖLLINGER. München, 1861.

Der Papst und das Concil. Von JANUS. Leipzig, 1860.

Die wahren Hindernisse und die Grundbedingungen einer durchgreifenden Reform der katholischen Kirche, zunächst in Deutschland erörtert. Von DR. A. FICHLER. Leipzig, 1870.

Das Christenthum und die moderne Naturwissenschaft. Von J. FROSCHAMMER. Wien, 1868.

Das Recht der Eigenen Ueberzeugung. Von J. FROSCHAMMER. Leipzig, 1869.

THE day is probably far off when language will cease to be conventional. Until that time comes we must be content to struggle with the imperfection of the signs which represent our ideas. The words Broad Church Catholic seem a redundant tautology. Does not Catholic mean universal, all-embracing? Is it not another word for liberal or comprehensive, implying greatness of heart and soul, wide and far-reaching sympathy? Whatever may have been the original signification of the word, it is certain that those who are most eager to be called Catholics, are usually understood to have least of the spirit of true Catholicity. They start with a claim to some peculiar possession which is supposed to give them a right to be exclusive. Hence the fact daily to be seen, at least in England, and which put into language seems a paradox, that those who call themselves Catholics are the most sectarian, while some of the smallest sectaries are, in spirit, most truly Catholic.

This paradox is due to the many conventional meanings of the word. The Romanist limits it to those of his own communion. The High Anglican includes himself, the Greek Church, and as many other Churches as can boast a succession of bishops duly consecrated. The Church of England, in the only description which it ever gives of the Church Catholic, includes "all who profess and call them-

selves Christians." To this definition nearly all Protestant sects agree. The Church Catholic is regarded as the whole house of God throughout the world, with all its varieties of thought and language, with all the modifications of time and place and circumstance, with various degrees of perfection and imperfection, separated into sects and nations, but united before God and one in the name of Christ. Some go beyond this and include the world as potentially the Church. The world is the Church in virtue of the fatherhood of God, and Catholic because of the brotherhood of man.

It would make too long a digression to enter into the history of the word Catholic. It was claimed by all sects in the first centuries of Christianity. Each boasted that it was the Catholic Church. St. Augustine was asked by the Donatists to define Catholic. He answered that it meant "over all." It is the title of that Church "which is diffused throughout the world, is found in all lands, and is everywhere known as the Catholic Church." It was objected that a part of the world was pagan, another part heretical, how, then, could the Church be "over all?" Augustine answers that the promise was made to Abraham,—“In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed;” and, again, that it is written in the Psalms concerning the Messiah,—“He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river to the end of the earth.” To make his argument good, Augustine added,—“Surely the promises of God cannot fail.” The “*Orbis terrarum*,” or Roman world, was supposed by Augustine to embrace all the inhabitants of the earth. They had been outwardly converted to Christianity. They were included in one empire, and the Church of the empire was, in idea, at least, the Church of the whole world. But the Donatists, like most heretics, were rather shrewd people. They hinted to Augustine that there might be nations on the other side of the world. Augustine answered that that could not be, for there was a great sea between us and the other side of the world, and it was impossible that any of the children of Adam could ever have crossed that sea. The Catholic Church had dominion over the whole world. It was to repress heresy and schism. It was Sarah the lawful wife, while the Donatists were Hagar, who was to be chastised till she returned to her mistress. The property of the Donatists was to be taken from them in virtue of the promise that the Messiah was to reign from the river to the end of the earth.

St. Augustine's idea of the Catholic Church is the one which we usually associate with the Church of Rome. If, then, to “Catholic” in this sense, we add “Broad Church,” we make no tautology. We only try to express what we mean.

It is always with a singular interest that Englishmen think of Germany. No two nations, if we may speak of the Germans as a nation, are more conscious of brotherhood. They understand each

other. They have been mutually indebted to each other, and both of them gratefully acknowledge their debts. No educated German is ignorant of English literature, and now happily in England the capacity to read German is part of the education of every well-educated man or woman. Sprung from the old *Teutones*, kindred in blood and thought and language, there are many things which unite the two races. But there is one supreme over all. That one is religion. Germany was the cradle of the Reformation. The Germans are Protestants. So are we. The name of Luther is a household word in England. We pronounce it with feelings of reverence akin to worship.

We have said that the Germans are Protestants, but this statement needs qualification. In number, not more than half the people are Protestants. That half is confessedly the higher, the better educated, the more influential. It is among the Protestants that the German spirit has had its best and highest incarnations. Our interest in Protestant Germany makes us almost forget that there is a Catholic Germany. This forgetfulness, however, will be remedied as we become familiar with the names of Döllinger, Huber, and Froschammer—remedied, too, by the memory of recent vigorous protests of German archbishops, bishops, and cardinals, against what is properly and strictly Romanism. Rauscher and Schwartzberg, Hefele and Strossmayer, are already heroes with the English public.

For some time after the Reformation the Catholics of Germany were zealous opponents of the Reformed religion. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, according to their own historians, they did but little for the Catholic cause, and still less for literature. Their prelates were princes, and the character of the ecclesiastic was frequently merged in that of the statesman. Any signs of life which their theologians manifested were in the direction of disobedience to the Roman See. Those who were most anxious for the conversion of Protestants regarded the authority claimed by Rome as a hindrance to the desired unity of the Christian world. In 1763, John Nicholas von Hontheim, Suffragan-Bishop to the Elector of Trèves, published a book under the name of Febronius, in which he maintained that the supremacy was conferred on the Roman Pontiffs by the Church, and not by Christ. He denied that the Pope had any proper jurisdiction or authority over all Churches, or that his laws had any binding force except through "the unanimous adhesion of all bishops." This work was condemned at Rome, but the doctrine of Febronius was generally received in the theological schools of Catholic Germany.

The reforms of the Emperor Joseph were all in the direction of securing the independence of the German Catholics. A check was given to the jurisdiction which the Papal nuncios had long exercised

in Germany. The emperor, with the bishops, took the government of the Church into their own hands. In 1786 the ecclesiastical Electors of Mayence, Trèves, and Cologne, with the Archbishop of Salzburg, met at Ems, and framed the articles known as the "Twenty-six Points of Ems." In these it was denied that the Roman See had any right to jurisdiction in Germany. The "Twenty-six Points" were not received by the other prelates, and under the influence of external pressure they were revoked next year by their authors. In 1814, after the general peace, the German governments negotiated with Rome for new ecclesiastical organizations. Roman Catholic writers complain that the stipulations of the Concordats then made have never been honestly fulfilled. The prelates have supported the princes in giving less allegiance to Rome than was promised. The principles of Febronius appeared in an intensified form in a party known as "Liberals," or "Anti-Celibates," who advocated a German National Church, a German liturgy, the sacraments administered in German, and the abolition of clerical celibacy. Another party, called "Hermesians," were kindred to the Liberals. They took their name from Dr. Hermes, a Catholic professor at Bonn, who thought that by adopting Luther's doctrine of private judgment he would be able to overthrow Luther's theology. Count von Spiegel, Archbishop of Cologne, with many of the clergy of Westphalia and the Rhine provinces, were numbered among the Hermesians. Both these parties as such have disappeared, and it is only within the last thirty years that the genuine Romanist could look with any approach to satisfaction on the Catholicism of the Catholics of Germany.

The first theologian of Catholic Germany whose name became familiar to Englishmen was Möhler. Through him we learned something of Diepenbrock, Sailer, and other great prelates, who fairly represented the better side of the German Catholics. In Möhler there was something of what we see in our own Newman—a rational theology conjoined somewhat incongruously with a belief in infallibility. Möhler had been brought up as a Catholic, but it was only Germany that could have produced such a Catholic. Protestantism helped to make him. In his first curacies of Walderstadt and Reidlingen he was reckoned a Rationalist. But this did not raise against him the persecution which it would have raised against a young Rationalistic curate in our Protestant Church of England. "It is allowable," said an old priest, in the spirit of the truest Catholicism, "for such a learned young man to believe a little differently from us old men." A few years later Möhler receded from Rationalism. And this he owed, not to Catholics, but to Plank, the Protestant Professor of Göttingen. The cure which Plank recommended was effectual. It was the study of the ancient Fathers. The spirit of reason, however, remained. It was fettered, but not dead. Möhler, like Newman,

was a great master of dialectic. Like Newman, too, he appealed to conscience, to reason, and to Scripture; and, like Newman, the force of his argument lay in giving a new colouring to Roman Catholic theology. Baur, one of Möhler's ablest opponents, seized the vertebræ of the controversy when he told Möhler that he had not fairly stated the doctrine of his own Church.

☞ Möhler was a great man, and great things were expected from him; but he passed away when he had scarcely reached the meridian of life. Then we become familiar with Döllinger, who is now the acknowledged intellectual leader of the Catholics of Germany. Several of Döllinger's works are translated into English, and are extensively read. There is probably no living German author so well known and so highly esteemed by English Protestants. We envy the German people, who, as Protestants and Catholics, can live together in peace, and discuss the questions on which they differ with mutual patience and forbearance. Catholicism, we use the term conventionally, is never presented to us with that tone of impartiality which is manifest in Möhler and Döllinger. In England it has so little of what is lovely, that when we hear of "good" Catholics we think of the old proverb about Nazareth. Its priests, with downcast eyes, apparently ashamed to look honest Protestants in the face, steal through our streets, as if conscious of intrusion. Its laity, if we except some old families chiefly in the north of England, are a horde of degraded Irish, multitudes of whom storm the parish clergy in their vestries for charity, volunteering to change their religion for the smallest coin, but without the most distant intention of doing what they offer to do. The only arguments which we hear in favour of Catholicism are some anathemas against reason, culminating in a demand for submission of body, soul, and spirit to the See of Rome. To these may be added misrepresentations of Protestants and Protestant teaching in "Catholic" reviews and newspapers, generally the outcome of that wild exaggeration which is natural to the Irish mind. We grant willingly, on the other hand, that the spirit of the specially Protestant press is "devilish." Frederick Robertson says, in one of his sermons, "The religious press of this country has a tongue set on fire of hell." But, vile as some of our Protestant newspapers are, they are more than rivalled in baseness by those which boast themselves Catholic, whether Roman or "Anglican."

In the "Church and the Churches" Döllinger speaks some severe truth concerning the Church of England; but, taking this book altogether, the estimate of Protestantism is impartial. He tells his brethren of the Church of Rome that for the sake of their own cause they must give up using their pulpits to abuse the Reformers. He would have, we imagine, but little sympathy with a sermon we once heard, which the priest began thus:—"In the sixteenth century there was a

blackguard in Germany of the name of Luther." A similar style of speaking of the Reformers has lately been tried in England by some of our imitation "Catholic" Anglicans; but Döllinger, whose acquaintance with the history and literature of the Reformation is extensive and accurate, admits that the Reformers did a great work, and that the evils of the Church of Rome were past endurance. Luther made mistakes. Had he lived to renounce them his retractations would have been more numerous than those of St. Augustine. Döllinger says, though not in reference to Luther, "It is a law as valid for the future as for the past, that in theology we can only through errors attain to truth."

Döllinger acknowledges that Protestant Reformers and Protestant theologians have rendered great services to Christianity. He believes that four-fifths of our differences are misunderstandings; that when these are removed, and a desire for unity is really felt on both sides, then the reunion of Christendom will come. But Döllinger is not unfaithful to his profession as a Catholic. He believes in the infallibility of the Church, though not of the Pope. He does not advocate national Churches. The idea of a national Church is to him Pagan. These existed before Christianity, but with Christianity came Catholicity—that is, one Church for all lands. To preserve the unity of the Church, and to keep it independent of secular governments, it must have a spiritual head. The Bishop of Rome has always been this unifying and protecting power. The Papal See is inextricably interwoven with the being of the Church. Döllinger says that the first mistake of Protestantism is "the delusion that the Papal See has arrogated to itself a despotic and absolute power, and exercised it whenever it was not restrained by fear." "This delusion," he adds, "is generally diffused, especially in Germany and England." In these countries Protestants really believe that the Pope's power is boundless, and that individual Churches are defenceless against it. But so far is this from being true, that the power of the Pope is very limited. Döllinger says it is universally admitted that the Pope cannot dispense with things which are commanded by Divine laws. He quotes and endorses the words of De Maistre, that "everything restrains the Pope—canon laws, national customs, monarchs, tribunals, remonstrances, negotiations, duty, fear, prudence, and, chief of all, public opinion, the queen of the world." He quotes, further, the words of Pius VII. and other Church authorities, denying that any absolute power resides in the Pope. He appeals to the declarations put forth in 1826 by the Gallican and Irish Churches, with the sanction of the Roman See, which affirmed that the Bishop of Rome had no jurisdiction in things temporal. He adds that in the middle ages "the laws and rights in religious matters were the same for all. It was everywhere taught that not only every bishop,

but the Pope himself, must, should he fall into erroneous doctrine, be deposed; and, in case of his perseverance in error, he must, like every other, be condemned." Since this was written, Dr. Döllinger has learned that the "delusion" is not entirely without foundation; and, should a certain dogma be established by the Council now sitting at Rome, the great German theologian, proud of the name of Catholic, will be in the same condemnation with the Protestants of Germany and England.

In the work of Janus we advance some steps beyond Döllinger. The author is generally understood to be Huber, another professor in the University of Munich. Huber's studies hitherto have been mostly in philosophy. He has written, besides some smaller papers, a little book, called "Philosophical Writings;" a treatise on John Scotus Erigena, illustrating the philosophy and theology of the middle ages; and another on "The Philosophy of the Church Fathers." The present work might have been written by an English divine of the seventeenth century. The standpoint, in fact, is substantially the same as would have been taken by Andrewes, Bramhall, Cosin, or any of the defendants of the Catholicity of the Church of England against the accusations of the Church of Rome. Janus strikes with even a sharper axe, and he has the advantage over them of the criticism of two centuries on disputed books and points of history. As a German Catholic, he has lived in the belief that the Church is independent of the Roman See. Like the other Catholics of Germany, he has been indulging in dreams of the reunion of Christendom. But the proposals of the Pope's Œcumenical have disturbed his repose.

There are two great parties in the Roman Catholic Church, and the first point of their difference concerns the bond which unites them. Janus speaks of a reactionary movement which has been going on for twenty-five years, and which, by means of the Council, is preparing to take possession of the whole organic life of the Church. This movement is mainly the work of the Jesuits. Their ideal of a Church is a universal spiritual empire, with the secular arm as its servant, to punish heresy and check every kind of opposition. Our ideal of the Church, Janus says, is separated from this by a great gulf. The Catholic Church is not the Papacy. That is but an excrescence entailing manifold diseases. The Primacy, in the judgment of all Catholics, was founded by Christ. Its type was ordained in the person of Peter. But this Primacy has been corrupted into a Papacy. The history of this transformation, as described by Janus from its first germs to its present stage before the Roman Council, only illustrates the craving of man for an absolute authority, with a fixed determination that if such an authority cannot be found it must be invented.

We cannot regard the difference between Janus and "true Catholics" as anything else but "a great gulf." It is the question of ecclesiastical authority against the divine government of the world. Benedict XIII. condemned the whole of Christendom when it refused to acknowledge him; and when deposed by the Council of Constance, he declared from his castle of Peniscola, "The whole Church is assembled in Peniscola, not in Constance, as once the whole human race was collected in Noah's ark." To this the disciples of Loyola, Janus says, will bring the Catholic Church, rather than admit the divine right of reason and conscience. And when the educated classes of Europe are thoroughly forced out of the Church, then it will be easier to guide the ship, then it will be easier to keep the flock obedient to the shepherds. "Catholicism, hitherto regarded as a universal religion, will, by a notable irony of its fate, be transformed into the precise opposite of what its name and notion imports." This warfare against reason, civilization, and human liberty, is not imaginary or inferential. It is openly avowed by the Jesuits and the advocates of Papal infallibility. They claim jurisdiction for the Church not merely over the minds, but over the bodies of men; a power to inflict bodily chastisement, to impose fasts or fines, to imprison, hang, or burn. "The Syllabus condemns the whole existing view of the rights of conscience, religious faith, and profession; it is a wicked error to admit Protestants to equal political rights with Catholics, or to allow Protestant immigrants the free use of their worship; on the contrary, to suppress them is a sacred duty, when it has become possible, as the Jesuit fathers and their adherents teach." It is admitted that this spirit has been working for centuries in the Church, but it is denied that it is the spirit of the Church, or necessary to the idea of Catholicism. The peace of Westphalia was condemned by Pope Innocent X. because it secured to Protestants the free exercise of their religion and their admission to civil offices. Döllinger, in his zeal for reconciliation, ascribes the Pope's disapprobation of the peace of Westphalia to a clause which imported that every civil government was to enforce its own religion within its own dominions. But though this spirit of Papal supremacy has been working in the Church for ages, it is only in these last days that the necessity has arisen for a final effort. The world has been developing independently of the Church. The voice of reason has been speaking in the world's highway. Even Catholics have been judging for themselves. But now, at last, the Pope is to interfere. He is to explain the true idea of a Church; he is to set aside the old canon of Vincentius Lirinensis, "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*" He is to put an end to all differences about doctrine; he is to save all men from scepticism, by saving them from inquiry. The

Biblical scholars of England and Germany are to be relieved from their arduous labours and their endless perplexities. A telegraph from Rome is to enlighten the world. No matter how ignorant the Pope may be, infallibility will serve for knowledge. In the expressive words of Erbermann, a Jesuit professor of Mayence, the world henceforth is to be instructed in righteousness "by the mouth of a speaking ass."

Janus quotes many cases from history which prove that Popes in past times have not been infallible. Innocent I. and Gelasius I. declared that infants dying without having received the communion "go straight to hell." This doctrine was anathematized by the Council of Trent. Leo IX. and Gregory VII. re-ordained priests that had been ordained by simoniacal bishops, in opposition to the constant teaching of the Church, that ordinations are valid whatever be the personal unworthiness of the ordaining bishop. Pope Pelagius declared that the invocation of the Trinity was indispensable to a valid baptism; while Nicholas I. assured the Bulgarians that baptism in the name of Christ was sufficient. Stephen II. allowed marriage with a slave girl to be dissolved, and a new one contracted; whereas all previous Popes had pronounced such marriages indissoluble. Nicholas II. taught the Capernaic doctrine that Christ's body is sensibly touched by the hands and broken by the teeth in the Eucharist; "an error," Janus says, "rejected by the whole Church." Pope Innocent maintained that the laws of Deuteronomy were binding on the Church, because that book is the second book of the law, and the Christian Church is the second Church. Pope Sextus V. published an "authentic" edition of the Bible, and in a Bull declared it to be the only one which was true and genuine. It was found to contain two thousand errors. The copies were recalled, and a new and correct edition issued in its place.

According to the earliest authentic histories, the voice of the Bishop of Rome was not reckoned final. Pope Stephen pronounced heretics' baptism invalid. St. Cyprian and Firmilian of Cæsarea denied the right of the Pope to dictate a doctrine to other bishops and churches. Augustine, looking back to this controversy, says that Stephen's judgment was not received as the decision of the Church. In the Arian disputes, the Roman See was passive for half a century. The first Popes who took a part in them were Julius and Liberius. Julius pronounced Marcellus of Ancyra, the Sabellian, an orthodox Christian; Liberius condemned Athanasius, and subscribed to the creed of Arius, giving a proof which satisfied all the middle ages that a Pope might fall into heresy. When Jerome declared that the world had become Arian, we might have expected that Catholics would have turned to the Roman See for deliverance from their perplexities. But we read only of synods. The Pope's name

is never mentioned. In these times all dogmatic questions were settled by councils, and these were convoked by the emperors, not by the Popes.

The beginning of the Papacy is dated from the middle of the ninth century. It was founded on the forged decretals of Isidore, which pretended to be decrees of the earliest Popes, confirming the decisions of councils. This idea of a Papacy developed into a belief in infallibility. Isidore makes one of the early Popes say that "the Roman Church remains to the end free from all stain of heresy." Writings, too, were forged in the names of Fathers, and genuine writings were corrupted, to support the pretensions of the Papacy. St. Augustine, speaking of the canonical books, said that those were pre-eminently attested which the Apostolic Churches had first received and preserved. This passage was changed into "Those Epistles belong to canonical writings which the Holy See has issued." This forgery served Peter Lombard and Gratian, and in later times Cardinals Turrecremata and Cajetan, for certain evidence that the great Bishop of Hippo raised the infallibility of the Holy See above that of the New Testament Epistles. Some extended the idea of Papal infallibility to that of Papal sinlessness. A rightly-appointed Pope was said to be holy, because of the merits of St. Peter imputed to him. But it was found difficult to maintain this in the face of the evil lives of many of the Bishops of Rome.

The doctrine of Papal infallibility found ardent supporters in the monks, who were independent of the bishops, and whose prerogative rested on Papal authority. It was enforced, too, by the Inquisition, in all countries where that institution was established. Gregory IX. on the strength of the fable of the Donation of Constantine, asserted that the Pope was lord and master over the whole world. Innocent IV. claimed to be supreme ruler of the spiritual and the temporal. St. Paul says, "The spiritual man judges all things," which some Popes understand to mean that they are to judge all nations. The Roman Church became the Roman Court. Instead of a community of "clergy and laity bound together by the ties of brotherhood," it became "a chancery of writers, notaries, and tax-gatherers, a rallying point for clerical place-hunters from every nation in Europe." Devoted Catholic bishops applied to the Church the same prophecies which had been applied to it by the sectaries. It was the venal harlot whose nakedness was to be uncovered before all men. Even St. Bonaventura, whom the Pope had loaded with honours, and who was bound to Rome by the closest ties, declared the Roman Church to be the harlot who makes kings and nations drunk with her whoredoms. When Dante called the Papacy Antichrist, and applied to it the Apocalyptic prophecy, it was not from the blindness of Ghibelline party spirit; he was only expressing the judgment of many earnest Catholics in that age.

Dr. Pichler is one of Döllinger's most advanced disciples. He is considerably beyond Janus. In fact, he has either left, or intends leaving, the communion of the Roman Catholic Church. He thinks the position of the Liberal party untenable. Döllinger and Janus take their stand against Papal infallibility on the infallibility of General Councils. This, in Pichler's judgment, was an error of the Reformers. They asked a General Council. Trent came, and they were condemned. Was Trent not Œcumenical? Will the Liberal Catholics abide by the anathemas of the Council of Trent? If they do, what avails it that they reject the infallibility of the Pope? The Reformers, indeed, had a plea which modern Catholics have not. The decisions of the Councils of Constance and Basle gave them hope that a General Council would do justice to all sides. The illusion was dispelled by the Council of Trent. If the present Council decrees Papal infallibility, then it must be true, or we have the other alternative—a General Council is not infallible.

The true hindrance to the reformation of the German Catholic Church is the influence of Ultramontanism. What that is may not be easily defined. When it comes in the gross, we can distinctly perceive it, but often it is infinitesimally diluted. Luther described it as that which is opposed to everything "free, Christian, or German." It consists of a claim put forth by the Church of Rome—or what, in one sense, is the same thing, the Court of Rome—with various degrees of authority to govern all Churches in all nations. Janus says that the Papacy is no part of the Church. The "true Catholics," as they call themselves, make the Papacy the essence of the Church. Döllinger comes mid-way. He denies Papal infallibility; but he says that those who do not acknowledge the Pope, and receive his Church for their Church, separate themselves from the Church universal. Germany has been for ages in conflict with the spirit of Romanism. "The cleft," Pichler says, "between Ultramontanism, with its frivolous irreligion, and the religious earnestness of the German people, became ever wider and deeper, till it found its strongest personal expression in Luther and Leo X." After the Reformation, the Papacy trembled even for the hold which it had upon Catholic Germany. Since this century began, the Jesuits have been hard at work. Twenty or thirty years ago it was expected that the whole of Germany would soon be restored to the Church of Rome. These hopes have not been realized. In the judgment of "Liberal" Catholics the Jesuits are hindering rather than furthering the return of Protestants to the Catholic Church.

The greatest enemies of the Church of Rome can have no more ardent wish than that the present Council would establish the dogma of Papal infallibility. This would put the topstone on the Babel of confusion. It would bring definitely before the world what Romanism

is. Pichler wishes that Protestants be told plainly how the Catholic Church regards them, and how by its own inherent principles it must regard them. Apologists for Catholicism in Germany show mercy to Protestants; but it is only in Germany that they are led to hope for mercy. In Italy they are told—as, for instance, by Cardinal Perrone—that “the leaders of Protestantism are men who, because of their evil deeds, deserve the gallows,” and that they are “all, body, soul, and spirit, the property of the devil.” The Church of Rome claims to be the only Church in which men can be saved. The greater part of educated Catholics in all lands, but especially in Germany, are opposed to this dogma. Let it only be known that this is the doctrine of the Church, and “Liberal” Catholics will see that their position is no longer tenable. It has been said by Pressensé that “concerning nothing does greater ignorance prevail than concerning Catholicism.” Döllinger has said that Protestants would be astounded if they compared their own convictions with the doctrines of their Confessions. It is ignorance of the Protestant standards which is the bulwark of Protestantism. On this Pichler remarks,—

“I very much fear this astonishment would be far greater with Catholics who would examine the Creed of the Council of Trent, which lays claim to infallibility; and the two hundred millions which Döllinger says desire a Pope, would dwindle down to the number, certainly very large, of those who do not know what they desire, or who have no desire on the subject.”

Pichler finds no hope for the Catholics of Germany but in separation from Rome. They must unite with the Protestants, and set up a National Church. The object of Ultramontaniam is to crush that freedom which Catholics already possess. The real conflict is between the divine progress of the world and the authority of Rome. Pichler sees a new era of Christianity dawning before the German mind. It will be an era in which Christianity will acknowledge God in science, in civilization, and in all the forms of human progress. Between this spirit and that of Rome there is a “great gulf fixed.” It is useless to pretend union any longer, or to speak of it as possible. In separation only is their hope. To this, Pichler says, Janus and the liberal Catholics must come, if not, all they are saying and doing will come to nothing.

In Froschammer we have an exposition of the Christianity which is henceforth to be preached to the Catholics of Germany. Its first principle is opposition to ecclesiastical authority. All progress is regarded as divine. The law of development to which every organism is subject is also the law of States and Churches, which are historical organisms. There is a law of death as well as of life. To it, too, States and Churches are subject; Christianity, at least in its externals, is not excepted. Times of transition in religious communities from life to death and death to life are times of trial, doubt, and

difficulty. But, as in nature, the old form dies and the new one takes its place, so in religion the old organizations decay, and newer and higher forms of faith are evolved. It is vain for ecclesiastics to breathe their anathemas and denunciations against modern science, the culture of the age, and the free government of States. This is God's world, and progress is God's order. Too long has the Church been at war with God. Too long have the so-called princes of the Church persecuted the world's benefactors—the genuine priests of truth. Henceforth Christianity must take account of the world's progress, and acknowledge all that is in itself good. As grace supposes nature and is built upon it, so Christianity supposes science, and must embrace all that science teaches. Most men prefer a positive religion. It is easy; it saves inquiry and anxiety. But the problems which present themselves to us are not problems of our making. We did not desire them. To turn aside and disregard them would be to disregard the work which in our day God has given us to do.

Froschammer starts with the familiar question of science and the Bible. The student of nature dwells chiefly on the discrepancies between them, while the theologian is deeply concerned to evince their harmony. But to harmonize the facts of nature with the statements of the Bible human ingenuity has laboured, and ever will labour, in vain. While this failure is manifest the Bible loses its place as a divinely-inspired source of revelation. Theologians feel the necessity of saying that though the Bible contains a revelation, yet there are things recorded in it which are not strictly true. Froschammer wishes to approach the subject from a philosophical standpoint. He is to pursue the inquiry in subjection to natural and logical laws. He is to build on axioms that cannot be disputed, and to recognise the facts of the natural world. Theologians, he says, usually start from this principle, though without confessing it. They say that between nature and revelation there can be no contradiction; that nature can teach nothing contrary to what is revealed; but when nature does reveal something different from what the Bible teaches, theologians say that revelation is more to be trusted than human reason. To this it is answered that the truth of revelation is not so clear and immediate as an axiom or a fact in nature. The natural, or that which we know immediately, must be held as the foundation, and used as the criterion, of truth. A Catholic would add in addition to the Bible the authority of the Church; but this authority, Froschammer conceives, cannot rise higher or be more certain than the revelation itself, and must be subjected to the same criterion of natural truth. Without this foundation in natural reason we should be incapable of knowing anything. Whatever contradicts the faculty of knowing cannot be a truth of revela-

tion. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Church have been compelled to act on this principle. They now admit the truth of the Copernican system, belief in which was once damnable heresy. Christianity has nothing to fear from science. Its essence as taught by Jesus remains the same, and as natural knowledge advances its divine origin will become more evident.

The first science which came in conflict with Church theology and Church authority was the science of astronomy. Christ Himself taught nothing concerning the heavenly bodies. Religious and ethical doctrines are not inseparably connected with any natural sciences. Christ spoke of Nature as it appeared to the people who were His hearers. But the system of theology which grew up in the Church incorporated the Ptolemaic astronomy. The earth was supposed to be the centre around which the sun, moon, and stars revolved. This seemed to correspond with the Mosaic account of the creation, and with the sun standing still on Gibeon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon. It became connected with a theory of inspiration which regarded the letter of the Bible as inspired. For centuries theological writers followed this belief till the Church consciousness and Western science seemed to have been united for ever. Other things helped to confirm this view of the universe. The doctrine of the Incarnation—that God became man, and died for the redemption of man—seemed to demand that the earth be the great centre of creation, and not a mere speck in the immeasurable universe. The Biblical accounts of heaven and hell, with the Church doctrine of angels, and Aristotle's doctrine of spirits guiding the stars, were all in harmony with the system of Ptolemy.

In the middle of the sixteenth century Copernicus published his six books concerning the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. The sun no more went round the earth. It was discovered that the earth was but a planet—one of an innumerable multitude that travelled through boundless space. The meaning of many texts of Scripture now became doubtful, and many dogmas of the Church untenable. Even the doctrine of the Incarnation seemed to vanish. Heaven could no longer be regarded as above us, nor hell as beneath us. The very existence of Christianity seemed to be in danger. Catholics and Protestants united to defend the system of Ptolemy. The doctrine of Copernicus was said to be contrary to Scripture, to the voice of the Church, and to Catholic antiquity. In 1616 the works of Copernicus were put into the "Index" as destructive of "Catholic truth." The Roman Curia and the Inquisition evinced the strength of their convictions in the persecution of all who taught the doctrine of Copernicus. It was not until 1835, when the work of Copernicus was taken out of the Index, that Rome ceased to maintain, in spite of astronomy, that the sun went round the earth. This

late acknowledgment of the truth of the system of Copernicus is a confession, even on the part of the Church of Rome, that ecclesiastical authority must yield to the truths of reason. Science must be free; it can not give up what it knows to be true because of anything in the Bible, or supposed to be in the Bible. It was well that astronomy was a definite science. When it came in conflict with Church authority and the old doctrine of Bible inspiration, there was no question which side had to yield. Astronomy has vindicated the cause of freedom for all science. It is vain, therefore, for the Pope to send forth his briefs, as he did so late as December, 1863, forbidding the faithful to receive the conclusions of scientific men, and commanding them to abide by the decrees of Popes and Councils; yea, even the decisions of the Congregation of the Index.

Froschammer maintains that the substance of Christianity was not touched by the system of Copernicus, but rather Christianity by the new science received a deeper meaning. Men learned to see God in the order of nature. They ceased to look for Him, as the Pagans did, merely in the extraordinary and the miraculous. Lalande said that he had searched the whole heavens and had found no God. That is, Froschammer says, no God according to the popular and in some respects heathen idea: no God working by miracles and interferences, but a God working by law and reason, and everywhere by His works manifesting Himself to the mind of man. There we see Him as a bountiful Father, as spirit and love, as the omnipresent and all wise. Aristotle's argument for the existence of Deity, which postulates a first mover, may not now have the force which it once had, but the principle is still involved. The argument receives another application when not a first mover, but an incessant worker is demanded for the necessities of creation.

The special doctrines of Christianity which seemed to suffer by the Copernican system were the Incarnation and Redemption. These doctrines had a foundation in nature so long as the Ptolemaic system was believed, and the earth regarded as the centre, or chief part, of the universe. It was now asked, how could the incarnate Deity die for such a speck in creation, and a being so insignificant, as man? But the Copernican system has told us that God is over all worlds, and that the centre of creation is everywhere. Heaven is no longer above us, nor hell beneath us. The soul of man cannot be either in heaven or in hell, but heaven or hell may be in it.

The scientific question of the present day, with which theology is most concerned, is that of development in nature. Mr. Darwin's doctrine may not be proved. The origin of man may still be regarded as a mystery. But it is impossible now to receive the Mosaic accounts as more than the popular ideas of the time when they were written. They are as much contrary to the ascertained facts of nature as the

Mosaic astronomy to the system of Copernicus. The Bible represents creation as produced at once, and everything perfect as soon as it appeared. All was "good," that is, free from imperfection, suffering, or pain. The world was paradisaical. Science, on the contrary, demonstrates that nothing was perfect at its first creation. From the very beginning of creation all living organisms have been subject to disease and death. Perfection lies in the future, not in the past. The ideal of creation was perfect from the first, but the realization of the ideal is to come. The Mosaic accounts of the creation of Adam and Eve, their innocency and their fall, are not regarded as credible in the light of known natural facts. The doctrine of original sin, which the Church elaborated out of the fall, is without any good foundation. In the interests of a speculative theology St. Paul spoke of sin entering by one man. The human consciousness of guilt, and the sense of Divine forgiveness, are the essential truths of the speculative doctrines of original sin and redemption by a price. The Book of Job, which confessedly has for solution the problem of the existence of evil, does not refer to the record in Genesis, which, if meant for what it is understood to be, would have settled the question at once. There is not a word of birth-sin. The whole argument is resolved into the power and wisdom of God. The principle is distinctly renounced in this book that physical suffering is a punishment for moral evil. It was renounced, too, by Christ Himself, when He said that neither "This man nor his parents have sinned that he was born blind."

This mode of viewing Christianity is not new to those who are familiar with German theology. To those who meet it for the first time it seems to deprive them of all certainty about religion. At this point its advocates are prepared with an answer, and one which deserves all attention, for it is, in reality, the foundation principle where the difference begins. We suppose an infallible Church or an infallible book, a miracle or some immediate interference of Deity, which gives us a certainty beyond what is given in the order of nature. The answer is, that no such certainty exists for us. Like everything around us we are being developed. God is teaching us, but teaching us in His own way. Shall we go on inventing schemes of revelation, or shall we be content to learn of God as He chooses to reveal Himself? In one place Froschammer says that Christ did not establish a Church with an external organization after the pattern of Judaism. He did not give a system of doctrines, ceremonies, and prescriptions. He simply asked a free, child-like disposition towards God, and a practical love to man.

Froschammer, we believe, is still a Catholic, nor do we know that he intends leaving the communion of the Church of Rome. He professes to take a middle course between Protestantism and Romanism proper. He wishes to stand on the same platform as Dollinger, in union with Rome, but independent of Rome. He has

been denounced by the Curia, indexed by the Congregation, and removed from the office of university preacher. We have read, too, that Catholic students are forbidden to attend his lectures. To our Protestant understandings, the course which Pichler has followed, or means to follow, is the only one open to the liberal Catholic. In the Church of England Broad Churchmen have difficulties; and on this very question they are divided whether they ought to separate or to continue under the old creeds. The Vice-Master of Trinity wishes to resign his orders, if it could be done, rather than subscribe, in the sense of a very modified subscription, to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. How would he writhe, if to Professor Froschammer's advanced theology, he had to add the decisions of the Council of Trent? We dare not judge for others, but there is much to be said in favour of keeping to the old building, and submitting to conditions which are inevitable. The old leaves may be allowed to hang. They will fall freely when the new ones begin to appear. The old walls may be allowed to stand till the stones are prepared for the glorious temple that is to arise.

But the practical and immediate question is the tenableness of the position which Liberal Catholics are now occupying. It is said that Rome never changes, but it is true that the policy of Rome is not always the same. The Pope was willing to sanction the English service, as it stood in the time of Elizabeth, on condition of submission to the Roman See. But in the time of Edward, by the Bull of Pius III., all England was excommunicated—Protestants and Catholics alike. The Catholics of that time wished to retain the same relation to Rome as Döllinger now advocates. They believed in the Pope's doctrines. They wished to be in union with the Roman See. They acknowledged the Papal Primacy, though they took the oath of the royal supremacy. The Reformers adopted the Thirty-nine Articles, which taught the Swiss theology; but it is only trifling with words to say that this theology is not Catholic. It was the theology of St. Augustine, the most Catholic of all the fathers, whose name alone had greater weight than all antiquity. Like Luther and Savonarola, all our Reformers were willing to abide by the decisions of a General Council. But when Trent came the Reformed Churches were excluded. Bishop Jewel complains bitterly that they were condemned without being heard. This was manifestly unfair, for it is admitted on all hands that the need of reformation was urgent. The Reformers had been rectifying evils in their own national churches, and ought not, on that account, to have been excluded from a General Council of the whole Western Church. But to us Pichler's argument is invincible, that General Councils are not infallible. If not, we ought to accept the decisions of Trent, and, if the present Council decrees it, the infallibility of the Pope.

We seem to recognise a difference between Döllinger's position and that of Janus. The latter denies the Papal supremacy though admitting the Primacy. He maintains that national churches may be members of the Church Catholic though owning no allegiance to the See of Rome. This was the position of English High Churchmen in the time of the Stuarts. It is still the position of our "Catholic" Anglicans. Like Janus they suppose the Church infallible, and like him they rest on the Divine right of Episcopacy. The Pope refuses to acknowledge this position as Catholic, even though like our advanced Ritualists they receive most of the doctrines of the Church of Rome. But is it tenable in itself? Does not the infallibility of the Church, in the sense necessary to the argument, disprove itself? To say nothing of the uncertainty of doctrine, can we suppose the Church to have been infallibly guided by the Holy Spirit when the clergy as a body were notoriously immoral in their lives? Janus says that though at the present time in Germany the majority of the priests are above suspicion, yet before the Reformation there was not more than one in thirty who even professed ordinary morality. And as to Episcopacy, are not the arguments as strong for the Divine right of the Pope as for the Divine right of the bishops? This subject has been discussed exhaustively in England, and, to say the least, the Divine right of a bishop has been rendered very doubtful. Moreover, Episcopacy is not sufficient to secure the unity of the Church. There are bishops against bishops, and episcopal churches against episcopal churches. The Donatists of Africa had more bishops than the orthodox.

It scarcely seems possible for the controversy with Rome to enter upon another phase. It has already passed through almost every conceivable form. The most characteristic part of the present opposition to Rome is the theological, at least as represented by Froschammer. The Reformers of the sixteenth century appealed to the infallible Bible against one infallible Church. It was a great reformation to go back to the original documents of Christianity. But it is not to be expected that the men of the nineteenth century can see everything with the same eyes as the men of the sixteenth. We are carried onward by the stream of progress whether we will it or not. English Protestants may not agree with all that German theologians have to say. But they cannot be unconcerned spectators in the present conflict between Germany and Rome. It is truly a battle for

"Science, freedom, and the truth in Christ."

"The combat deepens." In the words of the poet we say:—

"On, ye brave!

Wave, Munich, all thy banners wave!
And charge with all thy chivalry!"

JOHN HUNT.



MR. ARNOLD ON ST. PAUL AND HIS CREED.

St. Paul and Protestantism. With an Introduction on Puritanism and the Church of England. By MATTHEW ARNOLD, M.A., LL.D. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

MR. ARNOLD touches nothing which he does not elucidate. On the other hand, I think he often elucidates his particular theme at the expense of some greater whole, of which it forms only a small part, and assumes, without discussing, something so much more important and startling to the imagination of his readers than the point he selects for discussion, that they would often willingly exchange the beam of light which he has admitted with so workman-like an accuracy to irradiate his chief point, for an explanation which he does not vouchsafe on the assumptions which evidently underlie his thought. For instance, Mr. Arnold in this little work makes it one of his objects to prove that the chief sects of Puritans at the time of the Reformation misunderstood St. Paul's dogmatic teaching more grievously than the Church of England, and on that point we think that he proves his case. But then he founds thereon one of those homilies for which Mr. Arnold is famous, and which always make me dread the coming of the day when he may deem it his duty to disperse any illusion to which I am subject, on the only tenable apology for dissent—the utter untenableness of any Christian act of dissent of which there is historic record except dissent on purely moral grounds, such as he somewhat hesitatingly admits the Reformers may have had a sufficient excuse for at the time of the

great distribution of indulgences which roused the wrath of Luther. But even Dissenters will scarcely be more sensitive than most Churchmen to the sting of the reasoning by which Mr. Arnold condescends to bring home to them the iniquity of dissent. That iniquity consists, he says, in separating, for opinions, from a Church which does not exist for the sake of opinions, but for the sake of moral practice,—and he means by “opinions,” not the finer distinctions of individual thought, but the broad faiths to be entertained about “God, creation, evil, propitiation, immortality,” for he tells us there has never yet come a time proper for the development of these great ideas. Now I can hardly imagine a more perplexing axiom from which to start for the severe condemnation of Dissent than is contained in the following passage:—

“The Christian religion has practice for its great end and aim; but it raises, as any one can see, and as Church-history proves, numerous and grave questions of philosophy and of scientific criticism. Well, for the true elucidation of such questions, and for their final solution, time and favourable developing conditions are confessedly necessary. From the end of the apostolic age and of the great fontal burst of Christianity, down to the present time, have such conditions ever existed in the Christian communities, for determining adequately the questions of philosophy and scientific criticism, which the Christian religion starts? *God, creation, will, evil, propitiation, immortality*—these terms and many more of the same kind, however much they might in the Bible be used in a concrete and practical manner, yet plainly had in themselves a provocation to abstract thought, carried with them the occasions of a criticism and a philosophy, which must sooner or later make its appearance in the Church. It did make its appearance, and the question is whether it has ever yet appeared there under conditions favourable to its true development. Surely this is best elucidated by considering whether questions of criticism and philosophy in general ever had one of their happy moments, their times for successful development, in the early and middle ages of Christendom at all, or have had one of them in the Christian churches, as such, since. All these questions hang together, and the time that is improper for solving one sort of them truly, is improper for solving the others.

“Well, surely, historic criticism, criticism of style, criticism of nature, no one would go to the early or middle ages of the Church for illumination on these matters. How then should those ages develop successfully a philosophy of theology, or criticism of physics and metaphysics, which involves the three other criticisms and more besides? Church-theology is an elaborate attempt at philosophical criticism. In Greece, before Christianity appeared, there had been a favouring period for the development of such a criticism; a considerable movement of it took place, and considerable results were reached. When Christianity began, this movement was in decadence; it declined more and more till it died quite out; it revived very slowly, and as it waxed, the mediæval Church waned. The doctrine of universals is a question of philosophy discussed in Greece, and re-discussed in the middle ages; whatever light this doctrine receives from Plato’s treatment of it, or Aristotle’s, in whatever state they left it, will any one say that the Nominalists and Realists brought any more light to it, that they developed it in any way, or could develop it? For the same reason, St. Augustine’s criticism of

God's eternal decrees, original sin, and justification, the criticism of St. Thomas Aquinas on them, the decisions of the Church on them, are of necessity, and from the very nature of things, inadequate, because, being philosophical developments, they are made in an age when the forces for true philosophical development are waning or wanting."

Yet this is Mr. Arnold's ground for saying that those who have separated from the Church (Roman or English) on points of dogma are wrong, "because, *while neither they nor the Church* had the means of determining such points adequately, the true instinct lay in those who, instead of separating for such points, conceded them as the Church settled them, and found their bond of union where it in truth really was, not in notions about the co-eternity of the Son, but in the principle, 'Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity.' " Surely a Dissenter might very reasonably criticize this statement of Mr. Arnold's somewhat in this fashion: "You rest here," he might say, "on a whole world of assumptions far more complex, doubtful, and important than any you purpose to settle by them. You make a distinction between moral faith and theological faith hardly heard of till this generation, and import it into the past; you imply that those who separated for dogma were more of dogmatists than those who held close to the Church, also for dogma, whereas the unionists united for dogma often more fiercely than the separatists separated for dogma. Besides, your deepest and most fundamental assumption is, that the early Church never had what you are pleased to call 'a happy moment' for developing the thought of 'God.' Surely, if that be true, you do indeed make not only all separation from, but also all identification with, Christian Churches utterly unmeaning. If our Lord, who professed to reveal God, had not even 'a happy moment' for developing what he meant by God, wherefore either approve Churchmen or reprove Dissenters? You comprehend us all in a common condemnation. Again, if the early Church had no 'happy moment' for developing the thought of 'evil' as you tell us, how could the basis of the Church be, as you say, 'Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity?' and how could St. Paul's lists of virtues be so happily chosen, as you elsewhere tell us, for describing the many hidden secrets of righteousness? Surely your assumptions are far more doubtful and complex, and need far more elaborate exposition to clear them up than your conclusions, and till I can make out how far you mean to go in denying all power of arriving at dogmatic truth to every past age of Christianity, I not only cannot form any notion as to how far I was or was not wrong in separating from the Church, but I cannot tell how far the Church was or was not wrong in existing at all." As far as I can see, this answer, I will not say to Mr. Arnold's thought, but to the very imperfect exposition of it contained in this book, would

be complete. It is hardly fair to brand Dissent for its captiousness in separating from the Church on dogmatic grounds, from a point of view from which all positive creeds seem equally captious, and the acquiescence in them would be as great an hypocrisy, as the dissent from them would be a work of supererogation. For a man who thinks that the Church's definitions of faith have been, from the first age to this, mere forms of ignorance, to find more fault with the dissentients than with the assentients may be natural; but it can hardly carry much weight with those who hold that the Church had a very "happy moment" in the first moment of its birth for understanding "God, creation, will, evil, propitiation, immortality," that the great object of modern religious thought has been to recover that happy moment as completely as it could; and finally, that the Dissenters have often, by their dissent, recovered it much more completely than the Church in its quiescence had energy for. I say this, though for my part I agree with Mr. Arnold that St. Paul has, for the most part, been more misapprehended among the Dissenters than either in the Roman Catholic or the English Church, because I think there is a mistake in method in raising, as Mr. Arnold does, by his assumptions, questions so much bigger and more difficult than those which he really elucidates by his special disquisition. There was no occasion to take the opportunity of this discussion of St. Paul's real meaning to reproach all the Dissenters for their dissent, and that, too, on grounds which appear to mean that they were wrong only because there was nothing worth dissenting from in the creeds of the Church. Have not such doctrines, casually thrown out, a great deal more tendency to dissolve *all* Christian Churches than to convict the Dissenting Churches of self-will?

But, no doubt, much the most valuable part of Mr. Arnold's essays, one which will have its permanent value, and which ought to prevent us from attaching *too much* significance to his incidental remark that the early Church had no "happy moment" for defining its thought of God, and immortality, and evil, is the part on the profoundly moral basis of St. Paul's thought, and its deep and final antagonism to all Antinomian views. On this matter I believe Mr. Arnold has really given his fine critical faculty full play, and established what few who read his essays will ever again be inclined to dispute. Yet even here, his argument incidentally raises, as it seems to me, far greater questions than it settles, and so raises them as to lower St. Paul himself, whom he is labouring to exalt, into a figure of almost less authority on religious matters than it found him. Mr. Arnold remarks most justly that "what essentially characterizes a religious teacher, and gives him his permanent worth and vitality, is, after all, just the scientific value of his teaching, its correspondence with important facts, and

the light it throws on them. Never was the truth of this so evident as now. The scientific sense in man never asserted its claims so strongly; the propensity of religion to neglect those claims, and the peril and loss to it from neglecting them, never were so manifest." Nothing can be truer. And so far as Mr. Arnold vindicates St. Paul from all responsibility for the highly artificial forensic system which has been connected with his name, and demonstrates the apostle's deep and tenacious hold on righteousness of heart as at once the foundation and the end of spiritual life, he undoubtedly restores the true sense of St. Paul's teaching, and brings it into accordance with the truest modern thought. But, then, while on the one point to which Mr. Arnold devotes his essays, he effectually does this, some of the implicit assumptions which run through them seem to us, if true, to undermine quite as radically the general credit of St. Paul's teaching as the mischievous and artificial views Mr. Arnold confutes have ever been able to undermine it. My meaning will be best understood if I give briefly my own impression of St. Paul's religious work and object, and then compare it both with what Mr. Arnold has here established and with what he has here assumed.

St. Paul had lived a great part of his life under the rule of a most elaborate and tasking system of law, which strained, indeed, to the utmost his power of strenuous obedience, but yet gave in return a sense of substantive dignity and pride to the nature which fulfilled all those arduous requisitions. You see the reflection of the honest pride he had once entertained in his subsequent language:—"If any other man thinketh that he hath whereof he might trust in the flesh, I more: circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, an Hebrew of the Hebrews, *as touching the law, a Pharisee; concerning zeal, persecuting the Church; touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless.*" All this had seemed to give his life a specific mould of its own, a defined standing-ground even in the sight of God, a substantial worth, and a store of legitimate spiritual expectation. He had not shrunk from the most difficult efforts to come up to the legal standard; he had genuinely believed that his religion was to conquer the world; he had hotly assailed those who had apparently abandoned that religion; he had led the persecution of the Christians,—"*as concerning zeal, persecuting the Church;*" but his whole dependence and strength had been in a system ordained, as he believed, of God, but still a rigid system of definite motives and acts, a panoply of Divine prestige. Still he had never failed to enter into the heart of writings most hostile to all legal and external righteousness, writings which dissolved away, at a touch, the prestige of legality, penetrated to the core of the heart, detected the hollowness of all outward observances, and

exclaimed—"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." That was the *moral* aspect of the truth which, intellectually, the Hebrew Scriptures so constantly enforce, that God teaches by paradox, that nothing is too weak to be God's instrument against the strongest of human powers, that a lad with a pebble is the appointed destroyer of the giant in full armour, that "out of the mouth of babes and sucklings" God had "ordained strength," or to use St. Paul's own words, that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men." In a word, St. Paul having accumulated an elaborate armour of inward moral dignity from his study and practice of the Jewish law, had also learnt profoundly to distrust it, and constantly penetrate behind it,—having imbibed the principle that unless the inner will can be broken for God, nothing is effected,—nay, that Divine paradox may almost be called the law of the spiritual world, and is made so, lest by any chance God should be hidden by his own customs. Such, to my mind, was the nature on which the manifestation of a crucified master burst like a flash of lightning, melting at a touch the whole panoply of legal righteousness, and bringing his belief in "the broken and the contrite heart," and in that "weakness of God" which is "stronger than men," to the incandescent point. Thenceforward Christ was to him an ever-living presence, detecting and exposing not only all selfishness and wrong in him, but all legal righteousness,—all righteousness he could claim as his own, and substituting for it the wish to be nothing in himself, except a reflection of the crucified Will, and an organ for that divine weakness of which the cross is the symbol. If ever he catches himself exulting in a divine revelation or vision, he interpolates almost with grotesque haste the protest, "I speak as a fool." He reminds himself no less than his disciples that "we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God and not of us;" and even in enumerating his sufferings, it is not *as* sufferings that he values them, but as modes of enabling him to "bear about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life of Jesus also might be manifest in our mortal flesh." He gives us the divine answer to his thrice-repeated prayer that his "thorn in the flesh," whatever it might have been, should be removed, in the words, "My grace is sufficient for thee, for my strength is made perfect in weakness;" and there is no connecting thought running so uniformly and coherently through all his epistles as this, that since he "who was crucified through weakness, yet liveth by the power of God," so "we also are weak in him, but we shall live with him by the power of God toward you." To me it seems that it is the very heart of St. Paul's teaching, that self-

righteousness is but one form of unrighteousness, and that the complete abdication of every purpose, whether unrighteous or self-righteous, or simply wilful, which cannot be brought to answer at once to the living touch of Christ within the heart, is the life-long crucifixion by which the way is prepared for a life-long resurrection. Now hear Mr. Arnold. Nothing, I think, can be finer or truer than a great part of the following passage:—

“‘He that believes in Christ,’ says Wesley, ‘discerns spiritual things: he is enabled to taste, see, hear, and feel God.’ There is nothing practical and solid here. A company of Cornish revivalists will have no difficulty in tasting, seeing, hearing, and feeling God, twenty times over, to-night, and yet may be none the better for it to-morrow morning. When Paul said, *Have faith in Christ*, these words did not mean, for him: ‘Give your hearty belief and consent to the covenant of grace, accept the offered benefit of justification through Christ’s imputed righteousness.’ They did not mean: ‘Try and discern spiritual things, try and taste, see, hear, and feel God.’ They did not mean: ‘Rest in the finished work of Christ the Saviour.’ No, they meant: *Die with him!* The object of this essay is not religious edification, but the true criticism of a great and misunderstood author. Yet it is impossible to be in presence of this Pauline conception of faith without remarking on the incomparable power of edification which it contains. It is indeed a crowning evidence of that piercing practical religious sense which we have attributed to Paul. It is at once mystical and rational; and it enlists in its service the best forces of both worlds,—the world of reason and morals, and the world of sympathy and emotion. The world of reason and duty has an excellent clue to action, but wants motive-power; the world of sympathy and influence has an irresistible force of motive-power, but wants a clue for directing its exertion. The danger of the one world is weariness in well-doing; the danger of the other is sterile raptures and immoral fanaticism. Paul takes from both worlds what can help him, and leaves what cannot. The elemental power of sympathy and emotion in us, a power which extends beyond the limits of our own will and conscious activity, which we cannot measure and control, and which in each of us differs immensely in force, volume, and mode of manifestation, he calls into full play, and sets it to work with all its strength and in all its variety. But one unalterable object is assigned by him to this power: *to die with Christ to the law of the flesh, to live with Christ to the law of the mind*. Paul’s repeated and minute lists of practices and feelings to be followed or suppressed, now take a heightened significance. They were the matter by which his faith tried itself and knew itself. Those multitudinous motions of appetite and self-will which reason and conscience disapproved, reason and conscience could yet not govern, and had to yield to them. This, as we have seen, is what drove Paul almost to despair. Well then, how did Paul’s faith help him here? It enabled him to reinforce duty by affection. In the central need of his nature, the desire to govern these motions of unrighteousness, it enabled him to say: *Die to them! Christ did*. If any man be in Christ, said Paul,—that is, if any man identifies himself with Christ by attachment so that he enters into his feelings and lives with his life,—he is a new creature; he can do, and does, what Christ did. First, he suffers with him. Christ throughout his life and in his death presented his body a living sacrifice to God; every self-willed impulse blindly trying to assert itself without respect of the universal

order, he died to. You, says Paul to his disciple, are to do the same. Never mind how various and multitudinous the impulses are; impulses to intemperance, concupiscence, covetousness, pride, sloth, envy, malignity, anger, clamour, bitterness, harshness, unmercifulness. Die to them all, and to each as it comes! Christ did. If you cannot, your attachment, your faith, must be one that goes but a very little way. In an ordinary human attachment, out of love to a woman, out of love to a friend, out of love to a child, you can suppress quite easily, because by sympathy you become one with them and their feelings, this or that impulse of selfishness which happens to conflict with them, and which hitherto you have obeyed. *All* impulses of selfishness conflict with Christ's feelings, he showed it by dying to them all; if you are one with him by faith and sympathy, you can die to them also. Then, secondly, if you thus die with him, you become transformed by the renewing of your mind, and rise with him. The law of the spirit of life which is in Christ becomes the law of your life also, and frees you from the law of sin and death. You rise with him to that harmonious conformity with the real and eternal order, that sense of pleasing God who trieth the hearts, which is life and peace, and which grows more and more till it becomes glory. If you suffer with him, therefore, you shall also be glorified with him."

But there is one interpretation slipped in here which seems to me utterly un-Pauline, and which yet is the philosophic key to Mr. Arnold's view. He calls St. Paul's conception mystical, which it is, but he divests it of all mystical meaning in his exposition, when he translates St. Paul's motive power into "the elemental power of sympathy and emotion in us." I can find no trace at all in St. Paul's writings that he ascribed the great change of spirit he demanded to "the elemental power of sympathy and emotion," any more than he ascribed it to the conscience and the will. On the contrary, he uniformly ascribes the renovation of the affections to some deeper and more mysterious change which alone renders a transfiguration of the heart possible. "*If ye then be risen with Christ,*" he says in the Epistle to the Colossians, "*seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things of the earth, for ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God.*" If Mr. Arnold's interpretation of St. Paul's thought were correct, surely the form of this passage could be inverted, and run thus:—"If, then, ye seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God, ye are risen with Christ. Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God, for ye set your affections on things above, not on things of the earth." The course of thought is precisely the same in numberless other critical passages of St. Paul's writings. In the Epistle to the Romans (viii. 10)—"*If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.*" St. Paul's

language is, as far as I know, always the same, always cast in the mystical, never in the emotional, form. "Christ's love," he says, in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, "constraineth us"—*not* our love *for* Christ. "If any man be in Christ," says St. Paul, "he is a new creature," which means, says Mr. Arnold, "If any man identifies himself with Christ by attachment, so that he enters into his feelings and lives with his life, he is a new creature." But that is a gloss we do not for a moment believe St. Paul would have accepted. Only try it by the context—"So that *if any man identifies himself with Christ by attachment, so that he enters into his feelings, and lives with his life*, he is a new creature. The old things are passed away; behold, they are become new. And all things are of God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and gave unto us the ministration of the reconciliation—to wit, that God was reconciling the world unto himself by Christ, not reckoning unto them their trespasses, and put into our hands the word of the reconciliation. On Christ's behalf, then, we are ambassadors, as though God were entreating by us. We pray on Christ's behalf,—Be reconciled to God; him who knew not sin, he made to be sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in him."* However difficult it may be to follow the course of St. Paul's thought accurately here, one thing seems certain,—Mr. Arnold's paraphrase is entirely out of keeping with the remainder; for while that speaks of an effort of sympathy in the individual heart, in the whole of the context St. Paul's thought is turning upon a great Divine act by which the world has been reconciled, and for which he is only entreating recognition—recognition which directly it is given must inevitably be a fountain of new life, just as the recognition of a new scientific principle would be, to the modern world, a fountain of new power. St. Paul certainly does *not* here mean by "being in Christ," "identifying yourself with Christ by attachment, so that you enter into his feelings and live with his life." I venture to think that he has a very much simpler, though perhaps a much more mystical meaning, namely, opening your mind to an inward "conversation" and communion with Christ, which is, to him, far *less* of a mere subjective change, far less of a mere modification of yourself, than any change of nature caused by a new human relation, such as a new companion, however intimate and however dear. I know what Mr. Arnold will say to this. He will say that if St. Paul held this, as he may perhaps admit that St. Paul did, it is a matter on which "science" can pass no opinion one way or the other. He will say St. Paul is not a

* 2 Cor. v. 17—21. I have taken the translation of the last four verses from Dean Alford's Revised Version of the New Testament, which seems to me to be sufficiently accurate.

witness to be trusted on questions of "transcendental ontology." He will perhaps intimate that St. Paul "orientalizes" in ascribing to the personal agency of Christ, what he would, had he been used to our more discriminating western analysis, have ascribed only to the fascination exercised by his own thought of Christ. In short, Mr. Arnold will say that so far as St. Paul teaches this, he anticipates the results of a metaphysical analysis for which there had not then been, and has not even now been, any "happy moment," and that his testimony cannot be received for more than it is worth, namely, the penetration of his own thoughts and emotions by the image of Christ. St. Paul's "faith," says Mr. Arnold, "really means fidelity to an object which is both absent, and has never been seen by us. It is therefore rightly called, not constancy, but faith; a power pre-eminently, of *fast attachment to an unseen power of goodness.*"

Now it seems to me that Mr. Arnold has a perfect right to maintain this, if he had only given fair notice that he is putting a gloss of his own on St. Paul, and reducing vastly the power of the apostle's language in deference to the claims of "science." But I think he has made a mistake in not first admitting that St. Paul himself never attributes to "sympathy with Christ" any transforming power, but attributes it simply to Christ himself. All his phrases—"putting on Christ," "being in Christ," "being apprehended or laid hold on by Christ" (Philippians iii. 12, a most characteristic passage), "dying with Christ" and "rising" with him, "having the mind of Christ," being "members of Christ," and I know not how many phrases of the same kind—point to one and the same belief that it was Christ, and not "a power of attachment to an unseen power of goodness," who worked in the heart to make all things new. Whether that were or were not a belief for which St. Paul had no warrant, for the determination of which the Church had till then had no "happy moment," surely it would be well to keep quite distinct what St. Paul really thought and said, and what we regard as the only valid scientific element in what he thought and said. The mere thought on which he so constantly insists that we are "members of Christ," that is, organically united in Christ our head, or, in Mr. Arnold's more modern phrase, that there is a "solidarity" of the whole human race in Christ, proves the realism of St. Paul's conception, and that he never dreamt of the unity caused by a common sympathy with "an absent and unseen power of goodness," but only of the unity produced by pulses fed from one common fountain of spiritual power.

And the student of St. Paul should note that, if, in deference to Mr. Arnold's canon that science can neither "deny nor affirm" the ontological assumptions of St. Paul—in other words, his personal relation with the Son of God revealed in him, on which he so con-

tinually harps—he gives up those assumptions and contents himself with Mr. Arnold's modern equivalent for them, the spirit of sympathy with Christ, the veto of science will be pushed further, and he will soon be obliged to reduce St. Paul's God to a still fainter conception. "It is not," says Mr. Arnold, in describing the limitations which science sets to the language of religion, "it is not that the scientific sense in us denies the rights of the poetic sense, which employs a figured and imaginative language. But the language we have just been quoting is not figurative and poetic language, it is scholastic and scientific language. Assertions in scientific language must stand the tests of scientific examination. Neither is it that the scientific sense in us refuses to admit willingly and reverently the name of God, as a point in which the religious and the scientific sense may meet, as the least inadequate name for that universal order which the intellect feels after as a law, and the heart feels after as a benefit. 'We, too,' might the men of science with truth say to the men of religion—'we, too, would gladly say *God*, if only, the moment one says *God*, you would not pester one with your pretensions of knowing all about him.' That stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being, and which, inasmuch as our idea of real welfare resolves itself into this fulfilment of the law of one's being, man rightly deems the fountain of all goodness, and calls by the worthiest and most solemn name he can, which is God, science also might willingly own for the fountain of all goodness, and call God. But however much more than this the heart may with propriety put into its language respecting God, this is as much as science can with strictness put there." I have no wish to strain this passage beyond its meaning. But I cannot help asking whether, if that be all we have any right to mean by God, the gospel of St. Paul is intelligible at all. Is it mere poetry when St. Paul begins his letters, "Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of mercies, and the God of all comfort, who comforteth us in all our tribulations?" &c., and is there any meaning left at all to such a starting-point for a gospel, if I substitute for "God," Mr. Arnold's "stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being"? "The end and aim of all religion," says Mr. Arnold most truly in another passage, "is access to God," but he goes on to paraphrase this as meaning "the sense of harmony with the universal order," which is very like saying that it is "access to that stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being,"—an access which it hardly seems possible either to avoid or attain, since it is after all only another name for access to the forces by which we are moved. "Conformity to the will of God, as we religiously name the moral order, is our peace and

happiness," Mr. Arnold tells us elsewhere. "Grace, the goodness of God, the Spirit, as Paul loved to call that awful and beneficent impulsion of things within us and without us, which we can concur with, indeed, but cannot create, leads us to *repentance towards God*, a change of the inner man in regard to the moral order, duty, righteousness." Surely it must be evident, that if I am to give up as unwarranted by science, in Mr. Arnold's estimation, St. Paul's assertion of his direct life in Christ, or at least to shade it off into life modified by sympathy with "an absent and unseen power of goodness" as imaged in Christ, I must go a good way further, and give up also his faith in God as the living and loving Father of Christ, who so loved the world that he gave up his Son to the death of the cross. And if I go as far as that, can I honestly believe that the early Church was to be trusted for any of its fundamental conceptions? Mr. Arnold thinks it can be trusted for the fundamental thought, "Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity;" in other words, die with Christ to sin, rise with him to newness of life. But what *was* naming the name of Christ, if it was not invoking a new power, accepting a revealed Will, rejoicing in a fresh hope, discerning a new Love? If Christ had had no "happy moment" for developing the meaning of the word "God"—if the equivalent he suggested, "Father," is one which science cannot accept, what becomes of even the ethical teaching of the Gospels and Epistles? What becomes of "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," if I substitute for "your Father which is in heaven," that "stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being"? What becomes of "grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby all things are sealed to the day of redemption," if I make the same substitution? Surely Mr. Arnold must see that most of the assumptions which he calls metaphysical and ontological, are, at all events, assumptions running so completely through the very essence of the whole Hebrew revelation, that either they must be granted, or the whole fabric of revelation shrivels up at once. I, for my part, see as plainly as Mr. Arnold the difficulties which attend our apprehension of "God," "creation," "will," "evil," "immortality," and I am by no means willing to deny that those difficulties may be lessened as time goes on, and as "happy moments" for developing their meaning come. But I feel quite sure of this, that whatever these difficulties may be, they become indefinitely greater when I pare down the meaning of Revelation by a liberal use of the "Zeit-Geist," the spirit of the age, to which Mr. Arnold trusts so much, and that they are at their minimum when I try to interpret the spirit of the age by that of Revelation. Is it inconceivable

that the age which had, even in Mr. Arnold's opinion, so supremely happy a moment for developing the meaning of practical holiness and virtue, may have been warranted in assuming, as it did, that that moment came from communion with a higher Life, for which the language of human relations is at any rate by far the least imperfect expression? Nay, is it at all conceivable that that, the genuine fruits of communion with which are so eloquently asserted, by both St. Paul and Mr. Arnold, to be "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faith, mildness, self-control," can be most accurately described as a "stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being"? Is it more intelligible that the "sweet reasonableness of Christ" was obtained by nights of communion with "a stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being," or by an eternity of perfect communion with an eternal Father? For my part I do not believe that "God," "will," "evil," "immortality," will ever be made any plainer to us, but only darker and more confused, by being submitted to the sphere of "abstract thought" even in its happiest moments. I think the knowledge of God, of will, of evil, of immortality, is practical and not philosophical, and that flesh and blood has never revealed it, and never will reveal it to us, but only a Father who is in heaven. It seems to me that Mr. Arnold's noble vindication of St. Paul's insight into the depth and fulness of human righteousness implies a great deal more than he is willing to see in it—for assuredly St. Paul had not the dimmest conception of righteousness founded on a basis less deep than knowledge of a perfectly righteous will. Indeed, that "weakness" in which he so rejoiced, because a Divine strength was made perfect in it, would have been to him not love, joy, and peace, but self-hatred, despair and torment, if he had not believed that without any happy moment of philosophy, he had himself been "apprehended" by a love far mightier than any love of man, and that in it he lived and moved and had his being.

R. H. HUTTON.



KNOWING AND FEELING:

A CONTRIBUTION TO PSYCHOLOGY.

TO one fresh from physiological studies Psychology is seldom acceptable. Indeed, our mental philosophy is now accustomed to the language of apology, and generally presents herself with some preliminary word to justify her appearance at all.

The physiologist is plainly in the ascendant. Let us do honour to his discoveries; let us confess that it is in his department alone that we can look forward here to what can properly be called discovery. I can understand and forgive the somewhat petulant mood in which he occasionally speaks of the psychologist, or metaphysician;—for he is apt to confound them together, regarding them as the same creature in different stages of development, in which, I think, he is far from being wrong. He looks upon our self-examinant, turning his mind in upon itself, as some pensive idler, sitting apart with finger on his brow, revolving what has been a thousand times revolved before, and to no earthly purpose. Perhaps he pictures him as one who ducks his head beneath the stream, and, *in that position*, looks upward to its source. Whilst he, the man of science, and the free observer of the whole course of things, is busy in the dissecting-room, tracing the threads of that delicate machinery by means of which the world of space, the world of form, and force, and motion, transforms itself, through the sensibilities of a man, into a world of thought, of beauty, of intelligence. By ingeniously devised experiments he is extorting an answer to his questions from Nature herself.

I can excuse his impatience. I, for my part, have no wish to plague him with my psychology. If he is a phrenologist, or working in that direction, he will have to plague himself with a somewhat elaborate system of psychology; else how name his organs, or even know what organ to seek? If he has arrived at the conclusion—the conclusion of some of the most eminent anatomists—that the brain, as organ of consciousness, complex though it be, may still be considered as one organ—he will probably have wrought out for himself some scheme not unlike that of which I am about to give the outline. In any case, the intelligent physiologist has, doubtless, knowledge enough of this kind to guide him in his experiments, and enable him to interpret their results. Perhaps it is well that he should not be zealously devoted to any one system of psychology, that he may remain unbiassed in his observations, and both see and describe his facts in as dry a light as possible.

It appears to me as certain as to him that we do, in fact, step from organic life into consciousness. (I must leave others to determine whether what are called purely vital phenomena are not a higher order of physical phenomena, resolvable into chemistry, electricity, and the like. I may be permitted to speak of physical, vital, mental facts as three distinct orders.) Some vital or organic function seems to precede, and perhaps to follow, every manifestation of mind. There can hardly, therefore, be a branch of study of greater interest than that which traces the connection between physical or purely vital properties and psychical properties. But these last, which in their nature are clearly distinct from the physical or vital properties on which they are grafted, can define themselves only to the man reflecting on *them*. This reflection on ourselves is simply indispensable. We can know ourselves as conscious beings in no other way. This very self, this personality, this *I* that rings for ever through human speech, belongs essentially to the consciousness. What my consciousness rests on is a distinct and specific inquiry. It may rest on the brain; the brain destroyed it may cease; but while it exists it carries within it its own personality. The light of thought may go out when the lamp is shattered, but while it burns, *that*, and not the lamp, is the self; the *I* of human speech. Whether thought and feeling rest directly on the brain or on some intermediate substance we call spirit, shall be an open question if you will; but the personality lies in thought itself. It lies, as I take it, in the union of memory and anticipation. It is thought embracing the present, the past, the future, travelling on for ever—an ever-present thought, that embraces a future that will be past, and a past which has been future. I have been, I shall be, are but the past and future seen constantly in the present.

Be that as it may, mind as it is in itself must be studied in the

mind. A curious sophistical objection has been lately raised against the process of reflection, or self-examination, which perhaps should be noticed, since it has been paraded with an air of confidence by ardent supporters of the "physiological method," and claims the authority of Auguste Comte. "In order to observe," it is said, "your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is the very activity you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause you cannot observe; if you do effect it there is nothing to observe."

Now it is plain that we cannot think of any subject of personal or scientific interest, and be, at that same instant, occupied in self-criticism or self-inspection. But the very next instant we may find ourselves reviving our past thoughts and feelings, and noticing some peculiarity in them *as thought and feeling*. A man accustomed to self-observation finds himself repeatedly summoning back his experiences, his emotions, or ideas, asking himself perhaps by what process they came into his mind. The moral man exercises this self-inspection for a moral purpose, to detect the insidious approaches of some besetting passion; the psychologist for his psychological purpose, to compare and discriminate his feelings, or detect his laws of association. There is no pause in the activity of the mind, but this purpose gives it a new direction. It is a method of inquiry perfectly valid. That it needs to be supplemented by other methods will be readily acknowledged.

I intimated that the distinction often drawn between the psychologist and the metaphysician was one of a somewhat fallacious description. It is quite true that a writer or lecturer may discourse instructively on memory or judgment, imagination or reasoning, and not plunge himself into those abstruse discussions about being, cause, or the absolute, which are set apart by some as the especial domain of metaphysics or ontology. He may choose his illustrations from the common affairs of life. But, on the other hand, there are some topics which the psychologist cannot avoid, and which carry him, whether he will or not, into the domain of the metaphysician. One of his earliest subjects, our perception of the external world, cannot be pursued without leading into these very discussions of substance or being. How will he define his matter? If he calls it *phenomenal*, the very name suggests the dreaded *noumenon*. Will he give two substances, matter and spirit, defined each by their properties? Will he speak only of properties, and carry us down—or up—to the one absolute and self-existent from which all evolves, or by whom all is created? Some theory he seems compelled to form. Psychology expands into a system of philosophy. It is always the vestibule to any structure of this kind we may raise.

I.

I ask myself what it is to be conscious? or, in other words, what is the simplest form of mind?

If an animal moved when touched—if the stimulant that set the animal in motion was clearly a sensation, and if we rested *there*—if the animal were merely sensitive, and a series of movements were simply initiated by a sensation, if it never rose to any knowledge of its own movements, of its own body, of the relation of that body to other bodies—if, in short, it were utterly destitute of cognition or knowledge of any kind, should we say that it was conscious? Assuredly not. We should have before us a kind of vital mechanism, whose co-ordinated movements were stimulated by sensation, but we should not have before us a voluntary agent or a conscious creature. Desire would be absent, for desire implies certain elementary cognitions. It might move *to* this, or *from* that, but there would be no consciousness of a *to* or *from*, a *this* or *that*.

Evidently, therefore, in addition to vital movement and sensibility, a creature must have knowledge before we pronounce it to be conscious. It is not in pure and isolated sensation that the psychologist can find his starting-point. There is no such thing in the consciousness. He starts from a perception or cognition of some kind—sensations held together by the relations of time or space.

I accept the current definition of knowledge or cognition. It is a perception of relation. And for this perception of relation I can select no better word than that of judgment. It has been already used in this wide and technical sense. Sensibilities and judgments are the two elements that form the simplest state of consciousness. Nor are there any others in the most complex. The relations of time, space, and contrast between sensations themselves as pleasurable and painful, are the earliest that arise. The simplest state of consciousness is both a knowing and a feeling; a knowing so far that there is some relation apprehended, and a feeling so far that there is some sensation felt, pleasurable or painful: for I demur to the supposition that there can be sensations absolutely neutral. As sensibilities and judgments form our perceptions, and as these enter into our relations in thought, forming what we call new objects of thought; and as these new objects, or ideas, are themselves the source of new or modified feelings and emotions (a higher order of sensibility), it is plain that our two great elements of judgment and feeling can never be absent from our consciousness.

A sharp twinge of pain, I may be told, is assuredly a consciousness. I am assuredly conscious of it. But alone it would not form a state of consciousness; it must be connected, as it invariably is, with other sensations, forming some perceptive state: it is felt here or there,

has a before and after. A twinge of pain, however sharp, quite isolated in a vital frame, would not be an instance of consciousness.

I can *think* of an isolated sensation. But I do this by contrasting it with sensations not isolated. I can imagine it. But if I myself, so far as my mental attributes are concerned, consisted of nothing but this isolated sensation, I should not be a conscious creature.

The senses and the memory—which as a mere repetition of sensations has justly been called an internal sense—these give us consciousness by reason of some perceived relations that hold them together. To hold together what is different—the several in the one consciousness—is of the essence of mind. The mental unit, if such an expression may be used, always consists of terms and a relation. We cannot in our earliest perceptions separate the two: we are compelled to recognize them as both complex and indivisible.

Where, in fact, should we find such a thing as a solitary or isolated sensation? The structure of all the higher animals is such that if you awaken one sensibility you awaken others also, and these sensibilities belong to some central organ, in which they are not only felt, but felt together, and felt as different. A smell seems as simple a sensation as we can imagine, but a smell brings into play the muscles of the nose, and prompts to some movement of the head. Most sensations prompt to movement of some kind, and that before we move for a purpose, and there is that *consensus* or co-ordination in our movements, that the sensations accompanying many muscular contractions may be introduced by the slightest excitement. A pleasant taste, one of the earliest pleasures of the infant, is inevitably connected with the movement of the lips and the tongue. Sight, which is distributed so largely through the animal creation, and is manifested so early in most animals, is not only no solitary sensation, but is not even a number of sensations of different colours. Explain vision by what theory we will, it consists of form traced in different lights *outside the body* of the creature who sees; and therefore the knowledge of the body, as introduced by other senses, must co-exist in the consciousness, and form part of what we call vision. This is not a case of association of ideas, or law of habit; sight appears in many animals too soon to admit of this explanation; we have simply a confluence of sensations and perceptions, forming this new cognition or perception. Touch, again, as mere sensation, may be a pleasure or a pain; but as a perception, as it actually enters into our consciousness, it comes, as is universally admitted, with other sensations traceable to muscular contraction. What passes in that central organ which converts these various sensations into perceptions, into cognitions, into a consciousness? I know not. We only know that the *together* of sensations and repetitions of sense, result in what we call a judgment, a perceived relation, an object of cognition.

I do not care to perplex myself with the question whether there are any animals so framed as to be sensitive only, and not conscious, not cognitive. A low order of animalculæ, mere cells, borne hither and thither by the medium in which they float; or even larger creatures, like our jelly-fish, may be endowed with a certain dull sensibility as their only psychical quality. But the animal which has any of our special senses, and which has to seek its food, must have, we should say, cognition as well as sensibility.

Sensations held together in the one consciousness—the *together of the different*—implying a judgment, a relation perceived, this is the most elementary form of mind. Not the solitary nerve, but the ganglion with its nerves stretching here and there, is the type of our simplest consciousness. The relation perceived is a fundamental fact—fundamental as sensation itself, with which it is connected—and is the foundation of all our knowledge.

II.

There are writers of great repute who, as the last result of their analysis, find sensation to be the sole element of mind. Sensations, the memory and anticipation of sensations, and laws of association, forming new groups of such memories—these suffice to build up the mind of man. The sense of contrast, they consider, as involved in sensibility itself. Without change sensibility cannot be prolonged. First to feel, and then remember the change, is all that is needed for what I have called the perception of the relation of contrast. To remember change is to remember successions also—there is the relation of time: judgment is reduced to memory. At all events, these two judgments, contrast and succession, seem easily resolved into sensation and memory, and these two, they think, will suffice, with the aid of certain subtle laws of association, to construct the consciousness.

But in this account we have not, I apprehend, resolved judgment into memory, but have, in fact, introduced this new element under the name, and as a part, of memory. The *knowledge* of a succession of sensations, it will be admitted, is something very different from the *succession itself*—the mere flux and change of sensibilities. Therefore the memory is introduced to bring back into one consciousness a portion of this flowing succession. Originally each sensibility had vanished when its successor appeared, but in memory the procession, or part of it, is brought back, and antecedent and sequent perceived as such. But if this be so, we have introduced into the memory a quite new element which did not exist in sensation. If the memory were a mere reproduction of the original flux of sensibilities, it, too, would still be the same flowing succession, where each ripple was gone when the next came. If we have assigned to

the memory this new power of holding together in the one consciousness what originally was a mere flux of sensibilities, and so cognising the succession, we have simply introduced the element of judgment, or the perception of relations as part of memory.

Memory, when it is something more than a mere reproduction, when it implies a knowledge that such reproduction belonged to the past, is itself based on a judgment. A revived sensibility would in itself be only another kind of sensibility. It is relegated to the past in a state of consciousness which embraces a present also. Consciousness, therefore, so to speak, is wider than memory: memory exists in it.

The relation of contrast appears at first sight to be involved in sensibility itself. A state of sensibility, speaking physiologically, could not be sustained without change; the nerve requires rest, other nerves must be brought into action. But here, too, I must repeat that the apprehension of the change is something different from the actual change itself. If you describe the transition as a feeling, and say there is a *feeling of change*, that feeling would pass with others in the same unapprehended series, were there nothing but the series. Here also you must call in the aid of memory, and give to the memory this power of grasping the several in one act of consciousness; which power we find necessary to all consciousness, whether of the perception that manifestly precedes memory, or of that thought which is so largely made up of the revived past.

If even these judgments or perceived relations of time or succession, and of contrast and similarity, could be resolved into mere acts of memory, what are we to say to the relations of space or position constituting *form*, or the external appearance? It is true that the utmost subtlety of some of our subtlest thinkers has been put in requisition to deduce our idea or knowledge of extension from that of succession in time. In England, I believe, Brown first ventured on this hypothesis. Sir William Hamilton was thought to have demolished it, but it has been revived by two, if not three, of our most celebrated contemporaries. There were good reasons why this effort should be made. In the first place, there is a startling incongruity in the fact that sensations should be to us the terms of this relation—that they should uphold the relation of position even within our own body. What have sensations to do with space, as themselves space-occupants? There is a delusion here, and it seems more satisfactory to unravel the delusion than to accept it as one forced on us by nature. And, secondly, if the relation which constitutes form could be deduced from that of succession, one great obstacle would be removed to the theory I have already glanced at, that builds up the intellect out of sensation, and memory, and habit. I admit that I ought here to examine this hypothesis that deduces

extension from succession, as lately put forth by Professor Bain and Mr. J. S. Mill, but I must defer such examination to another opportunity. It would require more room than I could give it; it would require room for many quotations. I must beg a verdict against them. I must content myself with the counter-assertion (in which the great majority of psychologists agree) that the two relations of time and space are fundamentally different, and that neither can be deduced from the other. They blend and meet in the idea of motion; but they are always recognised as distinct, neither of them admitting of analysis.

When Kant asserts of space that it is a mode of sensibility, he expresses, I presume, the same truth that I endeavour to convey by saying that the relation of position, or the knowledge of space, is introduced directly by our sensations. And when the physiologist refers to his nerves of touch and sight and speaks of points of sensation felt, or perceived, at the periphery, he does but express the same truth. One sensation could not give position. Many do; but how? It seems a very familiar fact that the sensation should be felt *there* where the sensitive extremities are, and that a number of these *theres* should constitute a form. But it is one of those familiar facts which grow more marvellous and perplexing as we reflect upon them. What are the respective parts performed by the nerves and the ganglion? Plainly, we have left physical properties and are amongst psychical properties, and of that character that we have only to state them in the best language we can select. We find (1) The sensibilities; and (2) The relation of position perceived.

The perception of the relation is here inseparable from the concrete in which it appears. A form can only be dissected into minuter forms, in each of which the same relations of position, of sides and surfaces, reappear. When afterwards we compare forms with each other and perceive the relation of magnitude, the two terms of the relation can be separately cognised. And as this is the case wherever we are accustomed to use the word judgment, it seems a strained application of the word when we apply it to a case where the terms and the relation are inseparable. But no other word is more applicable. And it should be remembered that where the terms are distinct, as where the two forms are separate, between which we perceive the relation of magnitude, even here the terms and the relation form a new whole. We cannot think of magnitude, which is a matter of comparison, without the forms that are compared. We make the abstraction of a relation, of which we have had innumerable instances, and may speak, if we please, of the *idea* of magnitude. But magnitude itself can never be represented in consciousness, but by the two forms and the relation. In like manner we can speak of the relation of means and end

without having before us any specific instance of means and an end. But this is an abstraction, framed mainly by the aid of language, and for the communication of thought; the relation cannot really be brought home to the mind without the terms we call means and end.

If I had been writing this psychological sketch some thirty years ago, I might have said that the sensational school was well nigh extinct, and have spared myself the labour of contending for a distinct intellectual element in the consciousness on which knowledge depends. It was the habit then to speak of that school as the philosophy of the eighteenth century, as if it was already a matter of history. We of the nineteenth century, if not satisfied with what the Scotch professors taught, had gone to Germany for our metaphysics. Cousin, for the moment, was the representative of France. But the place physiology has lately taken in our studies has revived the desire in many for the simplest possible scheme of psychology. It seems easy to attribute to the brain a variety of sensibilities, and if thought is nothing but such sensibilities connected and revived in memory, there appears no difficulty in allying it altogether with the brain; the transition is rendered conceivable from purely vital to mental phenomena. I do not say that all who have sought a simple scheme of psychology have been biassed by their physiology, or by what are called materialistic views. Simplicity is itself at all times a legitimate aim of the theorist. And, on the other hand, there are many wedded to their physiological method (the phrenologists, for instance), who wield a very complex psychology. I merely take notice of a tendency I have detected in my own mind. The preconception that there is a transition from chemistry to life, and from life to consciousness, leads us to favour those theories which make such transitions representable to the imagination.

To me the old objection rings in the ear. If knowledge is finally reduced to sensation, this is tantamount to there being no knowledge at all, or knowledge only of our own sensations. Even the solid world of matter fades into a dream. Groups of sensibilities that have somehow, in my imagination, transferred themselves to space, that I remember and anticipate, that have an order in their coming and going—these *are* my material world. I cannot accept of this result, nor of the scheme that leads to it. To me it reads like a description of mind with the chief element of mind left out. We have no knowledge without sensations; they are the first terms to us of any relation; but it is in the perception of relations, of space, of time, of form and force, that knowledge directly rests; and as knowledge evolves, we come partly to understand how it was that we commenced by what seems in itself a delusion. The animated creature had but its own sensations to give it the first consciousness

of itself, or the external world. But the forms which sensation takes are immediately invested with other properties, by relations perceived between *them*, which alter their character, and convert them into independent realities.

III.

By insisting on the fundamental distinction between Sensibility or Feeling, and Judgment, or the element of cognition, I separate myself from the sensationalists, who, with Destutt de Tracy, arrive at the conclusion, "*Penser c'est sentir*;" how do I stand in reference to that opposite school of metaphysicians who are designated as intuitionists?

I cordially embrace the favourite doctrine of modern times, that of evolution. I believe there is an order in the appearing or becoming of all things, which order apparently enters into the very nature of the things themselves. But every new appearance, every new becoming, in this order is, in one sense, equally original. It could not be what it is, out of its order, but its coming into that order is always a new fact. Most of us refer the whole order to the one Being who is alone self-existent. Some prefer to rest in the observed order, not from a conviction that nothing else exists, but that human knowledge cannot penetrate beyond. To us evolution is but a name for the method of creation, and the nature of the created.

Well, when we apply our doctrine of evolution to the human consciousness, what is the meaning of such terms as primary and fundamental, to which so much honour is by some attached? Are we to suppose that the first intellectual forms or conceptions, such as issue in their order from vital or physical antecedents, are especially authoritative, or in any way especially excellent? In other departments of nature we are accustomed to say that the lower appears first as condition of the higher, the simpler as the condition of the more complex. It is the last development and not the first that should receive the highest honour; or rather it is that whole whose *harmonized development* is carried furthest that should be most honoured. It is that which will not combine with any harmonized whole that we reject as error. This, if not an infallible test of truth, will be found to be the actual test which every man of necessity applies.

It is nothing to me to be told that certain savages or uncultured men have not this or that idea or intellectual perception. When it has come, how does it enrich, how does it harmonize with the whole of the conscious life? This is the question to be asked. I am not concerned to build my faith on some primary intuition or judgment. Truth is a harmony of many judgments.

In this much debated question of our knowledge of the external

world, in this objective independent existence of matter, it is not to some primary instinct or intuition that I should appeal—not to the first, but to the last development of intelligence. It is possible that if you arrest us at a certain stage in the process a charge of delusion might be made out against the senses—especially against the sense of sight, for we are here certainly presented with appearances which claim to be outward realities, and which it required the science of optics so to connect with the veritable material world, that we are able to pronounce them to be *representatives* of real forms in space.

Let me be permitted briefly to indicate the steps by which I imagine (for we can only here imagine a past by the help of such laws of human development as we have been able to learn from facts still open to the memory), by which I presume our belief in the external world was formed. If my statement is correct it will, at the same time, relieve us from the perplexities of the Idealists, or all those who challenge us to prove that our knowledge of matter is essentially anything else than a knowledge of our own sensations.

That our sensations do range themselves to our consciousness in space—*outside each other* as it has been expressed—is a fact about which there can be no dispute, even if we accept the subtle hypothesis that originally they were known only as succeeding each other in time. But, indeed, I know not how that hypothesis can apply to that first localization of sensations to which I have to allude, that feeling or perceiving our sensations within the area of our own body; *there*, as a physiologist might suggest, where the nerves of sensation really extend and ramify. Besides the sensations on the surface, the body fills with sensations from muscular movement, the flow of the blood, or other work of nutrition. I can descend to nothing earlier than some knowledge of our own body by sensations felt in different parts of the area of that body, contrasting body and limbs, and limb with limb.

It may be well to observe that when I here speak of localization of sensations, I do not refer to that act of thought which the mature man is so familiar with, who says of one sensation it is in his arm, and of another it is in his foot. He has already the image in his mind of arm and foot, and refers the sensations to these well known limbs. Such localization as this is plainly a subsequent process. I speak of that localization by which the knowledge of limbs is formed, or rather initiated; so much knowledge as to render possible the conceptions of form and movement. I cannot but suppose that every animal whose heart beats, and whose limbs involuntarily stir, awakes to a consciousness of sensations felt *here* and *there*. It does not from this primary localization of sensation obtain the full knowledge of its limbs. What further knowledge it obtains enters with

the knowledge of the external, or other body against which it presses.

The cognition of our limbs as sensitive and moving forms is followed, or accompanied, by another most important cognition, namely, that the motion of the body or limbs is impeded in certain directions, unimpeded in other directions. The contrast stands out between a space that permits and a space that does not permit motion. The outstretched arms, the hand with its many fingers, these define the impediment in space, shape it, shape it into that resisting form we henceforth know as matter. The same process gives solidity and a more definite form to our own limbs. The little infant is seen hammering his own hand into the perfect tool it is to become, while he is making acquaintance with the objects on which he strikes.

All these proceedings are attended with vivid sensations, both in the muscles of the moving limbs and on their touched surface. These sensations combine from first to last with that cognition of the outer form in space we call material object. But that form is fundamentally a thought, not a sensation. Form, movement, resistance to movement, these are intellectual perceptions, what we have called Judgments. Resistance is a relation between a moving form and a portion of space that resists movement. That resisting space is shaped out to the consciousness by the continued movement round it and about it of the sensitive hand. But though the sensitive hand is necessary to the cognition, the cognition itself is not a sensation, but a relation between the hand as a moving object and the obstacle in space.

It is just here, I venture to say, that the analysis presented to us (amongst others) by Professor Bain and Mr. J. S. Mill is at fault. These writers speak constantly of the *sensation of resistance*, as if a muscular feeling, somehow or other associated with a space beyond the body, constituted the whole of what we call solidity.* Now Resistance not only in popular, but in strictly scientific language, is a relation only to be got at through the prior cognitions of form and motion. It means resistance to motion. In itself it is a thought or perceived relation. The muscular sensations which accompany it, obtain from it the name of feeling of resistance. But this feeling *in itself* would be merely a sensation felt under the skin.

If an analyst persists in limiting our attention to sensations alone and ignores that perception of relation which constitutes first form, then motion, then resistance to motion, he may very easily represent

* "That resistance is only another name for a sensation of our muscular frame, combined with one of touch, has been pointed out by many philosophers, and can scarcely any longer be questioned."—*Mr. J. S. Mill.*

"Of matter as independent of our *feeling of resistance* we can have no conception."—*Professor Bain.*

our knowledge of matter as, in fact, nothing but the memory or anticipation of sensations. But his representation will always wear the air of a paradox. Men will not recognise in it an accurate account of their own cognitions.

But I must proceed another step or two. Not only does my body move towards these forms that resist its motion—that are known and defined by that resistance, as well as clothed in some garment of my own sensations, but these bodies so defined move towards my body, impinge on it, pleasure it or hurt it. *They* have a motion of their own. They have movement as well as resistance to movement, and they too, so moving, move other bodies against which they impinge. They have force.

Here, also, if I am arrested at a certain point, I might have a great difficulty in eliminating the idea of force, from sensations and desires of the animated creature. For aught I know, a child attributes to every moving body, especially if it strikes him, the impulse of desire by which he himself moves. But sooner or later a distinction is made between the animate and the inanimate. And now when inanimate forms not only strike on me, the sensitive, but strike on other inanimate forms and the result is movement, is a *resistance overcome*; the conception of force as extended through nature—force as prior to, and independent of, sensation—is formed. Our conception of matter may be said to be complete. Perhaps resistance which wore the appearance of inertia becomes itself considered as a force. Force and resistance are regarded as two antagonist forces, revealing each other.

Amongst the steps of this process I have not introduced the sense of vision, because blind people do obtain our notion of the solid form in space without the aid of vision, and because I should have to discuss certain theories of vision. The Berkleian theory has been discredited of late. I am inclined myself to believe that the sensations of light arrange themselves directly in space, in form—that the animal which has vision has not to think out external form by the contrast between this and that direction in space. The form is given and the hand strikes it, and so demonstrates its resistance, its substantiality. Some knowledge of *its own body* is necessary to vision, otherwise no *outer* form; but this vision in outer space does not require that the animal should from other organs have obtained the knowledge of *solid* form outside of its body. The visionary form is probably in most animals the first introduction to the solid form.

Do I represent our knowledge of the external world as perfect? Is any man of reflection satisfied with it? These forms in space are defined by the forces they display. We cannot think of the forms but by these forces, nor can we think of the forces without aid of the forms. Yet the *form* cannot be itself the space-occupant, that which

really possesses or exerts the force. Not satisfactory, you say. But the cognition of these forces as manifested in space remains to us, although this cognition of them may still point to some being or existence that escapes in itself from our apprehension.

When, therefore, the old perplexity is put before us, how think of a world independent of ourselves—that is, independent of our own senses? my answer is, that we can think of no other; that the material forms we ultimately cognize are revealed to us by relations which our senses have enabled us to perceive, but which are from their nature upheld, not by sensations, but by space-occupants, whatever they may be. If cognized at all they must be cognized as independent of our senses. Merely to say that with my intellectual existence the world ceases to exist for me, would be a truism which no one would care to dispute, and which no one would care to utter. The philosophers I am alluding to say that matter, as known to us, is so completely the creation of our own senses, that it cannot be thought of except in connection with them. They ceasing to exist the material world as known to us must cease to exist—must be thought of as ceasing to exist. This they sometimes call the true doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. Solidity is not a property of the form in space, it is a muscular feeling of my own. I entirely dissent from this interpretation of my consciousness, from this description of our knowledge. Solidity or resistance is a force, not a sensation. I think of it, in my mature state of intelligence, as existing in space—as existing before sensation—as a necessary condition of sensation, as something that from its nature cannot depend on my consciousness of it, but on which it is very possible my consciousness may depend.

To return to the Intuitionists. I was about to say that I should not follow the example of those who commence their treatises with an array of fundamental truths which they appear to consider as inseparable from a human mind. Certainly not, if these truths are of a moral or religious character. If our very definition of matter alters or clears itself as knowledge advances, is it likely that moral and religious truth should reveal itself with precision in the first stages of intelligence? A truth is none the less a truth because for many ages, and to many minds, it was utterly unknown, and a sentiment is not to be described as less pertaining to humanity, because it comes in as a sequence to some previous accretion of knowledge.

In our ethical controversies there exists and has long existed a school of philosophers who insist upon describing the conscience, such as they find it in themselves, as having entered full grown into the world. God, and obligation to obey Him by loving our fellow-creatures—they detect all this in their own conscience, and forthwith

they describe this conscience as an original intuition. This may save the trouble of argument or investigation, but it leads to a misinterpretation of the real nature of a state of mind which has been gradually evolved. It is on such a subject as this that we must look into the history of the human race to assist and correct our psychology.

We must bear in mind that in no way does "the oak lie in the acorn." The only oak is that which begins to exist then and there as it appears above the surface of the earth, and throws its leaves into the light of day. The seed was a condition of the tree, so too was earth, and air, and water, and the heat of the sun. Through many conditions, after many antecedents, this grand novelty of the oak tree made its appearance. In like manner, the only mind we know is just this consciousness that evolves in its order under many conditions. The knowing and the feeling, the knowledge and the sentiments of which this mind is composed, have their order of development, order depending on the Eternal Cause of all things, if we can speak of its depending on anything whatever, but there is no substance, mind, or brain, no acorn which in any way held this wondrous oak tree within itself. New branches spread, new truths, new sentiments—they come; and would you estimate their comparative value and importance, you must do this by understanding their place in the whole.

Amongst relations which start up as life progresses, is this very one of the contrast between truth and error. At first all cognitions are equally true; but anticipations come that are not realized, and memories that are not confirmed, and imagination puts together, after some wild fashion of her own, the materials of experience. So then there are false cognitions, erroneous thoughts, as well as true. And it becomes one of the great interests of life to discriminate between them.

IV.

All our passions are thoughts on one side. The simplest desire enfolds some object of perception, or some anticipated action. You would not qualify our passions as pure feeling any more than you would describe them as pure thought. Separate the elements, and the passion ceases to exist. Fear is an anticipation of injury from some external object, or some voluntary agent. It is true that the injury we fear may be very vague, but these vague fears have entered through others not so vague. We run over all the evils we have known without resting definitely upon any one, or we fear something *worse* than anything hitherto known. When darkness brings its imaginary terrors we have the horrible suspicion that some creature or person is present, whom we cannot see, and who may sud-

denly make his presence known by seizing on us, perhaps to torture us. A quite strange object, seen for the first time, may excite fear, but this is because experience has taught us that there are hostile as well as friendly creatures, and we know not amongst which to class this new-comer. Uncertainty must take the shape either of a fear or a hope.

Merely to think of an object that has given us pleasure, is the source of a new emotion. It may be a desire or a regret; merely to think of a man who has injured us may be the source of a most vivid emotion of hatred or revenge. Merely to think of one who has given us pleasure is to love him. It is the first step into love, happily not the last. Then comes the love of *premeditated* kindness to another.

Pain and pleasure might exist without hatred and love. Hatred and love could hardly exist without pain and pleasure. Such is the order of their becoming. And by processes of evolution we cannot stop to trace, wider and more complex cognitions bring with them what we denominate more refined and noble sentiments. Always the sentiment is thought on one side, feeling on the other.

Is philanthropy—the question may perhaps have been asked—a feeling or a thought? It is plainly both. But then the elements of thought and feeling may be very differently proportioned. A man may be intellectually occupied with schemes for the amelioration of human society, yet not have sufficient emotion to lead him into any practical measures for that amelioration. He will not be without some emotion however, for to think of the happiness of others as a desirable object, is in some measure to desire it. Another man may have reasoned upon his benevolent schemes hastily or feebly, and yet be carried by his feelings into vigorous and pertinacious action.

No subject appears to me more interesting than the evolution of thought and feeling displayed in what we generally call sentiments, æsthetic or moral. But I must hasten to the completion of my psychological sketch; and two subjects remain—not to be discussed, for that is impossible, but to be defined and described—the will and the personality.

I have said that mind or consciousness is always a knowing and a feeling, always these in their infinite diversity, and nothing else than these. What account, then, do I give of the will? Is not the three-fold division—knowing, feeling, willing—that which is generally adopted by psychologists?

Let us limit ourselves at first to will as one with voluntary motion. As mere mental resolution, the questions that occur are of a different kind. A mere mental resolve to perform a certain action at a future time can be nothing but thought and desire, some combination of our old familiar elements of judgment and feeling.

That I have power to move I hold certain, but that power or force does not belong to man simply as conscious man. Sensation is not force, cognition is not force. There is some space-occupant that moves in obedience to sensation, but the force of movement must live in it. I learn that there is this force in my vital frame; I depend upon it, I trust it, I have the utmost confidence that it will not desert me; but in my consciousness it is an object of knowledge.

That which belongs to the consciousness, which lives only in it, is the *sentiment of power*—the *feeling* of joy in triumph which follows the knowledge of this force—the knowledge that *I can* what *I wish*, that desire accomplishes itself.

There is nothing that I sooner know, nothing that is more pertinaciously present to me throughout life, than this power of motion. But what does the power mean? It means that if I wish to move I move. A veritable power; an accomplishment of my wish. *How* that wish is accomplished I never know—except that some force that runs through nature is here linked to my desires. I know there is this connection, and have the *sentiment* of power due to such knowledge. This is all I can detect. I notice that between my desire and the movement intervene muscular sensations; these become to me the signs of movement and of force, but they themselves are neither movement nor force. There is no simple psychical element that in the case of voluntary motion can be picked out and called *will*.

To act, to move, is surely something different from to know I move. Certainly it is. The movement of any body is something different from my knowledge that it moves. But that movement can enter into my consciousness only as knowledge. I am not bound to explain voluntary motion on the theory of those who give me no movement at all, no objective reality in space—give me nothing but sensations or ideas. I have the cognition of my own limbs, and I know that they move in obedience to my desires.

Mr. Bain, at the commencement of his treatise on the "Intellect," briefly mentions and dismisses the twofold division here adopted; and insists, somewhat energetically, on the threefold division of knowing, feeling, and willing. But the reader of Mr. Bain's works soon becomes aware that in his analysis the radical element, to be called will, is reduced to a peculiar sensation which he somewhere suggests may be due to the motor nerves, in a more direct manner than physiologists generally teach. That there is this peculiar sensation no one will think of disputing, and that it has most important relations in this matter of willing; but if this peculiar *sensation* is the radical element left in the crucible, what ground can there be for making of *it* a separate class?

Many writers are accustomed to speak of a *sense of effort*, as if there

were some sensation which at once, and by itself, gave us knowledge of force, and of what they would call the mind's force. I must repeat here the same observations I made on the *sense of resistance*, the same muscular sensation, with a slightly different name. We call it *sense of resistance* when the obstacle is prominent in our mind; *sense of effort*, when the impelled or pressed limb is the prominent perception.

The muscular sensation we call sense of effort, would never have obtained this name, if certain cognitions had not accompanied it—cognitions of our moving limbs, of limbs pressed against an obstacle, of the *resistance overcome*. We must travel to this last. Mere pressure on an obstacle would be an increased sensation of touch. The resistance overcome reveals the force, and gives to pressure its true character. Effort is a correlate of resistance. We have cognitions of form, movement, resistance to movement, and resistance overcome. By being accompanied with these cognitions our muscular sensations obtain such names as sense of resistance, sense of effort, or of force. A sensation in itself cannot be the force we are seeking.

It being understood that our knowledge is of realities in space, forms, movements, forces, bodies inanimate and animate, what is there in will (psychically considered) but a knowledge of our bodies as moving under such and such conditions, our confidence in such laws of movement, and the sentiment of power that arises from desire accomplished?

And now a final word on the perplexing problem of personality.

Amongst the theories propounded on the nature or origin of the *ego*, the one most favoured, I believe, by metaphysicians is that which represents the ego and non-ego as rising together in every cognition. There is no thought, say some, without this *object* and *subject*. I have been, at times, disposed to adopt this theory, but further consideration has compelled me to dissent from it.

Attending as closely as I can to what passes in a cognition of the external world, all that I find, in the *immediate* act or state of knowledge, is a perception of those relations, as of time and space, which constitute it to *be* an object of knowledge. This other relation between myself and the object, between percipient and perceived, is, in fact, another cognition, to which I may pass immediately afterwards, but which was no essential part of the precedent cognition. It is another knowledge, and has its own history, its own course of evolution. Self, or the constant thinker, is *there* in every thought: such is our conviction; but I can only recognise it when in its turn it becomes an object of thought. What the metaphysicians call *subject* seems to me only the rapid, habitual, irrepressible recurrence of this object of thought. I do not think myself in every act of thought, though the self may be ever there.

Many high authorities represent the perception of an object in space as necessarily involving the *ego* and the *non-ego*, as if such object must necessarily be outside the mind. But surely the external object means external to my body. It requires two bodies, two positions in space, to give externality, to give space itself to the consciousness. My body and another body are here the terms of the relation. The cognition of externality is the perception of the relation between them. The cognition itself has no place. Consciousness cannot be thought of in a place, except by being connected with something that has been so cognised. The external object is outside *me*, because I have located this *me* in my body.

How grows up this *self*, this object of thought which I learn to regard as the percipient, the thinker, the receiver of all impressions, the agent in all acts? I am afraid that my account will be only thought too commonplace, too homely.

This body of mine not only fills its place, and stands opposed in turns to a multitude of other bodies, but it is the seat of marvellous organs of sensation, and of this marvellous power to move in obedience to sensation. It is the eye that sees, the ear that hears, the hand that touches, that moves, and moves other things. Innumerable are the forms seen, the sounds heard, but the same eyes, the same ears, are ever present; the same hands touch everything; the same vital, mobile frame is ready at all times to respond to our desires. This body, so endowed, I must need carry with me through all my memories and all my anticipations: it is my earliest *ego*, and the ground or condition for any more subtle *ego* that is afterwards devised.

For although to our first apprehensions it is the eye that sees and the ear that hears, and the hand that moves, we come to recognise our consciousness, as embracing in its own unity whatever the eye and the ear and the hand can contribute. What is this which combines all that the senses give, and contributes thoughts of its own? I see, and I remember while I see. What is it that both thinks and feels? Whatever it may be, I place it there amongst the senses. It has no form or substance that I can seize upon; but I can give it a place; I can lodge it in the body. Somewhere behind the eye and the ear is that which remembers what was seen and heard. Men soon become familiar with forms of matter impalpable or invisible; they feel the wind they do not see; they see reflections in the water they do not touch. Something both invisible and impalpable within the body—this shall be that which thinks.

The more mature and cultivated man meditating on the unity of consciousness (for the consciousness is always that one which embraces the many) carries his speculations still further. His thinking substance shall be one and *indivisible*. Here perhaps he rests. It is

no disparagement to his conception of a soul or spirit within the body, that it could not have been reached but through a previous knowledge of the body itself. Have I not said that it is the last, and not the first, that is most honourable and of necessity the most authoritative?

Whatever is the final conception we attain (some mingled conception to the last, I presume, of body and soul), whatever is the object of thought we call self, that object accompanies every memory and every anticipation. It is that which has felt and acted, which will feel, enjoy, suffer, and act in the future; it is this we surround, as a nucleus, with habits and acquirements, and ever recurring wants or passions. No reflection is without it. The thought just passed is instantly recognised as having been the thought of this self. But it is always as an object that it occurs; the relation of object and subject is, in reality, the relation between two objects of thought.

I do not say that thought exists without a thinker; I merely say that the thinker does not think himself in every thought. Under very strong passion, or in earnest meditation upon some impersonal topic, we are aware that there has passed an interval without any reference to self.

But, in general, the present consciousness is made up of memories and anticipations, and in all these self enters. To remember a sensation as mine is to attribute it to this body of mine. It is because the present consciousness is almost always some combination of our past or of our expected future, that this *self* is so rarely absent from us.

For this reason I said in the commencement that personality ultimately depends on the fact, that the present consciousness embraces in itself the past, the future. The two *selves* of past and future must need be identical, for our anticipations are our memories thrown before us.

The actual present consciousness, if it could possibly be limited to some one object, as the perception of relations in space, would have no *self* in it. It would consist of just that perception of relation.

To no such consciousness can we travel back. In the first place, all sensations, actions, cognitions, have been associated with this body, or this soul-in-body; and, in the next place, our present consciousness almost invariably consists of the past and future of *this self*. And the very present will, the instant it has passed, be known as having belonged to the same self.

Consciousness travels on, one ever-present, with its past and future self. And as it travels on it moulds and magnifies this self—whose real home is always in the past or future.

Our poet Tennyson has not scrupled to represent the personality

as a knowledge that has had its course of growth or development; and, to judge by the frequency with which his lines have been quoted, they must have harmonized with some general conviction—


"The baby new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is prest
Against the circle of the breast,
Has never thought 'that this is I.'

"But as he grows he gathers much,
And learns the use of 'I' and 'me,'
And finds I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch:
So rounds he to a separate mind."

The nature of our knowledge of the external world, the will, and personality, are three topics intimately connected. I regard our knowledge of the external world as based on the perception of relations which from their nature can be supported only by space-occupants. I believe in the external world; therefore I can believe that the actual relations of this world become (I know not how) in the sensitive organism, *perceptions* of these relations. And if I believe that an animated body, by such perceptions, has become cognizant of itself and of its surroundings, must not I see here the first *personality*? This animated creature, standing out in contrast to all the rest of the world, moving in obedience to all desires, *has will* because *there is* this combination of desires and movements; and has the sentiment of power because *it knows* this connection of desire and movement.

Man is not simply a conscious being, he is a combination of physical and psychical properties, or, as we familiarly say, he is body and soul. To know is pre-eminently the psychical property, and to know the body, its movements and laws of movements, and how they are connected with feeling or desires, becomes a consciousness of power. If we seek *anywhere* for an individuality that can march forth alone in the universe, we shall seek in vain. We move, and live, and have our conscious being as parts of some great whole—of Divine authorship as we think. There are, so far as we can penetrate, innumerable space-occupants which define themselves to us by their relation to each other; they form bodies, vital bodies, these last become conscious of themselves and their surroundings. As psychologists we must begin by shutting ourselves up in our consciousness; but having justified to ourselves our knowledge of the world in space, we end by, in part, explaining our consciousness by that world in space. Mind is a creation upon a creation; the mind of man, the last creation, still travelling on, as we believe, to its completeness or to further development.

WILLIAM SMITH.



MENDELSSOHN'S "ELIJAH."

A STUDY.

FIRST PART.

NEXT to the MESSIAH, the ELIJAH is the most popular oratorio in England: it is shorter and more dramatic than Handel's masterpiece, less theological than Spohr's *Last Judgment*, and infinitely less didactic and monotonous than the wondrous *Passion Music* of Sebastian Bach. Thus, whilst the subject-matter of the *Elijah* is full of the most stirring incidents, its artistic form is sufficiently brief to rivet the attention of even an uncultivated audience from the first recitative down to the last chorus. No man ever wrote more in the presence of his public and less in the seclusion of his study than Mendelssohn, and in no other work has he so finely calculated the capacities of the ordinary music-loving mind, and so richly poured forth treasures which the most experienced musician will find if not inexhaustible, yet always perfect.

The strange and majestic figure of the "Prodigious Thesbites," as he is called in the *Acta Sanctorum*, is ushered in by four solemn but not violent trumpet blasts—a mode of appeal to the imagination of the audience which afterwards frequently, but not invariably, accompanies the appearance of Elijah.

The northern kingdom of Israel under Ahab, in the luxury of its magnificent cities of Jezreel and Samaria, had forgotten the God

who had led the wandering tribes like sheep through the deserts of Sinai. Jezebel, the Sidonian queen, had not only persecuted the prophets of the true God, but had superseded the Jewish worship of holiness and purity with the seductive idolatry of power and passion. On every high hill flamed the Pagan sacrifices, and wild, licentious orgies had penetrated even into the sanctuary of Israel and taken the place of Jehovah's pure and elevating ritual. The harvest of sin seemed ripe, the time was near at hand, the hearts of the seven thousand who had not bowed the knee to Baal cried aloud from the dens and caves of the earth, and the God of righteousness at last arose to confound the rebellious nation with famine and drought. Alone, the man of the desert, clothed in a rough sheepskin and wearing a leathern girdle about his loins, with the suddenness of an apparition confronted the idolatrous Ahab, and pronounced the curse of drought upon the streams and valleys of the land.

The opening prelude indicates the gradual awakening of the nation to the sense of a new calamity. Less and less water, the wells fast drying up, the routine of life gradually affected, the cattle fainting on the highways, the people vainly seeking for relief, the impatient and irritable chafing of the sufferers at the consequences of a curse as yet but half realized; such is the purport of the first subject. The second begins with a *crescendo* of semiquavers, indicating very powerfully the approach of a more intense anguish. Still the first phrase of impatience is woven into this new subject as an undercurrent, and the movement is then carried on with increasing vehemence until impatience rising to fury, fury sinks at last into the wild impotence of despair, which culminates in the desperate cry of "Help, Lord!" wrung from the whole body of the apostate people.

After the first three passionate shouts the solid business of the first chorus begins, with a chromatic phrase of mournful and tender beauty taken up gently and distinctly by each part—"The harvest is over, the summer days are gone, no power cometh to help!" The sorrow goes on rocking itself into a calm and almost pensive mood, when suddenly a change of emotion occurs with the words, "Will then the Lord be no more God in Zion?" It is one of those abrupt and magic inspirations which Mendelssohn often employs to bind together the different sections of his choruses; anon the old plaintive phrase is woven in with a newly-developed meaning; the heavy grief is rapidly yielding to a stern and bitter feeling in the contemplation of certain special incidents of the drought, such as "the suckling's tongue cleaving to the roof of his mouth" and "the children crying for bread."

Another chorus full of heavy affliction follows, but its tone is more chastened, and it is not until all irritation has died away, and the

hearts of the people have been brought low by the Divine judgments, that Obadiah, the king's servant, in the character of a minor prophet, comes forth to speak of a God who is slow to anger and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil. With the immortal tenor-song, "If with all your hearts ye truly seek me," the hearer now enjoys a short respite from the dreary and hopeless anguish of the afflicted people.

But the rest is of short duration, for no sooner have the last echoes of the tenor solo died away than the chorus breaks out again into wild lamentations, mingled this time with a consciousness of sin as well as of suffering, and with that sense of sin comes terror. This last emotion is almost immediately suspended by a chorale of calm and severe beauty worthy of Sebastian Bach, as a vision of God's holiness dawns upon the sensual and idolatrous heart. The mourners seem to forget their sorrow for awhile and become rapt in the contemplation, not so much of a jealous God who visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, as of one "whose mercies fall upon thousands." In this wider and more consolatory view of the Divine nature we are again lifted above the harrowing scene of a great national calamity, and soon afterwards we find ourselves transported with Elijah to a solitary place by the brook Cherith, to await in the hollow of the torrent's bed the further unfolding of the Divine purposes.

It is here, beyond the cries of a distracted nation—beyond the reach of Ahab and the wrath of Jezebel, that Elijah listens in a dream to a double chorus of angels. These choral quartetts are managed with six trebles and two basses, and anything more truly ethereal than the effect produced can hardly be conceived. "He shall give his angels charge over thee." The waves of high, clear melody break upon the stillness of the desert, and float joyously through the air. The veil of heaven itself seems rent, and in the clear blue sky the faces and forms of the angels are ranged in calm and beautiful ranks, as in the pictures of Fra Angelico, smitten with the eternal brightness and filled with Divine harmony, as when "the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy."

No wonder that the prophet who had listened to such music and received the promise of Divine protection "in all his ways," returned with more than mortal strength to minister among men. Armed with angelic might, nothing was now impossible to him. The passionate appeal of the widow woman of Sarepta is answered by the calm words—"Give me thy son,"—and as the blood begins to course again through the veins of the dead child, and the breath in faint rushes comes and goes, the infinite love of God seems to break

upon the poor woman's soul for the first time, and the chorus, "Blessed are the men who fear Him," at once suggests the meaning of Elijah's miracle, and confirms in the mother's heart a new emotion of adoration and trust.

Once more the trumpets peal forth as Elijah reappears, after three years, in the presence of the king, and announces the close of the drought. A short choral burst interrupts his recitative—it is the clamouring of the fickle people, now rebellious, now penitent, then again ready to rend in pieces the prophet of the Lord as they shout aloud the words of the angry king: "Thou art he that troubleth Israel." But the solemn conclusion of all doubt is at hand, and both the multitude and the priests of Baal become strangely docile beneath the attractive power of a great impending catastrophe. Every word of Elijah is now caught up as readily by the chorus as were but lately the words of Ahab. The crowds sweep on at the bidding of the prophet, who, from this time forth throughout the scene on Carmel, never for one moment loses his ascendancy over them. They catch from his lips the inspiration of their brief chorus—"And then we shall see whose God is the Lord," as he gathers them together and summons the four hundred and fifty prophets of Baal to meet him upon the mountain promontory.

At the command of Elijah the first heathen chorus breaks forth. It is of a severe and formal character, very simple in construction, consisting of a hard, short melody, repeated again and again, with a kind of dogged abruptness. Indeed, the second phrase is sufficiently bare and ancient in form to remind one forcibly of the Macbeth music, commonly though falsely attributed to Matthew Locke.

The second Baal chorus begins with greater earnestness. It is full of misgivings, and at last loses every vestige of ritualistic stiffness in the wild cries of Baal, "Hear us!" followed by death-like pauses, in which the whole assembly waits for the reply of Baal. "Call him louder!" shouts the prophet of Jehovah, as he stands apart and views with derision the scene of idolatrous fanaticism.

The trumpets peal forth derisively, as though to herald in the answer of Baal, and his prophets spend themselves in frantic efforts to awaken their sleeping god, but in vain. Then, maddened by the exulting sarcasm of Elijah they pour forth their last wild chorus, leaping upon the altar and cutting themselves with knives, fainting at times from sheer exhaustion and loss of blood; then starting up with shrieks of frenzy and despair, they fall back upon the ground, and their plaint relapses into a protracted monotone of pain, succeeded by an awful stillness.

Wounded and bleeding around their unconsumed sacrifice crouch

the false prophets. The shadows begin to darken in the mountain hollows, and the sun dips slowly in the western sea.

In the deepening twilight the voice of Elijah is now heard, and the strong, calm prayer of the true prophet ascends to God. The meditative quartett, "Cast thy burden upon the Lord," follows. It is exactly what is needed to prepare the mind for the violence and tumult of the next terrible scene.

Once more Elijah speaks, but no longer in prayer. He has transcended all ordinary forms of communion, and his mind seems rapt in the contemplation of a spirit-world out of all proportion to ours; he is conversing with none other than the flaming ministers of heaven; and at the words, "Let them now descend," the fire falls from the skies with the hurtling crash of thunder, and the immense chorus of the people, thrilled with mingled ecstasy and terror, closes in round the blazing altar of victorious Jehovah.

The pent-up excitement of a long day finds a splendid and appropriate utterance in the passionate adoration of the crowd, as they fall upon their faces with one mighty and prolonged cry of, "God the Lord is our God: we will have none other God but Him." In another moment the religious emotion has passed into a murderous frenzy, and the prophets of Baal are hewn down like corn beneath a pelting hail-storm. The carnage is over and the vengeance done ere night descends upon the tumultuous throng and the smoking altar of the true God.

With a really splendid temerity characteristic of him, Mendelssohn dares after this climax return to the subject with a bass *solo*, descriptive of Elijah's prophetic majesty upon that memorable day, and a quiet *alto* song, full of solemn pathos, pronouncing woe upon all those who forsake God. It is here that, were it not for the exquisite beauty of what we may call this didactic episode, the action of the first part might be in danger of dragging a little. But the composer is still master of the situation. He knew that the mind would be exhausted by the prolonged vigil and sustained excitement of the scene upon Mount Carmel, and the needful repose is provided.

The way in which a second great climax is rendered effective so soon after the first is worthy of some attention.

After the two didactic pieces alluded to above, which are intended to recreate the emotions, the action becomes exceedingly rapid. Two short recitatives, then the brief cry for rain, followed by the thrilling dialogue between the prophet who prays on Carmel and the youth who watches the sky for the first filmy shadow of a rain-cloud. "There is nothing!" and the music is suspended on a long note of intense anticipation. "Hearest thou no sound?" and a growing agitation in the accompaniment makes us feel the distant stirring of

the wind. Then the little cloud appears like a man's hand, and in a moment, as the prophet rises abruptly from his knees, with the rapidity of an Eastern tempest, the deluge of rain is upon us, drenching the parched valleys of Carmel, and dashing into the empty pools. We are but one step from the grand conclusion of the first part; but that conclusion is not to be in the storm, as we should have expected. No temptation can hurry Mendelssohn from his artistic purpose; not a point is to be lost, not a touch of perfection omitted. A brief shout of mad delight rises from the people; in the pauses of the tempest, the dominant voice of the mighty Tishbite is once more heard, uttering the phrase, "Thanks be to God!" which is in another moment reiterated by the whole multitude; and the last and greatest chorus of the first part then commences, and thunders on with uninterrupted splendour to its magnificent close.

SECOND PART.

The second part of the *Elijah* is in some respects finer than the first. It contains at least as many immortal fragments, whilst the great danger of monotony is avoided by a variety of new and startling incidents, woven into an elaborate whole, which, if it does not exceed the first part in beauty of arrangement, has evidently made greater demands upon the composer, and astonishes the listener by its sustained power and completeness.

The *Messiah* is composed in three parts; but we may fairly say that although Mendelssohn found it possible to produce a second part in many respects more powerful than his first, the unique splendour of that second part rendered the very notion of a third simply out of the question.

Resuming our subject, we find that the action is not immediately recommenced. It would indeed be hard if we could not put up with some moral comment upon the events which have just occurred, especially when the moral is conveyed by one of the most thrilling soprano songs ever written. The clear freshness of the key of five sharps breaks upon us with an impetuous rush of words, "I, I am he that comforteth; be not afraid; I am thy God." The highest pitch of exaltation is reached when the voice sweeps up from C to the high A, to descend through a splendid sequence and rest upon the lower A in the words, "I the Lord will strengthen thee." In the course of the song, all the most brilliant soprano effects which are calculated to express the confidence of a burning impetuosity seem to have been well-nigh exhausted. The same phrase from C to A has apparently brought things to a climax towards the end; but in the next line a completely new and still more startling effect is

attained by sweeping up from B to A natural (instead of the normal A sharp of the key) and descending through a long G to the close of the song in B.

But we have not yet done with the exulting sentiment started by the soprano, for we are now close upon what has been not unjustly considered the greatest of Mendelssohn's choruses. After a silence of about half a bar, the mighty "Be not afraid," with the whole power of the chorus, orchestra, and organ, bursts with a crash upon the audience, already filled with the emotion of triumph in its more simple song-form. Now it is not one shrill angel only, but, as it were, all the battalions of heaven, with joyous shouting and glad thunder marching onwards, and chiming as they go the glorious deliverance which God has prepared for his people.

The languishing of thousands is then described in a *minor* phrase of contrast taken up by each part in succession, whilst the accompaniment expresses the fainting of those who rise and fall and gasp for breath; and the old scene of the wide land smitten with drought and inexorable suffering of thirst-stricken people, comes back to us like a dim memory in the midst of this glorious atmosphere of redemptive joy, when, with a suddenness and imperious decision that nothing can check, the dream is arrested, and vanishes for ever before the recurrence of the first colossal subject, which now proceeds for some time with a steady swing and a kind of white heat at once resistless and sublime. The rapid march of the chorus now so fastens the listener that he almost pants for an enlarged sense, or rather longs to take in the sound with more senses than one. There are no pages more utterly satisfactory, even to the ordinary hearer, than the closing pages of "Be not afraid." The satisfaction is shared by the orchestra; every instrument has to play what it can play so well; the first violin parts, especially, make the heart of a violinist leap to look at them. Who does not remember the richness of the accompaniments in that striking passage towards the close, where the musical phrase rises on a series of melodic steps, supported by the richest harmonic suspensions, from B, B to A, from D, D to C, from C, C to B, until the long D is reached in the word "afraid," and the violins in serried ranks, with all the power of the most grinding *stretto*, scale to the upper E once, with a shrill scream that pierces high through the orchestral tempest, and then draw down to the long-expected D which ends the phrase? This consummate passage is repeated *in extenso*, without pause or interlude, and brings us to the two last shouts of "Be not afraid," accompanied by the significant silences which usher in the close of the chorus; and then, in the simplest and broadest form, come the eight bars of thundering chorale, "Thy help is near, be not afraid, saith God the Lord." The chorus is well weighted. Those last bars rendering their three

massive clauses are felt to be sufficient balance without any extra page of musical peroration. Anything more simple can hardly be imagined; but nothing more complicated would produce so complete and majestic an effect. Mendelssohn is not less great because he knows when to be simple.

The enthusiasm of the people, for the worship of the true God and his prophet, proves short-lived enough, and a new figure is now brought before us in connection with the popular disaffection. A few words of scathing rebuke addressed to Ahab, in one of those matchless recitatives which knit together so many portions of the oratorio as with links of pure gold, a lofty proclamation of the outraged sovereignty of God, and a sharp condemnation of Baal worship, are sufficient to bring out the Sidonian queen with powerful dramatic effect. The type at once of heathen pride, beauty, and insolence, this great pagan figure, in the might of her haughty and indomitable will, towers high above the wretched vacillation of King Ahab on the one hand, and the miserable irresolution of the populace on the other. In all Israel she was the only worthy rival of Elijah, for she alone seems to have thoroughly known her own mind. Not for one moment did she confuse the points at issue. It was human passion and human power pitted against the righteousness of Jehovah; it was the licentious orgies of Ashtoreth and the splendid rites of the Sidonian Baal against the worship of holiness and the severe purity of the Jewish ritual. But in the moment of her supreme rage Jezebel did not forget her cunning, and she sums up her case before the people in the most effective possible manner, when in her remarkable recitative she exclaims, "Doth Ahab govern the kingdom of Israel while Elijah's power is greater than the king's?" For popular purposes it was not so much Jehovah against Baal as Elijah against Ahab; and the populace now side with the queen as readily as they had before sided with Ahab and Elijah. Shouts of "He shall perish!" rend the air; and in the pauses the voice of Jezebel is heard lashing the multitude into savagery with her scorpion tongue. The popular wrath settles at length into the powerful but somewhat unattractive chorus of "Woe to him!" rounded off with a brief orchestral close, in the course of which the last *forte* is toned down into *pianissimo*, and the much-needed rest comes in the shape of a beautiful and tender recitative and melody, in which Obadiah bids the prophet hide himself in the wilderness, assuring him, in a phrase of singular purity and elevation, that the Lord God shall go with him, "and will never fail him nor forsake him." And yet Elijah was destined shortly afterwards to feel himself most forsaken.

Sheltered only by the scanty boughs of a solitary bush in the

wilderness, alone amidst the inhospitable rocks of Southern Palestine, we can scarcely picture to ourselves a figure more utterly forlorn. Faint and weary, his steadfast spirit for once sinks within him. A great reaction, physical as well as mental, now sets in. Flesh and blood can stand only a certain amount of pressure, and Elijah's powers of endurance had been fairly over-wrought. The long watch upon the mountain, the intense emotion of that silent prayer for rain in which the prophet seemed to bear in his heart to God the sins and the sorrows of a whole nation—the stupendous answer to his petition, followed by the almost immediate apostacy of those to whom it was granted—the wrath of Jezebel, and the rapid flight for life—all this seems to have broken down for a moment even the noble courage and endurance of Elijah. The first and the last feeble plaint now escapes him, "It is enough, O Lord, now take away my life." We are filled with reverent sympathy at the sight of the prophet's utter dejection. Never, surely, was there anything conceived in the language of sound more pathetic than the melody to which these words are set. We follow every graduated expression of the almost monotonous emotion until we perceive how largely due to mere physical causes is this apparent spiritual lapse. Elijah prays for the sleep of death, but the recreative sleep of the body is all that he really needs; and presently, in spite of himself, overcome with intense weariness and exhaustion, whilst his lips have hardly ceased to falter out the words, "It is enough!" he falls asleep under the juniper tree.

It is a sight for angels to look upon, and with the silence of the wilderness and the sore need of the prophet, the celestial ministry recommences.

Not less exquisite, though more brief and, if possible, more perfect, than the angelic chorus in the first part ("He shall give his angels") is the soprano trio, "Lift thine eyes unto the hills." Happy prophet! to pass from the arid wilderness to such a dream of heaven, and to exchange suddenly the valley of the shadow of death for the bright morning hills, "Whence cometh thy help." No other vocal trio with which we are acquainted equals this one in perfection of form and in the silver-toned ripple of its unbroken harmony.

It was doubtless hard to follow such an inspiration; and with supreme skill, ere the prophet awakes, we are gently let down to earth by a chorus only a little less heavenly than the matchless trio itself. "He, watching over Israel," moves along with a certain quiet weaving of sweet rhythm and sound which indicates marvelously the steady and tireless vigil of the heavenly Father over his frail children during the hours of their helplessness.

Very softly at last comes the voice, mingling with, but as yet hardly dissipating, the prophet's slumber, "Arise, Elijah!" and

very touching is the answer, "I have spent my strength for nought, O that I might now die!"

The heavenly music was reserved for his dreams, but true to nature, with his first waking moments the melody reproduces the feeling of profound dejection in which he fell asleep praying that his life might be taken away. Listless, without hope or fear, the disheartened prophet, in passive obedience to the Divine commands, starts upon his long lonely journey of forty days unto Horeb, the Mount of God; and some of the thoughts which in that pilgrimage may have sustained and cheered him are embodied in the contralto song, "O rest in the Lord," and the quiet chorus, "He that shall endure unto the end."

The hearer is frequently so entranced by the full richness of the melody, that he may have failed to notice the art-concealing art of one of the loveliest of all sacred songs. The delicate and minute changes in a perfectly unlaboured and simple accompaniment—the fragments of tender counter-melody which, without being obtrusive, prevent the least monotony—the gentle continuity, so expressive of sustained and chastened devotion, which requires less than one whole bar of rest from the time the voice begins to the time it leaves off—the perfectly original and characteristic *coda* where, in the two last utterances of the phrase, "O rest in the Lord," the voice ascends unexpectedly to G instead of descending to C, and where the accompaniment contains a thrilling surprise in the slurred G to C in octaves above the line; and finally the long "wait" drawn out through a semibreve of time, with an aspiration of unbounded confidence, presently to be resolved into a deep and happy repose of patience—all this, and much more, will come back to the memory of those who have once studied this matchless song.

We pass over the grave and somewhat severe chorus, "He that shall endure to the end," simply remarking that at this point the interest of the oratorio seems to be intentionally diminished, so that we are tempted to think the action is again beginning to drag, at the very moment when we are about to be restored to the society of the leading character, and to assist at one of the most stupendous effects of dramatic music that has ever yet been realised.

A soft prolonged chord forms a prelude to the reappearance of Elijah among the rocky and cavernous clefts of Mount Horeb. The night is falling around him—his mood is changed, his deep depression has vanished. He is now filled with a passionate desire, not to die, but to feel the presence of his God and be assured of His protection. In such an aspiring and expectant state of mind, he hears the voice of a strong angel,—no murmur as of the night wind, but distinct, loud, and decisive: "Arise now!"—then a trembling in the accompani-

ment and a kind of agitation immediately suppressed into a whisper full of awe, with the words, "Thy face must be veiled," prepares us for the dread announcement in a single bar of unaccompanied recitative—"For He draweth nigh!" With a burst like that of a sudden earthquake the chorus, "Behold God the Lord passed by," comes upon us; but the *forte* is almost instantly suppressed, like fire that tries to escape. As when we watch the almost silent working of some monstrous engine whose force is nevertheless sufficient to crush the strongest fabric to atoms, we feel the presence of a power in all that immense repression,—something latent in the noiseless motion of the wheel which makes the inexorable swiftness of its revolutions all the more imposing, so the same kind of emotional effect is produced by Mendelssohn's use of *pp*'s to such words as "A mighty wind rent the mountains!" Great and glorious gusts of sound burst forth almost directly afterwards, and the *crescendo* increases with the throes of the earthquake until shock after shock subsides with a *diminuendo*, leaving us each time breathless with the anticipation of what is about to follow.

What follows is so unexpected in the elevation of its harmonic temperature that we have known persons in a state of rapt excitement upon hearing this chorus for the first time, break out into a cold sweat at the words, smitten like tongues of fire from the rocks, "But the Lord was not in the tempest!"

The mere excitement of watching for the recurrence of this thrilling major phrase makes each stormy interval full of new interest. Every time it recurs on a different note—"But the Lord was not in the earthquake,"—"But the Lord was not in the fire"—which last major, before it brings the series to a close, is carried on with a reiteration so urgent and absorbing as to impress the mind with the thought of a soul seized with a Divine frenzy to see God, and in almost a terror of anguish at finding the wind, and the earthquake, and the fire, pass without any definite discovery of the Divine Presence. So near the absolute beatific vision, and yet no vision! The earthquake and the tempest, and the blaze of the lightning, and yet no voice, for "The Lord was not in the fire!"

As the last wild and nearly distracted cry dies away there comes very softly one of those magic changes in which the whole of the emotional atmosphere shifts—the cry of the spirit is going to be answered with a gentleness and a power above all that it could ask or think. The key changes from one to four sharps, and the words, "After the fire, there came a still, small voice," then follow, with a peace and majesty of the most ineffable sweetness, "And in that still, small voice onward came the Lord." The melody flows on in the clear and silvery key of E major: it passes like the sweeping by of a soft and balmy wind, never rising, never falling, but gentle, and strong, and pulseless, coming we know not whence,

and passing with the "tides of music's golden sea" into eternity. And as the last delicate strains of the accompaniment die away, we are left still looking up to heaven with senses enraptured and purified like those who have stood between the gates of pearl and seen the King "in His beauty."

The recitative and chorus following, "Above him stood the Seraphim," and "Holy, holy," develop the memory of this blessed vision, whilst the outburst of earthly praise at the close prepares us for the more commonplace scenery of this lower world, where we are allowed to rest awhile before the final scene of the sacred drama.

Once more, and for the last time, Elijah sets out upon his solitary way, but now he is sustained by an unfaltering trust. No more suffering, no more persecution, no more faintness or weariness; he is filled through and through with a sense of the Divine presence, and bears the light of God's splendour upon his countenance. The quiet *arioso andante*, "For the mountains shall depart," is thrown in skilfully, to recreate the mind after the extreme tension to which it has so lately been held, and to prepare it for a second climax of equal greatness and solemnity.

Nothing can be finer than what we may call the transfiguration of Elijah before his departure.

When we come upon him for the last time, he is more imposing than ever—more terrible than when he first met Ahab in the way, more majestic than when he stood upon Carmel alone before the altar of the true God.

We are permitted to see him thus only for a few moments in the chorus, "Then did Elijah the prophet break forth like a fire." Not in vain had he been upon the Holy Mount and seen the Lord pass by; not in vain had the earthquake rent the rocks at his feet and the sky been changed into a sheet of living flame; the tempest and the flame seem in a manner to have passed into his being; and the whole man was growing almost elemental as he was about to enter into the presence of his God. Those who met with him were stricken with awe at his appearance, and marked how "his words appeared like burning torches;" then remembered they how he had "heard the judgments of the future and seen the vengeance of God in Horeb."

The action from this point becomes almost intolerably rapid; indeed, it is wonderful how the mind has been enabled to bear another climax in so short a time.

But it was doubtless impossible to put off the last scene any longer. We feel that the beloved but terrible prophet is already breathing the atmosphere of another world, and has well-nigh done with this earth.

Abruptly, in a moment, the phrase, "And when the Lord would

take him away to heaven," is heard; first from a solitary bass voice, then from a rushing and impetuous chorus, as of a multitude who see the heavens opened above them, and answer with a frantic shout of mingled terror and adoration. A brief pause, and the chariot and horses of fire are there, and black clouds hurled about by a whirlwind, and flashes of intolerable radiance and mighty thunderings—and Elijah has passed.

"He went up by a whirlwind into heaven."

All through this rending of sky, and cloud, and terror of blinding flame, the tension on the mind, produced by the accompaniment of incessant triplets in semi-quavers, supported by a magnificent pedal bass of chords and octaves, is so great that we lose all account of the time taken by the whirlwind. It is, however, very considerable, as a glance at the score will show us, and accordingly produces an adequate and massive impression, suitable to the august and miraculous nature of the event. The last long "Whirl—wind" on a minim, is but one more instance of Mendelssohn's inexhaustible command of effects at the moment when he seems to have strained our powers of endurance to the utmost, and exhausted every combination of sound.

Few composers would have attempted to produce at no great distance from each other in one and the same part, two such crises as the scene on Horeb and the Fiery Ascension; but surely none but the very finest genius would have resisted the temptation of closing the oratorio with this last scene. But Mendelssohn has had the courage to despise mere sensation for the sake of perfection, and has thus here, as elsewhere, asserted his claim to join hands with Handel, Mozart, and Beethoven.

Steadily through the glare of light which at once transports and dazzles us, does this great oratorio "orb into the perfect star we saw not when we moved therein." The bad art of leaving off with a shock, finds no favour with so complete an artist as Mendelssohn, and his greatness is never more felt than in the incomparable richness of the music from the time when all scenic effect is over, and all dramatic action has ceased.

At the close of some refulgent summer day, when the sun has set, darkness does not immediately take possession of the earth—the sky still pulses with pale light, and long crimson streaks incarnadine the west. Then, as we watch, the colours change and flicker, thin spikes of almost impalpable radiance shoot upwards through the after-glow, and with celestial alchemy turn many a grey cloud to gold. The rising mists are caught and melted capriciously into violet and ruby flame—and as the eye, still dazzled with the sun, traverses the deserted heavens, the prospect is no doubt more peaceful than when the fiery globe was there—more peaceful, for the cold twilight grows apace,

and the eye is gradually cooled as it gazes upon the fading fires, until at last the subtle essences of the night have toned all down into a calm monotint of grey and passionless repose.

The conclusion of the *Elijah* is like the splendour and the peace of such a sunset. The day-star is indeed gone, but all things are still impregnated with his glory, and not until every gradation of colour has been traversed are we suffered to rest from our contemplations and drink deep, as it were, from the cool cisterns of the silent night.

From the time of Elijah's departure we notice a preponderance of clear refreshing majors, which make us feel aware that we are coming to the end of our journey—just as the odour of brine from the ocean tells the traveller that he is approaching the sea-shore. The great tenor song, "Then shall the righteous shine," which falls as out of high heaven, like the clarion shout of an angel, is in the major; so is the chorus, "But the Lord;" so is the delicious quartett, "O come every one that thirsteth, come to the waters;" and so also is the final chorus, "And then shall your light break forth as the light of the morning!"

The one recitative which occurs gives a curious theological twist to the close by working in an allusion to Elijah's second advent as the forerunner of Messiah; indeed, we may call the quartett, "O come every one," strictly Messianic. It is as if Mendelssohn felt the incompleteness of the grandest revelation in the Old Testament apart from the New, and wished to give his hearers at least a hint of the Christian dispensation, a subject which he would, no doubt, have developed, had he lived to complete his unfinished oratorio of *Christus*. Some people complain of the last chorus as dull and needlessly protracted. But the more we study the *Elijah*, the more we perceive that this chorus is necessary, and in its place at the end. It is quite regular, and even somewhat mechanical, and it leaves the mind in an atmosphere at once severe and tranquil. That is a very high level of conception for the closing treatment of so majestic a subject, and it would be difficult to improve upon it without fatally destroying the musical morality as well as the artistic beauty of the work.

The *Elijah* destroyed Mendelssohn. It was produced for the first time at the Birmingham Festival in 1846, when Mendelssohn himself conducted; and there can be little doubt that the excitement and incessant toil incident upon so great an undertaking, largely helped to shatter a frame already enfeebled by excessive mental exertion.

On the 4th of November, 1847, Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy died at Leipsic, before he had completed his thirty-ninth year.

H. R. HAWES.

NOTE.—The writer wishes to express his obligations to Mr. Grove's masterly article on "Elijah" in Smith's "Dict. of the Bible."



CHURCH TENDENCIES IN SCOTLAND.

1. *Recess Studies*. Edited by SIR ALEXANDER GRANT, BT. LL.D.
"ESSAY V., CHURCH TENDENCIES IN SCOTLAND." By the
REV. ROBERT WALLACE, D.D." Edinburgh: Edmonston and
Douglas.
2. *Dr. Robert Lee*, of Edinburgh. By SHIRLEY. FRASER'S
MAGAZINE FOR JANUARY, 1870.
3. *The Free Church of Scotland*, BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW
FOR JANUARY, 1870.

SCOTTISH history only becomes fully intelligible when the contradictions of the national character are recognised. The passion for rigid logic and determinate consistency is, after all, but a half-conscious, sometimes a coy, excuse for the need of a definite resting-place in sentiments which do not readily flow into the grooves cleared for them by the intellect. Yet to keep steadily clearing such grooves is about as needful as is the exciting sentiment; and hence the restless intensity of the people. Sharpness of head, in company with an almost superstitious credulity; the capacity for deep attachment, together with the power of holding out the object at arm's length and scanning all its incongruities; one side of the mind doubting and analysing, the other clinging with fervid warmth to some outworn idea—these are noticeable Scotch characteristics. Not less remarkable is the air of stolid self-satisfaction, often veiling an ill-concealed impatience and doubtfulness of self; stingy closeness as to worldly means cautiously gathered little by little, going hand in hand with eager readiness to sacrifice grandly when any great object kindles a supreme interest; garrulousness, ever and anon overleaping the barriers of reserve; awkward shyness, breaking out into wild self-abandonment in moments of enthusiasm; and moderation and grave self-restraint, qualifying, and giving depth to, a quite peculiar faculty of contemplating oneself, as if out of a middle region of observation, which no stranger could ever occupy, and of enjoying a sort of earnest

smile at one's own oddnesses. The root of Scotch humour this, distinguishing it from almost all other humour. How else account for the wholly peculiar manner in which Scotch literature kindly makes fun of Scotch peculiarities, and for the phenomenon that in all this no truly Scotch characteristic is lost to the writer, but all rather, if possible, intensified and strengthened? Sir Walter Scott, Wilson, Galt, Dr. John Brown, George MacDonald, Norman Macleod, are they not all more intensely Scotch in that they can naïvely laugh at Scotch oddities, and make others laugh at them? Who are prouder of being Scotchmen, or more jealous of any slur cast on Scotland by others, than these very men who have interested the world in their country, and have been so happy sometimes in raising the laugh against her? They are steeped in her old lore, love her quaint, *siccar, canny* ways, and, in any moment of real peril, would be the first to rush to her defence.

And this tendency has its counterpart in the field with which we have more directly to do. The vague feeling of dissatisfaction with Church symbols, which we hear rising into articulate form now and then, must not be understood to imply a general readiness to part with them altogether—to throw them, Jonah-wise, overboard, as Englishmen might be very apt to suppose. Many of the men who have been raising their voices, would retire to array themselves in their defence, if any powerful onset were really made upon them. For, though it is now pretty widely admitted to be necessary to re-adjust somewhat the intellectual relation to these symbols, the prevailing hold they have over the heart of the nation is not intellectual at all, but is a thing of feeling, of sentiment, of semi-romance, which has its deepest root in what is most sacred in history and association. When Dr. Macleod and Mr. Gilfillan, brought face to face with their presbyteries, made admissions and qualifications so far as to bring them *en rapport* with what, for want of a better term, we may call the consciousness of the Church playing around these symbols, they only acted in a way most consistent with Presbyterian traditions; and, indeed, as we shall see, the traditions which make this proceeding possible, put a serious bar in the way of that reform which would build up by first, and entirely, casting away the old forms and formulas.*

The dependence of every part upon the whole, so as to ensure a carefully adjusted interaction of activities and interests, is the principle which the Church contrived to lay at the basis of Scottish development. The Reformers, in the first instance, and the men

* It is not without significance that the Duke of Argyll recommended Dr. Robert Lee to seek the opinion of the Assembly before introducing some of the "innovations" with which his name is now associated. That Dr. Lee had much to say in his own favour, by reference to early practice in the Church, does not in the least invalidate the ground out of which his Grace may be presumed to have spoken.

who afterwards framed the Covenant, were careful to reserve open lines along which the sentiments that hovered round their standards could play freely into the texture of common life. Scottish liberalism, in this way, took its hue from their characteristic determination; Scottish education, to this day, bears unmistakeable marks of their influence. The fact is, they never viewed political freedom apart from religious truth. Scottish Church life bears even now traces of its origin in a united protest, in which political and religious rights were viewed as inseparable. The action of the early Church leaders on social life was directed to impress it so that these should never come to be viewed as distinct or conflicting.* All the contests with the civil power have been conceived in the exacting spirit of this idea, that the moment the king sought to intrude into the spiritual sphere, he was guilty, by that very act, of splitting up the nation into two. Yet a Church apart from the State, a Church other than a National Church, was never so much as thought of till a comparatively late date. This explains how, on the one hand, there was so much freedom within certain limits; how, on the other, beyond certain limits there was no liberty at all. It was essential that the collective voice should be supreme, and that it should yield to no authority beyond itself; but to make it supreme, it needed the help of a sentiment. These words of the Duke of Argyll put this point very clearly, and show how, out of its attitude of protest, it got its ruling sentiment:—

“I have shown how soon it had become the doctrine as well as the practice of Presbytery, that the Church owned no authority superior to that of its own collective voice. Behind this principle, Presbytery had entrenched itself against such claims of authority as the Romish Church acknowledged in its priesthood—such headship as it recognised in its High Priest, the Pope. But it was equally applicable to negative that authority which in England had been transferred to the sovereign, and which James VI. was attempting to assert in Scotland. Here, then, is the clue to the language of Presbytery. Its object was to establish the full right of self-government by means of denying the existence of any authority *in the world* superior to that of her own Assemblies. But *denials*—mere negations—never make good popular watchwords. Some form of positive assertion is always requisite, especially where religious feelings are to seek expression. This assertion, then, was chosen, that ‘Christ is the *only* King and Head of His Church.’ But *how* did this express the principles referred to? *The truth is, it did not express them at all, but it was conceived to do so, and therefore was as useful as if it did.* The connection of ideas, however, can be traced. Since Christ was the *only* authority recognised, and since Christ was not on earth, it was taken for granted as following, that no authority remained *in this world* entitled to interfere, in spiritual things, with that of the Church, speaking through its representative Assemblies. Such is this celebrated

* Hence the weight of Mr. Buckle’s words:—“The rebellion against Charles, which on the part of the English was essentially secular, was on the part of the Scotch essentially religious. . . . Though the English only wished for a civil league, the Scotch demanded a religious covenant.”—*Civilization*, ii. 336.

formula of expression. *As involving an argument it is of no value, but as conveying a feeling it is full of meaning.*"*

The tenacious, *grippy* clinging to traditionary usages which it is so essential for us to recognise, and which is the necessary outcome of such ideas as these, may be a good or it may be an evil; but it is essentially characteristic of the people. Enabling them to coalesce easily when any great injury threatened them from without, and to separate again only to fall back into their original attitudes, and to fight out their small battles with each other, it has given an extraordinary coherence of national development, together with a very remarkable intensity of individual and family life. Jealousy of local habit and tradition, persistent assertion of separate claims and rights, combined with the faculty of *cannily* retreating from these in presence of general danger, and of readily rising to the idea of a general good, this is the secret of the restricted yet expansive vigour of Scottish national life. It has permitted freest action within the various limited circles of special and local interest, while yet the records of hard-won battles have never been long absent from ear or eye—have ever been so keenly present indeed as to quickly weld the whole into one in any really great crisis. Presbyterianism, in its last form of Kirk-session, Presbytery, Synod, and Assembly, seems constructed to achieve this result: active, incessant canvass of minor difference and delinquency, and all with a continual reference to a possible appeal to the wisdom of the whole, whereby questions will be lifted out of the sphere of heated local feeling into one of principle and "the merits." That ecclesiastical affairs in Scotland do still, as Mrs. Oliphant says, claim more popular attention and interest than elsewhere, is to be accounted for pretty much by this circumstance.

Struggling in this way to seize and to hold everything in its first principles, the Scotch are yet shy of extremes, are cautious, moderate, reserved, and firm, when called on to contemplate changes on the old. Notwithstanding the many battles and separations of the past, this careful tenacity of theirs has been powerful to preserve faithfully behind them all sacred rallying-points of union. And it must be said that the Reformers seemed to have had a pretty good notion both of the merits and the faults of the people, and took the sure way to make their work permanent in its results. They felt the one thing was to give the people an interest, and yet to control their influence very sharply within certain definite and beneficent lines of activity, with the whole always in view, and having, as has been said, the force of a religious sentiment behind it. They therefore aimed at penetrating the whole community with the principles of freedom, by making them members of a society in which every person had rights stretching up to the very highest place; but rights which could not be exercised apart from the approval of superiors.

* "Presbytery Examined," p. 157.

Thus, while the whole construction of Presbytery rests on the idea of a rising scale of offices, each including the other as they ascend, there is a machinery of election acting from above as well as from below, in the existence of tests held forth at every step for admission. In order, therefore, to justify its own principles in the rearing of men and women fit for membership and office, it was necessary to look to education. And this the Church did. It struggled to transfer every adherent—that is, every person in the parish, into a member, and this it could only do by education. Instruction thus became a first duty of the minister; and, since the family, and not the individual, was held to be the true social unit, it established family catechisings and enforced the duty of family-worship. Notwithstanding the Church being defeated in obtaining, at the Reformation, a portion of the property that had been held by the Romish Church, to uphold a liberal system of instruction, by her own well-directed exertions she established elementary schools in all the parishes. After the Restoration these became the foundation of the system of Parochial Schools.

Then this instruction, and the complete supervision it implied, inflicted a terrible blow on every kind of ignorance and idleness. Most Scotchmen can say, with that pious toper, Lord Hermand, "Sir, I sucked in the Being and Attributes of God with my mother's milk;" but they can also add, "and along with that a hatred of filth and idleness, which, at least, is valuable for several purposes of life." The parochial system, when thoroughly carried out, as it was over a large portion of Scotland, was so complete, that there was no need of poor-law officers—the deserving poor were relieved from the church-door collections, or were kindly helped by their neighbours, and the lives of the undeserving poor were made as miserable as may be. We say not this to flatter Scottish pride; but simply to show how the Church tradition and creed are so involved in the life of the people, so entwined around the sentiment which has given such vitality to their aspirations, alike in the social and political sphere, as to be, in fact, almost inseparable from it.

It almost seems, indeed, as if the early leaders of the Scottish Church had proceeded on nothing less than the idea of making the nation a religious confraternity. We know the result that often overtakes schemes which set foremost the best elements in human nature and ignore the lower ones—how they are overcome by rupture and the emergence of disintegrating elements not calculated upon by the projectors. But when we think of the way in which, working from the family outwards, a rigorous censorship was exercised so as to stimulate industry first, and then to waken an interest in an all-comprehending institution—the State, that which the Church symbolised being conceived as both base and crown of it—are we guilty of impertinence in quoting these words of Canon Westcott's, and saying that some vague glimmering of their sense

seems to have visited and dwelt with the framers of the Scottish Church:—

"A rule constructed with the individual for the unit can never satisfy the mature wants of humanity. The true unit of society is the family, and not the man. If, then, we wish to be faithful to the teaching of self-sacrifice which our fathers have bequeathed to us, we must carry it forward to some completer shape. If we wish to do our work, we must use our examples, not as copies, but as stimulants to exertion and as pledges of hope. . . . They point us to a rule which shall be suited to a work national and universal rather than personal; progressive rather than conservative; manifold and yet one in virtue of religious service. . . . It must be social in the truest sense of the word, with the family as its final element; so it will be able to cope with luxury. It must embrace within its sphere of action every subject of human interest in its proper order; so it will win thought. It must habitually connect doctrine with labour; so it will harmonize spiritual life."*

But how far short do all things come of their ideal! Knox and Melville, and Gillespie and Henderson, strove hard to make such a nation out of Scotland; and they failed. Yet did they not wholly fail. The possibility of return upon common interests is the legacy their efforts have left to Scotland over that of most nations. Strictly, there is no Presbyterian dissent in Scotland,—and that is a most important point in considering Church tendencies. Each band of seceders can show wherein they may claim to represent the ancient Church of Scotland in its integrity. The Cameronians, who refused to recognise an uncovenanted government under which civil things became unholy, are probably the most consistent in their claim; and they form a noticeable line—the "thin red line" of Scotch secession—running down unbroken from the time of the Revolution settlement almost to our own. With the exception of the small community naming themselves the Evangelical Union, or Morisonians (after their founder), and differing from Calvinistic Presbyterians in transferring the pressure of the problem of election from the will of God to the will of man, the interests of all circle and close round the same symbols. It is out of the strength that has come of this knowledge of a common base, that the nation has acted in all periods of trial. The nation, conceived in its oneness, where the political and religious aspects were not distinguished, was presumed to have the right to determine all the details of life—social, domestic, personal. The "inquisitorial supervisions," which Mr. Buckle cannot speak of with patience, are, after all, but the last outcome of the free determination of the national will directed towards the practical realization of its reformed principles. Whatever the Reformation has done for Scotland, it has done because of the complete application of these principles. It did not stop short half way. Nor can those who are in the habit of admiring the superior education of Scotland, and the system by which the people manage to express and carry into effect their mind on any great matter, consistently

* See this Review for April, p. 106.

declaim against these "inquisitorial supervisions" in the past, or the strange clinging to traditional forms and ideas in the present.

And here, in a single word, we may venture to point out how completely, under the Scotch system, the difficulties, now so keenly felt in England as to the voice and influence of the laity, were, at an early stage, perceived and met. The eldership was the uniting link between laity and clergy; and in the equal position the elders occupied with the ministers in the Church courts, the faithful expression of lay opinion was guaranteed. And not only was expression guaranteed, but the laity had thus in its hands a substantial power, which has been efficient in helping to save Scotland from a clergy in its upper ranks separated widely, by position and income, from the great body of the people. Presbytery contrives to lay down and carry out pretty effectively the salutary rule of poverty which Canon Westcott advocates; and it has also been effective, as we shall see, in maintaining a healthful sense of equality. The elders thus sit and vote in all councils—in Presbytery, Synod, and Assembly; but as the minister, since otherwise he might be helpless before his own Kirk-session, has the exclusive right to preside over it, he is hereby protected against the injustice of numbers, in that he can at any moment dissolve the sitting,—an appeal lying, of course, with the eldership to the Presbytery.

The compact strength which Presbytery has thus developed was such that no king or ruler ever meddled with it with impunity. There is a story told of a Scotchman, who, having had a difference with his spouse, pawkily enforced on her the duty of submission by saying, "Ye ken, Jeanie, I'm the heid!" "Weel, weel," said Jeanie, "but an ye be the heid, I'm the neck 'at turns the heid." And so with the Church of Knox, from his time till now. No ruler ever outraged any of its rights without being forced to own his error. The Stuarts surely found it so. And was it not the same with Sir Robert Peel and Sir James Graham, in 1843? They fancied that only a driblet would be bold enough to leave the Establishment; but how completely their hopes were falsified, when more than one-third of the whole Assembly followed Chalmers to the new place of assembly at Canonmills! And did not both these politicians express their regret at having thus divided the Scotch Church and nation? The idea that only when the civil power stepped out of its own place into that of the Church did the oneness of the national life suffer disruption, seems to have dominated down to the rise of the "Moderate" party in the end of the eighteenth century, when the annual protests against patronage were dropped. But the idea had its representatives still. The Evangelicals, who also were politically the liberals, grew strong, and reasserted it, and the result was the Disruption of 1843. Hence the significance of Mrs. Oliphant's words:—

"It may be even said that until the great event of 1843 the Church of Scotland had never fully faced and accepted its position as an Established Church. It had accepted as its right the humble provision made for it by the State; but it had never once consented to submit itself to the State in return for that provision. The conditions of existence which Rome herself has been compelled to accept, where her ministers are supported by the State, Presbyterian Scotland has never submitted to. There have been moments of compliance, times of decadence or weakness, when she has imposed unpopular ministers upon the resisting people, and otherwise bowed herself unwillingly to political restraint, *but such proceedings have always been against the principles of the Church.*"

Yet what did this facing of her position imply? Let facts speak. No sooner had the Evangelical party left the Assembly than the Veto Act, which had still insured some power to the people in the election of ministers, was repealed; *quoad sacra* ministers—i.e., ministers of non-parochial charges—were expelled the Assembly; and the popular election of elders done away. This was the first *distinct* and *formal* acknowledgment that the old tradition no longer held place—that the oneness of national existence was no more to be striven for—that, instead of a national Church, after the ideal of Knox and Melville, and the tradition maintained by Gillespie, Rutherford, and the rest, she was *now* to sink into an *Established* one—a position perhaps inevitable when such a large body outside claimed to represent a truer and earlier tradition. At all events, we see in this the later great turning-point in the ecclesiastical history of Scotland. The Free Church has been guilty of many errors—of tense bigotry, of narrowness, and of the schismatic sin of inflaming division when no purpose was further to be served by it; but here we simply contemplate her in her historical attitude at a great crisis, and are compelled to say that, whether or not her position was politically tenable, it was very nearly a reiteration of the earlier watchwords.

As for the Established Church, it then drew to its bosom the political Frankenstein, which had been called into existence for it by the Act of 1712, against which many efforts had been made; and the new stage of her history begins with the assertion that this is henceforth to be the only medium of her freedom; that she must trust to nothing else for this but to the State, and, in obedience to it, nullify and reduce to zero the power of her Church courts. Presbyterian traditions find their reversal here; and the "liberal" Church party is thus seen to have become possible by the fact of patronage—in fighting against which no section of the Church need look to them for countenance or active help.

But another circumstance is well worth noting. When recently the General Assembly, contemplating, in Mr. Gladstone's phrase, "the gravity of present circumstances," sent up a deputation to ask the repeal of patronage, this Frankenstein did not seem to view the matter exactly in the light they could have wished. Substantially, though from some points of view it might appear inconsistently, it

decisively declined to regard the other Presbyterian denominations as mere "sects." Somehow it would perversely glance at them as being still sections of a national Church, with clear and explicit claims on the nation in the event of certain changes.* The fact is worth emphasising, that liberalism in the ecclesiastical mind, and liberalism in the political one, are seen to take different positions in viewing the chief bodies that jostle each other on the field of Scottish Church life. These ecclesiastical liberals have defended patronage; they have warmly opposed the idea of ministerial communion, or the simple interchange of pulpits with their dissenting Presbyterian brethren, in terms that breathe of the utmost exclusiveness;† and on them, therefore, must rest the odium of having made beyond measure difficult and perplexing the position of the deputation to the Prime Minister on patronage. The roots of many of the trials which the Establishment will have to face in the future plainly lie here.

To render more intelligible what is to follow, it may be well to say a word or two about the more conspicuous leaders in this "liberal" Church movement. First and foremost, there is Dr. Robert Lee, recently deceased, for whose personal character—brave, honest, and indomitable as it was—no one can but feel some admiration. He was minister of Greyfriars parish and Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh. A man of keen intellect and rare capacity for action, whose life was spent in an endless fretting against the restrictions of a Confession which he had so decisively departed from, that it is hardly possible he could have escaped from the adverse judgment of a Civil court, had the constitution of his Church called him before such a tribunal,—he is best known in England as the upholder of those "innovations" of printed liturgy and organ over which there arose such a noise in the Church courts. As his own biographer says, much larger issues played round the discussion of these comparatively trivial questions than appeared on the surface: for Dr. Lee's divergence from the ordinary forms was regarded as being only symbolical of more essential divergences from the received sense of the creed. Dr. Lee's later life was spent in endless

* Lord Macaulay, in Parliament, years ago insisted that the true representative of "This Church" named in the Treaty of Union was not the Establishment, but the Seceders of 1843—the Free Church.

† These are Dr. Robert Lee's words on this point: "Why is this proposed? To exhibit the unity of the Church? What does this phrase mean? That there is unity among all the Protestant sects—Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Independent? If they are united in all matters of importance why are they thus separated? Why are they sects? If they are not united in all matters of moment, then this declaration of their unity is a declaration of a thing that does not exist. It is therefore an act of hypocrisy or an illusion. *Is there not something incongruous in our making laws declaring persons to be ministers whom our Church holds not to be ministers.*" How could a High Churchman help smiling consumedly at this? Would it reconcile him to it any more that Dr. Lee takes occasion to say that "foreign churches stand in quite a different relation from dissenters at home?"

contests about points of form, by which he contrived to stave off a final adverse decision till death itself solved the difficulty for him. He was a good representative of the purely sceptical side of the Scottish character; but in him the intellectual and emotional elements seemed so absolutely removed from each other, that his life was one restless and futile effort after a purely intellectual Christianity. Heaven with him was a place absolutely free from doubt; yet he refused to entertain either contradiction or mystery, and ended by retreat into another form of dogmatism.

Dr. Robert Wallace, his successor in Greyfriars' parish, is known as an able and eloquent preacher, who has imbibed more, perhaps, than anyone else of the master's spirit. His latest contribution to the literature of the subject is named at the head of this article.

Mr. R. H. Story of Roseneath, the biographer of Lee, is a man of fine taste and large scholarship, who, however, has sometimes fallen into the error of carrying to their extremest development the doctrines of his leader.

"Shirley" is the one lay voice that makes itself effectively heard from this camp; and his article on Dr. Robert Lee in *Fraser* for January sounded like a trumpet-tone. His defence of Dr. Lee, by the exposing of the absurdities of the Confession which Dr. Lee had signed as the "confession of *my* faith," is very characteristic of him.*

Dr. Tulloch is, perhaps, the best known of this school in England. He is as advanced in his theological ideas as Lee or Wallace, but he has more of the true urbanity of culture. Besides, his intellectual nature, more, perhaps, than that of any other of the school, is suffused by imagination and sympathy; and he is thus at once the most moderate and the most conciliatory. His fine historic sense, too, would make him loath to agree to abruptly separate the future of Scotland from its past. He is thus properly the connecting bond between this party and the growing school of more moderate liberals, best represented by Dr. Norman Macleod and Dr. Smith of North Leith, who, while anxious to secure a freer subscription, yet have a kindly inclination towards evangelical views, and recognise the injury that would inevitably accrue from any sudden disruption of the Church from all its historic traditions.

This latter party has done good service, in tempering between the extreme parties into which the Church has recently been divided. They sympathize warmly with the people, and recognise in the machinery of lay representation in the Church courts one of the

* This other utterance of Shirley's is likewise characteristic, though in a different way: "To Dr. Lee's chair a Mr. Charteris was appointed—a smooth, polite, urbane, gentlemanly person—destitute, indeed, of any special force or capacity, a sort of ecclesiastical ladies' doctor." (The italics are ours, but not the dashes !)

most efficient guarantees of true progress. They have tried, too, to keep open all channels of intercourse with the dissenting Churches. With some tendency to Tory opinions, their sympathies have always been liberal, and they have ever been ready to enter into any measure of reform calculated to draw the various sections of society closer. By their sympathies, at least, they have tried to keep the aspiration after clerical freedom from coming into rude collision with the wave of political liberalism, now so rapidly advancing; and in consistency with this, they have been ready to take definitive action, when our advanced liberal friends have only retired languidly to their studies, rewarding their more active brethren with a smile of contempt for their pains. Hence it has been not inaptly said that this moderate-liberal party do get along the road, while the Broad Churchmen only succeed in raising dust.

Now, these two parties, who, by a union in which something was mutually given up, could achieve so much, come directly to confront and oppose each other on this point of patronage. The political Frankenstein still seems to pursue the successors of those who, by submission, helped to call it into existence.

"The Church politics of Scotland," says Dr. Wallace, "centre in the question of the continued existence of the Established Church;" and the continued existence of the Established Church is, in our opinion, more bound up with patronage than he is willing to see.

Patronage has been the disintegrating, pulverizing element most unjustifiably introduced beneath the foundation of the Scottish Church. Macaulay rightly says that it has been the cause of all the dissent in Scotland since 1712, when it was imposed in direct violation of the articles of the treaty of Union. It was imposed by a Parliament wherein Scottish voices were overpowered by mere numbers, nearly all the Scotch members voting against it. The Union has been in many things beneficial to Scotland; but this is one fatal disadvantage it brought to her—in making possible the enactment of laws as to ecclesiastical procedure alien to all her traditions, principles, and aspirations. If any weight is to be laid on tradition,—and certainly, as we have seen, Scotchmen are about the last persons to cease to lay full weight upon it—the truly national party within the Established Church are those who are fighting the anti-patronage battle. For not only are they the maintainers of old traditions; they are striving to keep the Church in relation with a spirit, the best proof of whose strength is the existence of such powerful non-endowed churches outside. If the freedom of the established clergy is henceforth to be secured purely by reference to the State, then the advanced party are right, and should not only support patronage, but agitate for a final Court of Appeal, like that of England; but if the Church courts are to have real power and to

continue to represent the laity, then their course of inaction is not only nugatory but self-destructive.

It is in relation to patronage that the true character of this party comes out most strongly. The Scottish people, who in such matters have always been keen enough to see their own interests, and fully alive to the benefits of "Presbyterian parity," are certainly not so obtuse as to fail to discern that the extreme freedom thus claimed for clergymen tends to make those who claim it somewhat ignore the rights of the members. This accounts for the fact that, while Scotland is undoubtedly becoming more liberal, it cannot be said that this party enjoys such general sympathy as might be expected. Its following is rather influential, but very limited; the great body of the common people say little: what they do say savours of doubtfulness. The reason, perhaps, is, that this party are frank enough not to disguise their feelings as to their presumed independence of the people. Dr. Robert Lee used to say that "the liberties of the people were increasing faster than their knowledge and their grace were." Very probably this was over true; but it glanced too keenly athwart the idea of "Presbyterian parity;" and such expressions, only too common with the school, will have the effect of making the nation unwilling to go so far, as it otherwise might and would, to meet them.

It becomes more and more plain that the new liberalism of the Scotch Establishment, if it boldly proceeds to justify itself by action, can only do so by directly separating the nation from its most cherished traditions, and resolving the Church itself into a loose mass of sects. Such absolute disconnection of historic continuity would, we think, be perilous. But the liberals, in truth, do not recognise any real significance in history. Certainly, they deserve credit for the *forward-look*. The political mind, however, is bound to consider history; and if, in reference to Scotland, it wishes now to steer clear of the terrible errors of former legislation, it must carefully con the lesson. This it seems more inclined to do than at any former period; and the intimation of its intention in this direction throws not a little light on the future of the advanced party, and also on the practical problems which it tries to escape from facing. All the secessions in Scotland have been the result of political pressure affecting the rights of the people; and the steady front of opposition which the clergy presented to such intrusions was always strengthened by their consciousness of being spokesmen for the people. Happily there are still those in the Scotch Establishment whose sympathies lead them to hold by this principle—Mr. Matthew Arnold's polished deliverances, as to the evil done to religion by the intermixture of political ideas, not yet having taken such possession of them as to overcome old-fashioned ways of thinking. Dr. Chalmers, who per-

haps was the truest representative in later times of this tradition, is worth listening to; and surely it is significant enough that his most distinct and authoritative word was uttered just at the beginning of that strife which issued in the Disruption. When lecturing in London in 1838, in face of an audience not very often in the way of hearing such statements, he spoke thus:—

“We appear for the families of our peasants and our artisans, and our men of handicraft and hard labour. *We are the tribunes of the people*, the representatives of that class to whom the law has given no other representatives of their own—of the unfranchised multitude, who are without a vote and without a voice in the House of Commons. Our sacred object is the moral well-being of the mighty host who swarm and overspread the ground-floor of the fabric of our commonwealth; and after the mists of prejudice and misconception have cleared away, *our ultimate hope of success, under Heaven, is in the inherent and essential popularity of our cause.*”

Yes, *the tribunes of the people!* The clergy of Scotland, from the era of Knox and Melville down to the Disruption, save in the “times of decadence or weakness,” which Mrs. Oliphant speaks of, have always so regarded themselves; and that they have so regarded themselves has been the source of their strength. All political interference with the rights of the Church, was on one side an interference with the rights of the people, otherwise unrepresented. In this way politics, through the democratic ministry of the Church, actually took on a colour of sacredness. The *sentiment* the Church had laid hold of at first justified itself in its fruit, and drew the hut into direct connection with the palace. Now, all this is to be changed under the hands of our new reformers. They practically repudiate the idea of being tribunes of the people. Their appeal is to a new-fledged aristocracy of culture and refinement. The divisions they sow are not such as can be confined to the Church; but, in spite of their desire to withdraw their interest from the political sphere, the pressure of the past will inevitably prove too strong, and their influence will itself finally become political and inveterate. They inaugurate a new war of classes and interests that must in the end prove baneful to Scotland—baneful to the whole kingdom. They have won the honour of being the first ministers of the Church of Scotland, completely and in theory, to detach themselves from the people, to ignore their claims in the presumed dignity of culture, and to distinctly and formally intimate that they are no longer, in any true sense, their representatives, as were the clergy in old time. Between the *freedom of thought* they seek after, and that *complete national freedom* which Scotland has always aimed at hitherto, there is a great gulf fixed; if the one is not exclusive of the other, it, at all events, tends towards exclusion; and if the liberals carry their point, what has come to pass with the Church will come to pass with the nation. Scotland will no longer be one people with a historic

past, but a congeries of societies mutually destructive of each other, as they tend towards one or other of two main divisions—the cultured and the uncultured; those who have risen to ideas and have esoteric rights and interests, and those again who have only the bond of a common ignorance and a common need of simple teaching. In spite of a sort of sentimental multitudinism, seeking to base itself on a loose humanitarianism, the Established Church must become less and less the Church of the people in the very measure that such doctrines prevail within it.

The complete penetration of the body-social by ecclesiastical influence, which we have said was noticeable in Scottish history, has, no doubt, too often produced narrowness and intolerant bigotry; but no thoughtful person will deny that it has had one most beneficial effect on the national life and progress. The fluid interaction of the lay and clerical elements has to such an extent rubbed down the high walls of class-distinction, that, in Scotland, phenomena are observable scarcely to be seen elsewhere. The intermixture of the children of varied grades on the forms of the parish schools seems to have wholly taken Mr. Fearon with surprise, when he paid his visit of inspection some years ago. In many other ways the same thing meets a stranger's view. Now, it seems to us that the practical tendency of our Broad School, in so far as it seeks to secure union on the ground of mere *intellectual* freedom, is distinctly towards the assertion of an opposite principle, whose ascendancy would prove the reversal of all this. Grounding itself on an assumed State-protection which, were it real, instead of being illusory in face of the action of the Church courts, would exclude and weaken the influence of the people, heretofore freely exercised within the limits provided by the Church's constitution—what could possibly accrue in the long run save divided interests. The more the Church is by State-countenance enabled to fall—or to rise (?)—into the position of an organ of culture, you have necessarily an aristocratic Church; and in spite of occasional utterances now and then, we cannot help thinking that this goal is that towards which this party is inevitably tending. The languid indifference of its members towards those questions which have most stirred the Scottish laity in the past, is thus seen to be quite consistent with their principles. But at a time when in England, it is day by day growing more evident that something must be done to make the influence of the laity available to the Church, it does seem a strange way to reform Scotland by sneering at or, at all events, ignoring what she has already attained in this respect; and introducing into her system those very alienations between laity and clergy from which the sister-Church is so sorely suffering. It cannot be denied that Dr. Robert Lee and his friends have always spoken with concern of the *cultivated* laity, who have

shown a tendency towards the Episcopalian communion; but it surely seems short-sighted policy to run the risk of alienating the great bulk of the people to win a handful of men, who after all, as Dr. Wallace, with surprising honesty, admits, have very little influence on the mass of the people. He writes:—

“The fact that the higher classes are Episcopalian will do very little to extend the influence of the system. The Scottish gentry have not much weight with the people, and are in no respect their leaders—living a separate life of their own, and having little intercourse or sympathy with the middle and lower classes, who go their own way, and who will probably cling all the more closely to Presbyterianism if they think that, under another system, they may be eclipsed and inconvenienced by the presence of exclusive neighbours.” (P. 201.)

Dr. Wallace expresses the conviction that if the Scotch Episcopal Church could only fall on any workable method of giving the laity more power, and of really enlisting their sympathy, it might add much to its influence. Strange that he did not see how his own party need to take the lesson—how he did not see that they are, after all, limiting their own influence by similar disregard of the popular needs and popular sympathies.

This is one result, viewed more from the political side than any other: of the evils likely to accrue to the national conscience from such complete indifference towards accepted symbols, we will speak again.

It may thus come out that the advanced party are hardly so politic as they may seem in supporting patronage in view of that doctrinal comprehension which it is their grand aim to secure. By this very attitude they at once cut off the Church from what is most influential in its own past, and isolate it more and more completely from the intense church-life which surrounds it, without an assured platform of permanence to themselves in face of a despised and contemned Confession, which yet the Church alone claims to administer. Nay, the fact is daily growing more patent that the influence of this party is towards *isolation* within the Church itself. The temper which was finally developed in Dr. Robert Lee, by the altogether untoward fact that he found himself helpless before the general feeling of the Church courts, reduced him *practically*, as it would no doubt have done *actually*, had he been longer spared, to the attitude of an independent minister. The contempt he poured upon the sectaries might have had some effect had stress of facts not compelled him to include the Established Church itself in the same anathema. The claim of clerical independence has so far in Scotland only led to isolation.

We are much surprised if the great bulk of intelligent Scotchmen would be inclined to accept a position which so clearly carries on its

face the possibility of absolute clerical independence. Scotland is sometimes said to be a priest-ridden country; but the riders have only ridden safely when they have taken good care to study the ways of the steed and to carefully adapt themselves thereto. The advanced party go so far with the "doubting, questioning" temper of Scotchmen, and to that extent they have influence; but they fail to catch the point where it inevitably joins with the people's keen sense of liberty, and makes them absolutely impatient of everything that savours of priestcraft. Now the claim put forth by Dr. Lee and the rest simply amounts to a demand that they be let teach what they choose; and this Scotchmen will not readily see their way to grant. Besides, Scotchmen like definite lines, whatever way these lines may run, and, as we shall see by-and-by, the indefiniteness of Broad Church position and demand is their chief characteristic.

Thus, while admitting the tendency to a more liberal tone, we cannot go so far as to say that Scotland is completely "moving away from external authority towards self-reliance; from an objective towards a subjective standard of truth." The mass of cautious and thoughtful Scotchmen are scarcely preparing to go this road. Many things may need adjustment—the very action taken among the unendowed Churches for union is silently adjusting several things in the way of drawing point after point into the margin of open questions.* But as yet it has not been so much as mooted to dispense wholly with the Confession and adopt another and simpler one. Here, where we should have most expected to find some practical evidence of that fast-growing liberalism and rational theology, into which the Free churches are said to be advancing more rapidly even than the Establishment itself, no such traces can be found. We say more rapidly than the Establishment; for with respect to this point all our liberal guides are noticeably vague. Some are dumb. The avalanche of conservative opposition which the bold advance of Dr. Lee precipitated may dwell too freshly on their memories. But if the wave of liberal feeling is gradually washing away the boundaries which divide the non-established Churches from each other, and still leaving them such respect for the Confession as, with the qualifications of formula necessary under the very conditions of union, will be strong enough to maintain it as a national symbol, it seems to us that Providence itself has put them in the way of finally achieving a result now rendered very difficult to the Establishment. For that Frankenstein of a political right reappears again. All the authorities now admit that the Church itself cannot change its creed save by appeal to Parliament. And the difficulty of Parliament no longer being the Parliament of Scotland, intrudes in such a way as to make most wise men call *halt*.

* For Free Churchmen's view of this see Dr. Bannerman's "Church of Christ," ii. 34.

John Knox submitted his creed to the Estates, that is true; but in consistency with his idea of the headship of Christ he took very good care to accept nothing directly opposed to what was conceived to be the right of the Church, which he strove to keep *national*; and when any great divergence arose, the Estates had pretty much to give way. So it was with the fathers of the Covenant! But here you have an Established Church to be legislated for by an assembly, only one very small fraction of whose members may be presumed to know anything about the question, or to have the least sympathy with the position of the Church.

We cannot help thinking that it is an overpowering sense of the difficulties hence arising, which makes Dr. Wallace, and Mr. Story, and "Shirley" so noticeably vague in regard to what should be done. They are full of denunciations of the creed, loud in their advertisements of the growth of liberalism, which is so rapidly divorcing the people from the creed; and yet they have not one practical thing to say beyond this, that the Church, which has full power to administer the creed, but none to change or modify it, should be so moderate in its administration as not to administer it at all.* If they framed their ideas into proposals to Parliament for a new formula, we should feel they were doing something to help matters forward, and should accordingly be grateful to them. But no. All they say amounts to this: "Let things remain as they are; only let us subscribe the whole thing in our own sense, and do not let loose on us the bandogs of the Church courts." Yet the only way in which this party could be at all consistent is by an immediate, wide, and thorough canvass for change. Because, as Dr. Wallace hints, there is possibility of complete detachment of conscience from the symbol, which would be a very sad result for poor old Scotland—the country of Reformers and Covenanters!

But when we cast about a little, reflecting all the while on the strange puzzle of great reformers being at the same time really as great conservatives as those whom they so freely placard with big, bad names, we do get a glimmer of the cause of all this. The truth is, that no formula, which would not be a mere mass of simple qualifications, would content this class of advanced thinkers. The proposal to do away with the Confession wholly is the only thing which could satisfy them, if they are to be consistent; but this they do not definitively propose. Yet all thanks and honour to Dr. Robert Lee, who was frank enough and courageous enough to throw down the cartel. The policy of the step may be doubted so far as it concerned his own peace; but his words are as significant in their own way as Melville's, when he told James there were *two* kingdoms

* Innes' "Law of Creeds," p. 151.

in Scotland—the more that Dr. Lee's friends do not follow him in this line so often as they might.

Dr. Lee's statement that "to investigate, to ponder, and to reason, when we have for ourselves, or when others have determined for us beforehand, the conclusion at which we must finally arrive, is indeed a laborious farce and a solemn mockery,"* cuts at the very root of all dogma whatever, and properly annihilates a Church in the ordinary sense of that word, most certainly in the sense in which a State-Churchman is, above all, bound to understand it. For, as a nation cannot be expected to endow where it has no power of control, you must contrive somehow to give it a definitory instrument, and this can only be a line drawn somewhere around dogmas—in short, a test of some kind or other. There is no escape out of this position. And as it is of the very essence of a test, however wide, however liberally conceived, that there should lie in it the possibility of excluding people, it seems to be specially involved in the nature of a State Church that it must have dogmas, whatever other Churches may do. But if you have dogmas, however simply conceived, subscription to which is a necessary preliminary to admission to orders, then in greater or less degree "conclusions are inevitably determined beforehand." The same difficulties arise however wide you may draw the line, for a line is there, and a bar put upon freedom of opinion. The Church, of course, is not an institution for promoting research, but for framing men to piety and purer lives; and no restriction is thereby put upon activity exerted for its proper object. But the getting rid of the restriction of "conclusions determined beforehand"—that is, the bugbear of all dogmatic truth whatever, so that no man can any longer be held bound even by the rudimentary dogma, "That there is a God"—is simply to reduce the Church to a mere organ of philosophy and culture, and a true union on the basis of Christian belief is no longer possible. The isolation of Dr. Lee's position, looked at from this point of view, becomes intelligible.

Dr. Mitchell, of St. Andrew's, speaking of this claim for a right "to ponder and to reason," declares it a *carte blanche* to be given into the hands of Dr. Lee, and afterwards to be filled up according to his pleasure. And we are compelled to agree with Dr. Mitchell; for not only would Dr. Lee's principles, carried fully out in practice, reduce Presbytery to chaos, but it would render impossible any settled combination and communion for the furtherance of Christian objects. "An institute of *free* religious thinkers and teachers of the nation," as advocated by Dr. Wallace, is certainly far enough from that ideal of a Church which Scotland has always hitherto entertained; and it is a question, indeed, how far this is compatible

* Lee's "Clerical Profession," p. 12.

with the existence of Presbytery at all. But Dr. Wallace, in distinctly formulating Dr. Lee's more generally expressed idea that a State which enforces dogma cannot be tolerant, has done service in clearly exhibiting the ideal to which his party would conform the Church. In an abstract, rather than a concrete, form, he tells us that all Confessions whatever are to be bundled aside!

"We are always *tending*," says a living theologian, "towards the notion that we may think what we like to think; that there is no standard to which our thoughts should be conformed; that they fix their own standard. *A society consisting of men, each, in this sense, a law to himself, is the most incredible conception in the world*; and yet there never was a time when the social impulse was stronger, or the craving for a perfectly united society more vehement. But I find that I cannot check dogmatism by being myself dogmatic. I must think that the spirit of dogmatism which is rife amongst us requires to be counteracted, not cast out, and that I need myself to be delivered from it."—*Maurice, Theo. Essays*, p. 9.

Clearly, therefore, a class of men who, while holding a Confession in such disrespect as this, do not find it incumbent on them to take united and immediate action for change, are very near to becoming guilty of the sin of encouraging that very evil which has overtaken the unrevised-confession-laden Churches of Germany. Either of two results is inevitable. If there is not, on the one hand, an incessant, half-hidden, tentative proclaiming of doctrines *felt* to be inconsistent with the subscription, there will be, on the other, a bold and reckless defiance of authority which, were it to increase, would tend to transform parish churches into philosophical class-rooms, the pulpits into political platforms. Even Dr. Lee, in spite of all his straightforwardness and honesty, allowed himself to be dissuaded from publishing certain sermons, *for fear of consequences*. The question necessarily occurs, how far such discourses could have served the purpose of religious edification for which the Church exists and is endowed. But towards no other result can these things tend. Ministers of less potent name and less influential backing will behave still more dubiously, and a demoralization worse in character than the old Moderate one, will be inaugurated. And if it be said that men will only preach orthodoxy because they are held in by the rein of fear, and that you will have but poor preaching, the evident answer is, that whatever the result in this regard, the Confession then stands for something to those outside the Church, and so far accomplishes its object. Then, it may be asked, is this preaching of orthodoxy through fear so very much worse a position morally than the preaching of discourses which yet the preacher refrains from publishing *simply through fear of consequences*? The positions seem to us not so very different after all. But to have a Confession that is to bind nobody, and yet to be maintained and used in a Church that claims the sole right to administer it, seems the height of folly; and therefore we cannot

help thinking the advanced party are somewhat inconsistent in the security they feel in that "comfort" which delights to think the accession of Free Churchmen very unlikely.

The Duke of Argyll, who may be regarded as a good representative of the cultivated Presbyterian laity, advocates a modified formula, but says distinctly that to do away with the Confession would be fraught with gravest perils to the Church. In this, his Grace speaks the general sense and the general sentiment of the nation. We believe if the advanced liberals could consistently see their way to take up such a position as that of the Duke, some hope of a beneficial settlement of matters might be entertained. For the more moderate liberals would here go heartily with them; and this once secured, together with the abolition of patronage, the Establishment would have opened new points of contact at once with the thought of the age and with the popular sympathies. But instead of acting as a conciliatory and uniting element, this party acts as a dissolvent, coming into contact with other parties only to pulverise and disintegrate. The sneers and innuendoes launched at those of the moderate liberals who were forward in the recent anti-patronage movement, is itself sufficient proof of this.

For these reasons we certainly hold that those are not the true friends of the Church who, while they openly publish and preach what is inconsistent, to say the least, with the Confession, wrap themselves up in a dignified *laissez faire*, and even speak with contempt of those who, seeing the tendency of the times, are practically bestirring themselves for such reconciliation and adjustment as can be attained. The men who have now taken action for the abolition of patronage show themselves wiser than the "advanced thinkers;" for is there not some fear that men who have "moved away from an external authority, from an objective to a subjective standard," may be apt to apply their principles, and declare against an "external authority or an objective standard" in the election of their ministers? The two things are not absolutely divorced from each other,—at least, in Scotland, freedom of thinking has always been apt to breed freedom of acting likewise. Dr. Wallace's Essay may here be more specially drawn forward to establish many of our statements. It is from beginning to end a plea for such latitude of construction as wholly annihilates the Confession, so that Church courts would no longer have an instrument. No wonder the Church courts, with that "corporate self-will" which is said to grow out of independence, look rather askance at such radical tendencies! Nothing definite is proposed. "The religious thought of the country is moving towards a new point of view, and the Church must go there to meet it, if it means to be instrumental in preserving a living faith within the mind of the nation." Dr. Wallace veils radical changes under abstract

phrases, and does not come to the point and tell us whether the Confession should be thrown aside, or the formula softened, or the whole thing retained as useless old armour, only tending to cumber the action of a body filled with fresh vigour, as he hopes it will be. Dr. Wallace finds the justification of his position in the "growth of a questioning and doubting spirit towards theological determinations and ecclesiastical institutions claiming Scriptural sanction." But we cannot help thinking that he has in some degree exaggerated a national tendency into a special phenomenon, to get more countenance to his theory from it. Nay, did he not say, a few pages before, that this "questioning, doubting spirit" was nothing new; but rather was, and had always been, characteristic of Scotland? Scotland produced a Hume; and Hume is representative of a very prominent attitude and temper in Scotland. All that Dr. Wallace says on this point could have been said of Scotland at any period since the beginning of the eighteenth century; simply because the Scotchman, in spite of his religion, is of a "rationalistic, doubting, questioning, contradictory temper." But the strange thing is, as we have tried to show, that Scotchmen live two lives: so that what they may seem to hold in indifference or even in contempt with the head, they may cling to and cherish, and almost worship, with the heart. Where, save in Scotland, would you find a shy maiden counselling her lover to pretend to "lichtly" * her as he passes by, so that they two may enjoy a little longer the delights of secret wooing? Yet such is the burden of one of the most popular and most characteristic of Scottish songs. It is this possibility of attachment concealing itself under indifference and disregard,—this quickness of feeling thwarting all expected issues, which men like Dr. Wallace completely fail to grasp as likely to be an influential power in the battle of any such reform as they uphold. When it comes to the push they will find it so,—as Dr. Robert Lee would assuredly have found. Nay, is it not told of the very Hume who is named so freely in this connection, how that when a man brought him a laboured essay against the Sabbath, the sceptic gravely told him to go and put it in the fire, as the Scotch reverence for the Sabbath had certainly been a blessing, and should be maintained, instead of being weakened? The anecdote, whether true or false, is not without its significance here. Now Dr. Wallace's Essay, with all its knowledge of facts, its practical shrewdness and neat-cut completeness, simply takes no cognizance of this element whatever (save, indeed, by unconscious contradictions), and everything is simply forced into a mould to make it bear the impress of influence from Dr. Wallace's own party. But his misfortune is, that he has facilely allowed himself to prove too much.

* Make light of.

It may of course be a thing to be deplored that this tendency, in combination with the large space which Church symbols fill in the national history and associations, makes possible such a disruption between the intellectual and the religious life of the people. Possibly it was some glimpse of this proclivity which made the Reformers and men of the Covenant, whose insight into the national character was by no means small, so determined that no phase of social and public life should be dissociated from religious influence. The Cameronians, as we have seen, faithfully following direct traditions, actually refused to fulfil the duty of citizens under an uncovenanted Government which made civil things unholy. Certainly this two-sidedness of the national character is a fact so outstanding, that no true forecast of ecclesiastical possibilities is of much value which does not take it into account.

We have said Dr. Wallace's Essay presents unconscious contradictions. Let us note some of these. He writes:—

"But to them [the liberal party in the Establishment] the true salvation of the Church lies in making it doctrinally comprehensive, so that by embracing as much as possible of the national religious life, it may meet the righteous demands of religious equality. To those who are persuaded of this, it can be no recommendation of any policy that it tends to bring back the Free Church."

But were we not told a moment before that the Free Church (thanks to the influence of the advanced party) had undergone a wonderful change towards more liberal ideas recently?

"Since 1843, a generation has passed away, and a younger race, both clerical and lay, has arisen to influence the Church's counsels and character. Among these . . . a more moderate and liberal tone of thinking prevails, than was developed in the fierce and extreme times amidst which the Free Church was born. . . . The number of pulpits is increasing from which a tolerably broad theology is taught."

It is extremely awkward for Dr. Wallace's liberalism that he should so clearly claim to have it both ways! The Free Church is advancing towards the very point liberal Churchmen wish, and yet that is to be held a good reason for not recommending any policy to bring them back. But a recurrence to Dr. Wallace gives us the reason. The progress of the Free Church in this direction, "a feature more or less characteristic of all the Churches," of course, goes very fitly to support the generalization that—

"It is certainly the testimony of history that when religion is left to take care of itself, *left to grow into any shape that can be given to it between priests and people, without the organized application to its development of the best reason in the community* [an Arnoldian roundabout, better expressed by the single word, the State], it is too apt to assume forms that react disastrously upon the commonwealth."

And the very height of unconscious inconsistency seems reached when it is admitted that "*many of the clergy*" of the United Presbyterian Church—a strictly voluntary Church, be it noted—are, as well as *many* in the Establishment, "*men of liberal sentiments.*" Dr. Wallace might have added, only it would have borne rather strongly against his position—that these United Presbyterians, by the very fact of subscribing a modified formula, to the effect that the Confession is taken as exhibiting the sense in which Scripture is believed, instead of the more binding subscription as "*the confession of my faith,*" had already made a step forward. But then the awkward thing is, that this is a purely voluntary Church, which, on his principle, should only develop what is "*apt to react disastrously upon the commonwealth.*"

But the practically disastrous reaction anticipated in this special instance is that "*liberal Churchmen feel that a great accession of Free Churchmen might not prove comfortable to them.*" If the *comfort* of liberal Churchmen is identical with the true good of the commonwealth, then it must be admitted that Dr. Wallace has *more* than proved his point. The *comfort* of liberal Churchmen thus becomes the central element in the process of making the Church doctrinally comprehensive. It is well to see brethren growing together into unity of opinions. This is from a recent volume, written by distinguished English Nonconformists—

"The right of presentation, if it appears an advantage on one side, is manifestly a disadvantage on another. If it bestow independence upon an incumbent, it inflicts the opposite upon a people. They have no voice in the selection of their instructor. They must submit to his teaching, however contrary it may be to the Word of God, and to their own conscientious convictions. Much is said of the freedom of clergymen so inducted; but such freedom for a clergyman is really the bondage of his parishioners."—*Ecclesia*, p. 37.

Dr. Wallace's true policy, and certainly his best argument, would have been to show that no progress towards liberality had been made outside the Established Church. A similar error Mr. Story falls into in his *Life of Dr. Robert Lee*, in bearing so harshly against the great mass of the members of the Established Church courts. The frightful epithets about selfishness, self-interest, and hypocrisy, which are used in regard to them, force us very reluctantly to think of a Scotch proverb about a certain bird.

But might not a stranger be justified in expressing some surprise that the growth of liberal ideas outside the Established Church is not held to have something to do with "*comprehension,*" as well as the growth of liberal ideas inside it? How Dr. Wallace could calmly trace out such a revolution in the seceding churches as, on his own admission, puts them on a level with the Establishment

for liberality, and in the very direction, too, that he so much prizes, and at the same time look so coldly on anything like the idea of union or comprehension towards them, seems to us very remarkable. If, as Dr. Wallace seems to hope, the growth of liberal ideas is destined to go on as it has done of late, in spite of the aptness of "religion when left to take care of itself" to "react disastrously upon the commonwealth," might not the best safety of men like Dr. Robert Lee and himself lie in the Establishment seeking to embrace and receive back such communities? In removing the producing causes of what is apt to "react so dangerously upon the commonwealth" lies surely one of the very first duties of a national Church, more especially when the "true salvation of the Church lies in its embracing as much as possible of the national religious life, so that it may meet the righteous demands of religious equality." Or is it that we must return on the lame and impotent conclusion that liberal ideas "react disastrously on the commonwealth" when developed among seceders; and, on the other hand, are the seed of new blessings to Church and nation when they are developed in the Church, more especially with a reference to the *comfort* of liberal Churchmen?

"Quietude of opinion has always been an omen of evil and not of good to the Church," says Principal Tulloch, and in this the older leaders would have fully agreed with him. But certainly they never encouraged the attitude of individual revolt and isolation, which is inseparable from the position of men who feel they have diverged so far from the ordinarily received sense of a Confession that they are completely out of harmony with the Church, and must shrink from its associated conscience and counsel. And notwithstanding that Principal Tulloch's pamphlet on the "Function of Debate in Theology," from which we have just quoted, breathes a more conciliatory tone,* it gives no hint as to where any clear line might be drawn so as to relieve the Church from a position calculated to generate sects and parties within it,—a thing which all the machinery of Presbytery was instituted with the one end of preventing. The whole theory of the Scotch Church is, and has been, that its collective voice is superior even to creed. Recent legal decisions have, of course, blown rather rudely over the still waters of this conviction, more especially as regards the Establishment; but that this was and is the theory there can be no manner of doubt whatever. Otherwise, what can mean the ever-repeated

* Dr. Tulloch speaks with more wisdom than others of his school:—"It would not be well for you to be constantly straining these conclusions and probing their foundation as if nothing had been settled. This I am sure would not be good for you. . . . You will recognise that the old solutions on dogmatic controversy, whether or not they are any longer adequate, are entitled to your deepest respect."—*Function of Debate in Theology*, p. 12.

statements we meet with, from the time of Knox and Melville down to our own day, calling on any one who can show wherein the Confession is inconsistent with Scripture, to come forward "of his gentleness" (such was the early phrase), and make proof of the same in presence of the Assembly? It would seem, indeed, that theoretically Presbyterianism had already, in the moment of its origin, made full provision for what Baron Bunsen so desiderates in the disorganized Church politics of Germany—the voice of the congregation, to which a member may make appeal in order to the bringing of his judgment into conformity with that of the *Gemeinde*. This is a process, of course, very different from anything beheld in the Church of Rome; but it yields a result which may stand in the place of an authority to the wavering individual conscience—certain to waver the more where multiplied traditional forms are lightly held, and where there is not such constant adjustment of these to living consciences and to the special needs of a period as Presbyterianism by this means certainly in principle seeks to provide for. The Confession can never on this account be consistently reduced to a simple negative thing or to mere articles of peace. In former times this was clearly felt and acted on; for in 1692 the Assembly decisively declined to accept from the king a formula, which would have enabled them to do this. While, therefore, it would, on the one hand, be easy to cull authorities from all the Churches to prove that this is still the theory of Scottish Presbyterianism, it certainly would be as easy, on the other, to establish the doctrine, that the chief force of the system has been directed into keeping intact a strong attraction of all opinion towards the associated centre, the highest representative organ of the whole—the General Assembly. And, strangely enough, the voices of the leaders of the Establishment are most decisive on this head. Nothing is more clear than that the impugning of the Confession publicly, without having first made statement to the higher tribunals of the change of attitude towards it, amounts to the most serious infringement of the law of the Church. Without going over a long list of authorities, let us refer to two quite recent ones, called forth by circumstances within the memory of all who take any interest in Scotch Church politics. This is from a pamphlet by Dr. Mitchell, Professor of Divinity at St. Andrew's, and his knowledge of the law of the Church cannot be doubted:—

"Whenever a minister deems it his duty to give open expression to opinions apparently inconsistent with the Confession which he has owned and subscribed, he must, with respect to these, be content to abide the judgment of his brethren; he must be able to vindicate his consistency to their satisfaction, and if he fail to do so, must continue to hold his place in the Church, *not of legal right, but from their forbearance alone.*" *

* Westminster Confession, and its Historical Relations, p. v.

Then take this from, if possible, a still higher authority, Dr. Cook:—

"A minister cannot openly within the Church impugn the Confession. He must forfeit, should he be led to change his views with regard to it, that position, his admission to which his signature to the Confession of Faith was an essential preliminary."^{*}

It seems to have been felt vaguely from the first that, in the very degree that there was true independence and real sincerity, there would be variations of attitude towards the creed—that, indeed, a creed in representing all can only represent individuals as freely yielding something; but, at the same time, nothing can be clearer than that the Church constituted itself the absolute judge of the measure of allowable divergence as laid to the test of the Word of God.

Here again we see how Presbytery, while strict in defending itself from all outside domination, yet aimed at keeping clear a plastic sphere for its own inclusive self-adjustment. If firm towards others, it could be considerate to its own members as against others. The Confession contained the truth of God of a verity so far, said the Fathers; but let any one come and convince us of its being inconsistent with the Word of God, and we will in that matter yield unto him. This is still practically the view of the great bulk of the Scotch people; and men of learning and intelligence are not afraid to reiterate the principle. Strange it is, too, that the Free Church, held generally to be the most fixed and dogmatic of all the churches, is readiest with its admissions. This, for instance, is a very thoughtful and moderate view of the matter:—

"We do not say that the statements of the Westminster Confession comprise the whole truth of God; what we do say is, that we believe them to be true—to be a true expression of the revealed mind and will of God so far as they go. *Let any part of them be proved from Scripture to be false, and we give it up*, for we hold them only because and in so far as they are true. We invite every man to go beyond them if he can. We encourage and call upon every student of God's Holy Word to press forward to fresh discoveries of truth, and to open new views of the meaning of Scripture. 'There remaineth yet much land to be possessed.' Those who have studied the Bible longest and most prayerfully are most convinced of that. But here, we believe, in this form of ancient and sound words, is much of the good land and large already so far explored and taken possession of. Here is so much of truth made good, and rescued from the tumult of error and ignorance, and fenced round with enduring bulwarks, which have many a time already turned the battle from our gates."[†]

Or again, this from the pen of Dr. Horatius Bonar:—

"Disguise it as we may, truth is dogma. Let men sneer at catechisms and creeds as bondage and shackles; let them call them skeletons, or

^{*} Moderator's Address in Established Church Assembly, 1866.

[†] Bannerman's "Church of Christ," i. 321. |

bones, or something more offensive still, these formularies are meant to be compilations of *truth*. In so far as they can be shown to contain error, let them be amended or flung aside; but in so far as they embody *truth*, let them be accepted and honoured as most helpful to the Christian life; not simply sustaining it, but also giving it stability and force; preventing its being weakened or injured by change, caprice, love of novelty, or individual self-will."*

We have quoted these two passages, because, uttered by representative men, they express the feelings of a very large proportion of the Scottish people. The existence of such a feeling we regard as a justification of many of our statements as to the impolitic nature of the attacks made by the advanced liberals upon the standards, even in cases where we could to some extent sympathise with the feelings which prompted their attacks. But till they see their way to a more comprehensive and conciliating mode of action, to more definite proposals, and to wiser forbearances, they will not be able to grapple with the real difficulties of the position. Confessions have two uses: they are signs of things believed, and they are testimonies of fights fought and victories won. Not yet has the Westminster Confession ceased to have some significance for Scotland in the first sense; and surely that will be for her a sorry day when she throws aside for ever such memorials of hard fights, such trophies of her freedom and independence. Is it not a grievous error to seek to engraft upon Presbyterian institutions the presumed freedom which attends a Church whose liberty seeks centre in the Royal supremacy? The advanced Presbyterians had better walk warily. There can be no doubt that ultimately a great Presbyterian Union will be consummated in Scotland—that the obstacles which now lie in the way to it are temporary, and will vanish with advancing years. Can there be a doubt that such a Church, holding the Confession on the ground of what is common in it to all, would, by the very fact of its existence, compel a political reconsideration of Church affairs, more especially if the Establishment, as this party advises, clings to its patronage? And if it so cling, is there no fear that the spirit which before issued in disruption may break out again to weaken and vex the Established Church? This is the dilemma liberal churchmen in Scotland have to meet; and certainly those men are hardly taking the noblest way to achieve the solution of the problem who hug the idea of an illusory freedom secured to them by the State, and, in an imaginary security and dignity, laugh and sneer at practical efforts put forth with the best intentions both for progress and for peace.

H. A. PAGE.

* Catechism of the Scottish Reformation, p. xiii.



THE TRADE SOCIETIES OF ENGLAND,

FROM THE WORKMAN'S POINT OF VIEW.

IN the formation of a fair and just judgment of Trades' Unions, it is necessary to pass in swift review a long series of facts of which they are the present consequence.

The history of attempts by public authority to adjust the relations betwixt Capital and Labour, employers and employed, may be traced in English annals as far back as the reign of the First Edward. These attempts, therefore, cover a period of six hundred years. But measures which germinated under "Longshanks," did not attain development till his grandson ascended the throne. By several statutes in the reign of Edward III. labour and trade were affected. Wages and the price of provisions were regulated. The woollen manufacture was introduced from the Netherlands. The property of foreign merchants in England was seized to supply the wants of the King. He also debased the coin, and prohibited its exportation. He likewise forbade the exportation of wool and other articles. He put penalties upon forestalling, and even attempted to restrain private expenditure. These interferences teased the people, and increased those evils which they pretended to cure. The failure of one statute, however, did but lead to another, demonstrating the falseness of the legislation by a protracted series of bad results.

The Act (23 Ed. III. c. i.) first regulating wages, was therefore styled the "Labourers' Act." A great plague had thinned the

working classes, who, taking advantage of the fact, claimed an advance of wages. It was consequently enacted, that labourers in husbandry should not take more than a certain sum, should be hired for fixed terms, should be sworn to obey the statute, and, on disobedience, be put in the stocks for three days. This, in all probability, is the origin of the name "statutes" given to the periodical hirings of farm servants in the northern counties to this day. With prædial labourers, then little better than slaves, and even now in some counties mere serfs, little ceremony was used. But the Third Edward and his parliaments handled the inhabitants of towns, especially when foreigners, quite as severely. He laid a heavy hand upon the ancient guilds,—those trades' unions in their original form. But, first, they were combinations of masters and men. Their object was to foster the respective trades of whose practitioners they were composed. They possessed, in fact, a monopoly privilege of producing certain articles in the town where they were placed. The freemen of each trade, that is to say, those born in that trade, or those who had served an apprenticeship to it, thereby becoming free, were alone entitled to its privileges; all others were excluded, being mere serfs. When it seemed that these corporations shackled industry instead of promoting it, a law was passed annulling their franchises. In the same reign, however, another law declared apprenticeship indispensable, and, a trade once chosen, prohibited change of occupation. When license was given to make cloth, not only were prices fixed by law, but it also prescribed the kind to be worn by artizans or by rustics, and even the sort of shrouds in which the corpse of a townsman or of a countryman should be buried.

The next remarkable statutory interferences with labour occurred in the reign of Henry VI. In 1425 the workmen in the building trade drew hostile attention by efforts to maintain their rights, at variance with the Statute of Labourers before-mentioned. To restrain them an Act was passed which made it a capital offence to combine in the way imputed, and subjected all who should be convicted of taking part in such combinations to an indefinite term of imprisonment. In 1444 the general rate of wages for all ordinary workmen was again fixed by special statute.

In the reign of Henry VIII. legislation of this description took a turn in favour of those guilds which Edward III. had abolished. These were now restored, and invested with a monopoly of labour. An Act was passed in the short reign of Edward VI., tending in like manner to discourage independence on the part of the working men. In 1549 they were, for the first time in set terms, forbidden by law to enter into agreement with each other as to the mode in which they would dispose of their labour. The policy in preceding reigns

had been, first, to keep down the countrymen in absolute serfdom; and, as to masters and men in towns, to maintain wages and profits by keeping down competition. This naturally engendered a notion that law could regulate wages and fix prices. Those not content with their wages, and those dissatisfied with the prices demanded for commodities, threw the blame upon Government. This, perhaps, was the origin of the connection between physical distress and political discontent. When, in the reign of Elizabeth, the six hundred cloth-shearers of Shrewsbury complained of foreign interlopers, the legislature interposed; and those "non-unionists," as perhaps they would now be styled, were driven out of the town. The consequence, however, was, that the trade left it. In the reign of Elizabeth, nevertheless, and long after, Parliament continued to "meddle and muddle." The Apprentices Act, which continued in force for two centuries and a half, compelled all men not gentlemen born to work, whether in trade or in husbandry, at wages assessed by the justices, but not till after seven years' apprenticeship. From this law the guilds and corporations were for the most part exempt; one consequence of which was, that industry left them, and took up its abode in places then obscure, but now of world-wide fame, as Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Bradford, and so forth.

Under the first competitions between machinery and hand-loom weaving, into which there is not room to enter, the operatives betook themselves to the example set by the guilds and corporations, of combining for the maintenance of wages. The Act of Edward VI. had forbidden this under heavy penalties. Nevertheless, the bold men of the building trades persisted. The battle was fierce and long. No fewer than thirty statutes were enacted in successive reigns against confederacy to raise wages; and they remained in force till the year 1824, when they were all repealed.

This was an admission, if not of the rightfulness of such combinations, yet of the fact that repression, instead of stopping them, rather increased them, and put them upon the employment of secret methods as well as of resentful practices. "It was felt," remarks an impartial, not to say an unfriendly historian, "that, by confounding right and wrong, and treating unionists as felons, men were led to regard things really vicious with less aversion than formerly."

When the inevitable effect of the repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824 is considered, it seems strange that the legality of trades' unions should have been subsequently questioned. Then, provided always that no violence were used, it became lawful for workmen to combine for such purposes as fixing or advancing wages, altering hours determining quantity to be done in a given time, and even them either to quit work or to return to it. Masters and

men were now equally free; only, as to the men, they must allow among themselves the same freedom. As to strikes, that is a subject for future consideration. The present theme is trades' unions.

Were any man, acknowledged as a leader among the trades, asked for his definition of trades' unions, he would probably make answer after this fashion: Trades' unions, he might say, are the means adopted in combination to prevent the working man from being coerced, by pressure upon him as an individual, into the acceptance of unreasonable terms from an employer in the purchase of his labour. The value and usefulness of these organizations would be described as consisting in their tendency to prevent the rate of wages from falling below a fair remuneration—a tendency which would operate without check but for the impediment set up by the power of combination. Nor would any open-minded working man think it necessary to conceal, as, perhaps, the ultimate object of trades' unions, to secure for the producing labourer that portion of the profits of production which, on a fair estimate, should fall to his share. The claims set up on behalf of the workman, and sought to be advanced and established by means of trades' unions, may, in fine, be divided under four general heads:—

First, the power of bargaining as a seller of labour.

Secondly, the demand of fair wages in exchange for his work.

Thirdly, the limitation of exertion to reasonable hours.

Fourthly, his right as the producer to a share of the profits accruing from production.

Trades' unions are neither more nor less than a necessary consequence of those who form them being thrown upon their own resources for their own welfare, safety, protection, and defence. Called into existence by the requirements of the working classes, they are sustained by a deepening conviction of their value and indispensableness. They are equally essential to the promotion of the common welfare, and to the guardianship of the common interests. But are they to be eternal? The answer to that question depends upon circumstances. When they shall cease to benefit the classes who have formed them, when they shall no longer prove advantageous to the people in the mass, and when labour shall be able to dispense with the shield that they throw around it—then they will die by a natural death, without the employment of any external agency for their destruction. Nor is this all. Till those conditions shall be concurrently fulfilled, no amount of external agency put forth against them will accomplish their extinction. On the contrary, any such attempts would but stimulate them into more active life, and provoke them into more resolute energy. The will to extinguish them may be present in many minds, but how to per-

form what they devise they will never find, except they kill them, as the man was advised to kill his enemies, by kindness.

That one of the main objects of trades' unions is to maintain wages at a proper point, none of their advocates or apologists pretend to deny; but they do venture to ask why to the producers of commodities which other men make subject of sale and purchase in the open market, should be denied that power of bargaining which vendor and purchaser fully enjoy, and very freely, not to say obstinately, exercise? The consumer, too, may chaffer as long as he likes; but the producer, forsooth, must be steeped for ever in that "moral molluscousness" which my Lord Elcho has had the good fortune to make into a proverb—an abridged form of the proverb with which we were all familiar in childhood, when we used to bid one another "Open the mouth, shut the eyes, and see what God would send us." At the time, perhaps, of this present writing, what is going forward in the cotton markets of Liverpool and Manchester? Men of business are agreed that "brevity is the soul of wit" in business, whatever it may be in literature. Thus, most of them sum up whole volumes on Free Trade, in the maxim of "buying cheap and selling dear." The Manchester men are trying to buy cheap at Liverpool and to sell dear at home; but at Liverpool the same thrifty ideas prevail, and these exercises of a common propensity in opposite directions bring negotiation to a stand. Nobody, however, says, How shocking! but no sooner does the working man put in a practical claim to bargain, like other men, for the commodity in which he deals, than the Scribes and Pharisees of the mart and the exchange are scandalized beyond all power of containing their righteous indignation. It may be foreseen that a distinction would be set up between two individual bargainers on the one hand, and between master and men on the other; but the distinction really makes no difference; it is in both cases, "Pull, devil; pull, baker." Bargains on the flagstones at Liverpool, or in the Trade Hall of Manchester, are not between A and B, but between vendors and purchasers in the aggregate; and both those who offer goods for sale and those who present themselves in the attitude of buyers, act literally upon the principle of the trades' unions, and bring all the power they can to bear upon the maintenance of prices, or upon their abatement, according as this or that course suits them. The same thing takes place in all serious contentions betwixt master and men. Usually, if the dispute begins in one factory or workshop, it is taken up by others in the same line of business, and becomes a regular trade conflict. If, then, the individual employer betakes himself for support to other employers in the same trade, what wonder that a fellow-feeling among their workmen should express

itself in similar co-operation for mutual protection and help? But take the case of one master on one side, and a thousand men on the other: his position as proprietor, capitalist, and employer, gives him a power which, if not quite equal to the united power of his thousand men, is immensely too great for any one among the thousand to cope with single-handed; whereas, let the whole number combine in one demand for what they conceive to be no more than their due, and then the parties would be equally matched.

The question of wages is one which all the candid and reasonable must admit to be attended with difficulties, some of which are hard, if not impossible, of dogmatical solution. Like every other question in which there is or may be a rivalry, a competition, or a clashing of interests, it becomes easier of practical settlement in proportion as all concerned can be induced to bear in mind and carry out the golden rule, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." Here is a clue out of the most labyrinthine maze. But, in the business of life, we are obliged to come down to lower ground. Society is no longer society, however, if an honest, sober, and industrious man be not enabled to live. Even political economists approach to something like eloquence when, in reference to trades' unions, they flourish before the eyes of the many "the inexorable law of supply and demand." But are the unionists always to be hearers only? May they not, for once, be allowed to speak, and have even "inexorable" doctrinaires for their patient audience? These have much to say concerning production and consumption. Will they not grant, then, that the man who gives his whole life to the production of wealth, to the enrichment, first, of another man, next of a number of other men, and ultimately of an entire country and people,—that such a man is fairly entitled to have himself and his family well housed, himself and them decently clad, and himself and them sufficiently fed? To say nothing about a little luxury for his wife, is it not at this moment the cry of all sects and parties, that the working man ought both to educate his children, and make a provision for them and their mother in case they should be orphans and she a widow? Had the claims here stated or hinted at been spontaneously allowed by employers at large, and practically conceded, trades' unions might have been superseded. But, if it be replied, that in all, or nearly all, the respects named, the condition and prospects of the working men and their families have in this country been improved, it will be found that the trades' unions will claim a very large share of the result as due to their existence and exertions. Show us, they will say, a trade or a district where no unions exist, and you shall find the labourer robbed of his hire, and without spirit to demand

restitution—a miserable, puny, half-starved creature, hovering, with all dependent upon him, upon the verge of pauperism; while, if you point us to working men with good wages, good clothing, good feeding, good homes, and a good deal of intelligence, we will trace all up to their prudent attachment to the union or unions of their respective trades.

The trades' unions are not taxed with demanding anything so extravagant as a maximum of wages; but they do plead guilty, if any culpability be involved in it, to contending for a minimum of wages. And, on this point, what are the facts? A minimum rate of wages is maintained by the majority of the trades. In every trade the majority, perhaps the bulk, are average workmen. But above these are workmen especially skilled, and below them a certain number of incompetent bunglers. The majority of employers, it may be believed, wish to have good workmen, and to pay them fair wages; but nearly all work is now done by contract. The lowest tender is sometimes, perhaps often, taken. Contracts founded on this principle have an inherent tendency to depress wages. These being the facts (and they are fairly, if not fully, stated), what are the reasoning and the practical issues that they lead to and will support? First, a minimum rate of wages will protect the public against incompetent hands and inefficient work; secondly, it will act as a check upon such masters as snatch at contracts by means of low tenders; thirdly, it will insure fair play to honourable masters, who shrink from putting in tenders that would be practically dishonest, and scorn the idea of "scamping" any work that they undertake to execute; fourthly, it will afford to the less capable class of workmen the best opportunity of improving by association in labour with abler hands, while it will procure for them an amount of recompense which, under other circumstances, they would not command; fifthly, it will be a measure of simple, perhaps of bare justice to the middle mass of workmen, who, but for this protection, would be exposed to the hard fate of being paid, not on a scale adapted to their own earnings, but according to the inferior and slower workmanship of the least competent among their associates; lastly, as a minimum, and not a maximum, is the thing in question, the superior class would have free scope for the manifestation of their superiority and for reaping proportionate rewards. These have a certainty of employment. In the worst times, they are the last to be discharged. As a matter of fact, they often receive higher wages than the rest. From time to time they become foremen, and are appointed managers of works; and, in fine, there is no rule in any trade society forbidding a man of superior intelligence and skill to receive any amount of wages above the minimum that an employer may offer him, or may think him worth. On one occasion the claim for a

minimum rate of wages, calculated upon the value of the services of the average workman, was pithily defended by means of a homely but telling illustration :—

“We say,” observed the speaker, “that, out of a thousand, nine hundred and fifty of us are men of average skill. Our labour, therefore, is worth so much. We ask you to pay the nine hundred and fifty according to that average. Is there anything wrong in that? No; if a man had nine hundred and fifty sacks of corn, each of the same value, would you ask him to part with one at half the price paid for another? You never heard of such a thing. If nine hundred and fifty sacks of corn are all alike, they all fetch the same price; and it makes no odds whether the articles be corn or flour, beer or treacle, rods of iron or human sinews.”

The hours of labour is one point to which trades' unions have directed their attention. If there is any treason or felony in this, the Early Closing Association must be arraigned before the same panel and in the same bill of indictment. Nor, indeed, is it easy to see how either the sanitary reformer or the educationist can elude a share in the responsibility. It is vulgarly facile, no doubt, to describe the advocacy of shorter hours as an unreasonable claim of so many more hours' recompense for so many fewer hours' work. But let the matter be more fairly considered. Have the merchants, bankers, and others who have so freely allowed their clerks, warehousemen, and so forth, hours for drill as volunteers, and even whole days and parts of weeks for musters, reviews, and sham fights—have these employers deducted so much from the salaries of the young men thus privileged? Or have the young men employed in drapers' and other shops or places of business, who have been permitted to leave their work at earlier times than formerly, and to enjoy a half-holiday on Saturday besides—have these persons been called upon to pay for the relief by submitting to a proportionate docking of their salaries? No; there is no evidence that those employers who have adopted these liberal practices, have illiberally contracted their payments to the persons in their employ; on the contrary, it is well understood that they have come to the persuasion that the labour limited to a reasonable number of hours is more efficient than that which is spread over an excessive number of hours, and that what is conceded in opportunities for healthy recreation is amply returned in increased strength, alacrity, and diligence.

If, then, this is true of those lighter forms of work which fall to the lot of young men in the middle classes, how much more must it be true with respect to those heavier trades and callings which are pursued by working men in general, with closer application, for longer hours, and under less advantageous circumstances as to posture, ventilation, and other points of accommodation? Let us

economise the labour of our country. Long hours make life short, turn man into a machine, ruin health, cripple the limbs, stunt the mind, extinguish the desire for knowledge, create a craving for unwholesome stimulants, and, finally, demoralize the whole being. Divide the hours between labour and rest, assiduous work and pleasant relaxation, labour of the hands and exercise of the brain, and an entirely opposite class of results spring up. The man has a keen relish for both labour and rest, for earning a livelihood and enjoying leisure, for exerting his bodily powers and storing the faculties of his mind. The employer is served with alacrity instead of lassitude, with zeal instead of languor, with a man's best instead of his worst; and the employed, contented with his lot, grudges nothing to a master who grudges nothing to him, but works for him with a perfect heart and a willing mind.

To discuss on the present occasion the claim of the producing workman to a share of the profits accruing from that which he produces, might lead to greater length than would be convenient. But, in keeping more closely to trades' unions, and the views taken of them by both sympathizing friends and jealous, if not hostile, critics, those claims of the working man that have not yet been categorically and in prescribed order set forth, will be more or less embraced, at least incidentally. But, first, to clear a few miscellaneous items out of the way.

A term of apprenticeship, whether it receive that name or not, and whether with or without formal indentures, is obviously needful in order to secure skilful workmanship. In those trades where no such system is acted upon, inferior articles are manufactured. In proportion as suitable instruction is neglected, work of whatever kind is worsened. British workmen are reproached, justly or unjustly, as not equal to Continental artizans. The real truth in this matter is explained by reference to this subject of apprenticeship. For want of efficient teaching—or, in other words, for lack of apprenticeship—trades are spoiled by unqualified hands; because of unlimited admissions to the workshops, on the other hand, the skilled workmen are driven out of the English market, and have no resource but to sell their labour and skill to foreign employers. Thus the avaricious master at the same time lowers the character of the employed, and enables foreigners to establish a boasted, but unreal, superiority upon the foundation of a competency which he has himself driven out of the home market. In order to gain a good result, there must be proportion between journeymen and apprentices. Let this be duly observed, and the youths can be well taught; let it be neglected, let the shop be flooded with boys, and there are no sufficient means of teaching. Those who should be pupils far outnumbering those who

alone can instruct, the factory, which should consist of learners and of teachers, naturally degenerates into a wretched horde of inefficient bunglers. In point of fact, even in trades requiring nice manipulation as well as muscular effort, the boys have been disproportionately multiplied; and, among the class of little masters and sub-sub-contractors, numbers may be found whose "scamping" is cheaply done by "'prentice hands," and almost without journey-work at all. The reasonableness of restriction would seem to be self-evident. As matter of experience, in those businesses which impose no restrictions as to the number of apprentices, both the workman and the workmanship have lost character. Here it is that "slop-work" and the "sweating" system are found; and here, too, that the so-called workers, males and females, are prepared for pauperism or perhaps for prostitution. The economic operation of unlimited apprenticeship is a process from bad to worse. The greedy and needy master first clutches his premium; he then makes the boys work several years without wages, or for a miserable pittance. Meantime, the journeymen are by degrees supplanted, and finally thrown out. As each seven-years' cycle completes its course, the untaught apprentice becomes in turn an incapable journeyman. In due time he also is displaced for a senior apprentice by ill-spent time made a poorer workman than himself. The continual tendency from bad to worse in a system like this, is evident to every man of common sense. What, indeed, must not the evil effect be, since, even in trades governed by limitation of apprenticeships, numbers of skilled workmen are nearly always out of employ; thus, even in the most prosperous times, evincing a surplus of labour in the market! This being the case, the interests of trade cannot have suffered for want of producing power. Such being the effect of the use as well as of the abuse of the institution of apprenticeship, may there not be good reason why the unions should call for a limitation without fairly exposing themselves to the charge of striving to set up a monopoly?

With reference to the influence of trades' unions as brought to bear upon the non-unionists, who put themselves into an attitude of invidiousness, or even of antagonism, towards their fellow-workmen, no decent artisan in the kingdom would either descend to, encourage, or defend personal violence or coercion in any form. Unionists are, however, prepared to vindicate themselves in refusing to work with non-society men. In the first place, they conceive themselves to be doing no more than is done by their betters. Here, they say, is a gentleman who wants to belong to a West-end club. That club has rules, and to them every member is subject. The first that meets him, on applying for admission, is, that he must satisfy the actual members of his worthiness to be their associate. Terrible to say,

those clubs are "secret associations." Candidates are elected or are rejected by ballot. If an applicant is black-balled, there is no remedy. And what is it to be black-balled? All the balls but one may be white; but, if only that one is black, the gentleman who wishes to enter can by no means come in. He is kept out by one vote; and who it is that aimed that blow at his reputation he has no means of knowing, but the torturing conjectures of his own mind. Well, then, the trades' unions have their restrictions; but only such as will bear the most rigid scrutiny. First, a member must be of good ability in the trade. Secondly, he must be of steady habits. Thirdly, he must be of good moral character. Is there, they ask, anything wrong in such conditions? Ought not a man to be able to earn a livelihood at the trade, if he is to claim the large benefits given from the common stock to members out of work? An incompetent hand would be almost always unengaged, and therefore almost always on the funds. The same or similar reasons apply with respect to habits and character; and, in fine, the trades' unionists demand for themselves that full right of choosing their own associates, which, by secret ballot, pushed to the point of perfect unanimity, the dainty gentlemen who compose the clubs of Pall Mall and St. James's Street not merely claim, but utterly enforce.

Piecework and overtime are features in the business of trades' unions on which they are entitled to a hearing, not simply as interested, but as best understanding the subject-matter. They have been represented as hostile to work done and paid for by the piece. The truth, however, is, that very much depends upon the nature and condition of the work. In some trades that mode of payment is not practicable; while, in many others, it is freely practised. It is not to working and paying by the piece that the unions object. With them, whenever they take up the point, it is not against the custom that they protest, but only, as in cases of uniform wages, against what they deem an unfair rate or unfair rates of payment. Piecework, they affirm, is often given out at a price not admitting of fair earnings. An employer may pay a pretty good price at first; but, when he finds how much—too much, as he thinks—has been earned, he reduces the rate for the next job. On the part of masters, therefore, the tendency is to bring down payment by the piece to the same low level as payment by the day. This, of course, takes away the spur to industry. One indirect way of lowering payments by the piece is both distressing to the worker and disagreeable to the unions. Several circumstances affect the labour and the earnings; such as the conveniences, the quantities of work given out at a time, the quality of workmanship required, the height of finish necessary, the patterns to be wrought or followed,

and other circumstances. Naturally and properly enough, the employer looks sharply into the work sent in. It is subjected to severe inspection; and, if not up to the standard in the inspector's mind, it is rejected. All the man's time, labour, and skill may thus go for nothing; or, at best, he must submit to a compromise which sends him home at once disgraced and dissatisfied. It may be difficult to deal with the case; but the case is one in which the power of determination ought not to be all on one side. Another consequence, less severe, yet sufficiently trying, flows from this system of giving out work. The tendency of circumstances like those enumerated, is to consume the workman's time; but in saving this the employer has no interest. Of cheap materials, as good-looking an article cannot be made in the same time as of better materials. Of materials, however good, it must take longer to make the thing required if they be scanty than if they were ample. Nor is the system of piecework, especially in its connection with working overtime, free from debate on social, sanitary, and moral grounds. To such work at fixed prices and under conditions involving neither uncompensated waste of time nor temptation to excessive application, the trades' unions see no objection; but they do make a stand against long hours as hurtful to health, because, as they contend, that which injures the workman's health, cannot but be detrimental to the commonwealth.

It has become fashionable in our days to lecture the British artizan on his want of education, of technical knowledge and skill, and on his consequently inferior production. Possibly, the artizans of Europe may have improved in all these respects, and let them improve as much as they can. But *are* our own countrymen thus inferior? Has it ceased to be true, that, taking into account both quantity and quality of work, wages in England bear a lower proportion to total cost than anywhere else? In mere money, the English artizan or labourer may receive more than the Continental artizan or labourer; but what work do the islander on the one hand, and the European on the other, perform in the same number of hours; and to what account, respectively, is the work turned when, passing complete into the hands of the employer, it is taken by him for sale in the market? The tone of late has been, among a certain class of British capitalists and those whom they persuade to sing their melancholy complaints, that the English workman has lost that superiority which once distinguished him, and is now inferior in all main points to the foreign craftsman. He does not himself admit the truth of this representation. He may be too modest, indeed, to claim any pre-eminence, and too brotherly towards his fellow-workmen of other countries to cherish any spirit of rivalry or oppo-

sition towards them. But he will not be found willing to allow that he has forfeited any title that he ever won to be considered industrious, skilful, and persevering. The closeness of his application, the quality of his workmanship, the energy with which he throws himself, body and soul, into the labour of his hands, the patient spirit in which he pursues his unintermitted toil, the excellence of his tools, the masterly vigour with which they are wielded, the greatness of his muscular strength and the heartiness with which he puts it forth, the continuity of his individual and solitary pursuits, or the unity of his aggregated exertions, the unperplexed steadiness with which, partitively employed, in hundreds, he carries on a multitude of difficult and complicated operations at the same time, the certainty and speed with which harmonious and complete results spring out of his many-armed and simultaneous efforts,—these are things that have often filled other Englishmen with pride and foreigners with astonishment.

To trades' unions it is objected that they cannot supersede the law of supply and demand. But is this more true against the supposed efforts of the men than it would be against any conceivable endeavours of the masters? If that law is so "inexorable" as it has been declared to be, what peculiar or exclusive means has capital, apart from labour, of propitiating it? When it is suggested that there may be more workmen seeking employment than are required for the work to be done, it may be answered that those who have undertaken to execute orders must pay according to the paucity of the hands. But, in any extremity, a higher law steps in; and, instead of discussing the comparative claims of capital and labour, the community as such may possibly be called upon to consider how it shall save the bulk of the population from starvation and itself from consequences equally terrible to contemplate.

Talking of "supply and demand," the working man is by no means the simpleton that his modest mien may sometimes cause him to be taken for. "Labour," says one of the professional economists, "is as much an article of commerce as iron or sugar; money, or capital, is likewise an article of commerce." How do the reading public suppose a working man would deal with this sort of definition?

"How or when," asks one of them, "does labour take the form of such commodities as corn or sugar? It has no palpable existence. A man does not carry about with him something to be measured or weighed. No such thing. Labour is a human quality, a product of time, brain, and sinews, without which there could be no such thing as labour. When a man offers to work, he offers to devote his will and time and physical energies to a service, in return for which he must have the means of existence. It is himself, a human frame, imbued with thought and aspiration, that is to be bought, if any thing is. In all respects labour differs from such commo-

dities as corn and sugar. If they are not sold at a price to-day, they may be kept till to-morrow; but, *time* being an element in labour, where *it* is wasted, the labour is lost, and lost for ever. These human qualities, the ability to labour, are what the working man has to sell. Labour, when performed, becomes capital, and subject to laws regulating such things; but to begin with reducing human qualities to the level of corn and sugar, is to debase the moral constitution of man, and to lower his proper estimate of himself."

Now, here is political economy, sound philosophy, common sense, anything you will; but all economists by profession are not like the unlucky speculatist who laid himself open to this terrible "jobation" from a plain working man.

"High wages and short hours," says Mr. John Stuart Mill, "are generally good objects, or, at all events, may be so; and a limitation of the number of persons in employment may be a necessary condition of these. Combinations, therefore, not to work for less wages, or for more than a certain number of hours, or even not to work for a master who employs more than a certain number of apprentices, are, when voluntary on the part of all who engage in them, not only unexceptionable, but would be desirable, were it not that they almost always fail of their effect."

Nor is this all that this great authority says—

"In so far," he also observes, "as combinations succeed in keeping up the wages of any trade by limiting its numbers, I look upon them as simply intrenching round a particular spot against the inroads of our population, and making their wages depend upon their own rate of increase, instead of depending on that of a more reckless and improvident class than themselves; and I should rejoice if, by trade regulations, or even by trades' unions, the employments thus specially protected should be multiplied to a much greater extent than experience has shown to be practicable. What at first sight seems the injustice of excluding the more numerous class from sharing the gains of a comparatively few, disappears when we consider that, by being admitted, they would not be made better off for more than a short time—the only permanent effect which their admission would produce would be to lower the other to their level."

This, however, is not the reasoning of an ignorant working man, but of one of the greatest philosophers of the present or any other day.

From the trial of the five cotton-spinners charged with illegal conspiracy and murder in 1838, to the misdeeds of Broadhead and his confederates in 1868, trades' unions, nevertheless, have been the scapegoat on which all the sins of men wearing fustian jackets have been laid. What system of rules, or what society of men, could pass muster were it judged, not by the best results and the best men, nor even by the common run of either, but by the worst specimens of both that a malignant and perverse scrutiny could pick out? When such instances became so rare as to take the words of reproach out of the mouths of adversaries seeking occasion to find fault, they betook

themselves to the imputation of secret machination as the likeliest charge to make them obnoxious to the community. The Freemasons might continue their secrecy as warranted harmless; but it would not do to let England, like Europe, be "honey-combed" with trades' unions. This, and a great deal more, was said ten years ago, when all the proof afforded of its applicability was that the London building trades had made a vigorous effort to vindicate what they deemed their rights.

What is the great charge made against trades' unions? That the unionists strive to make the non-unionists join them in their measures for maintaining wages in relation to work. What, then, is the admission made with regard, on the one hand, to masters lowering wages, and men yielding to the reduction? "A lowering of wages," says the *Quarterly Review*, p. 494, 1859, "is usually begun by some needy employer, who seeks to eke out his profits by hiring labour at less than the market-rate." As to the non-unionist workmen, says the *Edinburgh Review*, p. 530, 1859, "the multitude outside the pale are the poorest of their class." Let these admissions of two influential writers be taken for what they may be worth; only, be it remembered, that they both come from minds hostile to trades' unions. In liberal minds, however, it ought scarcely to go against such associations that they are organized with wisdom and administered with efficiency. When, indeed, a case of coercion, especially one accompanied with violence, exercised by a union (not by a stray unionist) against one or more non-unionists, is established, then, indeed, there is something which calls for explanation; but, when the lazy, uninquiring, yet easily impressible, part of the public are gravely told that "the amount of compulsion administered never is or can be known till some time after the conclusion of the struggle," all that remains for sensible and fair-minded people is, to marvel at the audacity of the insinuation, and to pity the imbecility that is shocked by it.

Trades' unions, when tried by their effects, need not shrink from the dispassionate judgments of intelligent men. They have raised the working man in the social scale, by showing him how to dispose of his labour to the best advantage, and by enabling him to repel the unjust aggressions of overweening employers. They have a proud consciousness of their own existence—they *are*. They also grow—grow in numbers, grow in influence and effect, and grow in popularity among the millions of our countrymen. Mark the fact, that they are voluntary associations! No royal prerogative or Act of Parliament has called them into being. Say what accusers will, no man in England is *compelled* to belong to them. They have their rules, and of what use are rules unless they be kept? But then, no

legal penalty attaches to the violation of them. It may be undesirable that those who join them should change their mind; but separation from them involves no deprivation, neither loss of money nor forfeiture of personal position. But have unionists never tried to constrain or otherwise assail non-unionists? There have been stray attempts of the kind; and from such incidents what organizations, voluntary or otherwise, have ever been or can ever be exempt? But, in any such case, is not the law of the land both clear and clutching, and are its official executants at all wanting of zeal to put it in force?

One of the arts by which those who denounce trades' unions try to discredit them is, that of representing unionists as powerful and pitiless monsters, and non-unionists as feeble and fluttering creatures about to be devoured. Now, unions have no power at all but what they derive *from union*, from the free adhesion of large numbers, each of whom makes his spontaneous contribution to the collective strength. The extent to which this kind of organization has been carried relates to two things, its long duration and its present state. It has the experience of ages as well as the force of multitude and of universality. If these millions of men, like their predecessors in the same line of action, are persuaded that it is mutually beneficial to them, who flatters himself that he can make them think it a bad and suicidal thing? Nobody, in fact, hopes to accomplish the impossible task. The only hope cherished in this direction is that of perpetuating, if not extending, the semblance of schism betwixt unionists and non-unionists. But those who play this game, pay no great compliment to the men whom they affect to compassionate. They tell them they are the weak, who must be shielded from the strong. Be it so or not, no proposition is capable of easier or completer proof than this, that the weaker and less capable members of the different trades and occupations have the greatest interest in belonging to the unions of their respective callings. The best heads, the strongest arms, and the most skilful hands, have in any case the least need of help. The work of self-defence is easy to them, and their labour is sure to be first and highest in demand. Unions may not always succeed in their efforts; and, under circumstances with which they are themselves but too familiar, they may incur heavy cost along with temporary defeat. But, whether the distribution of their funds in "benefits," or the expenditure of a portion of them in maintaining "trade privileges," be had in view, it is manifest that participation in either, with sensible advantage, must be in proportion to the participating member's greater weakness and inferior capability. Even if objectors deem the unionists wrong-headed, they must acknowledge them to be right-hearted. They

may question their economy, but they ought to admit their humanity. What! will the sophists be so reckless of consistency as to make it a crime to endeavour to prevent an inferior fellow-workman from falling into that abyss of penury to which, in trying times, his unaided weakness irresistibly tends? Have they not soul enough to admire the generous magnanimity which causes the clever men to say one to another, Let us cheerfully submit to voluntary regulations, even though to our own disadvantage, for the sake of protecting our poor brothers from that hard-hearted avarice of which, whenever it triumphs, they are certain to be the first, because the helpless, victims? There is no need, however, to extol the feelings of the unionists at the expense of their understandings. While unions make it a chief point to rescue the weak from sinking to destruction, they make no attempt whatever to stop or restrain the upward progress of those who are stronger, abler, and more skilful.

In trying trades' unions by their effects, account ought to be taken of the facts which they present. It is impossible, in a brief review, to refer to all trades. A glance, however, may be taken at a few of those societies which have shown themselves to be powerful and influential. Unionism, it will be found, is no rope of sand, but a solid and compact body. During the last thirty years this kind of organization has performed a great work in raising the character and improving the position of the British artizan. No reference has been made, or is now intended, to the *political* importance of these free associations: the social aspects of the question are the present theme. Take as examples the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, the Operative Stonemasons' Society, and the Ironfounders' Society. Many other societies are equally large, and they embrace nearly every known and extensive trade; but these four may suffice as samples of the whole.

The Amalgamated Society of Engineers was founded in the year 1851. Many societies in the metal trades had existed throughout the country, such as machinists, millwrights, smiths, pattern-makers, and engineers. These were all united, in order to greater usefulness by mutual help. At the period of amalgamation, the members numbered about 5,000; they are now 33,539. In 1851, the whole income was £9,200; in 1869, £82,400. During the nineteen years of its existence, the society has paid to members out of work, £485,824; to sick members, £179,165; for accidents and funerals, £73,450; in superannuations, £53,327; in benevolent grants and assistance to other trades, £25,302; making in all the princely sum of £817,068, and leaving a balance in hand of £76,176. It is stated by Mr. William Allen, long the faithful secretary of this great

society, that only a very small proportion of the money paid to members out of work has been expended in trade disputes. No other trade, in fact, possessing such an organization, has spent less in strikes during the last eighteen years. The wages of the members range between 30s. and 36s. a week, the hours of work being 58½. From 1851 to the present time, engineers' wages have shown little, if any advance; nor has any reduction been made in the hours of work.

The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners dates from 1860. In that year it had twenty branches, and 618 members; in December, 1869, 224 branches, and 9,305 members. During the ten years, it has paid £23,000 to members out of work; £23,600 for sickness, funerals, and accidents; £1,900 in benevolent grants and assistance to other trades; and £8,106 in support of trade disputes; making a total of £58,872, and leaving a balance in hand, at Christmas, 1869, of £17,626. This society has done much to decrease the hours of work, and to increase the rate of wages in the building trades. In 1860, the London joiners worked 58½ hours a week, at the rate of 33s.; now they work 56½ hours for 38s. At Devonport they then worked 60 hours for 19s.; now, 58½ hours for 25s. At Sheffield, the hours were 58½, the wages 26s.; they are 55½, and 30s. At Manchester, the hours were 55½, the wages 28s.; they are 54½, and 32s.

The Operative Stone-Masons' Society was set on foot in 1840. It has 315 lodges, 17,200 members, and ramifications all over the country. It is more strictly a trade society than either of the former two. Its members receive no benefit when out of work; but it gives sick, funeral, superannuation, and travelling benefits. Members can choose to entitle themselves to the trade benefits, or to the sick and trade combined. The gross income since 1840 has been, £308,767 7s. 7d. The society has paid, for sickness, £43,034; for funerals, £26,674; to members travelling in quest of work, £43,528; and to disabled and superannuated members, £27,400; making in all, for benevolent purposes, £140,636, and for purposes of trade, £62,457. This organization has done much to advance wages and reduce hours. One of the most powerful and determined of its kind, it rarely enters into dispute with the employers without being successful in the struggle. Its seat of government, now at Manchester, is movable every three years, the town being selected by vote of the members. The wages and the hours of work vary. In London, they are 56½ hours, 37s. 8d. per week; Manchester, 54½, 33s.; Liverpool, 55, 33s.; Bradford (Yorkshire), 50½, 30s.; Halifax, 49½, 29s.; Birmingham, 56½, 33s.; Exeter, 58½, 23s.; Gloucester, 60, 26s. The last two cities show the lowest wages and the longest hours. During the last four years, the society has

expended a large sum in opposing payment of the hour, carrying on strikes against it in several large towns for months together. These struggles have nearly exhausted the funds of the society, and much disheartened many of the members. In a report just issued by the executive, however, it is confidently predicted that the society will shortly recover its financial position.

The Ironfounders' Society was started in 1809. It has lodges in all the large towns where the trade is carried on, and numbers 10,000 members. From 1848 to 1869 it expended in benefits to members the following sums:—To men out of work, £271,000; for sickness and funerals, £75,944; for accidents and in superannuation, £30,492; and for emigration, £3,336; making, in all, upwards of £380,000. These payments, it will be observed, were all made for purposes purely benevolent.

The facts, and the figures relating to them, from trades' unions, afford striking evidence of the magnitude, the usefulness, and the power of such associations. Their magnitude needs no other mention than their own statistics. Their usefulness, independently of their effect on work and wages, is threefold in its character. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (to take but one instance out of many) has done much to promote that "technical instruction" of which we hear so often, by the establishment of evening classes for drawing and other purposes; and its excellent secretary, Mr. Robert Applegarth, has devoted a great deal of time and pains to the promotion of Councils of Arbitration and Conciliation. Let any one, again, try to realize to his own mind the vast amount of misery prevented, the myriads of sick-beds that have been smoothed, the uncounted woes that have been assuaged, the deep and dreadful sorrows that have been alleviated, the widows that have been made to sing amidst their grief, and the orphans that have been saved from utter want, by the foresight of the associated members and by the faithfulness of the executives to their trust. Nor, in the third place, is the usefulness of such societies confined to the members and those dependent upon them. The state and nation are bound to acknowledge as among the most useful things in the trade societies spontaneously originated and voluntarily sustained, which, by a wise foresight and a manly self-denial, have been the means of preventing casual misfortune from sinking into destitution, and which have nobly scorned to swell the pauperism of the country and aggravate the burdens of the community. Whether, therefore, regard be had to the magnitude of these societies, to their private and public usefulness, or to their power, they surely claim the applause no less than the respect of the Government, the Parliament, and the nation; and, if they be watched on account of the power which they exert upon

the relations of capital and labour, they ought to be even cherished in so far as they manifest that desire for independence which is the best characteristic whether of an individual or of a people.

The attempts of the trades' unions to maintain wages against the opposite determination of individual or associated masters to reduce or not to raise them, have all along been much criticized and loudly condemned. Too frequently this has been done in a sweeping manner, and with haughty if not intolerant words; but sometimes in a patient and even friendly spirit. Even in such instances, however, the tone adopted has been that of very wise and old men lecturing very young and foolish children. The unionists have been told by these amiable censors that they injure themselves and everybody else; that they are extremely ignorant, and know nothing. Much, nevertheless, of the information condescendingly given them they fancy that they already possess; while, in some at least of the arguments employed to confute their principles of action, they think themselves able to perceive fundamental fallacies. For instance: they have been assured that to interfere with the prices and rates at which men found it profitable to exchange with each other, is hurtful and mistaken. This, they perceive, is true enough when spoken of third parties, who deserve to be stigmatized as interferers; but they are of opinion that it does not apply to those who are as much parties to an exchange as between master and men, as when the parties are manufacturer and merchant, or merchant and consumer. Again: the producing hands are informed that it is not within their power to determine whether they shall receive for a day's work four shillings, six, or eight. That depends, it is represented, upon a multitude of circumstances entirely beyond their control. They must be content with what the free course of trade and the skill of their own hands give them. Now, though, among working men, as among men of every class, high or low, there are numskulls that can understand nothing, the generality of artizans, it may be believed, are well aware that they cannot absolutely, and without limit, fix the rate of wages to be paid to them, and that influences affect trade which neither they, nor those who pay them, can control. But it is confessed that they ought to receive a fair return for their skill and labour, and it ought to be conceded that they have as good a right as their employers, or anybody else, to watch "the free course of trade," and to judge for themselves what price it warrants them in expecting for their exertions.

It will have been noticed by attentive observers, that demands for an increase of wages usually spring out of a condition of things which at once explains the ground of the demand. Those who make it may mistake; but, because sometimes not in the right, they are not always

in the wrong. Mankind in general tend to take a larger view of what they are entitled to, as individuals or as classes, than other persons or companies of persons are apt to take of any claims except their own. Workmen, therefore, among the rest, may occasionally betray themselves into this form of egotistic weakness. Yet, if objectors should search the records of such matters through and through, they would not discover any demand for higher wages so extravagant as to defeat itself by its own preposterous magnitude. Joiners and others may have occasionally asked for an additional sixpence or even shilling a day; but, while such applications will be always, or almost always, found in association with circumstances affecting particular trades, or trade in general, which afforded an apparent plea in their support, it will never be found that the most skilful and practised artificers in wood, or any other material, have come up to the counting-house door with a bold demand for five hundred pounds a year.

Yet, notwithstanding this moderation and reasonableness, no increase of wages, it seems, can be asked, without those who ask being twitted, even by amicable mentors, with "imagining" this or that, instead of being governed by the plain laws of common sense. They persuade themselves, we are told, that "the increase comes out of the excessive profits of the employer." But it is a pure "imagination." Now, working men are not so blind, from either stupidity or wilfulness, as not to see that wages must be governed by profits; but they have eyes enough to discern that, if profits are sometimes so low as to depress the rate of wages, they are at other times so high as to afford scope for a rebound; and, if they take the liberty of thinking that employers are as liable as other men to the human vice of selfishness, *that*, we suppose, will not be set down as a mere "imagination." Those economical fathers-in-law who undertake to school the working man, admit as much by the very terms in which they meet the supposition of increased wages coming out of "excessive profits." The employer's loss, one of them has expressly said, "*if any*, will be very temporary, and he will *indemnify himself* by raising the price of his goods." The professional speaker and his manufacturing clients may be left to settle between themselves how much of actual truth and how much of sheer "imagination" there may be in this statement.

Meanwhile, the question of profits, excessive or not, is one which every generous mind will own to be one of too much delicacy for hasty, peremptory, and dogmatic conclusions. Some, let us hope many, employers are content with a moderate profit; but is it not probable that the generality willingly, not to say eagerly, take all the gain they can get? The very authority whom we are quoting, running with the hare, but holding with the hounds,

intimates that the latter know very well how to take care of themselves. When the increase of wages has been paid, he owns it doubtful whether they suffer loss. "If any," he says. But, "if any," it will be "very temporary;" and, at the worst, they know how to "indemnify themselves by raising the price of their goods." Now, those who are not lecturers on political economy in any college, ancient or modern, can make answer to this in terms which the utterer of the words has not anticipated. The very men supposed to have received the money which has raised the price, are well aware that, unless goods are offered in the market on terms which will attract purchasers, those goods had better not have been made at all. It is curious to observe how the same teacher, who is all circumspection while lecturing the "imaginative" workmen, sees but half way round him when the employers are in question. "Bef ore making a tender," he remarks, "every contractor ascertains the cost of his materials, and the amount of wages he will have to pay, and adds on *the profit he thinks proper*." When the workmen are the subject of consideration, they must be curbed, and fettered, and confined by uncounted considerations; but the employer has but to "add on the profit he thinks proper!" Now, who shall say that the workman has not an equal right to demand the wages "*he* thinks proper?"

In sooth, however, the contractor is not without restraints, if, that is, he means his tender to have an even chance of being taken. What he will "think proper," will be one thing if the lowest tender is to be taken, and another thing if the party to be contracted with reserves the right of accepting which tender may seem likeliest to answer the purpose. In either case, he who tenders has to take into account "the wages he will have to pay;" but he who tenders in order to snatch the job in virtue of the lowness of his terms, has but a poor account to give of himself to his men when he says, "I have taken this job at such a narrow figure that you must be content to receive a sixth less wages than I paid you for the last."

When the class of reasoners to whom these observations are being offered proceed to tell the workmen who, by taking care of themselves, have obtained better pay, that they have committed something like robbery upon the community at large, he forgets, or does not sufficiently bear in mind, that the working classes all round, and all round seeking the best remuneration to be found, are inhabitants of those houses and consumers of those commodities which he represents as made so unpurchasably dear by their insane policy. It is perfectly true, no doubt, that some trades are more favourable than others to efforts to maintain or raise wages; and that inequality can only be redressed by that tendency to unite all trades in a bond of brotherhood, which is a characteristic of the time. Thus it comes to

pass, that, while the amiable expostulators under present consideration are mildly remonstrating with the working men on their "ignorant impatience" of hard work with long hours and low wages, they are, meanwhile, thrusting their tongue into their cheek and winking towards the employers, as much as to say, "Divide and conquer!"

Being, however, so utterly ignorant of political economy, the men must be thankful, we suppose, for those A B C lessons in that occult science which are vouchsafed them. Here, for example, is a teacher who gravely tells them, "Wages are only worth what they will bring," "You must turn them into food, and drink, and clothing, before they will be of any use to you," "How much you will get depends upon the price at which you can buy as much as upon the amount of wages," "Even supposing wages to be raised ten per cent., this would bring with it no advantage if prices were raised in the same degree." Now, neither a lean ghost from the grave nor a well-fed economist need come to inculcate these truisms upon the working men of England. It is just because the cost of living has given them sad experience of these things that they put in their claim to a price for their work which will *enable them to live*. How, then, can they, in such circumstances, "imagine (*imagine again!*) that the dearer things are the better they will be off." Economists, it would seem, are like other people, the easier to understand and the closer to truth in proportion as they speak the thoughts of practical experience and of common sense. Here, for example, is a proposition which nobody will dispute, "Real prosperity consists in having a great abundance of cheap comforts which every one can purchase." Not a doubt of it; but then, material comforts cannot be had, like spiritual blessings, "without money and without price."

The knockdown blow for trades' union policy is this—"There are no grounds for asserting that a general rise of wages has been received by means of trades' unions." The answer is ready. "Give them time, and they will show what they can do." Hercules is as yet but in his infancy; and, having begun with strangling serpents in his cradle, he will in his mature strength perform the whole round of his predestined labours, and finish with a complete cleansing of the Augæan stables. "In some trades, especially the building trades," it is admitted, "wages have been raised." But "those trades have special opportunities of protecting themselves at the cost of the rest of the country." Perhaps it will be shown that, as what one man has done, another man may do, so what some trades have accomplished, the rest may find practicable. But even to the builders the lecturer will not continue the credit once given. No; on second thoughts, the increase of wages has accrued from quite other causes.

Free Trade, the liberation of industry, emigration, depreciation of gold—these are the things that have raised the money value of work. Would that this half truth were a whole one! When the utterer of it comes to the depreciation of gold and the concomitant dearness of rent and provisions, he is obliged to confess that prices are “become seriously higher;” and, though with a fine moderation he says, “It is *doubtful* whether the money cost of living has not advanced for this reason,” he obviously means that it is *certain*.

Lo and behold! the gentle censor who took the rostrum to cry “fie” upon every effort to raise wages, ends by virtually admitting that wages must rise, or men must cease to subsist.

What is said in conclusion is matter of fact open to every eye; but it is worthy of notice as coming from a man who had first exhausted his whole quiver of economical axioms against the trades’ unions in reference to wages. This done, he thus proceeds—“It was to be expected that wages and all salaries not invariably fixed would advance, otherwise the receivers would be worse off than before, instead of better.” Cooks and housemaids, who used to get as little as £10, now get as much as £18. There has been a general rise in the salaries of mercantile clerks. The clerks of the Bank of England asked for an increase, and it was given. Even the pay of soldiers, policemen, and postmen has been augmented. Why, then, are not the trades of the country to participate? Are they to be “molluscously” content with what may come, or may they not ask that it may be given, seek and find, knock and get admission? By all means, let them practise temperance, frugality, and economy; spend their money in food and clothing, and not in drink; at home or in the reading-room, and not the public-house; but let them not be insolently, because fallaciously, told, “You cannot help yourselves, and are at the mercy of the capitalist, who alone can give you work.” Half true and half false, sentences like this should but make the working men more resolved than ever to work out their own temporal and moral restoration. Though too much and too often they have been, and still are, at the mercy (save the mark!) of the capitalist, yet they need not be always and in all places in that miserable position. The capitalist was not the creator of wealth, but that second creation was the work of the producer’s hands. At the very lips which uttered that bitter fallacy, “The capitalist alone can give you work,” the working man may learn this sweet and hopeful truth—“He [the working man] may by co-operation become his own employer; and then, I presume, he will cease to complain of the tyranny of capital.”

In preceding paragraphs nothing, it is believed, has been advanced in favour of trades’ unions but what might be fortified with admissions from writers who have assailed them. In the current number

of *Blackwood's Magazine* is opened a series of articles on the subject, which begin at least with a strange intertwist of concession and invective. Though once forbidden by the law, the unions have extorted from Parliament a special enactment in their favour. Though flagrantly defying the first principles of liberty, they cannot be made up of pure evil. With all their flagitiousness, their principles command the assent of political economists of the first rank, and their cause the warm and unflinching support of statesmen whose love both of order and of liberty is undeniable. While shrieking out that either the unions must be effectually controlled, or the dominion of the realm will be surrendered into their hands, this strange alarmist acknowledges that unionism is both the product and the producing cause of energy and intelligence. Of wealth, too, they unionists are at any rate "one of the parties in the joint production." While seeming to find fault with them for seeking to obtain the best possible wages at a given time and place, he admits that the single labourer acting by himself alone, is obviously weak in bargaining with an employer; and not only so, but that, as a matter of justice, the conditions are not equal. "The labourer," it is perceived and confessed, "is in danger of destitution; the master may be little, probably not at all, injured by his refusal to work." Is not union, then, the first dictate of plain sense? To be sure it is; "the question must be decided in favour of combination, the determination of the workmen to stand by one another in obtaining adequate wages, is *unassailable in respect of principle*." Nor, amidst a bramble-work of futile objections, do admissions end here. It is something to find conveyed in such a channel a full justification of the workman's claim to make his own bargain. "There cannot always [enough, notwithstanding the qualification, to settle the point] be clear proof that a reduction of wages proclaimed by masters is based on a trustworthy knowledge of the real condition of the trade." All to the contrary may go for what it is worth: in this is the kernel of the question.

GEORGE POTTER.



THE AUTHOR OF "FRIENDS IN COUNCIL."

Friends in Council. First and Second Series. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

Companions of my Solitude. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

Essays Written in the Intervals of Business. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

History of the Spanish Conquest of America. London: Bell and Daldy.

Outlets. London: Parker and Son.

Realmah. London: Macmillan & Co.

Casimir Maremma. London: Bell and Daldy.

IT would, perhaps, be far more easy to form a tolerably fair and exhaustive opinion of Mr. Helps from his books than it is to present even an approach to a fair and exhaustive estimate of his writings and his influence. Easiest of all would it be—so easy that we have with difficulty overcome the temptation to it—to discuss him in a parody of his own manner; to write a short essay upon him, which would of course be printed in large type, and then introduce all the "friends" whom he has made so familiar "in council" upon the essay. But this, done even by the most friendly and respectful critic, would infallibly carry here and there a rude look with it; so one must forbear, even though there is usually something of homage in the mere act of parodying, and though Mr. Helps is the most tolerant of men, and much in the habit of quizzing himself. "Roger," said the clergyman to the clown who was quarrelling with his wife, "you should remember that man and wife are one." "Ah, that be all very fine, sir," said Roger; "but if you was to go by sometimes, when me and my old woman's at it, you'd say there was a dozen of us." There is a dozen of Mr. Helps. Though he is capable of strong conclusiveness, he approaches conclusions by a zig-zag, and tries by a parting kick any god of his own setting up. He concludes, but his conclusions are half-regrets; and his despotism (for he can be despotic) is almost a genial rage; as of a man who should say,

"Come, something must be possible; let us go and make that something real after all this vacillation." He says of the statesman—that is, Milverton says of him—that "he should doubt to the last, and then act like a man who has never doubted." To this Ellesmere replies, "Cleverly put, but untrue, after the fashion of you maxim-mongers. He should not act like a man who has never doubted, but like a man who was in the habit of doubting till he had received sufficient information." There is a good deal of Mr. Helps himself in that description; and it is not a bad sketch of the right temperament for a statesman. Its very hesitancy makes it capable of a good deal of rapid *provisional* action (which, while it is regulated by present needs, is just because it refers itself to principles), in the nature of that kind of experiment or questioning of fact which leads to what are called scientific results.

This, however, suggests the most striking point in the books of Mr. Helps: at least, that which from the first has most forcibly struck the present writer, who made the acquaintance of this gentleman's works in a very slow circuitous manner, but began that acquaintance under the rare conditions of apprehensiveness approaching maturity, and incredibly little modern reading. It is that Mr. Helps never *discloses* his first principles. You cannot tell, to use a felicitous phrase of Mr. R. Hutton's, what are "the assumptions of his mind." A genial utilitarianism is the key-note of his writings; but nobody can affirm that he is, ranked psychologically, a utilitarian. It seems clear that the vividness of his instincts, his acquaintance with *passion* (for he obviously knows it, and has seen life by its flashes of infinite luminosity), and his regular "assumption" of certain emotions or "constants" in the problem of life, must make it impossible for him to be an experientialist: but, on the whole, the impression left upon the reader's mind, is that his author is a man whose super-physical substance is made up of practical wisdom, watered and brightened by poetry and humour. That he has ever distinctly formulated what must lie between these, we nowhere discover. Yet he is not inconsistent. Suppose we found him condemning duelling, and *not* condemning war, we should rightly say that he was so; for war not ignoble, and duelling not ignoble are both founded upon the same idea (an idea with which every passionate, poetic nature must have some sympathy), namely, that if we fight fair, God will declare for the right. But Mr. Helps has the same verdict for the arbitrament of the sword in both cases. Only he gives us no clue to the process by which he has disposed, in his own mind, of the whole army of subtle things that may be said for its inevitableness in any conceivable stage of the existence of creatures short of perfection. Now, to persons whose strongest tendency is, when out of the sphere of pure poetry, to pigeon-hole ideas, and

thumb-screw everything till it confesses its justifying secret and its relations to those grand conspiracies of nature that govern us all without our will, there is something tantalizing about this.

On the subject of religious faith, Mr. Helps is not so inscrutable. His manner in speaking of Christianity is uniform, both in its positive and its negative aspects. There is no difficulty here in pigeon-holing what he says and what he avoids saying.

A point which strikes you with recurring force if you read much of Mr. Helps is one that we must all inevitably experience—though, no doubt, in varying degrees—in reading all propounders of paper constitutions or schemes of policy. Every Utopian, and (a curious essay might be written upon the reasons of this comparison) in a still higher degree every *quasi*-Utopian plan, if given with any detail, is liable to ravening threats from the sad sphinx of the *How?* Handel was once urging a performer upon some wind instrument to blow harder. Over and over again he shouted in the poor man's ear, "I zay to you, zare, blow har-r-der!" "Yah, yah," said the man at last, taking the instrument from his mouth, and turning savagely upon Handel, "it is vary goot to zay blow harder, but vere de devil is de vind to come from?" That is the question one often puts in reading Mr. Helps. Oddly enough, Dunsford asks the converse question, when he submits that in speaking of Love, Milverton allows too little to the Will. This interpellation, too, throws—is allowed to throw—a haze of confusion over the whole essay and discussion; a curious example of what some of us would call speculative inexactitude. But when you have finished one of these deliciously inviting essay-schemes, you instinctively ask, Where is the Inspiration to come from? But there is this to be said, Mr. Ruskin positively compels you to ask it in accents of real despair; Mr. Helps simply suggests it as a topic of humour with just a tear on its eyelid; and your hopes and energies are raised rather than lowered.

What is the reason of this last fact? How is it that Mr. Helps does not depress you, as Mr. Ruskin, and, too often, Mr. Carlyle does? The reason does not lie upon the surface, and in it is involved a truly noble characteristic of the writings of this author. You may say it is his humour, his gentleness, his *neque semper tendit arcum* temperament, his habit of relieving his writings by versatile illustrations, his never pushing a victory to the length of trampling on the fallen, and so on. And all this has truth in it. But the final reason is, the sensitive fairness of the author's mind, his great respect for himself and for others. There is something hard (in the bad sense) in the grain of the works of Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Ruskin; something overbearing and unjust, which constantly suggests to you that your author's moral *criteria* might, unconsciously to himself, become personal, and personal only. If anybody will turn to

Mr. Carlyle's answers to Mr. Hume, upon the selection of books, in the Commission which sat many years ago upon the British Museum, he will at once see what I mean. "But what you might think wrong I might think right?" is the substance of the amazed Mr. Hume's questions to the philosopher, who was for stark naked despotism in this matter. He would allow a book of which he disapproved "a run for its life," but he would shoot it down if he could. Mr. Hume could produce no impression upon him, and the subject dropped. Now, whenever there is this glaring possibility that the moral "assumptions" of a writer may become, in some point or other, purely personal, there is the possibility of his leaving his readers in utter despair. It has been said that "Don Quixote" is the most melancholy book that ever was written; but I claim the yew-leaf garland for Mr. Ruskin's "Time and Tide by Wear and Tyne." It is you *should* this, and you *should* the other, till at last you exclaim, "This is all very fine, but suppose I am of a different opinion?" Then, if my conscience has the same rights as yours, which it has, nothing remains but for me to say, "Well, sir, I *shan't*"—and then all is anarchy again—a stand-up fight all round. Mr. Helps never suggests the possibility that you and he, even if he were your sovereign, might come to this final conflict, so long as you refrained from directly injuring others. He might be a despot; but it would be in his *methods* only, and his tyrannies would involve no assumptions that would hurt the conscience. But, really, one almost blushes to write the word in these days of "the duty of compromise" and "the logic of facts;" when the character which, when I was a boy, was known as an honest man, is now called an Irreconcilable. This may well bring us to what is a very striking characteristic of the mind of Mr. Helps, namely, its flexibility. This is a word of ambiguous application; but, of course, it is not now applied to Mr. Helps as involving weakness—I mean rather the capacity of elastic resistance. It is not a common capacity, and perhaps it is rarely combined with that of speculative exactitude. Speculative exactitude is almost necessarily associated with stringency of intelligence. The minds of close thinkers have seldom much "atmosphere" in them. Supposing a picture could be made of the intelligence of Mr. Helps, it would be full of "atmosphere." This flexibility, or power of passing by imperceptible gradients from one set of conceptions, or one state of facts, or one way of dealing with life, to another, is an essential condition of two things which belong in a high degree to the author of "Friends in Council." One is a strong faculty for organization, at least on paper—since nobody can organize by jerks, or by heavy gradients and sharp curves; the other is an immense practical toleration. By practical toleration is meant a toleration which

takes men as they are, for better for worse, and which sustains with its patience the efforts of the whole man to get people from the worse to the better. A man may have an almost infallible sense of justice, and a toleration (founded upon that sense of justice) which is absolutely inexhaustible so far as letting other people do as they like is concerned; and that toleration may be connected with the deepest individual convictions in matters of right and wrong. But he may have this kind of tolerating capacity, and yet be scarcely capable of practical toleration; for the very stringency of his intelligence, especially if his temper be not of the best, may make him impatient of the necessities of concerted action, or even of moving *without* concert in harmony with others. The writings of Mr. Helps, however, display not only what Dunsford attributed to Milverton, along with Sir Robert Peel, namely, a strong sense of the slowness and dulness of the majority of mankind, but a deeply-seated and well-justified patience with them. Thus, Mr. Helps's manner is never that of the rattling hail. You never hear the crack of the whip: and hence arises a peculiar difficulty in estimating his influence upon his generation. It is like a gentle rain—nay, it is rather dew-fall—and helps us indefinitely more than we know of.

This patience or toleration in the author of "Friends in Council," is associated with another quality which keeps it from ever becoming maudlin, namely, a high sense of duty. He has himself told us that his history of the Spanish Conquest in America was taken up, in the hope of contributing something towards a solution of that slavery question in the United States which was so cruelly solved by the civil war. Few persons, perhaps, would have thought of undertaking so serious a task for so remote a purpose. But Mr. Helps's writings display this high *motif* of the conscience in a very peculiar way. He never condescends to invective. Take what he has to say upon the subject of the sin of great cities, in "Companions of my Solitude." Take, especially, his remarks about the duties of parents to children born out of wedlock, or rather about the habitual neglect among men of the world of such duties. Most readers of strong moral feeling will think that in Chapter VIII. of that delicious book, Mr. Helps has stopped far short of what he might say. But then his object was persuasion, and he put the curb upon himself. Yet he actually apologises for what he has written, by adding, "These are indignant words, but not more so than is right, I do believe, and I will not suppress one of them." One can imagine a "young lion of the *Daily Telegraph*" asking, Do you call that indignation, Mr. Helps? But Mr. Helps knew his business, as he always does; and the combined result of his toleration and his sense of duty is, that he succeeds in writing up Goodness by making Responsibility amiable—and that to a degree which I believe is unparalleled.

It has been said that praise is necessarily dull, so it will be necessary to find fault before long, even in the interest of Mr. Helps, if this paper is to do anything towards getting him even more respectfully and attentively read than he now is. But Mr. Helps knows that to be always wise and gentle, even with all his power of brightening the page, would lead, not necessarily to dulness, but certainly to flatness. Besides, he is human, and having in him a good deal of the poet and of the epigrammatist, he cannot but be struck with the irony of life, and the humour as well as the sadness of that rowing against the stream which makes up so large a part of the careers of all those who have a passion for reforming mankind. So, every now and then, he blows off his steam through Ellesmere, Midhurst, or Mauleverer. In doing this, as at other times, he is a great self-repeater. For example: Ellesmere's wonderful Essay on the Arts of Self-Advancement and a speech of Mauleverer's in a recent number of *Good Words*, are the same thing in different shapes. And, by-the-bye, in that very dialogue, we had a curious example of Mr. Helps's indifference to speculative exactitude. It is no answer to Mauleverer to say that his speech is one to make you go and hang yourself (indeed the man is answered in another way), for this is liable to the retort, Why should we not all go and hang ourselves? There would be a satisfactory rejoinder to this retort, but it would be just the kind of thing which you never get in Mr. Arthur Helps. I am not saying that you ought to get it, which is a very different matter.

That Mr. Helps is a constant self-repeater is no blame to him. As a wag who has pretended to write essays wrote in defence of his own habit of repeating himself, "Que voulez-vous? The number of good ideas in the universe is severely limited, and no writer worth twopence picks up more than half a dozen of 'em in the course of his life." It may safely be said that there is not in all the later writing of Mr. Helps a single idea of which the germ is not to be found in his earlier writings. A man who has read "Companions of my Solitude" knows Mr. Helps by heart—not only in his moral subtlety, his gentle pathos, his felicity in description, his quietly effective humour, his occasional sub-acidity, and, still better, his power of passing by sudden, resolved discords from the small and common to the infinite and the supreme; but also in the methods of his mind, and in his favourite topics. His hatred of war; his large faith in human nature, mingled with that pleasantly quick sense of the irony of life, and the slow rate of all human improvement; his keen feeling of the importance of leadership, and the duty of those whom Providence has placed upon a vantage-ground to lead and help (not drive) those who are less fortunate in character and culture; his habit of dwelling on the imperfection of our means of knowing each other,

and the folly of being too much annoyed by calumny; his peculiar relish of proverbs, especially Spanish proverbs;* his kind, almost tender, anxiety that useful and well-meaning men, who have made false steps, should not allow them to weigh heavily upon their minds, to the injury of their future life; his sympathy with children and dumb animals. All this, and much more, and with a curious repetition of the same illustrations, is to be found in "Companions of my Solitude," and in the other writings of Mr. Helps. There is one other peculiarity which is also abundantly exhibited in the same books. Harriet Martineau says of Mrs. Jameson that she looked at women's questions too much from the stand-point of the relation of women to men. What standard there is upon this subject, how the too much or too little is to be gauged, it is not easy to say; but women play a large part in the writings of Mr. Helps, though he is not a novelist. A critic writing one hundred years ago would have said of him, "Our Author is a great Admirer of the Sex;" and our author evidently is. It is in "Companions of my Solitude," as all the world knows, that the beautiful episode of Gretchen appears; Gretchen being reproduced in the *Ainah* in "Realnah," large hands and all. I am sorry to see that Ellesmere, in another place, endeavours to back out of that pathetic little transaction—it is the clearest case of downright self-stultification in all literature.

It would be very ungrateful, not to say unjust, to leave this subject without calling attention to the obligations—far too much overlooked as they are—under which we all lie to Mr. Arthur Helps for his treatment of what are called women's questions. The world in which "Companions of my Solitude" was first published (1851), appears centuries behind us. We now find women boldly, and I think not always gracefully and modestly, discussing topics which were in the year of the Great Exhibition *taboo*. But there is more moderation, wisdom, and tenderness contained in the sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters of that book than, I am strongly tempted to say, in all subsequent discussions of similar topics. The little girl brings a pretty straggling weed to her father, and asks, "Is this a weed, papa?" Being told that it is, she goes and asks her mother the same question. Again told that the thing is a weed, the little child replies, "But it has flowers!" On being assured that that makes no difference, she appeals to the technical skill of the gardener. "Nicholas dear, is this a weed?" And finding Nicholas supporting the decision of her parents, she moves off sadly to meditate. The

* By-the-by, Ellesmere claims the proverb, "Only the wearer of the shoe knows where it pinches," for English. But there is a book by a great Englishman on a most difficult and delicate subject, which Mr. Helps has the moral courage to say is much more easily laughed at than answered, ("Companions of my Solitude," 1st edition, pp. 156, 157; the passage remains unaltered in the last edition), in which a Roman origin is given to this proverb.

father thought the little girl had been "fairly silenced by authority, when all at once the little voice began again, 'Will you plant it in my garden, Nicholas dear? Do plant it in my garden.'" By-the-bye, the next sentence is bad English; the sequence after the word "deal" being incongruous with the "which" after "ground." However, from this point begins a wise and gentle discussion of what Mr. Helps called "the sin of great cities," which deserves at least all the praise that I have given to it. But I may observe, in passing, that his discussion of the "Causes" is far from exhaustive, and in particular that it omits one of the most frequent of them, namely, a wild and rebellious disposition on the part of the girl.

Although it is a comment which, upon a superficial view, might seem more related to the question of style than to any other, it goes in reality to the very heart and life of the writings, to say that Mr. Helps is "a vernacular man."† This is disclosed, not only in his own essays, but in his liking for Cobbett, for Ellesmere, for the common people—and for Spanish humour, which last is eminently vernacular. The quality to which these remarks are addressed has, among other effects, that of keeping in check any such possibility of "fine writing" as might without offence be conceived to exist in the mind of this very peculiar essayist. Sometimes one wishes he would trust his wing and fly higher, when he obstinately keeps upon the level, and turns what bid fair to be an inspiration into a stroke of tender irony. Perhaps he wrote from a light which had been strack out in the depths of his own being when he observed, "It is difficult to sound the depths of some men's humour, the deepest part of their nature." This is true, but it is even less than the truth. Small and narrow minds, even when helped by much culture and knowledge of life, fall far short of understanding the fact, and are usually offended by it. But for all their dulness, it remains true that some of the very finest natures are so mysteriously compounded that the highest and the deepest together get entangled or impacted in their humour. What splendid names would fall to be quoted in a list of great men intended to illustrate this! Cervantes, Jean Paul, Fielding, Sterne, Heine, Hoffman, Voltaire, George Eliot, Burns, Charles Lamb, Mr. Carlyle, Mr. Arthur Helps—it is a motley list,

* Mr. Helps writes a peculiarly beautiful style, but he is occasionally, like the rest of us, inaccurate. One of his slips in quotation is a grave one—"Fresh fields and pastures new."

† I put this phrase within commas, because in a beautiful paper in the last number of this Review it is assigned (apparently as original) to Thomas Erskine of Linlathen; but it is to be found in print from the pen of the present writer many years ago. Besides, it is so natural an invention that I should be only too happy if some rich man would wager me a competency that I would not, in a week's reading, find it a score of times in English classics. Nothing is more surprising than the arrogance of reviewers in these matters. In a review of the highest pretension, I was, not long ago, contemptuously snubbed for using a word which was classical before my critic was born, and which has its exact analogue in half the tongues of Europe.

and might be much extended. The humour of one writer upon it, George Eliot, has indeed not received the faintest show of justice in this particular; nor has Mr. Helps fared *much* better, though, as he is an essayist, his secret is more easily discoverable. Yet it is a shame that a man like him should ever be obliged to say such things as this: "*To the very serious reader I may mention that the above description is not given quite in earnest.*" It is, perhaps, the prevalence of his humour which accounts for a point which I have already noticed—the impossibility of fixing Mr. Helps with any particular speculative stand-point. It may not be uninteresting if I say how it happens that this strikes me. Looking into "*Tom Jones*," while in the middle of this paper, I was struck anew with the fact that in Fielding as in Chaucer,* a great speculative intelligence was abundantly manifest; and that in each case (as in George Eliot), it went for much in the humour, while yet the humour—involving the quick apprehension that, as Sir Roger de Coverley observed (immortal words!), "*there is much to be said on both sides*," which too is the kernel of the matter—prevented any taking of sides. In the case of Mr. Helps, however, positive dicta are not wanting upon practical questions; while his insight into character and his verdicts upon moral relations are of a kind which could only be delivered by a man who was (to take one point only) fully satisfied that character is connate, and is destiny. Well, when we know so much as this of a man of the calibre and culture of Mr. Helps, we are almost driven to this kind of reflection:—If this writer believes that character is connate (as he evidently does), and yet believes in human responsibility, how does he formulate these two beliefs in relation to such prime truths of morality as he may also maintain? To this question there is no answer capable of being extracted from the writings of Mr. Helps. Yet a positive answer might be given by a writer with a keen sense of humour in general, and in particular with a keen sense that the knight of the shire was to a sensitive eye visible through the Saracen's head.

In his quality of historian, Mr. Helps produces effects which almost tempt us to wish that he had earlier and more steadfastly wrought in that quality; but, as might be expected, his history tends, more than is usual, to assume the form of biography enlarged in scale. Hence the ease with which the lives of Las Casas, Pizarro, and Columbus can be detached. In these writings we find, besides that subtle and tender moral criticism which is the *peculium* of Mr. Helps, instances of dignified expression and beautiful or lofty

* In opposition to the common opinion, I must maintain that the case is not by any means clear as to Shakespeare in this respect. We find in Bacon something of what we find in Shakespeare, but so little in Shakespeare of what we find predominant in Bacon, that this difference alone was always to me decisively sufficient *prima facie* evidence against the hypothesis that Bacon wrote the plays.

metaphor, which of themselves would make us wonder whether the writer of them had ever attempted poetry.

Another feature in the writings of this gentleman might well suggest the same question—namely, the tragic or fatalistic character of some of the images which break up, though rarely, the level of the essays. Here is an example which is full of imagination:—“Our passions master us, and we know them to be our enemies. Our prejudices imprison us, and, like madmen, we take our jailors for a guard of honour.” This might very well become poetry; but when we read “Oulita,” we find something short in rhythm, intensity, and general fusion. It is like Henry Taylor diluted, and yet, strange to say, there is a deeper infusion of sadness and fate than we find in Mr. Taylor; nay, a more pervading perfume of sensuous beauty and delight. Hence, if we say, “This is not quite poetry,” we say it with perhaps more regret than the author might feel (supposing he cared for our judgment) in hearing the verdict. It must be a paltry-spirited reader that does not rejoice in seeing all things work after their kind, and long to find a man come off with flying colours in whatever he attempts. Why Wordsworth and Mr. Henry Taylor—the former so often, the latter now and then—write very doleful prose, when the least thing we could expect is level poetry, is too obvious a thing to talk much about. Why Emerson, who sometimes succeeds, so frequently breaks down, is not always clear. In Walter Savage Landor, the causes are numerous, but not on the surface. In Mr. Helps, besides the disintegrating, thwarting, back-pulling effect of the author’s sleepless sense of the compensations of life, there is something else—a *temperamental* want of continuous intensity. As we have not the slightest doubt this is ultimately a matter of personal physique, we can say no more about it than that it is very easy, in the case of Mr. Helps, to construct the whole man from his books.

The wide reach and versatility of the writings of Mr. Arthur Helps have at least this result, that the honour he gets out of them while living is indefinitely less than their value and public and private influence might claim. No man is better able to assess the worth of praise than Mr. Helps, or more likely to put aside all such matters with a genial smile; or, if with a genial pang, yet with a pang for others as well as himself. Never to think of himself *alone* is, indeed, one of the characteristics of this subtly generous writer; and when some of the kindly acute seeds of criticism and nobly generative roots of practical wisdom, which he has so freely scattered upon the field of the world, have become mighty trees, in which the birds of heaven sit joyfully while men take shelter beneath, then—why then, perhaps some one will hang the *purpureus pannus* upon the boughs, and, after a little ado, it will be remembered to whom the world is indebted for the beauty and the shelter.

HENRY HOLBEACH.



OUR VERY CHEAP LITERATURE.

The London Journal.
The Family Herald.
Bow Bells.
The Ferret.
The Devil.
&c. &c. &c.

WHEN Charles Knight, in the prime of life, was labouring to inculcate a taste for higher literature among the people, he fancied he found an insurmountable bar to his success in the existence of the paper duty. He argued that, the larger the capital you compel a man to employ in his business, by taxes or otherwise, the more you limit competition, and give practically a monopoly to the few; and, as the people were more inclined to buy trash than anything else, he was ready with the dictum that the paper duty was nothing less than a premium on bad literature. The publishers of that commodity had possession of the field first; and, therefore, the tax bore most hardly against him, and others like him, who were aiming at supplying the labouring classes with good reading at a cheap rate.

But the paper duty has been repealed, and both classes of publishers stand pretty much in the same relative position as before. The advantages which Mr. Knight grieved to find so entirely on the side of his opponents still remain with them; and facts which are open to any one who looks carefully into the matter prove that the fiscal changes which have enlarged the field for cheap high-class reading, have also operated in enlarging in an equal ratio what Mr. Knight called the "garbage field, or stream of sewer literature."

In the concluding address to the *Penny Magazine*, Mr. Knight

wrote:—"I rejoice that there are many in the field, and some who have come at the eleventh hour, who deserve the wages of zealous and faithful labourers. But there are others who are carrying out the principle of cheap weekly sheets, to the disgrace of the system, and who appear to have got some considerable hold upon the less informed of the working people, and especially upon the young. There are manufactories in London whence hundreds of reams of vile paper and printing issue weekly; where large bodies of children are employed to arrange types at the wages of shirt makers, from copy furnished by the most ignorant at the wages of scavengers. In truth, such writers, if they deserve the name of writers, *are* scavengers. All the garbage that belongs to the history of crime and misery is raked together, to diffuse a moral miasma through the land, in the shape of the most vulgar and brutal fiction." These words, written in 1846, seem as truly expressive of the facts now as they were then. Indeed they would seem to be more true now than they were then, for in the month of April last the quantity of printed trash in the form of periodicals sent to the Post-Office for transmission to the colonies was so great* that the Postmaster-General, notwithstanding his desire to aid in the dissemination of wholesome literature, decided to withdraw the privilege of cheap postage from all magazines alike—thinking it better to shut out the good than to foster the worthless. In looking into this lower class literature we get glimpses of human nature far enough from flattering, yet we must not forget that the existence of this literature is a witness to one of the deepest and most hopeful needs of man—a real interest in something beyond the limited circle of his hard daily routine; and the self-denial undergone by the vast majority of the poor in order to the gratification of this appetite is the one ray of hope that visits us as we go from deep to deep in the ever-widening abyss of penny and halfpenny prints.

┌ A sheaf of this "very cheap literature" lies before us—a bundle of specimen numbers, purchased at random. We will endeavour to give a fair general notion of their contents.

┌ The *Family Herald* opens with some lines entitled, "Avonside," a bit of musical commonplace. Next come two chapters of "Letty Leigh," a story "to be concluded in five numbers." The first instalment is tolerably written, and contains probably the greater portion of the plot. A handsome young doctor in an obscure fishing village finds time to mix in London society. In them he meets, and falls desperately in love with, "an heiress, a belle,

* We understand that of one publication, which has certainly to be ranked under the garbage if not the sewer class, no less than three tons were sent to the Post-Office in one day.

queen of a brilliant London season." Merely for the sake of change, the wealthy beauty becomes the bride of the handsome, grave young country doctor; but, as might have been expected, she soon grows weary of the fishing village and its general practitioner. She insists on going back to London, and her husband, who has found out that he has made a bad bargain, allows her to do so. Not that he wants her money minus its mistress. Her fortune was £15,000, but no marriage settlements were made. The doctor, however, never touched a farthing of it, and at last insisted on its being post-nuptially settled on his wife. But the wife grows weary again of being a "grass widow" in London, and writes to her husband that she wants to come home. He hopes that he is going to regain the angel of his bachelor dreams, but finds that it is merely an incarnate "devil of a temper" he has welcomed once more to the domestic hearth and the gallipots. A baby is born, and dies; its mother's health rapidly fails; and in her wasted state she becomes madly jealous of a blooming, innocent girl (the heroine of the story), to whom the doctor shows mere common politeness, but who, in spite of her innocence, cannot help thinking the doctor a nice, good-looking man. He sees the young lady home one evening; the invalid wife dogs them, gets caught in a storm, and catches her "death of cold." On her deathbed the dying woman implores her husband's pardon for her evil behaviour of all kinds. His old love returns, his wife dies in his arms and beneath his clinging kisses, and then—shortly afterwards, we presume, he will marry Letty Leigh.

Sandwiched between "Letty Leigh" and the next story is another thin slice of verse, thickly spread with mental mustard—"The Phantom Steed," by H. J. B. The poet metamorphoses death into a runaway horse that digs graves with his hoofs, kicks old men on the head and babies on the breast, leaps down into coal-pits, races after cannon balls, and neighs so terribly as he gallops over the sea—presumably as a "white horse"—that although

"Ha! ha! the seaman laughs in his heart
As he climbs the slippery mast;
His hold gives way at the wild steed's neigh,
And dead on the deck he is cast."

We make our first acquaintance with "True to Herself," the next story, at the sixty-first chapter, and therefore it is difficult to appraise it. Devourers of sensational novels would probably relish it, for, judging of the bulk by the sample, we should say that it is highly sensational, and the "sensation" seems as well done as that of more famous novelists. A Colonel John Garth, Ex-President of the State of Alsako, which has treated him badly, returns after Ulysses-like wanderings to his

native village, in Norfolk or Suffolk. His landing at Barstoft, probably Lowestoft, has been noticed both by Hetty Deerham, a young lady who appears to have been a first love of his, although he is now a widower with a little girl, and who somehow deceived him into accepting money from her, and also by a reprobate Italian adventurer of the name of Baretti — at present married to a “flash barmaid,” and, though at the point of death, very fond of brandy—who hates Colonel Garth. Miss Deerham, just as a thunderstorm is coming on, goes to Baretti’s to learn where Colonel Garth is. Whilst she is there a son of Baretti’s, by a former wife, arrives — an honest, struggling music composer in Paris, who once proposed to Miss Deerham, whose life Colonel Garth once saved, and of whom, as well as of brandy, old Baretti is very fond, although he is disgusted with him for adopting such a beggarly profession as music-writing on spec. Whilst the lightning is flashing, and the thunder is crashing, old Baretti hands over to his son ten thousand pounds’ worth of Turkish bonds; but his son reminds him of just such another tempestuous night two years ago, on which (apparently), by the sly opening of a bridge, he murdered Gregory Deerham, who was carrying to John Garth these very bonds—the now Colonel Ex-President John Garth’s property. Mr. Charles Reade could scarcely have conceived a more piquant ending for an instalment of an unfinished tale.

The writer of “True to Herself,” moreover, has an imaginatively receptive ear, and a faithfully reproductive pen for the voices of the night-wind. Listen to this:—“It came across the ocean, and the long tract of sand, and sandy common, to the narrow defiles of houses, where in gusty weather it made strange moaning noises, as of a breeze that had lost its way, and was trying to escape. Hetty did not know that the wind was astir that night in any great degree until she found herself in the Salt Score, and felt the keen draught rushing towards her from the lower level, and heard the sighing and moaning of the sharp current of air which met her there.”

There are little touches of humour also in the story. Take this bit:—Hetty Deerham is trying to make the old Italian reprobate repent on what she supposes to be his death-bed, but “I haven’t been treated well,” said Paulo, half sullenly; “Tony has not treated me well—everybody has been against me. I have had two wives, and both of them bad ones. Why should I be a perfect Christian with all that?”

“Esther Tresgold’s Friend,” Chaps. VII. to X., we are afraid we must call namby-pamby. Two cousins, a doctor’s daughter and a

not very pecunious organist, are engaged to be married ; but a pretty young friend of the female cousin's, who lives in the female cousin's father's house, and goes out to give musical lessons, supplants the female cousin in her cousin's love, and, according to her own account, loves the male cousin passionately for the first time in her life. The female cousin bears their double treachery with most becoming resignation. She even offers to give her wedding dress (already made) to the pretty young friend, but the pretty young friend cannot quite stand *that*. All this time, however, the pretty young friend has been "carrying on" with a richer man than the organist, and the organist, just before his marriage—"Serve him right," will probably be the general verdict—finds this out, and a scene ensues. Of course there is a temporary reconciliation, but about the time when the jilter hopes to get the second bride of his choice, he reads a letter informing him that he has been jilted. The pretty young friend never loved, and never will love, any man but the organist, but still she cannot help selling herself to the richer man. The pretty young friend is married to the richer man, launches into Parisian gaiety, and keeps her word by never loving anybody but the organist (except herself), not even the husband whose position she had preferred. The husband, not unnaturally, gets sick of that sort of thing, and the young couple first spar and then drop their fists in languid indifference. The pretty young friend, of course, dies as soon as her "beauty" is "wasted," and is buried somewhere in Normandy. The female cousin very sensibly becomes the wife of the worthy young man who buys her father's practice ; but the persistently celibate male cousin, still longing for his jilt, goes over every year, like a spooney, from Newhaven to Dieppe, in order that he may "lie by her grave in the warm sunny air and dream that Tally" (the pretty young friend's affectionate nickname) "is back with him again."

The "Phantom Steed" begins with a reminiscence of Longfellow—"There is a courser unseen of men." "Myself," another copy of verses, by Peter Spenser, begins with a reminiscence of Wesley's hymns, "Oh, sure I was not born to die." In the first part of his poem Mr. Peter Spenser expresses a craving after posthumous fame, and hints a strong belief that he will secure it—

"And if I ever live, indeed,
 'Twill be when I am dead;
 Though now I die, mine be it then
 To live within the hearts of men !

Longing to make my name sublime,
 And bear it to the end of time."

In the middle of his poem, however, he intimates that he would rather be butcher's meat than what, with sudden modesty, he half fears he is—

"The brutes that only live and die
 To man their substance give;
 But lower e'en than they am I
 If mine it be to live—
 A mere encumbrance to my kind,
 Then die and leave no trace behind."

The last part of the poem, in accordance with the key-note struck in its first line, is a kind of hymn, the somewhat inconsistent burden of which is—

"And what can matter earthly fame
 To one who cannot die?"

In the pages of answers to correspondents information is given on the subjects of, *inter alia*, basilisks; the true meaning of the word "perpendicular;" the advisability of emigrating to New Zealand; the propriety of making restitution, and the proper mode of making it; the prudence shown in strongly and fondly loving a young man introduced to one in the street; the sinfulness of marriage without love; the shortcomings of the press (the *Family Herald* excepted) in a moral point of view; the arrangement of initials in the abbreviated designations of institutions; the excellence of Mr. Eyre Evans Crowe's "History of France;" the "entire" unity of the sexes, and yet the proper and affectionate subordination of woman; the price of a book; the possible good qualities of Jewish husbands; photography; the remuneration per folio that ought to be given for copying a philosophical work in MS.; the legal validity of a memorandum of gift; the proper person to pay for refreshments taken by a "cavalier and the lady of his love, when they are out together;" the revision of the Authorised Version of the Bible; and the goodness of a submitted sample of a lady's hand-writing.

The rest of the number is made up of scraps, riddles, and answers to riddles, verbal and arithmetical.

X The *London Journal* is illustrated after a fashion. We have read the first chapter, or rather the thirty-fifth, of its first story, "The Young Wife; or, the Shadow of Crime." The said chapter is a diary written in a style that somehow makes one think of Mr. Burnand's "Happy Thoughts," only the diarist's recollections are very unhappy. Lionel Lindsay has married a young wife who does not care for him. In Italy he benevolently lends his top-coat, without taking out his watch, purse, &c., to a "tall boatman," who wants to see his sweetheart "on the other shore," but who is unprovided with an upper garment, and who begs to be allowed to take the wealthy young Englishman's place in the ferry-boat, just when the young Englishman, with his foot "resting on the boat's keel"—a peculiar position under the circumstances—suddenly resolves not to go in her. The boat is wrecked, the mangled body of the "tall boatman" who borrowed the top-coat, is washed ashore—so mangled that the top-coat and its contents make

Mr. Lindsay's friends believe that the corpse is *his*. As his wife believes that she is a widow, Mr. Lindsay magnanimously resolves that she shall have the freedom she desires. He "hides away the secret of their being man and wife in the depths of his own individuality," permits her to take possession of the property she would have been entitled to if she *had* been a widow, and starts as a penniless adventurer, under the name of Horace Masterton. His adventures, however, are not very eventful. He very speedily gets adopted by an old Scotch admiral, whom he has rescued from an attack of brigands. As the Scotch admiral's adopted son he is admitted into society again, and is taken by one of his friends to visit a lovely young widow, with whom the friend is in love, and who is playing hostess to a lot of men, all more or less declared admirers. The modern Penelope (who, however, does not weep over the absence of her Ulysses) is Mrs. Lindsay. Mr. Lindsay feels strongly tempted to claim her as his own when he fancies for a few minutes that she loves him as Horace Masterton, although, after only seven years' absence, she has not the slightest recollection of him as Lionel Lindsay; but, on the whole, Mr. Lindsay thinks that it would be more magnanimous to allow Mrs. Lindsay to commit bigamy, if she likes to do so.

Our readers will probably require no further taste of the quality of the *London Journal's* fiction.

H. J. B. figures as a bard in the *London Journal* again, and his contribution to it is decidedly better than his "Phantom Steed." An old man and his wife are taking their "evening stroll," and see a pair of youthful lovers doing the same. The old man thus apostrophises the young people—

"Ah blessed ones! may life on you
Shed only fruitful showers!
May nought destroy the passion true
Ye vow within these bowers.
May marriage fetters round your hearts
So cunningly be set,
That when death fain would loose one's chain,
Both hence may homeward flit!"

The "scrappy" contents of the *London Journal* are very like those of the *Family Herald*. The "Notices to Correspondents" are rather more spicy than the *Family Herald's*. We cull samples as they come:—

CHARLIE, a widower, fair, middle-aged, and not bad-looking, well-educated, and has a private income of £200 a year from funded property, besides other resources, is very anxious to meet with a lively, well-educated lady, musical, affectionate, and a brunette, from thirty to forty years of age.

MAGGIE MAY.—1. Present the slippers, and never mind the feeble nonsense of your sisters. 2. People make their own luck in this world.

HEPATICA, a light-hearted, industrious girl, twenty-one years of age, would much like to open a correspondence with a respectable, industrious, good-tempered young farmer or tradesman.

CLARA, thirty-one, tall, fair, intelligent, domestic, and of Christian principles, would like a husband forty years of age, tall, dark, and of a serious turn of mind.

HOME-BIRD, a widow, thirty-eight years of age, always cheerful, with a comfortable home, a moderate income, and two children, aged respectively four and seven, would be pleased to receive the *carte de visite* of a clerk or mechanic who desires a true-hearted wife.

ALEXANDER, a little over fifty, of independent means, accustomed to a country life, quiet and retired in his habits, tall, seeks an amiable and affectionate wife—one who has no pretensions to beauty. Age unimportant.

KATHERINE P., a widow, just fifty, with a daughter fifteen, and is not without home comforts and a little money, wishes to receive the *carte de visite* of, and correspond with, a nice, comely-looking widower without children.

A MAID OF BERKS.—1. Letters can be left at village post-offices till called for. Of course you are fully alive to the proverbial curiosity of the keepers of such places. 2. Very good.

EVELYN, thirty, and moves in good society; Alfred, a Government clerk, 6 (*sic* ?) feet 7 inches high, with £150 a year; A. Z., who has a little money; and J. S., a quiet bachelor, aged fifty, about to retire into the country, ask for the *carte de visite* of Sarah Jane.

THE YOUNG WIDOW.—*Cartes de visite* wanted by A. B., highly-educated, and holding an appointment with £800 a year; Francis H., twenty-eight, dark, and has £250 a year; University, thirty, fair, well-connected, and literary; J. K. L., a widower, thirty-six, and has £600 a year; C. A., professional, and has fair prospects; F. S., twenty-six, a widower, with a good private income; and Thistle, who has a business worth £1,000.

IN DOUBT.—Love comes unbidden, and from what you say of yourself you are just the kind of person to be taken by surprise. Go more into the society of young ladies, and cultivate an easy, agreeable manner.

S. J. JOHNSON.—"That man's second wife" can prosecute him for bigamy, notwithstanding the bigamy of his real wife.

NORA.—Your husband, if of sound mind at the time, can by his will exclude you from having a single shilling of his property. Would it not suit your purposes and temper to humour his peculiarities? Your relations, by their too frequent visitings, are sadly damaging your interests. You should recollect that your husband has been a widower, and has had probably bitter experience of "the fond attentions" of relations by marriage, who, we must say, are apt to be too intrusive upon the good-nature and common sense of husbands.

T. E. J.—For the cause and treatment of red nose, we must refer you to No. 1190, post-free for two stamps.

AN INTENDING EMIGRANT.—Every information ought to be afforded you by applying to the Emigration Commissioners, 8, Park-street, Westminster. Should your letter not be attended to, let us know, and we will expose the wanton and cruel neglect of the highly-salaried officials who have nothing else to do but comply with such requests. You may also apply to the National Emigration League, Salisbury-square, Fleet-street.

SARAH MARIA P.—For a remedy for disagreeable perspiration, see No. 1272, post-free for two stamps.

MILLIE.—We do not think the marriage would be a happy one for either of you. The parents of the young man object to you, so that you would have to enter his family under a cloud of black looks; and really, according to your own statement, the best part of the love is on his side. On your part we can detect more than a latent indifference. Take a little more time to consider.

ALPHA AND BETA, two gentlemen, brothers, aged thirty and twenty-six, fair and dark, Protestants, both tall, passable in looks, of good family, in a very respectable business, and doing well, living in a large house, and will soon have two homes, find one is too large at present, and they don't know how they will do with two, unless they take a wife each. They would like to receive the *cartes de visite* of too young ladies, good-looking and accomplished.

MARY ANNE D., a retired farmer's daughter, twenty-one, under the medium height, who has received a good plain education, is a good horsewoman, and drives well, would like to receive the *carte de visite* of a professional gentleman not over thirty, nice-looking, and of a good family.

DUBLIN, a kind-hearted Irishman, twenty-seven, dark, in a good business, producing £300 per annum, and an abstainer from the evils that make so many homes unhappy, asks for the *carte de visite* of a young lady reader, a good managing housekeeper, with an income of her own.

We should add that the proprietors of the *London Journal* reserve the "right of translation," and that one of the serial stories—"The

Buried Legacy," by Mrs. Harriet Lewis—is "the only edition in this country sanctioned by this celebrated American authoress."

We have lingered over the *Family Herald* and the *London Journal* because they are veteran caterers for popular taste—our specimen of the *Family Herald* is numbered 1406, and our specimen of the *London Journal*, 1314—and because they have a certain kind of literary reputation. Did not Leigh Hunt, as advertisements inform us, eagerly anticipate the arrival of his *Family Herald*? Has not even the *Saturday Review* puffed it? And did not Mr. Charles Reade once write for the *London Journal*?

The *London Reader* and the *Penny Miscellany* are mere imitations of the *London Journal*. The differences in the titles are the only differences which a hasty purchaser could notice in the rival publications. We have no respect for the business sharpness that tries to make a profit by mimicking the form or title of a publication that has obtained a position of any kind—that wants, without paying interest, to make use of the invested capital of a publisher, whom it also desires to cut out from the enjoyment of the profits of such investment.

"T. T." (we suppose that he wishes to be thought Lord Tancred) sends to the *London Reader* a recipe for egg preserving, which was successfully tried last year by Lady Tancred, whoever that egg-preserving Ladyship may be.

As in the *London Journal*, so in the *London Reader* and the *Penny Miscellany*, the "Notices to Correspondents" are the most entertaining portions of the contents to those who are not regular subscribers to those periodicals—and possibly to those who are.

With the exception of a sketch of Mr. Dickens's literary career, and a scrappy paragraph or two, *The Million* is made up of stories with highly-spiced titles—"The Spies of London; or, the Companions of the Temple"—"Dalilah; or, the Little House in Piccadilly;" and so on. One of the stories is Mr. Edmund Yates's "Black Sheep," reprinted. The others may be reprints also for what we know. They, of course, are sensational—thieves, murderers, villanous old money-lenders, mad-house keepers, and the rest of that race, figuring in them; but the rascality, sooth to say, does not come up to the promise of the titles. Police reports, we should think, would be decidedly more entertaining to those who like that type of reading—more exciting, and not only truer, but also truer-sounding. There is, however, a little bit in "How to Get Rid of Her," which, in spite of the staginess of the incident described, has a touch of nature about it. Kitson Brown has quarrelled with his wife, and run away from her and his two children. Getting rich and also old, he determines to come back to London to look after them. He

returns to his old house, but all that he can hear of his wife is that she has left the neighbourhood. He wanders about, and halts—

At the corner of Tichborne-street; and as of course no gentleman can stand a moment at such a place without being accosted, Kitson was presently saluted by a young but jaded-looking girl, with the *raucous* voice common to these unfortunates through constant exposure to the night air.

Kitson would have moved hurriedly on, but the girl, in the spirit of desperate jollity, which her class substitute for real gaiety of heart, detained him.

"Come now, father," said she, "ain't you going to treat me to something to drink?"

It was not the words that made a cold shudder vibrate through Kitson's frame like a flash of electricity. He was one of those men that do not follow the fashion, and might have looked paternal enough to warrant the girl applying the epithet "father" to him. It was the voice. The voice had that cadence peculiar to each individual, which is never lost, and which pierces through the strictest disguise.

Kitson staggered rather than walked to the nearest public-house, and presently stood in the midst of a crowd of gay, drunken, and dissolute men and women, who were collected before the bar of one of the gilded gin-palaces of the neighbourhood. The glare of light and confusion of tongues seemed to revive him, and in turn he led his companion into the parlour.

She was already astonished at his manner, and fain would have quitted him; but he detained her, and gazed at her steadfastly. Then he said simply, sadly, but tenderly, "Yes, Nelly dear, I am your father."

The girl turned white through her paint, then red. She would have been defiant, but the father's arm was thrown round her, and she burst into tears, and sobbed convulsively on his shoulder. There was but one man in that parlour besides this pair, and he was a profligate-looking man; but he rose hastily, and leaving his drink untasted on the table, retired from the room.

A single recognition, however, under startling circumstances, would not be enough. When the old man has provided lodgings for his lost and found daughter he steps into a public-house, to get a glass of brandy, is followed out of the public-house by some men who noticed his well-filled purse, is knocked down, robbed, and then carried with his head smashed to the nearest hospital. A man, supposed to be the striker of the blow, is captured by the police, after a long chase. Next morning Kitson is trepanned, but as it is plain he has not long to live, his daughter is sent for, and also a magistrate to take the dying man's deposition; the supposed murderer, in a handcuffed condition, is likewise confronted with the old man. But suddenly the nurse in charge of him discovers that her patient is her husband, and then mother and daughter suddenly discover that the accused man is the old man's son, and adjure the old man to clear their darling of the awful crime laid to his charge. The old man does say it was not his son who struck the fatal blow—"Ten thousand times no, no, n—" and then "his eyes rolled wildly, the apple of his throat heaved once, and he was dead." It turns out that in spite of the suspicious circumstances, the son *was* innocent, although after a somewhat unheroic fashion.

He was unanimously acquitted. But the first question his mother asked him as he left the dock was, "Ben, tell me—did you do it?"

"Upon my soul, I did not, mother!" he replied. "I saw the blow given; but I had followed the murderer out of pure curiosity, because he left the public-house suddenly on father's leaving. I was having a chat with the landlord, who keeps a book—a betting book. I thought something was wrong, and followed the man; but fearful of being implicated in it, and not knowing the victim was father, I ran away, and was caught."

The mother's answer was a convulsive kiss.

The three survivors are shuffled off into one of those rural villages into which novelists are fond of shooting the rubbish of their used-up characters—and, of course, all three become very proper personages, with the orthodox, abiding shadow of melancholy—mournful but mellowing—hanging over their virtues.

Bow Bells gives music and work-patterns, as well as the cuts, riddles, and miscellanea it follows the example of its older three-columned contemporaries in providing, but its staple, like theirs, is stories. Taking it to be a best foot put foremost, we have read the whole of the first instalment of the first story in *Bow Bells*, and it has so completely exhausted our patience that—apologising to the writers of the other stories for not having been able to get up enough interest to tackle them (although they cannot possibly be worse, and may possibly, nay, very probably, be far better than that first story),—we must confine our remarks to the said first. “The Red Grange” is either unmitigated bosh, or else a burlesque on the sensational style of writing, so clumsily done that the editor of *Bow Bells* has been gammoned into inserting it as a specimen of the regular article. How scrupulously faithful the story is to life, general and military, we leave our readers to judge from the opening paragraphs:

“It is a handsome face; but in no feature of it can I trace the slightest resemblance either to my late wife, her mother, or to myself. Look at it, Lambert, and tell me what you think of my daughter’s photograph.”

The above words were spoken by a gentleman verging upon fifty years old, to his brother-officer, who was his junior by some fifteen or sixteen years.

Captain Lambert received the picture from the other’s hands, and, for some moments, quietly and narrowly scrutinised it, without making any remark.

It was a coloured *carte-de-visite*, representing a woman of probably twenty summers, of figure perfect, and with a countenance of radiant beauty.

At last the Captain spoke.

“Colonel,” he said, rapturously—“Colonel, it is the most exquisite visage I ever beheld!”

The other smiled pleasantly, and looked much gratified.

“And she is your daughter, Colonel?” the younger man continued.

“Yes, and my only child! I have not seen Denise since she was ten years old. When my regiment was ordered off to Australia, her mother reluctantly consented that she should be left under the care of some very distant relatives of her own in London, who had a daughter of the same age precisely. From Australia we came here to India; then I lost my wife; and afterwards there followed the late unhappy outbreak. But heaven be praised! I am free at last to visit my native land, and to once more regain possession of my dear daughter, who is now all I have in the world to cling to or care for.”

“I congratulate you, Colonel, upon having so lovely a companion in perspective. Now, when I put my foot on shore in the old country, I shall not have a single relation to greet, or to greet me. I’m a solitary fellow, the last of my stock.”

“We shall proceed home in the same ship together, Lambert; we have fought side by side in many a fearful contest, and I have learned to esteem you highly. Why, then, when we reach our own shore, should we not share the same habitation with one another, like brothers? Come, what say you to my offer? Denise is certain to like you; and, should that liking assume a more serious form, so much the better; I shall throw no obstacles in the way of her happiness.”

“Colonel Garstone!” exclaimed his companion, in great surprise and confusion. “Oh, surely you forget my age? I am thirty-five—fifteen years the senior of Miss Garstone, and a rough, weather-beaten soldier to boot.”

“Well, my dear fellow, and what of that?” laughed the Colonel. “I tell you, Lambert,” he added, checking his laughter, and assuming a grave and earnest manner,—

"I tell you that my proudest wish will be fulfilled, if you succeed in winning Denise's heart. What have you to reply now?"

"That I feel much flattered and honoured by——"

"Honoured? Stuff! I did not think, Lambert, to hear such hackneyed words from your lips."

"Indeed, Colonel, I am at a loss to answer you as I ought. I am not deserving of your kind favour, and am overwhelmed with gratitude, and——"

"Yes, yes; I know all about it," interposed the other. "Of course, I shall not build too confidently on seeing my desires prosper, for you may fail to care for Denise. She may be beautiful in person, and yet be lacking in mind and disposition. The Quittrains, the people with whom she is domiciled, have always represented her to me as a most amiable girl; and, indeed, Denise's letters to me have always been written in a charmingly feminine strain. Still, I place but little dependence upon either the Quittrains' report, or the style of my daughter's correspondence, as both may, probably, belie her real self. I am very anxious to see her with my own eyes, and to judge her with my own judgment."

"You may depend on't, Colonel, your daughter's charms have not been misrepresented. That you will find Miss Garstone full of sweet, womanly perfections, I feel certain."

"I hope so—I hope so," was the half-audible rejoinder. "And, now, to prove to you how much I appreciate your integrity and worth, I must tell you that I have made my will; and, without asking your permission, have confided Denise—ever harping on my daughter, you see—to your guardianship. I am about to embark on a long and dangerous voyage, and cannot say what mischance may overtake me. I am no longer a young man, and it behoves me to be prepared for the worst that can befall me. In one word, will you accept the sacred trust I have placed in you?"

"Gladly; although I doubt my ability to accept it. But you are hale and hearty, Colonel, and are as likely to reach dear old England in safety as I am. Still, should any unseen accident arise, would not the Quittrains themselves be the fittest protectors for Miss Garstone? I——"

"No, no, no—emphatically no!" cried the senior officer. "I can't account for the strange feeling which has of late taken possession of me relative to those people—heaven forgive me if I wrong them by my doubts."

"Doubts, Colonel! What sort of doubts?"

"Ah! that question I cannot possibly answer. An unaccountable and undefinable suspicion has crept into my mind, and do what I will, I cannot drive that suspicion away."

"Your daughter has never said that they have treated her otherwise than kindly, has she?"

"Denise has been at school until very recently—say a couple of years, up to which period she has only been with the Quittrains at intervals—at holiday time, or when she wanted to see some particular town sight."

"Those people live in London, do they not?"

"Yes; but in one of its most dingy neighbourhoods—Fitzroy Square."

"They are well to do, I presume?"

"I can't say for certain. I fancy they've been living for some considerable period on the prospect of the death of a grand-uncle, a miserly old fellow, from whom they expect to inherit an absolute mine of wealth, which he has been hoarding up, and adding to, for three-quarters of a century, or more."

"They have a family, you say?"

"Only a daughter of the same age as my Denise. A very lovely girl, as I have been given to understand."

The miserly old uncle dies, and only leaves his Fitzroy Square relatives his ruinous rat-haunted "Red Grange" in Lancashire. The Fitzroy Square people are overhead in debt, and this blow is a crusher to Mr. Quittrain; but Mrs. Quittrain is more than equal to the occasion. She persuades their chief creditor to buy the house in Fitzroy Square in quittance of his debt—giving hard cash to boot, and then the Quittrains, taking the colonel's daughter, and a devoted old Irish domestic to whom two years' wages are due, make a moonlight flitting to the "Red Grange,"—snapping their fingers at the other creditors. The devoted old Irishwoman is specially devoted to the

exquisitely beautiful Miss Ruby Quittrain, and expresses her devotion in very comical, would-be Irish brogue. Ruby is very fond of Denise Garstone, but Ruby's mamma, who doats upon Ruby, resolves to make Colonel Garstone believe when he comes home that Ruby is Denise, and Mr. Quittrain and the old Irishwoman, after a little faint kicking, join in Mrs. Quittrain's plot. By mistake, Mrs. Quittrain sent her daughter's instead of her ward's photograph to the Colonel, and she means to make good profit out of her lucky blunder.

When the Londoners get down into Lancashire Mrs. Quittrain's good fortune is still for a time in the ascendant. Denise is brought to death's door by a fever. But she doesn't die and slip conveniently out of Mrs. Quittrain's way. Ruby, however, is persuaded to believe that her friend is dead, and to consent to personate her, when Colonel Garstone arrives. The doctor, without going up into her room, believes that his patient is dead. The doctor has been informed that Denise, not Ruby, is Mrs. Quittrain's daughter. The devoted Irish domestic persuades a carpenter to make a coffin for the "corpse," from measurements which she has taken. The curtain falls on a sham funeral, Denise in mysterious limbo, and the other occupants of the "Red Grange" awaiting Colonel Garstone's arrival from the East, in not unnatural anxiety.

Every Week, price one halfpenny, consists of sixteen pages, containing two cuts, and eight stories, which, apparently, are harmless enough, but which, in any case, could do very little harm, since we cannot imagine that any one but a paralysed imbecile would ever suppose that he was deriving pleasure from such enormities. The average mind, so to speak, gasps for breath in the presence of these stories, as if in a mental vacuum.

Life and Fashion is a sixteen-paged, eighty-columned, gossiping, penny newspaper, intended for people who do not care about politics. Its salient feature is the epitome with which each weekly portion of its serial stories is prefaced, for the benefit of readers who are unacquainted with the chapters of the same that have appeared in previous numbers. We cannot be accused of unfairness if, instead of epitomizing any of the stories ourselves, we give a specimen of the way in which their authors epitomize them. Our extract is from the summary prefixed to "The Rose of Kendall," by the author of "Sometimes Sapphire, Sometimes Pale."

Rescued from death, illness supervened, and postponed the marriage of Claribel for a time. But on recovering, she, obeying the promptings of her ambition, and ignoring the suffering she should inflict on Eustace, became the bride of Lord Chesterton. The humbler and discarded lover, also rescued from drowning, in pursuance of his scheme of vengeance, as a disguised monk assailed her on her wedding night with fierce reproaches, vows of vengeance, and even personal violence, and then fled to Paris, plunging into the wildest excesses. Lord and Lady Chesterton, after their wedding tour, settled in

the gay French capital; and here William Eustace and Claribel met again—he as a reckless student, she as a brilliant and admired leader of the fashionable world. At a grand masked ball, given by the Russian ambassador, the vengeful Eustace gained access to her. Availing himself of the disguising domino he wore, to solicit her hand for a waltz, he contrived to direct their movements towards a conservatory, and at the same time to render Lady Chesterton—the faithless Claribel—insensible by using a subtly perfumed handkerchief. Swiftly from the conservatory the frenzied lover bore her away from the ball, placed her beside him in a waiting carriage, and hurried through the night to the dismal “city of the silent”—the catacombs—into which he had already secured the means of entrance. Descending with her into those gloomy precincts, Eustace’s heart was filled with a mad joy; and when the senses of Claribel returned, and she, appalled with terror, recognised who it was that had abducted her, and whither he had brought her, his feelings of gratified revenge were boundless: for here he had brought her to remain with him until they both should cease to live.

Some of the Answers to Correspondents in the *Young Ladies of Great Britain* are rather smart. Specimens of them will give an idea of the kind of young ladies who subscribe to the periodical.

MAY BLOSSOM.—Your other question is very vague. What service do you mean—Army, Navy, domestic, or what? You can leave any service when the time you have agreed to stay is run out.

ADA LILY S.—As to “Minnie Maythorn,” we have already shown that it is impossible for a story to go on for ever.

A LANCASHIRE WITCH.—We presume that is the title by which you want to be known. Well, we do not believe very much in phrenology; you may have the bump of wit, but then, having the wit is quite another thing. Spelling correct. For your other question, see “May Blossom.”

SENSELESS POLLY.—However appropriate the *nom de plume* may be, we cannot see why you should have used it. However, we will not discourage Polly too much, though of course she must expect that her first attempt at verse, above all others, would be the least acceptable. Fancy a “Land flowing with Milk and Honey.”* No wonder England is so full of sweet creatures. But, setting that aside, “honey” does not rhyme with “burning.” It is seriously to be hoped Polly possesses more sense than is displayed in the verse (we call it so out of courtesy).

LITTLE MISS TROT.—For your first question, see “May Blossom.” 4 feet 10 inches is short for a girl nearly sixteen, and a girl of nearly sixteen is too young to give her mind up to a sweetheart. Do not wear a chignon—it is ugly. Always practise an hour a day for three months, but not on lined paper, and your writing would very much improve.

GEORGE B. wishes to know if it is wrong to make a fool of two girls, by meeting one after the other on the sly. Our opinion is, that George B. ought to be followed up by a brother of one of the young ladies and soundly horsewhipped—that, perhaps, would put a little more good sense and good feeling in him than he displays in his letter. We regret to have to say this, George B., but you merit it.

LITTLE MINNIE should not fret herself about being ugly. Leave others to judge of that, as they will judge you fairly—“handsome is as handsome does” you know is frequently said. You will find some one some day who will think you the prettiest creature in the world. Beautiful girls are not the soonest loved or the soonest married. You are not very tall for your age. Choose dark or rather quiet colours, and dress neatly. Your letter is a nice little one for your age; we like its simplicity and its truth.

A LIFE ON THE OCEAN WAVE.—Do choose a shorter signature. The receipt you want shall be given shortly in the domestic column. Dress your hair according to your own good taste, and you are sure to like it. You have, in admiration of the services of the Editress, sent your love and kisses for her. We will give the lady your letter with pleasure.

The editor informs one of his fair friends that the lines she has forwarded him “would go very well in an album, but are not quite the thing for print;” but the lines he does print are just such verses. Of course the *Young Ladies of Great Britain* contains fashions and recipes. Of course, also, its tales are all about love and marriage. One of these, however, “Sweetbriar,” is written with more incisiveness

* We are afraid that the Editor of *F. L. O. G. B.* does not read his Bible.

than might have been expected from its sentimental title—though, after all, sweetbriar is prickly. Some of the hits are made by picked-up arrows that have been fired before, but still the following is not bad:—

When Maurice Rayne and Nelly left the beach at Westling, he took her to the railway-station direct, and engaged a reserved compartment for her and himself. He took a reserved compartment because he did not want her to be recognised by any friend or acquaintance, who might have shared the carriage had he travelled in the ordinary way; and he did not want strangers to gaze upon the beautiful child, who was his own sole treasure now.

It had been the dream of his life to have some such love as this.

To the domestic life he had seen at Chilpert-street Maurice owed much that was faulty in the bent of his mind. Marriage, as far as he had seen, made man a labourer, no matter what his work might be—in literature, in painting, in music, in the drama, in the sciences—there was always a ceaseless pressure on the married worker—a state of need that made money the one dominant thought—destroyed the charm of painting, writing, playing, or acting; for pure love of either made work a matter of pounds and pence and shillings, and so drove the beauty out, making noble toil mercenary.

"Those dull, leaden fetters never shall be mine," Maurice had resolved even in his early youth. The love that was to give him gentle companionship must not be a condition of bondage. Pure as the worship of saints he would have it, but untrammelled by worldly considerations. "If ever I were to tell a girl that I loved her," he had said to Slater, "and she referred me to her father in the usual way, I should fly as if from the enemy. What a death-blow to passionate idealism to have to hold a consultation with the paternal relative as to your ability to support the idol of your heart and contingencies.

"But, for the good of society, such questions must be answered, and satisfactorily," Slater had replied. "You are just at the age, Maurice, when one likes to set up for singularity, defying society and all its works. You would alter the course of the world, if you could upset the good old safe conventional, and institute laws to suit yourself, subject to as many changes as might be desirable, from your own point of view, when you desired a change."

"Not quite so far as that, Uncle Phil."

"Pooh! that is what you mean—it is what every man, or every boy, means at some period of his youth. I see no reason why genius, which is the very essence of common sense, should not be mixed with just sufficient of the common common sense to make men of genius respectable; and they are only disreputable in one thing as a rule. They neither steal, nor commit arson, forgery, or murder: but they deem it no crime to run away with a neighbour's wife, and neglect their own. They call it warring with society; I call it a cowardly and selfish war with women."

"But," Maurice had urged, "if men of genius were like other men, they would not be men of genius."

"If donkeys were like other quadrupeds, they would not eat thistles. That is fairly as deductive as yours, Master Morry. I say it is a pity and a shame that these men, who are worshipped now, and will be worshipped through distant ages, have died with that one blot upon their names, that one sad record—a woman's broken heart on their gravestone. Look at Napoleon—the gentle woman that he put away, by divorce, for ambition's sake; Byron—his daring, sardonic, open shamelessness; Shelley—who went as far; Swift—who was worse than either, for he was mean and cruel; Sterne—who left his wife to pine and his mother to starve, while he went weeping over dead donkeys, and making a sentimental noodle of himself to pretty grisettes. This is the strong social point of your men of genius, my boy; and I am sorry to say, it is the only point the young men of our generation are desirous or capable of emulating."

Our copy of the *Ferret* is "No. 5 (No. 3 New Series)." The short-lived old series, we believe, attracted the attention of the police. This specimen of the new series is, for the most part, dull as ditch-water, but under the head of "The *Ferret* would advise," it gives two columns of vulgarest spite and prurience, supplied by its choice correspondents. A very little of this nasty drivel will serve our purpose.

THE FERRET WOULD ADVISE

Sam K—t—l—e not to hug the bar so much at the Long Dog, not far from Peckham, but to pay more attention to the fruiterer's daughter at Camberwell-green, or the FERRET will speak again.

G. A—s—n, of Bow, to patronize some respectable barber in his neighbourhood, and wear high-heeled boots the next time he takes a tall young lady under the mistletoe. You know who we mean, George.

E—, the chairwoman, not to be looking so much out of the windows of a public house not a hundred miles from Newcastle-street, after W— P—; it would be much better for her to attend to her domestic work, as W—'s wife has got sharp eyes.

Dumpling Polly, not many miles from Globe Fields, not to go round the dark so often with Harry. Ferret knows her little game, and will acquaint her sweet tempered papa unless she is more careful of herself.

D—k, the would be swell, not to be seen hanging about the Westminster road so late at night,—he is thin enough already, and if he continues his present mode of life, will soon be invisible. Be careful for the future, old boy, for Ferret has his eye on you. How about the red-cloak girl and the dog?

M. D—n—l, who does not live a hundred miles from Notting Hill, not to be seen so much in the neighbourhood of a certain Miss T—tt, close to St. John's square, for Ferret has his eye on him.

Old Mother, L—, living not many miles from Delamere Crescent, not to prate about what she is ignorant of, as "Ferret" is quite sure she has got hold of the dirty end of the stick. He don't wonder at your husband being jealous; but he wishes to say he has given you but a short notice, this time, and should it occur again, he will disclose something which would be very backward in coming forward.

Geo. C—, alias fop, the gorilla-backed imp of ugliness, not to go flashing his half-washed-out Sunday suit that he got on tick in the lane, but to go and pay the second-hand clothes dealer for them; also not to be always hopping about with flash girls at the Grecian, as your wages are not more than 10s. a-week.

The "loudly" illustrated, "loudly" written *Young Gentlemen of Britain*, *The Gentlemen's Journal*, *Boys of England*, *The Young Men of Great Britain*, *The Young Briton*, and *The Sons of Britannia*, are specially written for boys, and no doubt boys read them; but what kind of boys can they be? We have been led to believe that the "rising generation" is a far 'cuter generation than it was when we were part of it; but in our young days boys would not have stood such stuff as the stories in these periodicals. We liked narratives of adventure, well and racily told; but if we may judge from the periodicals we have named, the boys of the present day relish utterly absurd narratives, in shambling English, about tamed tigers, young heroes swimming up to revolving mill wheels in order that they may be raised to the rescue of their beloveds, and so on, and so on.

The young gentlemen, like the young ladies, of England ask their editors to pronounce judgment on their personal appearance, generally in the matter of size, and also on their handwriting. The boys' editors' answers are not quite so complimentary as the girls' editors. The boys' editors, however, are very polite to correspondents who flatter their periodicals:—

G. CARR (Birmingham).—We are rejoiced to hear that our magnificent plate of the bull-fighters met with such unqualified approval, and we are also pleased to hear of your resolve to subscribe to the *SONS OF BRITANNIA* while it is in existence. We give you warning that this will be for many years to come, although we do not doubt, judging by the tone of your letter, that the promise will be kept.

A SCORCH SON says: "We gave him a prodigy of literature some time ago in the form of 'The Young Briton,' and now we have heaped favours on his head by the issue

of the SONS OF BRITANNIA." A thousand thanks to the Son of Scotland for his amiable recognition of our labours.

PASHLEY CRANE.—You have done a very generous act on our behalf by sending copies of our journal to your firesides in remote parts of the country, and we heartily thank you. "Rapier Jack" is already recognised as one of Mr. Steven's best, and he has written many excellent stories, and we are certain it will be deemed by all the best ere a month has passed. "Dick Whittington," in "The Young Briton," is also a general favourite.

The Wonder-Book is a quaint-looking, *Chambers's Miscellany*-like little publication, with an illustration of a bear up a tree, bayed at by four wolfish dogs, and aimed at by a backwoodsman, who seems to be anxiously meditating how he can fire between the bear's legs without hurting it. There is nothing very wonderful in the *Wonder-Book*, since it confines itself to things that have, or are supposed to have, happened in reality. Were it not for a biography of "Claude Duval, the Pink of Highwaymen," the youthful purchasers of the *Wonder-Book* might, perhaps, vote it "slow."

The Novel Reader, No. 26, and *Lea's Pocket Novels*, No. 12 (thirty-two close-printed little pages for a penny), give complete narratives of adventures with those wearisome North American Indians, whom English novel-readers, we should think, must be quite as sick of as Generals Sherman and Sheridan are.

We come lastly upon a spawn of numbers of serial novels, each trusting solely to its own attractiveness, in spite of its incompleteness, to find purchasers, some beginning in the middle of a sentence—e.g., "trouble on my account! and it was with infinite difficulty that Augustus could so far control his feelings," &c. Is not that intensely interesting to a purchaser who has not been a "subscriber from the beginning?" The titles of these serials are—*The Boys of Bircham School*; *Giles Evergreen*; *The Rival Apprentices*; *Alone in the Pirates' Lair*; *Tyburn Dick*; *The Boy King of the Highwaymen*; *Canonbury House*; *The Student Cavalier*; *Robin Hood*; *My Adventures among the Prairie Indians* (those Indians again!); *The Count of Monte Christo*; *The Gipsy Boy*; *The Knight of the Road*; *Roving Jack, the Pirate Hunter*; *The Skeleton Horseman, or the Shadow of Death*; and the *Wild Boys of London, or the Children of Night*. The author of *Monte Christo* would scarcely feel proud if he knew the company into which he has been thrust by his latest English publisher, and the guise in which he is presented to the juvenile public of Great Britain. The paper, print, and pictures of these serials leave, to use a mild phrase, much to be desired. Two of them have coloured illustrations, grimly grotesque daubs. The cuts, however, are sometimes in their way ingenious. The author of *The Wild Boys of London*, having been prevented by printers' exigencies from finishing off his last instalment with a tantalizingly startling situation, has persuaded his illustrator, or perhaps the publisher should be credited

with the adroitness, to head the instalment before us with a cut representing a scared man in night-cap and night-gown, bound in a chair, at whose head one villanous-looking fellow in a costermonger's cap presents a pistol, whilst another rascal in a black-banded white hat, gloats in a ghastly open-mouthed fashion over a corpulent bag of gold he has taken out of a box. "The Burglary (see next number)" is the explanation appended to this work of art.

Sensational art, however, attains its climax in the coloured illustrations of "Roving Jack." On the first page Jack is lying in the "Death Hole" in the midst of chained, grinning skeletons—some with rags of red and yellow raiment still clinging to them. A man-of-warsman, with a cutlass in his mouth, and a torch in one hand, lowers himself down a rope by the other to the rescue. But even this impressive *tableau* appears tame when you turn to the double-page illustration of "Roving Jack's Attack on the Phantom Captain in the Witch's Cave." Roving Jack, a juvenile cross between a stage smuggler and a stage foreign peasant, is coming down the witch's cave's rough staircase, at the head of his youthful companions, with his sword in his left hand. He looks horrified, and well he may. The witch, in crimson poncho and somewhat fashionably-cut green dress, has a monstrosously bloated toad squatting beside her train. A viper writhes round the pitchfork she brandishes in her right hand, another sits upon her shoulder, a third twines round the chain of the cauldron she is adjusting over a roaring fire, whose flames are rushing towards the opening which ventilates the cave. A bat, about the size of a crow, is hovering in the lilac smoke. Beneath a beam, round which a long green snake is twisted, stands the Phantom Captain, with a death's-head and a cross-bones embroidered on the undertaker's cloak, which hides half of his red kilt and one of his jack-boots. Near him sits, with his red nightcapped head between his hands, and his elbows on his knees, a grown-up stage smuggler, grinning in envious rivalry at a skull, through one of whose eye-sockets his twisted rapier is thrust. Between the smuggler and the skull, with her feet in the fire, lies a plump young woman, pinioned down to the ground by a dagger stuck through her right arm. We have inventoried the illustration before reading the text, which we supposed it illustrated. Turning to the letterpress we cannot find any such text. Here, however, is a specimen of the intellectual food supplied in "Roving Jack":—

Oh! the unutterable horror and despair of that awakening in the pit of death and darkness.

The rude shock of his fall roused our hero from his state of insensibility.

He lifted his head. He felt blinded, racked with agonizing pain, sick, giddy, faint, bewildered, half-suffocated with that awful stench of corruption.

He was alone in the deep darkness, but where?

He knew not; his mind was a glass darkened and shattered.

He must shake off the wretched incubus that lies like a ton of lead upon his breast; he must awake—awake to the cheerful light; start from his hell-charmed slumber; break through the hag-spell that enthrals his soul with such dark and loathsome conceits.

The boy uttered a wild cry; the echoes laughed like mocking demons.

He raised his hands.

The hard steel clinked, and he found his wrists locked together, and his feet bound!

A twinge of exquisite pain shot through his aching head, and the veins of his brow seemed to swell to bursting.

He felt a clammy, warm trickling down his face.

It was a stream of blood!

By slow and painful degrees he collected his thoughts, and recalled all the dread incidents of that eventful night.

The savage face of the miscreant thief-taker seemed scowling upon him.

This fancy nerved the fierce heart of the fiery young hero to a pitch of desperate anger.

"No, you villain!" shouted Roving Jack, shaking his fettered hands through the darkness as if his enemy was actually before him, "you shall never, never conquer me! Oh, if I had you alone, armed to the teeth as you are, with just my father's pure sword in my hand!"

Jack gnashed his teeth with rage.

"I suppose I must die here," he sighed, bitterly. "That is hard, too—so young! To leave no name behind me! all my bright gleams of glory to perish so soon and miserably! And mother!"

Jack burst into tears.

"And—and Violet, who loves me so dearly; but there—there, I must not think of them, I cannot bear it!"

Jack dried his eyes and rested his head against the cold, dank wall.

He fixed his thoughts steadily upon holy things, and murmured a prayer.

Jack turned over upon his side, and managed to writhe along for a yard or two. He stretched out his arms.

"Ugh!" gasped Jack, recoiling with a violent shudder. "It is—a skeleton!"

He shook convulsively, and it was a long time before he could control his excited feelings.

"Oh! for one ray of blessed light!" he cried fervently.

Crawling about he laid his hands more than once on round hard skulls, and sharp fleshless bones.

He uttered a fearful cry, his brow exuded a cold clammy sweat, his limbs quivered like reeds in the wind, his lips became parched, his hair roused, and he felt as if he were losing his senses.

He threw himself down against the wall, and buried his face in his hands, crushed by despair and dismay.

At last he roused himself from his stupor, and glared wildly around him.

The stench grew more and more oppressive and the darkness was intense.

All at once there arose from the floor at some distance from him a greenish lambent flame that flickered faintly, and threw a ghastly light upon the awful scene.

Transfixed with awe, our hero glanced around.

The place was a very charnel of dead bones.

But whence that spectral light illumining the ghastly scene? *

It lapped along the floor, and in its fantastic waverings resembled the flare of ignited ether.

At last it settled at the feet of a lank and hideously-grinning skeleton propped against the opposite wall. Then it spread about the dread relict of miserable humanity, and flared upwards in an unconsuming blaze, playing round the smooth bare skull and creeping into the hollow eye-sockets.

Presently he was startled by a *quick stealthy rustling*.

RATS!

Tumbling and squeaking among the rattling bones, a legion of these detestable vermin surged round him.

* It is a well-known fact that dead bodies in advanced stages of decomposition emit certain foul gases, which occasionally appear in a state of combustion, flickering round the corpse in a faint blue flame. This natural phenomenon will account for many of the strange tales told of "corpse candles" and "death lights" seen glimmering around graves in old and dank churchyards. A similar luminate gas is engendered by miry swamps and marshy fens, and is often described by the belated traveller dancing before him on his dark path as if luring him to follow, and which is considered by some superstitious country folk to be a certain tricky fire-sprite, called "Will-o'-the-Wisp," or "Jack-o'-Lantern."

One darted right across his face, inflicting a sharp bite upon his cheek. Jack shrieked and staggered on to his feet, supporting himself against the wall. Goaded to a pitch of madness, he snatched up a skull, and sent it clattering along the ground.

Squeak, squeak ! and a terrific scampering.

Jack hurled another skull, and another, and another, till he sank with exhaustion.

He fainted.

His mind wandered, and he feebly muttered his incoherent prayers.

Now, the darkness seems peopled with dusky, yet visible forms, shapeless, yet living ; they surrounded him, and seemed to gloat over his dying agonies.

"Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha-a !" the cavern resounds with demoniac laughter.

"Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha-a !" roar the echoes.

A mystic blue light dawns in the place.

The skeletons move!

They rear themselves on their gaunt shanks, and clack their bony hands together.

"I am mad, mad !" gasps Jack ; "oh, horror, horror !"

Now they whirl round him faster and faster and faster, till he becomes dizzy.

One of them is taller than the rest, and seems to be their leader.

He is mantled in a heavy, black velvet pall, fringed with white lawn.

He pauses in the dance, and, approaching the captive, seems to proffer him assistance.

Jack holds out his chained wrists.

The spectre touches them with the hard tip of his bony finger, and an electric thrill darts through the captive's shrinking veins.

The steel manacles are shattered, and clash to the ground like broken glass.

Jack shouts in mad triumph, and then points to his scorching lips, and sues for drink.

The spectre presents a skull into which he has poured some ruby liquid.

Jack takes a greedy draught.

Then, with a horrible scream, he dashes the ghastly chalice to his feet.

His face and hands are smeared with—blood.

"Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha-a !" yell the death spectres, and away they go round again, whirling dizzily, dizzily, dizzily, nimbly, nimbly, tossing up their jointed limbs, and nodding their faceless heads.

A delightful sensation of languid repose now overpowers the captive, and he stretches himself on the ground.

But what strange spell is on him ?

Now there is a deep hush ; the skeletons depart and he is left alone.

After awhile they return and swathe the living corpse in the garments of the grave and place it upon the bier.

Boom !

The hollow echoes respond solemnly.

Boom, boom !

The passing knell of the living dead !

The bier is raised on the clacking shoulders of the ribbed spectres.

Boom ! boom !

The cavern rings with a grand organ peal—the dirge of the dead alive !

Boom !

The funeral procession is formed ; some of the grizzly skeletons march before, and they scatter fresh flowers that wither to dust ere they reach the ground.

Others of the spectres follow.

The black-mantled leader acts as chief mourner.

Still the enchanted retains perfect consciousness.

A dark grave yawns beneath him.

He is lowered amid the hollow moanings of the skeleton mourners.

Cooped in his narrow cell, still conscious, but dumb and impotent to stir a muscle, the living dead glares up at the black cloud that is descending upon him.

It is the pall !

He feels the mazy velvet folds wrap round his spell-bound limbs, he hears the last grand chorus of the requiem dying away ;—then

DARKNESS ! OBLIVION !

This perhaps is an extreme instance of the rubbish that may be found in "our very cheap literature ;" but, looking back even upon the best portions of the periodicals we have waded through, we cannot help asking ourselves what good can they do to anybody ? Is it worth while to agitate for compulsory education, if, when people

have learnt to read, they will content themselves with such poor innutritious stuff? We take comfort in the conviction that they will not be content, and that they are only content now, because there is nothing better, of the very cheap kind, within their reach. There are few questions more important than those which concern the relaxation, the amusement, and true enjoyment of the people. The bow cannot always stand bent, nor can human frailty subsist without some lawful recreations—such as only require to be kept within due bounds, and be turned upon innocent and beneficial objects, to become springs of happiness. Of all the amusements which can possibly be imagined for the working man (we are now speaking upon the authority and using, pretty much, the words of Sir John Herschel), there is nothing like reading, supposing him to have a taste for it, and supposing him to have the right thing to read. It calls for no bodily exertion, of which he has had enough or too much. It relieves his home of its dulness or sameness, which, in nine cases out of ten, is what drives him to the ale-house, to his own ruin and his family's. It transports him into a livelier, and gayer, and more diversified and interesting scene; and, while he enjoys himself there, he may forget the evils of the present moment, fully as much as if he were ever so drunk, with the great advantage of finding himself the next day with his money in his pocket, or at least laid out in real necessities and comforts for himself and his family,—and without a headache. Nay, it accompanies him to his next day's work, and if what he has been reading be anything above the very idlest and lightest, gives him something to think of besides the mere mechanical drudgery of his everyday occupation—something he can enjoy while absent, and look forward to with pleasure. But supposing him to have been fortunate in the choice of his reading, what a source of domestic enjoyment is laid open! what a bond of family union! He may read the book or magazine aloud or make his wife read it, or his eldest boy or girl, or pass it round from hand to hand. All have the benefit of it—all contribute to the gratification of the rest, and a feeling of common interest and pleasure is excited. Nothing unites people like companionship in intellectual enjoyment. It does more, it gives them mutual respect, and to each among them self-respect—that corner-stone of all virtue. It furnishes to each the master-key by which he may avail himself of his privilege as an intellectual being to

"Enter the sacred temple of his breast,
And gaze and wander there a ravished guest;
Wander through all the glories of his mind,
Gaze upon all the treasures he shall find."

And while thus leading him to look within his own bosom for the ultimate source of his happiness, warns him at the same time to be

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cautious how he defiles and desecrates that inward and most glorious of temples. If, then, we would generate a taste for reading, we must, as our only chance of success, begin by pleasing. And, what is more, this must be not only the ostensible, but the real object of the works we offer. Furnish the people liberally with literature—not written expressly for them as a class, but for all alike—and that the best of its kind. We shall soon find that they have the same feelings to be interested by the varieties of fortune and incident—the same discernment to perceive the shades of character—the same relish for striking contrasts of good and evil in moral conduct, and the same irresistible propensity to take the good side—the same perception of the sublime and beautiful in nature and art, when distinctly placed before them by the touches of a master—and, what is most of all to the purpose, the same desire, having once been pleased, to be pleased again. In short, we shall find that in the writings of our best authors we possess all we require to strike our grappling-iron into the working people's souls, and chain them, willing followers, to the car of advancing civilization.

Whenever these grand suggestions of Sir John Herschel's are acted upon,—and no publisher could enter on a more glorious work,—the new state of things will be so much better than the old, that we must all be surprised it was not done before.

ALEXANDER STRAHAN.



CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

I.—THEOLOGICAL.

Biblical Studies. By E. H. PLUMPTRE, M.A. London: Strahan & Co.

PROF. PLUMPTRE'S "*Biblical Studies*" is a collection of papers which have for the most part already appeared in *Good Words* or the *Sunday Magazine*. Thirteen of them belong to the Old Testament, and seven to the New. They are on such subjects as are at once interesting to the Biblical scholar and the ordinary reader. Mr. Plumptre combines two things which are rarely found together—an extensive knowledge of Biblical criticism and an interesting style. He tells us all about his subject that is known, for he has examined it in all its bearings, and then he tells it with the grace and ease of a popular writer. The book is not argumentative, but there are arguments underlying every paper. In the first, which is on the name or title of God, "The Lord of Sabaoth," he remarks the absence of the name from the Pentateuch and the books of Joshua and Judges. A common argument for the late origin of the Pentateuch is the presence of the name Jehovah, which was not in use till the time of Samuel. But here we have a fact quite as significant on the other side, that the title "Lord of Sabaoth" is not found in the Pentateuch, Joshua, and Judges, yet it was in current use in the days of Samuel, and is often on the lips of the psalmists that had been trained in the schools of the prophets established by Samuel. But this is only by the way; the subject presents for discussion the history of the title, the meaning of *hosts*, whether the hosts of the stars or the armies of Israel which were led by Jehovah. Its connection with the hosts of heaven opens the questions of Sabeian worship, and the monotheism of the Jews which rises above the hosts of heaven to the Lord of Sabaoth, the Maker and Ruler of the heavenly hosts. It was a natural transition from the hosts of armies on earth to the hosts of stars or hosts of angels in the immediate presence of God. There is a criticism which we should have liked Mr. Plumptre to have noticed. German scholars find in this expression the idea of plurality in the Godhead, Jehovah is not, they say, in the construct state, so that the translation should be in apposition Jehovah, the Hosts. If this is not a mere nicety of the grammarians, it would mark a stage in the history of monotheism. The titles of some of the other papers are "The Most High God," "The Tree of Life," "The Old Age of Isaiah," "The Last of the Prophets," and "The Old Age of St. Peter." Professor Plumptre's volume should be in the library of every student of the Bible.

The Book of Psalms. A New Translation. With Introductions and Notes, Explanatory and Critical. By J. J. STEWART PEROWSE, B.D. Vol. I. Second Edition Revised. London: Bell & Daldy.

MR. PEROWSE'S work on the Book of Psalms is acknowledged to be the standard English work on that subject. It was high time that we had a critical and sensible interpretation of the Book of Psalms. Their value for purposes of worship and for the expression of devotional feelings has been felt by the Church ever since they were first chanted in the great temple on Mount Zion. But the uses to which they have been applied by Fathers and schoolmen have brought great confusion into theology. The old Puritans, in imitation of the Fathers, found Christ in every verse. The High Church divines of Laud's day found the King of England spoken of in every expression that referred to the greatness and glory of David or Solomon. Even now we sometimes hear it said in pulpits of the Church of England, that the "Table in the midst of mine enemies" is the "Eucharistic feast," and that it is prepared in the presence of our ghostly foes. Sound criticism will deprive preachers of many arguments usually derived from the Book of Psalms; but the gain, in the end, will be far greater than the loss. Mr. Perowne's work is the work of a thorough scholar, and one not afraid to face the truth. In this edition he has taken advantage of the criticisms made on the first edition; correcting some errors that had formerly escaped him, and keeping as near as possible to the authorized version.

Commentary on the Gospel according to Matthew. By JAMES MORRISON, D.D. London: Hamilton, Adams, & Co.

WHEN we saw this immense volume, over 700 pages, devoted to the exposition of the brief evangel of Matthew, we were reminded of a prayer which occurs somewhere in the Old Testament, "Let me fall into the hands of God, and not into the hands of man." No doubt the few words of St. Matthew are of infinitely more value than the many words of Dr. Morrison; but it is true that many of St. Matthew's words require exposition, and we have found Dr. Morrison a very able commentator. He has a sound judgment, great capacity for criticism, and immense industry. He seems to have read everything that has been written on Matthew's Gospel, and to have entered into every controversy on every disputed question. We do not profess to agree with him on all points, but it is something to have such a world of information on one subject in one volume. We need not say that Dr. Morrison is orthodox; that he vindicates the apostolicity, originality, and authenticity of St. Matthew's Gospel against all destructive critics, from Matthew Tindal and the German Rationalists down to Dr. Davidson. We read the announcement of a Commentary on St. Mark, and hope that Dr. Morrison may be able to complete the New Testament, and to expound every book as well as he has done the Gospel of St. Matthew.

Judged by His Words. An Attempt to weigh a certain Kind of Evidence respecting Christ. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

THE words of Jesus are the life of Christianity. Even should all other evidence of its Divine origin fail, we have still the words of Jesus. They have been a power in the world. On them the Christian religion rests. Christ Himself laid down the principle that a man was to be judged by his words. The author of this work, with the conviction that Christianity has existed in the world in virtue of the spiritual power of Christ's words, examines these words from the beginning to the end of the life of Jesus. He does not expect to be able to reconcile the statements of the four Evangelists. He does not think it likely that any four writers writing a history of the same things would, without complicity, have no discrepancies in their narratives. The question, then, is to be discussed without reference to "harmonies." The argument is very good of its kind, and the author seems to remember that it has limits. Christ's words prove that He possessed certain qualities. It is also evident that He put forth very extraordinary claims. These must be taken together, for unless we admit His claims His words would be discordant. There is a long appendix, the author says, devoted entirely to an examination of Dr. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament. The author answers Dr. Davidson, as many of our Biblical critics ought to be answered, by showing that one conjecture is quite as good as another.

The Resurrection. Twelve Expository Essays on the Fifteenth Chapter of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians. By SAMUEL COX. London: Strahan & Co.

WE have often questioned the wisdom of reading this chapter as part of the Burial Service, not because of insensibility to its marvellous beauty or its fitness for the occasion, but because so few people understand it. The argument is digressive, and passes, after the fashion of St. Paul's arguments, by a sudden transition, from one kind of illustration to another. Great attention is necessary to discover the connection of the different parts, and this cannot be expected from those who are mourning for the dead. The very first sentences have to be explained; but, as Mr. Cox truly remarks, the commentators can scarcely be satisfied with their own explanations. The Apostle says, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." If all have died in Adam, in what sense are "all" made alive in Christ? Can any kind of fair reasoning make the latter "all" less than co-extensive with the first "all"? Then how is it that all are made alive? Some say Christ's death was sufficient for all, some that He wills all to be saved, and some that He really died for all. But none of these answers meet the exigencies of the Apostle's argument. He describes the order: Christ is the first fruits, then they that are Christ's, and then cometh the end, when every enemy is to be subdued, and God is to be "all in all"—literally, "all things in all things." The Greek is *ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι*—as Dean Stanley remarks, the very words out of which we form *Pantheism*. Mr. Cox quotes Origen, who gives it as his opinion that the Apostle meant that God was to be "all in each individual person." Then we have the difficulty of baptism for the dead, which cannot to an ordinary reader mean anything, but which evokes stores of learning from the ingenious commentator. The illustration from the different kinds of bodies is beautiful in the light of science and to those who can reason about spirit and matter; but it is so little understood, that we often hear the passage about the stars differing in glory quoted to prove different degrees of enjoyment in heaven. Then we have the clear words, "We shall not all sleep," plainly meaning that St. Paul expected to live till the second advent. This is admitted, not only by the Dean of Westminster, but by the Dean of Canterbury. In the end of the chapter St. Paul says, "The sting of death is sin," which is very intelligible in the prospect of deliverance; but he adds, what seems to have nothing to do with the argument, "The strength of sin is the law." Dean Stanley illustrates this by a number of cases where St. Paul abruptly turns aside to some of his favourite topics. But St. Paul seems to be applying here his favourite antithesis of the law and deliverance from it by Christ. The chapter is full of difficulties, but so rich in meaning that no labour can be too great to bestow upon it. Mr. Cox has written a charming book. His language is clear and elegant, and he has not hesitated to borrow the best things that have been said on the subject by other writers, specially acknowledging his obligations to Stanley, Robertson, and Rückert.

The Complete Works of W. E. Channing, D.D. With an Introduction. A New Edition Rearranged. London: George Routledge and Sons.

THIS edition of Channing is published at the marvellously small price of three shillings and sixpence. Our memory of Channing dates from our earliest capacity to appreciate the beauty of the English language. Apart from his elegant writing, the great charm of Channing's works is the overflowing goodness of the man. He had piety, patriotism, and a pure love of truth. He was one of those truly great men who have written themselves in their works. If we wanted to elevate men by means of books, we should certainly prescribe as the first book to be read the complete works of William Ellery Channing.

Ante-Nicene Christian Library. Vol. XV.—"The Writings of Tertullian," Vol. II. Translated by PETER HOLMES, D.D., F.R.A.S. Vol. XVI.—"Apocryphal Gospels, Acts, and Revelations." Translated by ALEXANDER WALKER, Esq. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

OF the many valuable series of works that have been published by Messrs. Clark there is none which in importance is to be compared with that of the "Ante-Nicene Christian Library." It is simply impossible for more than one in a thousand, even of the best educated ministers of religion, to find time to

read all the Fathers in the original languages, and it is surely better that they should be read in English than not read at all. Whatever estimate we may set on these early writings there can be no question of the necessity of being familiar with them in order to forming a correct judgment of the history of Christianity and of Church dogmas. A large party of the clergy in the Church of England appeal to the Fathers as authorities, and it is very desirable that they should know something of the authorities to which they appeal. It is also desirable that those who do not take the Fathers as authorities should know from personal reading what is the real worth of their writings. The intrinsic value of the two volumes before us is not great, but their historical interest is considerable. Tertullian was not a teacher whose doctrines or arguments we should care to adopt. He was a rhetorician rather than a logician. He fell into the heresy of the Montanists, and it is a question not decided if he ever renounced that heresy. But when we come to the historical interest we see how the Christian Fathers understood Christianity, and how they defended it against the Pagans. Tertullian was the earliest writer of the North African Church. He influenced St. Cyprian, Cyprian influenced Augustine, and Augustine influenced the whole Latin Church. Dr. Holmes has performed his task with great care—a task which could not have been an easy one, because of Tertullian's barbarous Punic Latin. The value of the apocryphal writings we cannot express better than in Mr. Walker's own words:—

"While these documents are of considerable interest and value, as giving evidence of a wide-spread feeling in early times of the importance of the events which form the basis of our belief, and as affording us curious glimpses of the state of the Christian conscience and of modes of Christian thought, in the first centuries of our era, the predominant impressions which they leave on our minds is a profound sense of the immeasurable superiority, the unapproachable simplicity of the Canonical writings."

Foreign Theological Library. Fourth Series. Vol. XXV.—Keil's "Introduction to the Old Testament," Vol. II. Translated by GEORGE C. M. DOUGLAS, D.D. Vol. XXVI.—Bleek's "Introduction to the New Testament," Vol. II. Translated by the Rev. WILLIAM URWICK, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

BOTH these works are well-known as the works of eminent German scholars of the orthodox school. They resemble each other in character and in the mode of their execution. What Keil does for the Old Testament, Bleek does for the New. The volumes abound with information on the history of the books of Scripture, the languages in which they are written, the different translations, different MSS., and all matters that concern Biblical literature and criticism. Professor Douglas has added to Keil supplementary notes, gleaned from other writers, which greatly enhance the value of the work.

Sermons. By HENRY WARD BEECHER, Plymouth Church, Brooklyn. Selected from Published and Unpublished Discourses. London: Sampson, Low & Co.

SOME people would perhaps say that the key-note to this volume is well, though half unconsciously, struck in the first sermon. It is a sermon of ministerial experience, and was delivered on the thirteenth anniversary of Mr. Beecher's ministry at Brooklyn. Inevitably it is pervaded by egotism; but the egotism is of quite a peculiar flavour. Magnets, we are told, lose their attractive power when raised to a red-heat, and this may account for the failure of some men of rare gifts—men of large imaginative force and fine sympathy, as pulpit orators. Edward Irving, for instance, lost his attractive power as he became more and more completely possessed by his later ideas, yet the capability of being so completely possessed by them was present in him from the first, and indeed gave him his distinguished power. But Mr. Beecher disperses his heat and his light skilfully round his subject, never concentrates it so intensely on any one point as to become himself rapt and lost in the view of it. A kind of well-distributed self-consciousness rules throughout—never permitting him to rise into poetry, never permitting him to descend into bathos. The sermons tend to resolve themselves into a series of pictures, each with its own proper centre, though sometimes only with what seems a vague relation to the rest. There is a sparkling brilliancy, a sort of panoramic equality and steadiness; the ideas follow at settled pace, and though one may affect the

hearer more than another, the preacher seems to lay equal value on each. This effect may be in some measure due to his mode of composition, which we are told is this: Mr. Beecher notes down the main heads of his discourses and trusts to the impulse of the moment for illustration, sometimes drawing upon what has just before passed under his eye. Occasionally this issues in quaint surprises; occasionally, too, in familiarities tending to something worse. But self-composed strength is everywhere present. Doubtless those sermons which owe more to immediate and temporary influences would be most effective in delivery; but certainly those read best which owe least to it. The sermon on "The Blind Restored to Sight," is really a masterpiece of its kind, having more unity and relation of parts than many of the others. The best specimen of the other class in the volume, the most chastened and sustained, we think, is that on "The Lilies of the Field: a Study of Spring for the Careworn." It is simple, spontaneous, easy, yet full of the spirit of the spring. Mr. Beecher had evidently come from his farm to his pulpit that day with a real, although a mild, inspiration. Indeed, it would appear from the general tone of these sermons that Mr. Beecher is more indebted to outside life than to suggestions which come in solitude, though he needs them too. But he is as much a man of the world as a student, and, knowing the American character, seeks to express, and to guide it by expressing it. In the sermon on "Christian Waiting"—a sermon characterized by exquisite phrasing and inimitably felicitous illustrations—we have many instances of this descent from principles to local and temporary circumstances, which are now and then dwelt on with what looks to an English reader like an undue familiarity. Turning suddenly to address the negroes, Mr. Beecher says in this sermon:—

"I have a word for my coloured friends that are present. You certainly have learned to wait. God forbid that I should say a word to inspire in you vanity, pride, or any evil feeling. The devil will not fail to tempt you in a great many ways. You ought to be most watchful. You have an enemy that is like a roaring lion, going about seeking whom he may devour, but you need not fear him. *It is not many men that lions catch. Your most dangerous enemies are like serpents in the grass.*"

To a staid Englishman, it seems not seldom that disparate things are thus brought into too sharp and distinct association; but not the less the presence of a genuine eloquence must be recognised here and a strikingly ready power of mind and fancy, though the sermons aim more at present effect than at classical completeness.

II.—HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

Ecclesiastical History of England. The Church of the Restoration. Two volumes. By JOHN STOUGHTON, D.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

THESE two volumes are the continuation of Dr. Stoughton's "Ecclesiastical History." The two former volumes treated of "The Church of the Civil Wars" and "The Church of the Commonwealth." The author starts now with the Protectorate of Richard Cromwell, and ends, we may say, about the Revolution. During this era, Church and State were so closely allied, that the history of the one is to a great extent the history of the other; Church questions were connected with the restoration of Charles II., as they had been with the execution of Charles I. It was a Church question which expelled James II. and brought in the Prince of Orange. With the restoration of Charles II. came the restoration of the bishops. Then followed the ejection of the Nonconformists, with their sufferings and trials, down to the expulsion of the Stuarts and the era of toleration. Dr. Stoughton has bestowed great labour on his work. He has consulted many original documents, and he has written with an impartiality not common to Church historians. He tells us that it is now twenty-five years since he formed the plan of writing the Church history of England. He has taken up the subject out of pure love to it, and his object seems to be to state facts rather than to make inferences. On the great ecclesiastical event of that era, the ejection of the 2,000 ministers, there can be no difference of opinion among impartial men. The Presbyterians, during the Long Parliament, had shown but little mercy to the bishops and

their supporters, and now the bishops were not disposed to show mercy to them. The case of the Presbyterians was certainly a hard one, as they really had been the means of bringing back the king. Yet every one who reads the history of the Savoy Conference must see that if the Presbyterians had possessed a tithe of the shrewd common sense that fell to the lot of the bishops, they would have got nearly all they asked. If we were to find fault with these volumes, it would be on account of their size. In our judgment, the author has not learned what Dryden calls "the art to blot." The sentences have more words than are necessary, and the material is malleated when it should have been condensed. The reading is heavy. It sounds sometimes like the rumbling of a waggon when we expect the solemn march of history. But the simple and impartial statement of facts will make the work of permanent value. There are many sketches of the lives and opinions of the leading theologians and divines of the period, both Conformist and Nonconformist. Whatever may be said of the intolerance or even irreligion of the time of Charles II., it is certain that the Church of England had then an illustrious band of great theologians. We marvel that Dr. Stoughton, in his researches, did not fall upon a curious volume of poems by Dr. Robert Wilde, one of the ejected ministers. They contain an inimitable description of the march of General Monk from Scotland, the dissolution of the Rump, and the restoration of King Charles, with many poems concerning the leading Nonconformist preachers of the Commonwealth times. They are very facetious, and tend to illustrate Mr. Skeats' thesis, advocated, too, to some extent by Dr. Stoughton, that the Puritans were not so sad and sullen as they are generally painted.

The History and Development of Gilds, and the Origin of Trade-unions. By LUGO BRENTANO, of Aschaffenburg, Bavaria. London: Trübner & Co.

THE importance and interest of this book can hardly be over-estimated. The first thoroughly complete account of the origin of those bodies which have attracted so great attention of late years comes, curiously enough, not from an Englishman, but a German. This is the more remarkable, as nearly all the information is drawn from English sources, and the gilds are shown to have been thoroughly rooted in England long before they appeared in Germany, and to be far more bound up with English than with German history. But though as clearly-defined institutions they are first to be found in England, the first hint of the customs which led to their formation can be traced, as Dr. Brentano shows, to the old German family banquets on the occasion of great sacrifices. Thus the first origin of the gilds is the family, embracing in England all degrees of kindred, and supplying a common union between kinsmen for defence and offence. The latter object, indeed (combination for offence), seems to have been more characteristic of the continental gilds than of their English models. The combination of freemen against their lords appears as the first form of the German gilds, whereas in England not only were the masters the first to form gilds for trade purposes, but there seems to have been great fellow-feeling between workmen and masters, even after the former had developed separate gilds of their own.

The second section of Dr. Brentano's book is devoted to the "Religious or Social Gilds," and is perhaps interesting rather to the antiquarian than to the politician. The third part (about Gild-Merchants) is chiefly devoted to the well-known struggle between the weavers of the Netherlands and the Flemish aristocracy. But it is in the last two parts that the interest of the history culminates. The first of these is called "The Craft-Gilds." In this we see how, during the infancy of trade, and the bondage of some of the craftsmen, the gilds contained the whole body of the citizens, and how, as trade grew, and the distinction between bond and free ceased, special organizations separated off from the full-citizens' gild, and formed themselves into purely trade societies, which became dangerous rivals to the old burghers.

Thus the *esprit de corps* shewn in the protectionist feeling of the craft-gilds, became a necessity of their existence:—

"The organization of the free craftsmen into gilds, we thus see, was called forth by the want of protection against the abuse of power on the part of the lords of the town, who tried to reduce the free to the dependence of the unfree, and by imposts and other-

wise to encroach on the freeman's earnings. Being organized, the craft-guilds provided for the maintenance of the customs of the craft, framed further ordinances for its regulation, saw these ordinances properly executed, and punished the gild-brothers who infringed them. The maintenance of their independence against the city authorities, and the possibility of carrying out and making efficient their trade rules depended, however, on the condition that all who carried on the trade should belong to the gild."

At last this struggle ended in the victory of the gilds. In the course of it Dr. Brentano mentions that the "right of rattenning"—*i.e.*, taking away the tools of members who did not pay their subscriptions to the gilds—was legally recognised at an early date.

The next stage in the history is the separation of the workmen from the employers, and the formation of separate gilds by the former. In the early days of the craft-gilds it appears that there were special regulations in favour of the workmen, and the payment of their wages was enforced by the gild. The change in these relations between masters and workmen, Dr. Brentano traces first of all to the attempt of the workmen to obtain higher wages in consequence of the depopulation caused by the plague of 1348. Then followed statutes regulating the scale of wages. Then gradually, as the workmen make their power felt, the employers close their ranks against them, and the workmen are driven into separate combinations.

The fifth part of this book is devoted to the origin of trade-unions. Many of the rules which the more extreme trade-unionists have attempted to enforce with respect to limitation of the number of apprentices, and the regulation of wages, were for a long time the law of the land, and whatever their first cause may have been, Dr. Brentano considers that they tended to the security and contentment of the workmen. The opposition, at any rate, to the enforcement of these laws, seems to have come from the masters, and to have been strengthened and assisted by the substitution of large factories for home-work:—

"It seems that at the beginning neither masters nor journeymen resisted at once the violation of the old customs and laws. But the employment of great numbers of children, apprentices, and journeymen who had served no apprenticeship, soon took the bread out of the mouth of the weavers, and this led, in 1796, to the foundation of a trade-society, the so-called institution among the clothworkers at Halifax, to prevent people from carrying on the trade in violation of custom and law."

But the tide had now set in favour of "unrestricted competition," and against freedom of combination. The Combination Laws were at first evaded, and for a time some of the employers supported "the institution," which added to its objects "the assistance of the sick and of the widows of deceased members." But even this partial union between classes did not last long, and the repeals of the various acts for regulating wages seem to have been met by ever-increasing violence from the trade-unions:—

"After a contest of almost a hundred years—for the violations of the 5th Elizabeth, c.4, began about the eighteenth century—the master manufacturers at last obtained the victory in 1814, (for the woollen manufacture, the Statute of Apprentices had previously been repealed by the 54th Geo. III., c. 96): the industrial system, which was as old as the craft-gilds, was abolished for all trades."

On the way in which this system was brought to an end Dr. Brentano is not unnaturally bitter, though he allows that "the condition of things before this repeal had become untenable." How far Dr. Brentano thinks that such matters should be regulated by the State, is not quite clear from his book. Some remarks, indeed, on State interference, while true in themselves, yet from the connection in which they are used, seem to point to conclusions of a somewhat startling character. It is, however, but fair to add that he does not directly commit himself to any remedies more novel than Courts of Arbitration and Industrial Partnerships.

But the real excellence of the book is not in its theoretical conclusions, but in the wonderful power of connecting, arranging, and understanding facts, which indicates an historical genius remarkable even in a time so prolific of good historians as our own. Considering that Dr. Brentano is barely twenty-five years old, we have reason for the highest expectations.

The Home-Life of Sir David Brewster. By his Daughter, Mrs. GORDON, Author of "Work," &c., &c. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

SIR DAVID BREWSTER was in many respects a typical Scotchman. With an intense microscopic cast of mind, which could dwell long and lovingly over the most minute objects and detail, there was combined an impatience almost fretful and a bitterness sometimes cynical. Intense and self-concentrated, his nature yet needed a continual escape from its own impetus. "I am one of those ill-organized people who cannot live by rule," he writes to Miss Edgeworth. "I must be in a fit either of unremitting labour or of absolute relaxation, taking no amusement in the one paroxysm, and doing no business in the other." He seemed indeed to live a dual life. One side of his intellect was truly scientific and saturated with the scepticism that is bred of science, the other was credulous and superstitious, clinging to old habits, ideas, and modes of thought. He was "afraid of ghosts, though he did not believe in them." How characteristic, for instance, is the following anecdote of his life at St. Andrews:—

"Living in an old house, haunted, it was said, by the learned shade of George Buchanan, in which certainly the strangest and most unaccountable noises were frequently heard, his footsteps used sometimes to perform the transit from his study to his bedroom in the dead of night, in double-quick time, and in the morning he used to confess that sitting up alone had made him feel quite 'eerie.' On one of these occasions, when the flight had been more than usually rapid, he recounted having distinctly seen the form of the late Rev. Charles Lyon, then Episcopal Clergyman of St. Andrew's, and an attached friend of his own, rising up pale and grey like a marble bust. He often mentioned his relief when he found nothing had occurred to his friend, and pointed out what a good ghost story had 'been spoiled.'"

Though his intellect was intense in its capability to concentrate itself on whatever was before it, the imagination did not play freely into it, but wasted itself in spray-like clouds outside this circle of activity. Hence he applies ideas rather than discovers principles. But his scientific life has yet to be written. Mrs. Gordon has given an excellent picture of her father, disfigured only by such faults as are inevitable from too near a view of the subject. Sir David's death-scene was very characteristic and touching, especially in its almost impatient reference to the restless impatience of the times. Dr. Herdman, in his account of the last moments, writes:—

"The wish of many to relax the creeds was referred to. 'He had no such wish; it was just an index of the restlessness of the age, and want of submission to what is revealed. He was thoroughly satisfied with our Confession of Faith.' Did the Christian mysteries give him no trouble? 'None. Why should they? We are surrounded by mysteries, our being was a mystery—he could not explain the relation of his soul to his body. Everybody believed things they could not understand.'"

Autobiographic Recollections of George Pryme, Esq., M.A., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Cambridge, and M.P. for the Borough. Edited by his Daughter. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, & Co.

HAD this volume been published before Crabb Robinson's Diary, to which indeed it is a sort of appendix, some of the main lines running into the grooves of Robinson's life, it would have had a good deal more interest. Mr. Pryme died in the end of 1868, in his eighty-seventh year. He had passed through a very busy and varied life, and had come into contact with many classes of men, and seemed to have learned something from each of them. He was a scholar and a man of science, but he was a man of affairs as well; and it is not surprising, therefore, that he has a good deal to tell us of the style of life and manners in vogue when he was young, and now removed so far from us. He is another of the few links which carry us back to the end of last century. He was of Huguenot descent, was distinguished at Cambridge, was called to the bar, went circuit with Robinson, founded the Chair of Political Economy at Cambridge, and devoted himself chiefly to politics, which to the end remained the main interest of his life. The anecdotes with which his Reminiscences abound, are concerned more with lawyers and politicians than with poets and great literary magnates, as was the case with Crabb Robinson's journal. But in their own way they are equally interesting. The following *môt* arising out of a discussion as to the proper pronunciation of the name Dalgetty in the "Legend of Montrose" is good. "Baron Alderson and Lord Campbell were

differing at a dinner-party about its pronunciation, the latter saying Dälgetty. It was settled by Baron Alderson remarking, 'I thought that you Scotchmen always laid the emphasis on *get*.' This also has its significance, socially and politically :

"At Hedon, a small borough and seaport on the Humber, now disfranchised, it was usual to give twenty guineas for a single vote, and ten for a divided one. Before an election there was no actual promise made, but the voter would say on being canvassed, 'You will do what is usual after the election, sir, I suppose,' and the candidate would reply in the affirmative. Many of the *poor* electors did not wait for an election, but borrowed of the members sums of money, for which they gave a promissory note. When an election came ten or twenty guineas was receipted upon the note, the residue of which still gave the candidate a hold upon the elector for a future occasion."

The book contains much interesting matter of this kind; and is very readable, having been carefully edited, and such notes having been added as would furnish helpful links to the narrative.

Life of James Hamilton, D.D., F.L.S., Minister of the Scotch Church, Regent Square, London. By WILLIAM ARNOT, Edinburgh. London: Nisbet & Co.

DR. JAMES HAMILTON'S life was well worthy of record; and here we have a graceful full-length portrait of him, clear and expressive, notwithstanding that some parts of the picture are rubbed-in rather than finished. But though the biographical work had been coarse, instead of fine and sympathetic, as it could not help being when Mr. Arnot is the biographer, we should still have had an interesting book; for the beauty of Dr. Hamilton's character could not fail to break through upon us. The vinegar of the Scottish character transmutes itself into wine as it passes to us through the tendrils of his genial nature. Yet he was a true Scotchman. His buoyant lightsomeness of temper and readiness of liberal allowance, only conceals a certain necessity for a varied outlet of activity; and hence we see in his life a constant effort after impossible inclusions and determinations to touch widely-separated points. He was a very earnest preacher; yet he hankered after science and literature; and to the end scarcely seemed to have been so certain of his true destination as not to be sometimes troubled with doubts. Notwithstanding that he himself tells us that he had got tired of the florid eloquence of his earlier preaching, yet William Bunting, by a few words, leads to this confession: "He retorted by telling me that I was meant to be a preacher, and had gone aside into authorship. If I could persuade myself that I am as well adapted for speaking as for writing, I would even yet abjure the press for the pulpit. But what with weakness, nervousness, an ungainly manner and inability to rely on myself, I hardly think so." Dr. Hamilton would have seemed to a mere stranger Scotch enough in a certain pleased self-satisfied vanity—in the airy lightsome flow of his talk; and yet he is persecuted by self-doubtfulness and the haunting oppressive sense of work undone. His life was untroubled by great calamities; yet it has all the interest of an interior tragedy. In circumstances that seemed the most favourable for his attaining all his ambitions, he has to offer up his own aims and hopes unceasingly; and the way in which he does it—the quiet smile of genial resignation on his face—gives to his life a deeper touch of pathos than the loudest outcry against adverse fate. His was a most useful and self-denying life; and the Memoir deserves a wide circulation, as it is sure to have an abiding influence.

Biographies of John Wilkes and William Cobbett. By the Rev. JOHN SELBY WATSON, M.A. With Portraits. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Sons.

MR. WATSON does not seem to have proceeded altogether without a purpose in setting forward these studies in the manner he has done. The two men, we take it, are used by way of contrasts and foils to each other. Wilkes is the mere political adventurer, the demagogue who never loses sight of his own purposes; William Cobbett is the Radical, who only loses sight of his own purposes when he is lost in the savage earnestness of his onslaughts. Not only were these two men incapable of disinterested political conduct, but doubt seems to be thrown now and then, more by inference than direct statement, on the possibility of such a thing being found in company with radicalism. This doctrine is carefully insinuated throughout; but it does once or twice rise into

definite utterance. We get pretty well on in the volume, however, before we come to this passage:—

"Wilkes is not the only political character that has been on the lower level in public affairs when he had rather been on the upper. Burke is said to have been always at heart much more of a Tory than a Whig, having no liking for the cause of the multitude, on whom he fixed the epithet of swinish. Cobbett became a Radical, not from inclination, but because Pitt, as it is told, was unwilling to meet the ex-serjeant at dinner, or, at any rate, because he was not sufficiently encouraged by Pitt's Government. Pitt's father took the side of the Opposition, in order that he might assail the aristocratic powers who had slighted his talents. Henry Brougham, when he was climbing up on the shoulders of the populace, was aiming at a stand on the Tory's platform. And Macaulay would have stood forth a strong Conservative had not the Conservatives rebuffed him into a Liberal. *How, indeed, is it possible that a man of education, who has read enough to understand the effects of human action on human society, should feel within himself other than Conservative tendencies?*"

Had Mr. Gladstone's defection been explained by some Tory rebuff, the series had been carried down to our own day; and then Mr. Disraeli's defection! Surely it had been sufficiently triumphant proof of the latter sentence! Passing from Mr. Watson's political proclivities, we must admit the biographies are well and gracefully done. There is much clever sketching: the characters are grasped as a whole, and set before us with vivid strokes. Poor Wilkes, with his domestic disagreements, his debts, his duels, and his dashes at the powers that be, was one of those men who have a faculty for getting into hot water and keeping in it. Mr. Watson deals with him not altogether unsympathetically, and is true to the few attractive features. As for Cobbett, his history is more carefully detailed; but it does not seem to us that Mr. Watson has been so successful in reducing the varied phases of his character to one element, as he has been in Wilkes's case. Cobbett is altogether a tough customer, not to be lightly dealt with on any account. He was a solid piece of English sense; one of those hard facts of which, as in the case of a solid, you only see one side at a time. Mr. Watson has seen one side and faithfully tried to do justice to it. Scarcely more than this. But he deserves credit for industry, in having gathered together so many new facts, and thrown them into a form so pleasant and easily available.

III.—PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC.

Benedict de Spinoza; his Life, Correspondence, and Ethics. By R. WILLIS, M.D.
London: Trübner & Co.

THIS work is a valuable addition to the philosophical literature of our country. It has been prepared by one whose admiration of Spinoza amounts to enthusiasm. There is nothing which concerns his favourite author that has not interest for Dr. Willis. He illustrates, explains, and defends, with the ardour which a son might show as the natural guardian of what has been sacred in a father's memory. The result is a work which will be accepted as a boon by all the earnest students of mental science in our land. This mode of concentrating upon a single author in the long line of thinkers whose speculations make up the history of philosophy, renders a peculiar service to the cause of philosophy itself. The service is not of the highest order, certainly; but its importance is so great that every devoted student will feel grateful to him who successfully accomplishes it.

In the present case, we must express pleasure in paying this tribute to a member of the medical profession. There seems even at this date a fitness in the fact that Spinoza has found a translator and vindicator in a member of the profession entrusted with the healing art. When we remember how common it was among that portion of the Jewish race in Spain and Portugal, from which Spinoza sprung, to give themselves to medicine; when we call to mind Ludwig Meyer, the physician, the intimate friend of Spinoza, the writer of the preface to the "*Principia*," and the editor of the "*Ethica*," we feel as if things had fallen out naturally when we find M.D. appended to the name of the author

of the life here given us, along with the translation of the correspondence and ethics.

The place which Spinoza occupies in the history of metaphysical and ethical speculation is a very prominent one. He stood near the fountain-head of modern philosophy. We are not able, with Dr. Willis, to regard him as "the source whence all the systems of philosophy that sprung up since his day have had their rise" (p. 4), but he is one of the figures seen in sharp outline in the early dawn of modern philosophy; one of a group, numbering such men as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Hobbes, and he is quite distinct in mode of thought and style of character, as he is seen quietly, and most modestly, standing amongst them. His favourite line of thought was speculation as to the infinite and absolute in relation to the finite and corporeal; and his uniform method, the mathematical, advancing by definitions and axioms. His speculation continually turned on the most abstruse problems which Descartes had so wonderfully opened up; and was of the kind by which philosophy has since been largely characterized under the guidance of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in Germany, Cousin in France, and Hamilton and Mansel, with their opponents, in this country. With clear, penetrating, and profound intellect, Spinoza made a contribution to philosophical thought which has always been ranked high in merit, and will continue to be so esteemed. We cannot allow to Dr. Willis that "Spinoza may indeed be said to be a name among us, and nothing more." His power has been acknowledged by all genuine students of mental science in this country; though beyond a doubt that place has not been assigned to him which Dr. Willis claims for him, nor is it likely to be assigned now. While all familiar with philosophy will allow to Spinoza a place amongst the first rank of thinkers, there are very few who will assign him the place of pre-eminence, or turn to him as the pole-star, for guidance in our navigation. Neither in respect of method, nor in respect of matter, can this distinction be given to him. His method has cumbered and weakened his whole argumentation, and never even in his correspondence could he clear his feet of the trammels, and walk at ease along any but the single beaten track. Seeking exactness in the use of a mathematical method, he brought himself under restraint. Making definitions and axioms the basis of every speculation, the logical validity of the whole was imperilled by simply questioning a definition. The definition of substance is everything to Spinoza. It is the virtue and the vice of his system; it is at once its life and its death, for his is in part a living system, acting still in modern thought, and partly a dead system, preserved and labeled in the philosophical museum. When he defined substance as the self-existent (*zelfstandigheid*), and so made God and substance synonymous expressions, he had determined his philosophy. This settled the whole, and with consistency of thought he kept to it; with simplicity, and reverence of character, he religiously framed his life in acknowledgment of the self-existent One. If substance is self-existent being, then there is but one substance. The true theory of the universe is in the unity of the self-existent, therefore, Eternal One. He is the only substance; all else is only the mode or manifestation of his being. He is the cause of all, but the immanent, not the extraneous, cause. All is in God, and God is in all. Thus Nature is essentially existent, and agrees exactly with the essence of the only God.

Since the days of Spinoza, the evolutions of philosophical thought have been continued much beyond the circle in which he reasoned with power. Speculations as to the absolute have been carried to the verge of abstraction, and distinctions have been forced upon us as to existence and knowledge, which Spinoza did not contemplate. He rejected many commonly received views as to the relation of finite existence to the Deity, and this he did in a most reverential and religious spirit. The question in dispute must be dealt with in his own spirit, while it is asked whether we come nearest the truth, and most harmonize with religious feeling, by holding to the sovereignty of God so as to make all known existence the manifestation of the one only Being, or by maintaining that much of known existence cannot possibly belong to such a nature as the Divine. On the latter side, we apprehend the strength of reasoning will be found, and not on the favourite side of Spinoza.

Passing, however, to speak of the work before us, as intended to introduce English readers to the thinking of Spinoza, we regard it as deserving of much

praise. With manifest faults, it really succeeds in its purpose. The first thing that strikes the reader is, that Spinoza himself alone of philosophers stands out before you here, with the group of his admirers. There is no attempt to fit the author into his place in a history of philosophy, unless the claim that he was the very first of men is to be taken as such. While there is a disadvantage in this, we think it on the whole an advantage. This is Spinoza himself to whom you are introduced, and not a mere preparation of Spinozism. The main blemishes are undue adulation, undue expansion, and needless concern as to the reputation of the philosopher who, having passed away from this sphere of speculation more than two hundred years ago, is beyond the range of personal animosities. Dr. Willis has done full justice to the intellectual energy, simplicity of life, and really deep religious feeling of Spinoza. But personal enthusiasm grows rather hot, when on its ruddy glow such a representation as this is made to appear:—"No less than a being, the highest, the holiest that can be enshrined in the likeness of humanity." Such a picture needs toning.

Our readers may understand how sensitive such a biographer must be as to the reputation of his hero. He is hot with just indignation, as he well may be, at the persecution and calumny to which his hero was subjected, specially by the adherents of the Jewish faith, which he abandoned. And he is full of bitter feeling against the clergy and theologians, doing nothing to hide from public view this little shred of narrowness and bigotry which still flutters at the skirts of his liberalism. We think that clergy and laity together in our day will be found agreed in nearly equal proportions in lamenting the treatment to which Spinoza, and many more independent thinkers, have been exposed in past ages, when theories as to freedom of thought were little understood. Certainly we have now reached the time when we may think and speak calmly about Spinoza, and quietly attempt, in the spirit of fairness, to assign him his meed of praise. Dr. Willis has, as we think, written rather too obviously in the style of one who feels as if Spinoza needed defence as to his personal character. He was once denounced as an Atheist, but there is no risk of that now; and the time has gone by when it is needful to consider, in the spirit of his good friend, Oldenburgh, the effect which his speculations might have on "the degenerate and wicked age" in which he lived. The simple question now is, what credit is due to Spinoza as a thinker; and in regard to this, there will be a general acknowledgment of his power, however much diversity there may be as to his doctrines. Those who differ from him, as we do, will nevertheless allow the advantage of studying his works, and will testify to the honour which he deserves for lofty views of religion and virtue.

Whether the Pantheism of Spinoza can be maintained by sound reasoning, and whether it be really honouring to the Deity, as he sincerely believed it was, are points of high moment, which we should certainly answer otherwise than he has done. But we can grant that his Pantheism is not of the low kind that drags the Deity down to the level of Nature, but struggles by subtlest logic to lift Nature to the level of Deity. Elevated as such a theory is above the lower type wearing the same name, it is to our thinking far below the truth, and is certainly not that truth spoken of in the motto which Dr. Willis has placed on his title-page—*ἡ ἀλήθειαλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς* (John viii. 32). Nor can we allow that the translator has brought support to the doctrine by arguing that men naturally express themselves in accordance with it, and that in the Bible "we find many utterances that are only consonant with the Pantheistic idea," giving as his first example the passage which begins, "If I ascend into heaven, thou art there." In this relation, also, we must object to the attempt to draw upon Descartes for witness in favour of the same theory. The words quoted are from the sixth meditation, and are the following:—"By Nature, considered in general, I now understand nothing more than God Himself, or the order and disposition established by God in created things." Now all that we understand by these words is, that Descartes held that when we speak of what is ordained of Nature, we understand ordained of God; that is, Nature is then used as equivalent to God. And so the words which immediately follow are these:—"And by my Nature in particular I understand the assemblage of all that God has given me." Spinoza was indeed much indebted to Descartes—much more so than Dr. Willis is inclined to allow, in proof of which it is enough to refer to the fact that his first published treatise was entitled, "*Renati Descartes Principia*

Philosophiæ more Geometrico Demonstrata;" but he did not get from Descartes his geometric method, his definition of substance, or the Pantheism he deduced from that definition. All of these are distinctly the production of Spinoza himself, and all are equally faulty.

We conclude our criticism with the expression of our conviction that the book is too bulky. The life, the letters, and the ethics are the essential part of the book. The rest, to the extent of fully 160 pages, might well be omitted. The value of the work to students will be obvious to those who peruse it, and for their sakes we would desire to see it abbreviated. Bruder's edition of the works of Spinoza has been exceedingly accessible to students, and those who have studied these works critically will be glad to avail themselves of the aid which the labours of Dr. Willis afford.

The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Translated from the German of Dr. E. ZELLER by OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L. and M.A., Vice-Principal of Cuddesden College. London: Longmans.

AN important service has been done in the interests of mental philosophy in our country by this continuation of Mr. Reichel's work in translating the valuable history by Zeller. The very favourable reception given to the translation of the earlier part, which appeared under the name of "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," was encouragement enough to carry forward the task which had been so well begun. The volume before us is the result, embracing the later developments of Greek philosophy. The exceedingly high merit of Zeller's history is now so well known by the specimen given in Mr. Reichel's former volume that we need not enlarge upon it. We have abundance of handbooks giving sketches more or less trustworthy of the successive theories of philosophy in ancient and modern times. But after a general acquaintance with these theories in outline has been obtained, what the student needs is more minute guidance in the prosecution of personal investigation. And such guidance is better supplied in the work of Zeller than in any other placed within the reach of the English reader. The minuteness of reference, and carefulness of quotation are features of the book invaluable to the student.

In treating of the later philosophy of Greece, Zeller has given his strength mainly to the Stoics. Most deserving they were of this distinction, no doubt; but the attention given to them has somewhat robbed the Epicureans and Sceptics of their honour. Everywhere, however, there is the same careful evidence of scholarship, and of calm, deliberate judgment as to the merits of those whose views are set forth. Not only by the carefulness of the translation, but also by the construction of the index, Mr. Reichel has made this translation exactly what a student desires to have at command.

Logic; Part First: Deduction. Logic; Part Second: Induction. By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. London: Longmans.

THE Professor of Logic in Aberdeen cannot be charged with inactivity, or lack of public spirit. We honour him for the energy of which he gives us full proof in his works. This admiration we express the more readily that we feel constrained decidedly to differ from him in the system which he propounds. Dr. Bain is enthusiastic as a teacher, and resolute as an expounder and defender of the theory with which his name is associated in companionship with Mill, Grote, Lewes, and others.

The two volumes now before us embrace a system of logic. The first and smaller of the two being the Deductive, including what is more commonly taught under the designation of Formal Logic. The second presents a view of the Inductive Logic on a decidedly wide scale. The whole system is constructed on the basis of Mill's Logic, which is amplified and vindicated. This work gives evidence of more care than was apparent in the last given to the public. Everywhere in these two volumes are to be found those features of his writing, familiar to those who are acquainted with "Senses and Intellect" and "Emotions and Will." There is the same minuteness and patient investigation, and we must add the same unfortunate facility to be first attracted by the discovery of a process, and then satisfied with it, as if it carried the explanation of everything involved in the problem raised. As the works accumulate they seem to

us as if marked by this common feature, that they are books full of partial explanations. The disadvantage of this work on logic is that it is everywhere resolutely sensational or experimental, going out of its way to advance the favourite theory even in the regions of psychology and ethics. We fancy Dr. Bain can hardly avoid this now. The merit of the work is that it commonly gives a representation of the different modifications which have been proposed by various authors, including Arnauld, Hamilton, De Morgan, Boole, Mansel, and others. In this way the view presented of recent inquiry is really good, whether the reader assents to the criticism or not.

The part of the work which deals with Formal Logic has an introduction which sets forth the experimental theory of psychology, and then follows of consequence that view of logic which regards reasoning as proceeding from particulars to particulars, and widens the science at length in the Inductive part to embrace a portion of all sciences. The opening definition of logic is wide enough. "Logic may be briefly described as a body of doctrines and rules having reference to truth." This certainly leaves room for all that is afterwards put into the second volume, where, extending beyond the plan of Mill, we have the "Logic of the Sciences" under these heads:—Logic of Mathematics, of Physics, of Chemistry, of Biology, and of Psychology, all of which we think wide of the real province of logic. But we cannot here enter upon the dispute as to the question whether logic is concerned only with the formal laws of the reasoning, or with the various applications of the reasoning process afforded by distinct sciences.

The present work we deem peculiarly unsatisfactory in its attempt to deal with necessary truth, and to vindicate the doctrine that an induction may be the basis of all induction. Dr. Bain deals successfully with some points, and is always interesting, but there are topics recurring again and again in the treatment of which he is obviously troubled. Let any one take the references to Causality, tracing them through the following portions of the volumes, and we venture to think our meaning will be apparent:—Vol. i. p. 11, p. 13, p. 20, p. 106, p. 226; and vol. ii. p. 30 onwards, and p. 113 and onwards. Take the example of the stroke given to a golf-ball, as employed by Dr. Bain, and we think it will appear that correlation or conservation of force does not meet the problem, because the term force contains the difficulty, and correlation does not lessen it. So once more Causality is left unexplained when you refer to collocation, along with conservation of force, since the force itself still continues the thing to be explained. So, as it seems to us, does Dr. Bain pass by the difficulty in another department of inquiry when he treats of the relation of body and mind. Nor does he seem in anywise more successful, whether attention is turned to the relation of faith or belief to knowledge as the basis of the science, or regard is given to results in the attainment of what may be accounted as necessarily credible. The system does not begin with a clear view of the nature and foundation of belief; and, though dealing ably with the facts of experience, so far as we can see, it does not guide to an ultimatum of credibility in which intellectual security can be found.

Madam How and Lady Why. First Lessons in Earth Lore for Children. By REV. CHARLES KINGSLEY, M.A. With Illustrations. London: Bell and Daldy. 1870.

WE well remember, some years ago, when the gifted author of the work before us was called upon at a scientific gathering to respond for literature, how humorously he bemoaned the humiliation of one who had just been elected an F.L.S. being treated by scientific men as *only* a literary man. However, he avenged the cause of literature by showing in the raciest language the dependence of science upon literature, and how very little she could do to advance her claims, unless her more graceful and attractive sister took her by the hand, finished her toilet, trimmed her tangled tresses, trained her in graceful airs, and introduced her as a captivating nymph to the public. Methinks in this comely volume, with its fairy-tale title, Mr. Kingsley has pretty well assured, not for the first time, his claim to no mean place in the scientific, as he has long had a foremost one in the literary, world. It is needless for us to dilate on this unrivalled experiment in the art of setting the deepest scientific theories of geology before the young in the most attractive and simple form, as the

whole has already appeared in the pages of *Good Words for the Young*, and has been thoroughly appreciated by the readers of boy-literature. Sometimes, perhaps, Mr. Kingsley jumps too fast at a general conclusion to which we might demur; as, for instance, when he lays down dogmatically from the Wanderthal skull, that "it belonged to a savage of enormous strength of limb (and, I suppose, of jaw likewise),—

'Like an ape, with forehead villainous low;'

who could have eaten you if he would, and (I fear) also would have eaten you if he could."

But a work of this kind must be didactic, and boys will take in the conclusions of "Madam How" long before they can appreciate the reasons of "Lady Why."

The illustrations of natural phenomena are the parts of the book most attractive to boys. Here is a good example. Speaking of earthquakes, and how substances are hurled into the air, "just as things spring off the table if you strike it smartly enough underneath," we read:—

"By that same law (for there is a law for every sort of motion) it is that the earthquake should sometimes hurl great rocks off a cliff into the valley below. The shock runs through the mountain till it comes to the cliff at the end of it; and then the face of the cliff, if it be at all loose, flies off into the air. You may see the very same thing happen if you will put marbles or billiard balls in a row touching each other, and strike the one nearest you smartly in the line of the row. All the balls stand still except the last one, and that flies off. The shock, like the earthquake shock, has run through them all; but only the end one, which had nothing beyond it but soft air, has been moved; and when you grow old and learn mathematics, you will know the law of motion according to which that happens, and learn to apply what the billiard balls have taught you, to explain the wonders of an earthquake. For in this case, as in so many more, you must watch Madam How at work on little and common things, to find out how she works in great and rare ones." (P. 49.)

Older philosophers might take a hint from the following racy criticism:—

"However, Analysis is a very clever young giant, and can do wonderful work as long as he meddles only with dead things, like this bit of lime. He can take it to pieces and tell you of what things it is made, or seems to be made; and take them to pieces again, and tell you what each of them is made of; and so on, till he gets conceited, and fancies he can find out some one Thing of all things (which he calls matter) of which all things are made; and some Way of all ways (which he calls force) by which all things are made; but when he boasts in that way, old Madam How smiles and says, 'My child, before you can say that, you must remember a hundred things which you are forgetting, and learn a hundred thousand things you do not know;' and then she just puts her hand over his eyes, and Master Analysis begins groping in the dark, and talking the saddest nonsense. So beware of him, and keep him in his own place and to his own work, or he will flatter you and get the mastery of you, and persuade you that he can teach you a thousand things of which he knows no more than he does why a duck's egg never hatches into a chicken. And remember, if Master Analysis ever grows saucy and conceited with you, just ask him that last riddle, and you will shut him up at once." (P. 178.)

Here, again, is a bit of political economy:—

"Suppose a pound of salmon is worth a shilling, and a pound of beef is worth a shilling likewise. Before we can eat the beef, it has cost, perhaps, tenpence to make that pound of beef out of turnips and grass and oilcake; and so the country is only twopence a pound the richer for it. But Mr. Salmon has made himself out of what he eats in the sea, and so has cost nothing; and this shilling a pound is all clear gain. There—you don't quite understand that piece of political economy. Indeed, it is only in the last two or three years that older heads than yours have got to understand it, and have passed the wise new salmon laws, by which the rivers will be once more as rich with food as the land is, just as they were hundreds of years ago." (P. 275.)

But the small boy gets bored at last:—

"There, you are fast asleep, and the best thing for you, for sleep will (so I am informed, though I never saw it happen, nor any one else) put fresh grey matter into your brain; or save the wear and tear of the old grey matter; or something else,—when they have settled what it is to do; and if so, you will wake up with a fresh fiddle-string to your little fiddle of a brain, on which you are playing new tunes all day long. So much the better; but when I believe that your brain is you, pretty boy, then I shall believe also that the fiddler is his fiddle." (P. 300.)

IV.—CLASSICAL.

Horæ Tennysonianæ, sive Eclogæ e Tennysono Latine redditæ. Curâ A. J. Church, A.M. Macmillan et Soc. Lond. et Cantab.

THIS graceful production of a little knot of scholars is at once a refined compliment to the Laureate, and an evidence of the high cultivation still bestowed on Latin versification, despite the gainsayers. Mr. Church, the editor of the volume as well as one of its largest contributors, has for some years occupied stray portions of his rare leisure in laudable efforts to transmute the true metal of the Tennysonian mines, and, not caring to trust wholly to his own skill and resources, has invoked the aid of picked and scholarly coadjutors. And with what success it will be easy for any classical reader to judge, by even a passing glance at the pages before us. It would doubtless be possible for hypercriticism to espy a microscopic flaw in some sly corner of one, or haply two, of the thirty-eight translations of which the book is made up; but this we are prepared to assert, that while the whole number have a thoroughly classic flavour and redolence, the nicety with which English idioms are represented, or approximated, or, if we may use the term, equivalented in all, is so conspicuous, and so equally diffused, that it would be a difficult, not to say an invidious task, to decide which translators merit the chief meed of praise. The requirements of verse translation are met, when the spirit and drift of the original are at once caught and reproduced in language such as the most nearly kindred Latin poet might be expected to have used. And this we can say of all the specimens which have seemed to us "the cream of the cream"—viz., the contributions of the late Professor Conington and of Dr. Hessey (too few, unfortunately, in each case), and the more frequent versions of Mr. Church and Mr. Keibel. We invite attention to the oft-translated bit from "Mariana," in page 8, in the certainty that it has never been rendered more closely and at the same time gracefully than in Mr. Conington's elegiacs; and to the subtle and very skilful art with which, in page 37, Dr. Hessey has translated "The Blackbird." It is quite a study to see how he has broken up and put together again, without losing an atom, the second stanza, in the lines—

"Tu campis dominare meis: tibi crevit in horto
Nigrescens cerasus: retia nulla vetant;
Est tua, seu muro palisve ininitur arbor,
Seu scandit cœlum viribus usa suis."

Dr. Hessey's version, too, of "The Beggar-Maid," an old favourite also with elegiac translators, is as good as Mr. Church's alternative, and that is not saying a little. We like best the latter's rendering of the sixth line, "to meet and greet her on her way." "Obvius et primo limine dixit 'ave,'" is simpler and less vague than "excipiens dulcibus alloquiis." It strikes us also as more like Ovid. Indeed, Mr. Church has evidently moulded his elegiac style on that best model, and not seldom caught to the life that poet's grace, and spontaneous ease. We like him better in his elegiacs than in his hendecasyllables, which strike us as an ill-choice of metre for a snatch from "In Memoriam;" or in his Alcaics, which are undoubtedly happy, as are, *par excellence*, Mr. Seeley's. None of the Hexameter versions in these "Horæ" are so faultless and sustained, and in their measure Virgilian, as Mr. Keibel's, in his translation from the parting-scene in "Guinevere." We should like to quote the version of the half-dozen lines which end with "not Launcelot nor another," and which are admirably rendered, though we are not quite satisfied in point of clearness with the words "non imparis umbræ," as a rendering of "not a smaller soul." There is just a suspicion of ambiguity at first sight. But we owe it to the editor to give a taste at least of his own work, and from three of his best efforts (the others being a piece from "Maud," p. 111, and another from "In Memoriam," p. 93), we give chiefly for its brevity the version of the touching song out of the "Princess," p. 29, of which the original, beginning "As through the land at eve we went," cannot possibly require to be reprinted by us for English readers.

"Delia maturas mecum carpebat aristas,
Vespere per flavos dum spatiamur agros.
Nescio qua causa nobis brevis arserat ira;
Mox vetus est lacrymis conciliatus amor."

Contigit advenisse locum, qua conditus infans,
 Quem prius heu! nobis abstulit atra dies;
 Par stetimus mæstum cespes qua lene tumescit;
 Sic vetus est lacrymis conciliatus amor." (P. 63).

We cordially wish Mr. Church so much future leisure for weaving elegiacs good as these, as is compatible with fullest success in his new sphere at Henley.

The Lyrics of Horace, done into English Rhyme. By THOMAS CHARLES BARING, M.A., late Fellow of Brazenose College, Oxford. London: Rivingtons.

CONSCIENCE forbids our encouraging Mr. Baring in the notion that he has adequately translated Horace. He has underrated the task. He has missed his original's spirit, manner, and melody. Without questioning his scholarship, we wonder it stood him in no better stead than to allow him to translate vv. 10—12, in Ode viii. of the First Book,—

"His arms have ne'er been trained to war,
 Ne'er thrown the quoit or javelin."

Or, again, to English "Sævis Liburnis scilicet invidens" (I. xxxvii. 30), "She scorned—to glut the Liburnian's hate" (p. 64); or to lose sight utterly of the exquisite force of "mordet" in the description of the silent Liris in I. xxxi. 7, 8: for it is nothing else than losing sight of it to translate—

"Ah, no! nor the meadows where Liris strays,
 A silent stream through the silent lea." (P. 54.)

A little more pains might have averted these and such-like failures; and a longer musing on his author might have taught him that the spirit of "Insanientis sapientiæ—consultus," is but slenderly and verbally realized by, "In folly's learning a full graduate" (p. 58); but we confess there seems to be more than ordinary unfitness for appreciating Horace exhibited in the complacency which suffers such slang, as the third of the lines we quote, to represent a well-known half line in the graceful and refined Ode to Pyrrha (I. v.):—

"He now takes all thy coin for gold;
 He hopes thy whim for aye to hold;
 Nor dreams of being in the cold."

Even, however, if we could away with these *laches* and others of a kindred lack of taste, it would be impossible to approve of Mr. Baring's equivalents for the Horatian metres. They lack steadfastness. A Sapphic Ode is turned now into one rhyming metre, now into another. It is converted into at least half-a-dozen English shapes. It is the same with other metres; most conspicuously with the Alcaic stanza. The equivalent which he seems to prefer for this may be best likened to a canter. If that was the customary or even occasional pace of Horace's Pegasus, we shall be happy to withdraw one objection to Mr. Baring's versions.

Speeches from Thucydides, Translated into English. With an Introduction and Notes by HENRY MUSGRAVE WILKINS, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Longmans.

UNDERGRADUATES and sixth-form fellows (we must not say boys!) will find a godsend in this scholarly work of Mr. Wilkins. Older heads, that still retain their Greek, will recognise its combination of critical with translational matter, and will derive pleasure as well as instruction from its very thoughtful and well-reasoned introduction. And, last not least, English readers, though quite unable to comprehend the niceties of Greek construction discussed in the foot-notes, will get from it a capital notion of those far-famed speeches, which, though they do not really reflect the sentiments of an orator, are instinct with the philosophic observation of an historian. In his introduction Mr. Wilkins has gone deeply into the peculiarities of Thucydidean style, its pregnancy and poetical constructions, its love of "antithesis" and "pariosis," and the other rhetorical artifices which are plausibly traced to the influence of the sophist Gorgias; and having fully discussed these features, he explains with what principles of compromise he has met them in different parts of his translation. His

exact scholarship has of course led him duly to estimate the immense force of such connecting particles as γάρ, εἰ, &c.; and, as far as our examination serves, we should say that no former translation has come anywhere near Mr. Wilkins' in the ease, as well as accuracy, with which these are made to exert their influence on the sense. To the general reader and scholar alike the question of the degree of authenticity claimed by the speeches of Thucydides, will be fraught with deep interest, for though the prefatory εἰς τὸν τοιαύτου or τοιαύτου, and not τὰς or ταῦτα, abundantly exonerates Thucydides from the charge of trying to pass them off as authentic, the question will still remain how much of them was the real produce of the mind of Pericles or Cleon, and how much was put into their mouths by the Athenian historian. The speculative and didactic element, as Mr. Wilkins shows, is undoubtedly due to Thucydides, and though he represents to the life, probably, the sordid and commercial spirit of Corcyra, and the higher and more generous tone of Corinth, the bluntness of Sthenelaidas, and the contempt of Pericles for popularity, yet we cannot but note that he neither descends to the vulgarity which would, in reality, have animated the speeches of Cleon, or the stolidity that would have obscured the Theban replies to Plataea's prayers for mercy. For a clear insight into the whole question we know not where to direct the student to abler or more concise assistance; whilst we may add that if, in translation, Greek sentences occasionally look unlike themselves, through necessary breaking up and twisting, this never occurs without justification in some explanatory note, which, withal, almost invariably enunciates some neat question of syntax. Of his success in catching, not only the mind, but the antithetic manner, where he chooses, of his author, we could produce many instances as good as his echo, in p. 150 (Book IV. 61, *ad fin*) of the Thucydidean sentence "ἐμπροπῶς ἄνθρωποι ἐλθόντες, ἐνδόγως ἀπρακτοὶ ἀπίσαν." "They visited our shores with excellent pretenses for doing wrong, and will leave them with excellent reasons for doing nothing." And of his general execution—immeasurably more spirited than even that of Mr. Crawley—we give a sample in the conclusion of the forty-third chapter of the "Funeral Oration":—

"For the whole world is the tomb of illustrious men: it is not the mere monumental inscription in their native land that records their valour: no! even in climes that knew them not, an unwritten memorial of them finds a home not in monuments, but in the hearts of the brave. Emulate, then, their heroic deeds: and, believing happiness to depend on freedom, and freedom on valour, shrink not, to your own prejudice, from the perils of war: for it is not men of broken fortunes, men hopeless of prosperity, of whom we can so fairly expect a generous prodigality of life, as of those who still risk the change from wealth to poverty, and who have most at stake, in the event of a reverse. For disaster, amid the softness of affluence, is infinitely more grievous, at any rate, to a man of high spirit, than the sudden and painless death that surprises the soldier in the bloom of his strength and patriotic hope." (P. 75.)

18

A Golden Treasury of Greek Prose. By R. S. WRIGHT, M.A., Fellow of Oriel, and J. E. L. SHADWELL, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

THIS handy conspectus of Greek prose literature is well printed, put together, and annotated. Its divisions into the Ionic, Attic, Alexandrine, and Roman periods will give a notion of its range and survey, and the book is calculated for sixth-form use, rather, we should say, in the study than in the lecture-room. Its larger half consists of "the finest passages in the principal Greek prose-writers," Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aristotle, Plutarch, Lucian. The residue is composed of a number of very limited specimens of lesser luminaries, who, early or late, represent the curiosities rather than the crowning beauties of Greek prose literature. Had we been purveying a treat of the kind, we should have let the greater authors take care of themselves, and be read, as of old, in separate editions; and have aimed rather at giving an ample and readable selection from the lesser and less known. Not that one wants more of the early Ionic specimens. A language in its infancy, when, as Mr. Wright puts it, it has no "other mechanism of connection or transition than *καὶ, μὲν, and δὲ*," is not an interesting study; and such samples as are given from the "shady" Heracleitus—*e.g., κῶνις βαλζουσι*

δὲν ἂν γινώσκωσι (iii.); and, πιθέων ὁ καλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν. ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανέται (xv) are, in point of fact, symptomatic of an even earlier stage of archaism. We would except, for curiosity's sake, the extract from Hanno's *Periplus* about the Gorillas, but most of the bits treasured up out of the Ionic age might as well have been allowed to go by default. Such retrenchment might not have provided space for the fuller and more specific account of the authors of the Alexandrine and Roman periods, for which Mr. Wright could not apparently find room in his interesting survey; but, had the better-known prose-writers been left apart and in another volume, there would have remained a sufficient field for comparisons such as that of Thucydides with Antiphon, and Theophrastus with Aristotle, and for fuller notices of, and extracts from, Æschines and Isocrates; from the style-critics Dionysius and Longinus, from Ælian, Pausanias, and Diogenes Laertius, as well as from the Greek novelists. But we must not cavil at a duumvirate which has packed specimens of thirteen centuries of Greek prose into so small a number of pages. The editors of the *Treasury* are naturally most proud of showing their chief treasures; and we have not a fault to find with the judgment shown in bringing their best gems and jewels to the front. The notes, too, although brief, are to the point, and well considered, and the printing of the text is, generally speaking, remarkably accurate. It will serve as a good manual to run the eye through before a scholarship examination.

Ancient Classics for English Readers. Herodotus. By G. C. SWAYNE, M.A., late Fellow of Corpus Christi, Oxford. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Sons.

THE third volume of Mr. Collins's "*Ancient Classics for English Readers*" will be found a delightful whet to the appetite for marvel and adventure, which only wants quickening in every intelligent schoolboy. Put into the hands of a lad who knows but little Greek, we can conceive it stimulating him to such progress as shall enable him to attack Herodotus in the original; and if he is fairly well read in the rudiments of general history and legend lore, Mr. Swayne's happy knack of historical parallelism will additionally feed the appetite to which we have referred. With almost too little effort, this writer has a modern counterpart for everything which occurs in the pages of the so-called "Father of History;" but it indisputably gives reality and life to a narrative, to find the massacre of the Magian class after the death of Cambyses (p. 77) called the St. Bartholomew of Susa, and the festival under the name of Mago-phonia, which commemorated it, dubbed the "Median Vespers;" the rush at Marathon likened to the Balacava charge; and the alarm of Athens, on hearing of an actual Persian landing on the plain where Pisistratus had a short time before stifled Athens and liberty, approximated by a hypothetical picture of "what England would have felt had news come that Buonaparte had landed at Pevensey Bay, close to the ominous field of Hastings" (cf. p. 132). Such reality is imparted to every page, and generally with excellent effect, though it is impossible not to smile at the importunity of Mr. Swayne's fancy for parallels, when, in describing the 'return of Pisistratus,' he suggests that *had he had an owl* (which he had not) as well as a personatrix of Minerva by his side, the case would have resembled that of "a fugitive prince" of this generation, who landed in France with a tame eagle on his shoulder. In the same way he introduces the fact that Herodotus *does not* mention the hanging-gardens, which were a great glory of ancient Babylon, apparently to secure an opening for a note allusive to Mr. Assheton Smith's Winter Garden (p. 133). It must be allowed, however, that he does help us wonderfully to realize that famous prototype of Jeddo in Japan, in its collection of country houses, farms and gardens within walls—walls, by the way, unlike any modern city walls, in their height which approached that of St. Vincent's Rock at Clifton, and in their breadth of not less than eighty-five feet. But though this parallelism is Mr. Swayne's specialty, it does not usurp undue space, or prevent his *resumés* of Herodotus's accounts of Egypt and Scythia as countries, and his chapters headed "Marathon" and "Thermopylæ," as campaigns, from being replete with interest germane to the subject, and enhanced by his manner of illustration. His version of the recipe for crocodile catching in p. 49, and of the early experiment of King Psammetichus in comparative philology (p. 42), are good

examples of his style; and the only fault we have to find with his legend-lore is that he never quotes or mentions Bode's *Palimpsest* from Hieronymus. Of the researches of Lavesol and Ravinsson, and the discoveries of travellers as late as Spike and Grant, he makes as much use as is compatible with the attempt to give "a coloured sketch, on a small scale, of a great work." And if his work is worthy in solid and true life as the two volumes on Homer which preceded it, and in which, by throwing himself heart and soul into his subject, Mr. Collins paved the way in high favour for his series, that perhaps is the fault and corruption of the glowing example of the passionate but most disinterested of ancient historians.

V.—POETRY, FICTION, AND ESSAY.

POEMS. By DAVID GARRETT ROSSSETT. London: F. S. ENNIS.

MR. ROSSSETT has occupied for many years a high and peculiar position as a painter; but we have no business here with the associations that cling to his name—his book comes before us, just like any other book, on its own bare merits. A thousand things might be said about the school to which he belongs, and the circumstances of culture and personal influence which must have conspired to produce a book like this. But that would be beside the mark, and would carry us too far afield. Taking this thick and closely printed volume as it stands, and making as far as possible a clear slice of our minds in all that relates to Mr. Rossetti except the book, the first thing that strikes us in these poems is one, to state which it is unfortunately necessary to employ language which has become conventional. The characteristic which, as the French say, leaps into your eyes, in turning over these pages is the marriage, so to speak, of flesh and spirit—words which we, however, employ under protest until we are sure of a common understanding. In these poems, particularly in the "House of Life," we have the love of man and woman suggested, not to say painted—may, that word will not do, we must rather say made living to the imaginative memory of every sense, without reserve. "Venus and Adonis" is not more plain, and yet we have here something that cannot be found in "Venus and Adonis." The same peculiarity of varied sensuous vividness, fused into white light by spiritual suggestion, runs through all the poems. Take a few verses from—"The Blessed Damsel," which, we believe, is one of Mr. Rossetti's early poems:—

"It was the rampart of God's house
That she was standing on:
By God built over the sheer depth
The which is Space begun:
So high, that looking downward thence
She scarce could see the sun.

"It lies in Heaven, across the flood
Of ether, as a bridge.
Beneath, the tides of day and night
With flame and darkness ridge
The void, as low as where this earth
Spins like a fearful ridge.

"Heard hardly, some of her new friends
Amid their loving games
Spoke evermore among themselves
Their virginal chaste names.
And the souls mounting up to God
Went by her like thin flames.

"And still she bowed herself and stooped
Out of the circling charm;
Until her boom must have made
The bar she leaned on warm,
And the lilies lay as if asleep
Along her banded arm.

"From the fixed place of Heaven she saw
 Time like a pulse shake fierce
 Through all the worlds. Her gaze still strove
 Within the gulf to pierce
 Its path; and now she spoke as when
 The stars sang in their spheres.

"The sun was gone now; the curled moon
 Was like a little feather
 Fluttering far down the gulf; and now
 She spoke through the still weather.
 Her voice was like the voice the stars
 Had when they sang together."

This is as chaste as the hour before the dawn, or, to quote Shelley, as a boy on a winter's noon, but the lines in italics are full of sensuous warmth; and they might be paralleled a hundred times out of this very remarkable volume. The peculiarity which, we think, will next strike a totally impartial reader is a quality in the style which it would be wrong to call affectation, or reticence, or literary cynicism; but yet there is something in it which suggests all these names. Devotees may laugh or be angry; but when the anger or the laughter is over, it will remain true that Mr. Rossetti has a "formed" and not a simple and spontaneous manner; and not only that, but that his culture is always traceable in his thought, like veins in marble; or, to repeat an old image, the honey tastes of the particular class of flowers on which the bee has been feeding. In fine, Mr. Rossetti is a poet, and his gifts in the music, colour, and perfume of verse are extraordinary; but though he gives us a new pleasure, he opens no new path. The fusion of "flesh" and "spirit" belongs to his school, though in him it certainly takes on a deep, very beautiful intensity and lustre; but, while the design of the series of sonnets entitled, "The Hours of Life" is new, the "poems" have not stirred us with any new suggestion. Abundance, a superabundance of felicities of the highest order we do find, and everywhere the passionate yet dreamy repose of the school,—a muse with fire in her eyes, but singing a song which, though full of sense, is heard by an inner rather than the outer ear; but, after all, we are not satisfied. Perhaps this may be in part because we have so much—and yet so little—at once from the poet. Something, also, is due to what must, in charity's despite, be called mannerisms, consisting in almost painful iteration of certain sensuous suggestions, which, nevertheless, are rather left to do their work upon the reader with the help of his imagination, than compelled into positive poetry by the author. But, on the whole, when we have read and enjoyed, we wonder why it is that we have brought away nothing of the poet's; only a keen admiration for him. Nevertheless, these "Poems" ought to be possessed, and the links of the author's thoughts are often so subtle, that they can hardly be taken up at one reading. Of course, all this is only the result of a first impression; but still, Mr. Rossetti does not, as we have said, satisfy us, even when he is at his best. What is it that is wanting?

Owen Glendower; A Dramatic Biography: being a Contribution to the genuine History of Wales. And other Poems. By GORONVA CAMLEN (Rowland Williams, D.D.). London: Williams and Norgate.

In a few words of notice prefixed to this book from the widow of its lamented author we are told, "While the following pages were in the press, the proofs only partly revised, the spirit of their author passed into the unseen world." It is impossible to speak otherwise than respectfully of the work of so single-minded and ardent a seeker after truth as Dr. Rowland Williams, coming to us under such circumstances. But it is equally impossible to persuade ourselves that devout and lofty thoughts are in themselves sufficient to constitute a man a poet; or, that, if he be not a poet, he had not better refrain from attempting to write poetry. We should have liked the book better if Dr. Williams had never thought of adopting the dramatic machinery, and given us his facts in the form of prose. He seems to us to have made out his case for Glendower; to have cleared him from the charge brought against him by certain chroniclers, of perfidy towards Hotspur, on the occasion of the insurrection of the

Percies and their friends in 1403, which terminated so fatally for them at Shrewsbury, and also of having been guilty of exceptional cruelty and barbarity in the guerilla war he waged for so many years against the English leaders. The severities which he undoubtedly practised were but retaliations, justifiable at least according to the current ideas of the day, for those which had been previously exercised against him and his adherents. We cannot say that we think the subject one of much importance or interest; still accuracy is always desirable in small things no less than in great. But Dr. Williams almost moves us to a smile in his zeal for the national hero. He appears to have thought that there still existed a wide-spread and active spirit of hostility towards the brave Welshman, as having repeatedly defeated English troops, and resisted English rule. We suspect that such difficulties as may stand in the way of his rehabilitation would arise far more from invincible indifference than from prejudice. We do not feel it needful to attempt a criticism of the literary merits of the "Poems" which fill up the rest of the volume. It is not, indeed, as a poet that Dr. Rowland Williams is likely to be remembered among us; but his friends need not, therefore, fear that his is a name that will soon be forgotten.

Portraits. By AUGUSTA WEBSTER. London: Macmillan & Co.

THE reputation which Mrs. Webster has already won by previous poetical attempts will certainly not suffer from this her latest work. There are real beauty and power in many of these pieces; and no positively bad or slovenly work in any of them. There is a distinct idea in each; and this idea is always clearly expressed. Indeed, Mrs. Webster's mastery over her instrument—poetic diction—is remarkable. There is, we think, hardly a halting or unmusical line from one end of the book to the other. The "Portraits" to which, on the whole, we should be disposed to give the palm, are the two of "Circe" and "The Happiest Girl in the World," particularly the last. The rendering of the passing phase of doubt in the mind of the betrothed maiden whether she can really love since her love is so calm, is very beautiful, and we believe original.

"This love which I call love, is less than love.
Where are the fires and fevers and the pangs?
Where is the anguish of too much delight,
And the delirious madness of a kiss?
The flushing and the paling at a look,
And passionate ecstasy of meeting hands?
Where is the eager weariness at time
That will not bate a single measured hour
To speed to us the far-off wedding-day?
I am so calm and wondering, like a child
Who led by a firm hand it knows and trusts
Along a stranger country, beautiful
With a bewildering beauty to new eyes
If they be wise to know what they behold.
Finds newness everywhere, but no surprise,
And takes the beauty as an outward part
Of being led so kindly by the hand."

This comparison, too, of the unknown and undiscoverable beginning of love is of singular excellence—

"Oh, was it like the young pale twilight star
That quietly breaks on the vacant sky,
Is sudden there and perfect while you watch,
And though you watch you have not seen it dawn,
The star that only waited and awoke?"

We do not think there can be any question that the writer of these passages is a true poet. But having said this, we may say also that Mrs. Webster's verse, though always smooth and mellifluous, seems to us sometimes wanting in *spontaneity*. There are passages that give one the impression of having been elaborately built up, rather than of having flowed forth naturally. One in especial, at p. 128, in "A Dilettante," exactly illustrates what we mean, but

it is altogether too long for quotation. But the general merits of the volume are quite sufficient to outweigh this drawback. We must venture, however, to express a hope that Mrs. Webster may be induced to abandon the affectation, for such it is, of discarding the use of capital letters at the beginning of her line. Of course there is no reason in the nature of things why the lines in poetry should begin with a capital, but the practice has universally prevailed; nothing can be gained by refusing to adopt it, and for most readers the unwonted aspect of the page simply vexes the eye.

London Lyrics. By FREDERICK LOCKER. London: Strahan & Co.

WE do not believe that we have here much that is altogether novel, as most of the pieces have, we think, already seen the light either in the pages of the *Cornhill Magazine*, and other periodicals, or in a little volume published some seven or eight years ago. But their re-issue is not the less welcome. In his own way Mr. Locker is excellent. His verse is what used to be called *vers de société*, the kind of verse that Swift and Prior wrote in the last century, and Moore, Præd, and Thackeray in this. We do not go so far as to say that Mr. Locker is the equal of such names as these, but he is, at any rate, no unworthy follower in their steps. His verse is smooth and sprightly, with just enough of pensiveness, now and then, to act as a relief to the gaiety—a little of the softness of sadness, with no touch of its bitterness. In the modern and Christian world not only is it true that

“Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought,”

but no songs seem to us to have any sweetness at all that contain no note telling of the abiding sadness of life, be it only by way of the merest passing hint or suggestion. Mr. Locker, in our judgment, shows great good sense and moderation of mind in confining himself to his own line in art, and indulging in no attempts at poetry of a loftier and more serious order. That he would succeed in such we should doubt, but there can be no question that many have ventured in the field with far slenderer pretensions.

A large part of the book—and by no means the worst—may be characterized as “Studies after Thackeray.” But Mr. Thackeray’s cynicism—itsself very far from the real thing—sits uneasily upon our author. His nature is genial and joyous; and he likes the world far too well for his laugh at its foibles to have any ring of contempt. His own *Philosophy of Life* is best expressed in the piece called “Bramble Rise,” where, speaking of the change observed in the aspect of a place familiar in childhood, when revisited in mature years, he asks:—

“Whence comes the change? ’Twere easy told
That some grow wise, and some grow cold,
And all feel time and trouble;
If life an empty bauble be,
How sad are those who will not see
A rainbow in the bubble!”

Perhaps for humour, the best specimen in the book are the verses entitled “A Human Skull:”—

“Time was, some may have prized its blooming skin;
Here lips were woo’d, perhaps, in transport tender;
Some may have chuck’d what was a dimpled chin,
And never had my doubt about its gender!

* * * * *
It may have held (to shoot some random shots)
Thy brains, Eliza Fry!—or Baron Byron’s;
The wits of Nelly Gwynn, or Doctor Watts,—
Two quoted bards! two philanthropic syrens.”

The coupling together of Mrs. Fry and Nell Gwynn on the common ground of their “philanthropy,” is singularly delightful. The lines “To my Grand-mother,” “An Invitation to Rome, and the Reply,” and “Geraldine,” are also worthy of special praise. But we wish Mr. Locker were less addicted to punning. It is one of the few sins of commission with which we should be inclined to charge him.

Poems and Lancashire Songs. By EDWIN WAUGH. Third Edition, [with Additions. London: Bell and Daldy.

WE like Mr. Waugh's "songs" in the Lancashire dialect very much better than his "poems" in the Queen's English. The latter are of the "Annual" type—pretty, but conventional. There is too much in them about "mossy nooks," and "limpid rills," and "gleaming flowerets," and so on. But the *patois* braces his powers, and in the "songs" we have plenty of nerve and freshness, and often of a certain homely grace and tenderness. This, for instance, from "God bless these Poor Folk," is very good:—

"An' he that seems ale to his victual,
Is welcome to let it alone;
There's some can be wise with a little,
An' some that are foolish wif' women;
An' some are so quare i' their nature,
That nought wif' their stomachs agree;
But he that would hester drink wayter
Shall never be stinted by me.

"Owd Time,—he's a troublesome lodger,—
Keeps unclean'ns on to delay,
An' whispers, 'Ye're no better a lodger,
Get ready for goin' away.'
Then let's ha' no skilkin' nor scrivin',
Whoever misdortins befall;
God bless him that feeds for his livin',
And hoofs up his yod through it o'!"

We like quite as well "The Dulle's o' this Bonnet o' Mine," wherein a Lancashire lass, arraying herself to meet her lover, bewails the perversity of her "ribbins," which will not be "reet," as becomes the importance of the occasion, for she is to give him an answer, which she might as well have given him at once: only, she remarks,—

"Aw thought to seem dormal were wrong,
So aw told him I'd tell him to-morr;
"Eh, dear, but it's time to be gown,—
Aw shouldn't like Jamie to wait,—
Aw cannot for shame be so soon,
An' aw wouldn't for th' world be so late."

Very happy, too, is the picture of the "Trim Little Pattern for Wives," who gets indignant at the thought that her lord and master should be sitting in the rain while she sits comfortable under cover:—

"So though it were rainin' like mad,
Aw thought—fur my heart gave a swell,—
'Come leavin' me will, but you hai
Shall not have it o' to hissel'!"
"So whippin' my bucket i' th' rain,
Aw ha' th' bits o' windovs a-rain;
An' though aw get drenched to my skin,
Aw be better content wif' mysel'."

No difficulty will be experienced in reading these songs, as Mr. Waugh has been even unnecessarily careful in explaining each word that might puzzle the least expert. How any tongue, not a Lancashire man's, could utter some of the extraordinary combinations of letters we meet with, is another matter.

Lothair. By the Right Honourable B. DISRAELI, M.P. London: Longmans.

IT is useless to disguise the fact—Mr. Disraeli is a fascinating person, and writes fascinating books. From "Vivian Grey" to "Lothair" he is insurmountable: but always entertaining, always acute, always furnished of a gliding grace,—which is not English, but heaven-knows-what! He is a man considerably slier than Mr. Gladstone: who has been through all the rough-and-rumble byways of politics in the most graceless country of the world, except the United States; who has lived through the most bewildering and chaotic changes of the most

rapid of centuries; who has headed for years the party of tradition, and used the vantage-ground of his position solely to transfer despotic power from King Log to King Stork; who, finally, has retired from office (practically, his advising the Queen to send for Mr. Gladstone meant that, and nothing else) in favour of Mr. Bright—and what does this man do, while he is on the downward slope towards seventy? He writes a three-volume story, which may be said to “resume” every tendency exhibited by him in his long and surprising career. In “Lothair,” by the Right Honorable (*sic*) B. Disraeli, we have all the social *diablerie* of “Vivian Grey,” the irony of “Ixion in Heaven,” the playful love-making of “Henrietta Temple,” and the odd quasi-mysticism of “Tancred;” while the style is as buoyant, the humour as elastic, and the sensuous vivacity as marked as in any one of the author’s writings. It is a baffling book; you search in vain for its secret; you are pleased with it, and wonder why; you read on in the mood of one who is passing through scenes which he will forget to-morrow; and at the end find you have read what you will never entirely forget. At least, we cannot conceive any reader of catholic appreciativeness saying less than this.

There is a grave artistic blunder in “Lothair.” Theodora is the true heroine, and when she disappears from the scene, we feel that the book may be closed. The scenes in which the “machinations” of the Jesuit conspiracy to entrap the young nobleman are described have a marvellous ingenuity about them, but not even the appearance of the phantasm of Theodora in Rome to remind him of his pledge contents us. Even if we could believe, or were intended by the author to believe, that this phantasm was anything more than the creature of a disordered brain, we should still feel that the author was detaining us too long after the noblest and sweetest figure on the stage had been withdrawn. By the way, two very curious points arise in this place. We do not think justice has yet been done to Mr. Disraeli as an imaginative writer, or, in particular, to his power of painting women. Sybil is a living and beautiful figure; so is the daughter of Besso; so (and still more so than the latter) is the Queen of the Ansareh; so is Henrietta Temple in her way; but the unanimous verdict will be that Theodora Campion, the enthusiast of Italian freedom, is the noblest female figure ever created by Mr. Disraeli. That the leader of the Conservative party has conceived such a woman (we use this phrase *pace* Lord Westbury) is, in our opinion, his greatest triumph; and posterity will confirm the verdict. But, though he has chiselled a noble creature, and put life into her too, he has, strange to say, made her act amiss. Theodora, seeing the current upon which Lothair is likely to drift away, makes him promise—giving him a dying kiss to seal the bond—that he will never join the Romish communion. Now, we unhesitatingly say that this is a false touch. A woman like Theodora would be high as heaven above anything of the kind. She, of all women, would know that, in matters of the inmost soul, “influence” is as base a form of compulsion as the lash or the bribe, and would shrink with horror from asking a man to impawn his soul by a prospective oath. This is, to our mind, the flaw of the book.

As a novelist, Mr. Disraeli possesses a power which is exceedingly rare—that, namely, of taking current phases of thought, feeling, and morals, and making them up, with living persons for his puppets, into downright romance. For “Lothair,” after all, is a romance, not a novel, while yet almost every figure it contains may be referred to some living model. If anything can justify this species of artistic workmanship, it is genius like that of Mr. Disraeli; but we do not like it well enough to pursue the topic. Croker deserved all he got in “Coningsby,” and more; but the book lost in dignity by his presence, and Lord Henry Sidney remains a *mauvaise plaisanterie* in “Sybil.” Still, nobody can help marvelling at the wondrous tact and grace with which the irony of the pamphleteer who touches passing things, and the imagination of the story-teller who deals with what is universal, are blended in “Lothair.” We know who Colonel and Mrs. Campion, and Mr. Phœbus (with his Aryan art-principles), are, as well as we know who Garibaldi, Lothair, and the Pope are; but they are made to take their part in perplexing the young nobleman in so perfectly natural a manner, that we are not conscious, until after some reflection, of anything but pleasure while we read—except, indeed, for that apprehension of a cynical outcome which attends upon all Mr. Disraeli writes.

"Lothair" has been called a "duchessy" book. It is so; but not in any sense which implies that Mr. Disraeli does not know the poor, or feel for them; a conclusion which the wonderfully life-like scenes in "Sybil" would for ever bar. It is "duchessy" in the sense that while you are reading you feel as if you had been accustomed to duchesses all your life. Its ease is, in truth, one of the greatest charms of the book. It is impossible to answer for others, but, for ourselves, we feel that much must be forgiven to the man who could conceive Theodora; and, indeed, on the whole, "Lothair" has so much raised our opinion of the total capacity of Mr. Disraeli, that we look forward to some future day when the clouds which now make it difficult to believe in his intellectual sincerity shall be dissipated, and we may be able to accord to his public career a homage as unhesitating as that which is extorted by his genius.

Casimir Maremma. By the Author of "Friends in Council." London: Bell and Daldy.

From "Lothair" to "Casimir Maremma," by the author of "Friends in Council," "Revels," &c., is an immense leap; and yet one cannot but feel a thrill of subtle joy in seeing the two books lying side by side on the table. The Cosmopolites of Wieland rush into the mind;—differing in ten thousand things, but linked together by the sovereign freemasonry of high intelligence and rapid sympathy. Mr. Arthur Helps is a true "cosmopolite," and the mere presence of his books in a library has an olive-branch look about it. Casimir Maremma is a much more practical person than Lothair—he is one of those young men who long, almost as soon as their eyes are opened upon life, to commence some form of direct attack upon its many miseries. He comes to England—from the territory of Prester John, or some place as vague—and with the permission of his father (who is the widower of an English wife), devotes himself, in a life of squalor among the English poor, to the task of acquiring such a real, practical knowledge of their life as may enable him to help them. In the meanwhile, his introductions give him the entry to "the very best society," and—and, in fact, his career in England has a piquancy of contrast about it which effectually prevents your pitying him, or admiring his self-sacrifice; at least, up to a certain point in the story. Mr. Helps is too dignified a man not to foresee this result, so he contrives to snatch the reader's sympathy by a *quandary-dilemma*. Some working men who suspect Casimir's motives of action, send him a gentle present—an infernal machine, which nearly blinds him; thus he gets some pity, after all. Emigration is well, but emigrants want leaders, so Casimir, unsoured by the outrage, proceeds with his benevolent plans, and manages to take out of England the whole raw material of a colony, in gentlemen and ladies, as well as low people: actually introducing one Maggie, born in squalor, but capable of the best, into his party, as a "revolved discord" in the path to perfect harmony. The book—which, like "Lothair" so far, is a romance in the wildness of its incidents—is interspersed with comments, conversations, and letters, of the type which Mr. Helps has made familiar to us, and is almost oppressively full of wise and kindly things in politics, sociology, good manners, education, and the like. In two particulars Mr. Helps carries off all the surrages: the skill with which he handles off character, and his power of sketching love-scenes. It has been said that the capacity to paint a distinct female figure is the ultimate test of the high imaginative genius: that a man who possesses this capacity, whatever his rank in the first order may be, lives assuredly being to that order. We are definitively in the power of Mr. Helps. But indeed, all the figures are admirably drawn—Lord Lonsdale, Lord Stenham, Maggie, Ruth, Thurston, and the rest; and so we can read the story of young Casimir without feeling weary of its accomplished author, and still better, without feeling how near its sympathy Mr. Helps is to every form of human suffering.

Justice Done. By the Author of "Stone Signs." With three Illustrations. London: Smith, Elder & Co.

It is no easy task to estimate a work so complete and perfectly realized as "Justice Done." It is more a prose epic than a novel. There is here no conventional character thrown in to set out the machinery of the story. It seems, rather,

as though it were real, and not invented at all; the close and loving observations of a long life carefully grouped round a few characters rather than an effort of imagination, pure and simple. Art, in its simplicity and unpretendingness, has come very near to hiding art; and yet there is more of real romance, more feeling of the strange tragedy that lies at the centre of all human existence, than we find in the most ambitious inventions. The local colouring, and the quaint, tender suggestiveness of the dialect are, in the author's hands, very useful in helping the main effect—deep emotion rising to the lip, yet shyly sinking down again, like sap to the roots, full of life, yet never rising to flower. It might appear as though the characters, in their simplicity, were very easy to represent; but when, as in this case, they are suddenly lifted out of their simple ways into the most artificial entanglements, it is felt to be a great triumph to completely maintain their individuality, and not let it vanish at last in thin spray. Yet we never find ourselves questioning the reality of the personages, or of their words, and justifying them to ourselves on the ground that it is a story—we simply acquiesce in their right to do as they do, because of their clearly distinct characters. Lettice Lisle, in her strange self-composure and quiet dignity, remains simply Lettice Lisle through all the terrors of the fair-trading—and the trials of Caleb's honest, but unrequited, love; and not till the last glimpse we get of her does it seem to us as though the outlines were ever so little blurred. Some of the touches in luckless, woman-hating Caleb's love-making are truly tender, and have a strange morning freshness about them, with all its dewy surprises and shy revelations—

"Let me go, Caleb! What good were it stopping? If you'd as many words as there's drops in the sea, don't ye see that it wouldn't sinnify now? It's too late."

"But ye might try and see whether ye couldn't fancy me if he don't come back again. Who is he, and what is he, and what is he like?"

"'Twouldn't make no odds whether he comes or no, I should go on caring just the same; and love don't come by wishing or not wishing it," said she, sorrowfully.

"He sat down on the shingle looking so miserable that Lettice's tender heart would not let her leave him."

"It's on'y just now," pleaded she—"it won't be bad long: ye know ye never thought much not of women-folk; it can't have been but like yesterday as ye could ha' thowt on me."

"He shook his head ruefully. 'I believe 'twere from the first day as ever I set eyes upon ye, and carried ye across the water, though maybe I didn't know it; and a light heft ye was in my arms, Lettice, that day, for all ye're such a heavy one to my heart now.'

"I'm so sorry, but ye'll think no more on it after a bit, Caleb," said she; "there's no end o' young maids as is better nor me all to nothing."

"What's other young maids to me?" answered he, bitterly: "it's you as I want. My love's like the great sea washin' over me, it's so strong. I niver thought as man could feel so," he went on, without attending to her as she tried to soothe him. "Seems as if I'd took the disease worse because I'm older," he said, with a bitter laugh. "Come to me, Lettice, try and think o' it again, Lettice. You say you're sorry; why will ye answer off like that short, without a thought like?" cried the poor fellow, springing up as he saw that she still lingered by him, and stretching out his arms towards her.

"She turned hastily and ran from him."

Lettice's love for young Wallcott, the son of the grinding money-lender, is beautifully pictured in its results on her life. Her dare-devil, scapegrace father, who suddenly comes and claims her from poor uncle Amyas, whose heart is so bound up in her, is, perhaps, the only one of the characters who comes too near to a set conventional type. His smuggling enterprises seem as though they would twine around poor Lettice the chain of a terrible fate. Her nephew, Ned, and her own lover, Wallcott, are concerned in her father's capture. Indeed, as she is being driven home to Amyas's farm from the Puckspiece—the smuggler's head-quarters—she sees one man pursuing another, sees first one and then the other rush over the cliff; and she unsuccessfully begs the man driving her to go to the rescue. In this way circumstances close around the heroine with a sense of fatality, and yet the pure, young heart remains strong, and brave, and equal to service in midst of it all. The grand, simple uprightness of Amyas and Lettice, amidst the over-mastering and crushing misery of the position, has something of the spirit of the Greek drama in it—notwithstanding that so much is different. Here is the same calm, reliant fronting of wha-

seems a calamitous fatality, without either fretfulness or outcry; the same pathetic strain of silently-apprehended mystery rising through the current of individual feeling, though never reduced to articulate words; and the same contrast between the simple motives of the actors, and the strangely involved and perplexing circumstances amid which they are thrown. And the powerful influences of religious belief are cunningly interblended, and give a depth of tone to the whole. Mr. and Mrs. Jesse are two excellent characters, whose influence on Lettice is clearly traceable in the way of deepening her character, and giving clearness to many of her views of life. Some of Mrs. Jesse's words, in their direct wisdom and sharp sense of concrete fact, are well worth noticing; and many of her husband's not less so, with their note of simple faith and pious inquiry. But for this we have not space. We can only very warmly recommend this story to our readers as being a true work of art, thrilling with suggestions, and full of strangest puzzles, just as everything pertaining to human nature inevitably is seen to be when apprehended and presented to us by a great and truly creative mind.

Kilmeny. By WILLIAM BLACK. Author of "Love or Marriage," "In Silk Attire." London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston.

AMONG recent novels those of Mr. William Black have made, and very rapidly too, a marked impression upon the public. In his new work Mr. Black has produced another book which has the same general characteristics, but which will not carry his reputation any farther. The peculiarities of Mr. Black's writing are now well known. He has a kind of ingenious ease, which occasionally looks like almost wilful carelessness. He exhibits abundantly the culture of a man of society as well as a man of books. Nobody can thoroughly enjoy his novels who cannot read French and German, and who does not know something of good society. In "*Kilmeny*" we have a long anecdote told entirely in French, and there is no end of German, classical or not classical. One fault of "*Kilmeny*" is that the author has attempted to work up far too many episodes, and another is that the conclusion is hurried. But if Mr. Black's cunning has anywhere failed him it is his own fault—his capacity is evident upon every page. We have in "*Kilmeny*" the same speculative intelligence, the same power of epigrammatic humour, the same gift of sensuous description, and the same versatile sympathy as we had learnt to admire in previous novels by the same writer. Bonnie Leslie is the author's favourite coquette in another dress, and very well she is drawn; but Polly, the artist's model, will carry off all the suffrages, in spite of the beautiful portrait of Hester. Heatherleigh is well done, but he too obviously and too strongly suggests Warrington in "*Pendennis*." The following passage will give some idea of Mr. Black's power of describing scenery:—

"I was proud of my native country when we saw it, then in all its spring greenery. The young hawthorn was out in the hedges, the chestnut-buds were bursting, the elms were sprinkled over with leaves; and the windy clouds that crossed the blue spring sky gave to the far-off woods and hills a constant motion of shadow and sunlight that created landscapes at every step. We drove through the old-fashioned villages—Chalfont, with its stream crossing the main road; Amersham, with its broad street and twin rows of quaint, old, red-brick houses; Missenden, with its ancient abbey, and church high up on the hill, and then we found ourselves in the valley that looks up to Burnham.

"I took Franz up and over the chalk-hills, and through the woods that were now growing rich with flowers. These were a wonder to him—the wildness of wild hyacinth, a lambent blue; the pale, blush-tinted anemone, the pink-veined wood-sorrel, the tiny moschatel, the dark dog's-mercury, the golden celandine; and everywhere the perfume of the sweet violet, clustered among its heart-shaped leaves, along the rabbit-banks and around the roots of the trees. The constant animal life, also—the ruddy squirrel running up the straight stem of a young beech, the disappearance of a rabbit into the brambles of a chalk-hill, the silent flight of a hare across the broad fields to some distant place of safety, the sudden whirr of a cock pheasant, and the incessant screaming of jays; while all around were the busy tom-tits, and thrushes, and black-birds, with a glimpse of a golden-crested wren hopping from bush to bush, or of a kestrel hanging high up in the blue, his wings motionless. Over all these again, the light and motion of a breezy English sky, with cumulus masses of white cloud that chased the sunlight over the Burnham woods, or hid the distant horizon in dark lines of an intense purple."

"Kilmeny," as we have said, will not add to the reputation of Mr. Black, but, on the other hand, it should be read by all who care for a good story; and, perhaps, its faults arise from the fact that the conditions of a three-volume novel are not entirely favourable to the free play of qualities so high as those of this remarkable writer.

Estelle Russell. By the Author of "The Private Life of Galileo." Two Vols. London: Macmillan & Co.

THIS is a book of very decided merit, though showing a curious unevenness of mind. The career of Estelle herself is drawn so naturally and unconventionally, with so complete a disregard of the "common form" established for the treatment of heroines of romance, that one would say that the author must have observed closely, and thought much for herself. We say "herself" advisedly, though from internal evidence only; it is one of those books which *must* be a woman's. On the other hand, there is much in it—less in its style and construction than in its ways of thinking and viewing things—which seems emphatically "young" and unreal. Thus, perhaps, the most prominent feature in the story is the might of mothers. Evidently this is not the result of design: there is no attempt made to point a moral from it. It is due simply to the fact that in the author's conception of life, "these things are not otherwise, but thus." There are three mothers in the book, quite unlike each other in character and conduct. Mrs. Russell carries her point by calm force of will; Madame de Montaigu, by perpetually storming and "nagging" at her victims; and Mrs. Vivian, by coaxing. But they all have this in common, that they always have their way. Mrs. Russell succeeds in forcing her daughter into marrying a man she does not love, and preventing her son from marrying a woman he does love—or thinks he does. Madame de Montaigu insults and tyrannizes over Estelle and her husband, Raymond de Montaigu, who is intended for the very reverse of a weak-minded young man, unchecked save by the mildest remonstrances; and Mrs. Vivian, when her son has every motive that can urge a man for setting off at once for the south of France, manages to keep him at her side, to support her in a round of formal country visiting. All this certainly savours strongly of nursery doctrines.

But in spite of these terrible mothers, the story is very well told, and undoubtedly interesting. The way in which Estelle, when once married—though so far from commencing with love for Raymond, she is in love with another man—subsides into happiness almost against her will, and becomes fond and proud of her devoted and highly-gifted husband, is worked out with great skill and fidelity to fact. It is rather refreshing to meet with a departure from the established tradition that none but unworthy lovers are ever inconstant. Still she never feels that, well as she loves Raymond, he is *quite* to her what Louis Vivian would have been; and when, after many years, she meets him dying of consumption at Caunterets, at a time when she is ill-pleased with her husband's prolonged absence in deference to his mother, one is disposed to think her peace in danger. But though there is darkness for a while, the storm passes; and there is no shadow of estrangement or disunion between husband and wife in the end.

The scene of perhaps the greater part of the story is laid at Toulouse and its neighbourhood, which enables the author to introduce many sketches of provincial society in the south of France, with which she seems familiar. Indeed, we think her French and semi-French characters, such as Estelle herself, decidedly superior to the English. The chief fault we should find with the book would be a tendency to a redundancy of trivial and common-place talk, a blemish only too common in novels of the present day, springing from that worship of a realism which is, after all, a false realism, which Mr. Anthony Trollope, with all his excellencies, has done not a little to create and encourage. A good deal of quiet humour shows itself here and there, as when the old Comtesse de Montaigu tells her son that she shall make it her business to convert Estelle to Catholicism, as he must understand that it would be disagreeable to her that any one bearing her name should be damned eternally. And one scene, at least, between Estelle and Sir Louis Vivian, in the mountains at Caunterets, is of real power. Both for good work actually accomplished, and still more for the promise we think it gives of higher excellence in the future, we can bestow on "Estelle Russell" a very sincere approval.

Irma: A Tale of Hungarian Life. By COUNT CHARLES VETTER DU LYS. Two Vols. London: Strahan & Co.

IRMA comes before us as the daughter of a Bohemian steward, or director, on the large estate of the Hungarian Baron Er6a. She has rare gifts and a peculiarly happy disposition, which makes her beloved of all. Even the Baron, who has no children of his own, watches her with a kind of fatherly affection, and gives her apartments in his castle. His nephew, Count Kalman, falls in love with her, but is afraid to acknowledge his passion to himself, for he cannot understand the Baron's attachment to her: and, besides, he is heir of entail to the estates, one condition of succeeding to which is, that he must marry a lady of equal rank. Now Irma sympathizes deeply with the aspirations of Hungary, has little in common with her parents, and dislikes the idea of being a Bohemian. Count Kalman is just about to escape from the dilemma in which her society places him, by seeking a new field of adventure, when there come hints of peasants' outbreaks and Bohemian schemes, in which Irma's father, the steward, is involved. This keeps the Count at home; and matters proceed from bad to worse, until the steward gets notice to quit. Just then Irma disappears, and, notwithstanding that all search is made for her, it is some time before she is discovered. Then a wounded peasant is found by Count Kalman, who bears a letter to the Baron from Irma. In it she tells him that, not being able to face the idea of departure, and in order to spare the feelings of all, she has taken refuge in a convent. The Baron, at last, tells his sister, his nephew, and the rest, an important episode of his early life. Irma is his own legitimate daughter, and the work ends by her being rescued from the convent, and, in due time, married to Count Kalman. This, of course, is but the barest skeleton of the story, which is wrought out with much ingenuity, subtle depicting of character, and due introduction of plots and counterplots. Sometimes, it seems to us, the writer errs on the side of seeking romantic motifs, thus, to some extent, spoiling the effect of what might otherwise have been valuable for its faithful representations of Hungarian society. The author has facility in construction, and keeps the subsidiary incidents in due and careful proportion, while yet he conceals his secret very skilfully, till his own time comes to unravel the involved skein of incidents. Irma is sketched with much care; and so is the Baron's imperious, and rather self-interested, sister. Some of the subordinate characters prove that the writer has a faculty for quiet humour; and there is an ease and lightness about the workmanship generally, which makes us hope to meet with Count Vetter du Lys again, and on ground which will not be quite so foreign to us as that he has traversed in this very interesting novel.

Terence McGowan, the Irish Tenant. By G. L. TOTTENHAM. In Two Vols. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.

If we believed at all in the possibility of making fiction serve any useful purpose, in reference to the settlement of difficult and keenly-disputed questions, we should say this was really a good story. It is written by a man who has observed, and can reflect back both individual character and general tendencies with a peculiar vividness and force. Terence McGowan is tenant under Mr. Rochfort, a good landlord, who sympathizes with his tenantry, and encourages them to improve their farms. Terence is a great favourite with his landlord, intelligent, and hard-working. But Mr. Rochfort is shot one day when defending his friend, Lord Shirley, who, though the holder of somewhat different views, is about to be wedded to his daughter. Then the estate falls into other hands; the old tenants either have to pay increased rents, or are served with notices to quit. Terence McGowan is one of these; but he has special indignities to submit to at the hands of Mr. Marjoribanks and his agent—at all events, he thinks so, and broods over the injuries done him. His mind at length loses its balance, and after a long struggle with himself, he shoots the agent. He is afterwards hunted over the country, and manages to hide himself from the police, because all the sympathies of the people are with him. He makes hairbreadth escapes, and at last sails for America. The sufferings of his wife, who falls into a high fever under the excitement of the crime, are heartrending; and the close of the novel is effective in its grim pathos. Some of the other characters also are well touched off; as, for instance, Lady

Eleanor Rochfort, with her mild conservatism. There are exquisite passages of description here and there; and the novel, as a whole, is skilfully planned, and effectively wrought out; but as we have said already, we are doubtful of the policy of lashing the imagination to the one-sided service of a purely political object. It must be confessed, however, that Mr. Tottenham has struggled to be fair and faithful; only his Appendix itself strongly backs our criticism.

Essays and Stories. By the late G. W. BOSANQUET. With an Introductory Chapter by Captain C. R. BRACKENBURG, R.A. Sampson Low & Co.

THIS little volume has a mournful interest. Mr. Bosanquet died in his twenty-fifth year. He had been for some years an officer in the army, from which private reasons led him to retire, and after this he found an appointment in the Civil Service. We can easily believe that a mind of such sensitiveness did not find itself at ease in the army; and the fact that he was so much exercised as to the best means of elevating the common soldiers only goes to confirm this view. Some of these little sketches were written to be read to a gathering of privates; and we can easily imagine how the writer struggled to make them *hit* the available points. Yet in reading them we feel that their chief merits are hardly such as would suit them for this purpose. He was too meditative, too self-absorbed, and delicate in his way of conceiving things to have thoroughly succeeded in this. Yet, doubtless, his very presence and effort would have good results on those he wished to benefit. The little stories are beautiful, but they are monotonous and self-coloured, and want reality. In the essays there is a great deal of valuable information as to military examinations, promotion in the army, religion in the army, and combination among workmen. The latter essay we have read with deep interest, as showing how anxious this young man was to master the practical problems of the time. "Off the Line" has a tenderly pathetic interest in the light of the little preface, which is done simply, yet with sympathy and appreciation.

VI.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Ginx's Baby: His Birth and other Misfortunes. London: Strahan & Co.

HERE is a writer whose humour is deliciously genuine, albeit somewhat grim. This is the first impression the little volume leaves on the mind of the reader; it is a slower and more difficult matter to decide as to how far he has achieved his practical purpose. Through the light and hurried play of his fancy, the points of the most terrible social problems show themselves keenly, and with that dark jaggedness and terrible meaning, which come out more and more fully when bright light plays round the edges of anything black and awful. And this author whirls the dancing lights of his genius round the whole circle of his social *Inferno* with such strange whimsicality now and then, that we are afraid at our own laughter; and on second thoughts take ourselves to task for yielding ourselves up to the enjoyment of his *grotesquerie*. That the book has this effect is a proof that our author has not wholly failed in his purpose. The earnest sigh is felt beneath the surface-rattle and sudden kaleidoscopic changes; and we find relief in a powerful impulse, if not to active effort, then to that profound sympathy which is near akin to effort. The object of the book is to expose the absurdities of the machinery by which society in England has agreed to discharge its duties towards pauperdom and those on the verge of pauperdom. Nearly all the darker social problems run up into this one of over-population, and the inefficient means of dealing timeously with the large masses who stand on the border line of vice and crime, struggling to escape, yet every moment drawn fatefully further and further on. To outline the idea of the book would simply be to spoil its interest. Ginx's Baby is the feeble martyr to social progress; the terrible sacrifice which civilization offers up in its efforts after complete self-adjustment. In a series of short chapters the typical creature is followed from stage to stage; society and ill-directed benevolence only interposing, and saving from lesser sufferings to precipitate into greater ones, till at

length, after infinite labour and means spent, the poor wretch, alternately cuddled and cuffed, alternately overfed and starved, escapes out of a life of misery by the short cut so easy to the miserable. A drag upon society living, and unmourned when dead, he goes his dark way, cursing; and society balances its account, and finds loss, only loss; and yet it just shrugs its shoulders, and goes on precisely as before.

There can be no doubt that the statement of the problem in this concrete fashion must have more effect than regiments of arguments. The only qualification to be made is, that here and there, although the humour never becomes so broad as to hide the serious purpose that lies beneath, the exaggeration sometimes presses too close in upon the real substance of the work; so that there is a temptation to feel that the writer is forcing a point rather than representing things even with a general regard to faithfulness, as he was in duty bound to do. This feeling is somewhat intensified, too, whenever the writer comes to hand-to-hand fight with institutions and individuals, easily recognisable through his laughably droll yet cutting paragraphs. But the book is, on the whole, one of the most original and humorous we have read for long. We have only abstained from epitome or extract that we may lead our readers to procure the volume for themselves. They will not grudge either the money or the pains, which we assure them will be amply repaid in that genuine laughter which has a heart of earnest sympathy, leading to benevolent impulses and to enlargements of hope for the miserable and the stricken—"those conscripts of society on whom the lot fell, and who, fighting our battle, were so marred."

The Mythology of the Aryan Nations. By GEORGE W. COX, M.A., late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford. London: Longmans.

OBVIOUSLY, it is impossible to notice these volumes in anything like the manner they deserve in this department of the Review; we can only in a few words signalize the fact of their appearance, and express the hope of devoting more space to them at some future time. Mr. Cox's theme stretches pretty well over the whole sphere of human learning; for he is concerned with phenomena which date from the first infant speech of man, and cast their broad shadows over every development of human thought and belief. Human language is properly his field, through its manifold manifestations and modifications; and his aim is to prove how, in spite of their varied forms, all myths have a common source or ground; are, in fact, nothing but the simple record of the dim conceptions of the early men as to physical fact and law. He wishes to reduce them all to one type, to draw their various far-shining threads of meaning and reference into one point.

"In the spontaneous utterances of thoughts awakened by outward phenomena, we have the source of the myths, which may be regarded as *primary*. But it is obvious such myths would be produced only so long as the words employed were used in their original meaning. While men were conscious of describing only the departure of the sun when they said, 'Endymion sleeps,' the myth had not passed beyond its first stage; but if once the meaning of the word were either in part or wholly forgotten, the creation of a new personality under this name would become inevitable, and the change would be rendered both more certain and more rapid by the very wealth of words which they lavished on the sights and objects which most impressed their imagination. A thousand phrases would be used to describe the action of the beneficent or consuming sun, of the gentle or awful night, of the playful or furious wind; and every word or phrase became the germ of a new story, as soon as the mind lost its hold on the original force of the name. Thus in the Polyonymy, which was the result of the earliest form of human thought, we have the germ of the great epics of later times, and of the countless legends which make up the rich stores of mythical tradition. There was no bound or limit to the images suggested by the sun in his ever-varying aspects; and for every one of these aspects they would have a fitting expression, nor could human memory retain the exact meaning of all these phrases, when the men who used them had been scattered from their original home. Old epithets would now become the names of new beings, and the legends so formed would constitute the class of *secondary* myths. But in all this there would be no disease of language. The failure would be that of memory alone,—a failure inevitable, yet not to be regretted, when we think of the rich harvest of beauty which the poets of many ages and many lands have reaped from those half-remembered words."

Whether or not the reader will agree with Mr. Cox in tracing the origin of myth so definitively to man's first contact with physical nature, or be inclined rather to agree with Mr. Gladstone and others in finding in the myths the dispersed yet radiant fragments of a primitive revelation, it will be impossible for him not to acknowledge Mr. Cox's wide and careful research, his complete grasp of facts, his keen instinct for coherently relating what is distant, and bringing out sudden light from the contact. The book is a solid and masterly one on a great subject, and should be carefully studied by every one who takes the least interest in liberal learning.

The Modern Buddhist; being the Views of a Siamese Minister of State on his own and other Religions. Translated, with Remarks, by HENRY ALABASTER, Interpreter of H.B.M. Consulate-General in Siam. London: Trübner & Co.


THIS is a curious little volume; but it is as suggestive as it is curious, notwithstanding that it brings before us a type of intelligence with which it is extremely difficult for the English temper to fully sympathize. We know a good deal of the lithe intellect of the Brahmin, gliding with serpentine sinuosity round absurdest dogmas, yet sufficiently immobile not to trust itself to even a momentary detachment, so as to view them quite independently of its own relation to them. Englishmen are inclined to think, indeed, that if they could only effect this detachment, the victory were more than half won; and certainly English education is doing very much in this direction. But here we have an Oriental, who has so completely detached the *individual* reason from every type of dogmatic truth, that he can contemplate all forms of faith with equal serenity and urbane patience—can even calmly scrutinize the basis of his own Buddhism, carefully pare away and reject what is incongruous, contradictory, and absurd; and yet find in the depths of its spiritual reason what satisfies him more fully than aught else whatever. Here, assuredly, intellect has obtained free play; but our Buddhist Minister has learned the lesson, so hard for human nature to learn, that it can only hope to reach truth by first distrusting its own tendencies, and entering on such profound studies with an assured conviction that everything man has ever believed has some glimmering of truth in it; but that, on the other hand, no religious system has long been able to maintain itself free from admixture of "vain imaginations." For our Buddhist's chief charge against religions generally is directed to the mythical element in them. His Discourse on Rain is very characteristic; and the way in which he disposes of Phya Nak, the King of the Naks—i.e. hooded serpents of immense size and power, which, "in play, blow water high into the air, where it is caught by the wind, and falls as rain"—is perhaps most so.

"As for the Nak playing with water, no one has seen him, so there is no proof of it. The Chinese say rain falls because the Dewas will it, or because the Dragon shows his might by sucking up the sea-water, which by his power becomes fresh. They having seen that in the open ocean a wind sometimes sucks up the water transparently into the sky, and that thence arise clouds, believe that the Dragon does it. There is no proof of this."

The truth is, our modern Buddhist discredits the faculties of man, which are mainly concerned in the development of religion, and without continual refreshment from which the religious instinct itself would wither away; and he sets up a kind of quasi-religious inductive science, under which everything is to be reduced to the test of strict evidence. His reason, in its incisive deliberateness, and the force and clearness accruing from the self-possessed, patient attitude of inquiry, would certainly be apt to make the missionaries feel that a trap had been laid for them, and they would be only too swift to prove the truth of the text, "In vain is the net set in the sight of any bird." But it is evident that such minds as that of this Siamese Minister will never be favourably operated on by the usual arguments advanced. So far as argument goes, he certainly has the advantage; and some of his remarks are extremely apt and forcible. Altogether the little book is a suggestive study, and opens up hosts of questions which cannot be discussed here.

Varieties of Viceregal Life. By SIR WILLIAM DENISON, K.C.B., late Governor-General of the Australian Colonies and Governor of Madras. Two Vols. London: Longmans.

THIS book is guilty of the great offence of being far too long. A work of 1,053 octavo pages is a very serious matter in these busy days, particularly when a large part of it is by no means of sufficient value or interest to make us forget its prolixity. If Sir W. Denison had been content to condense his recollections, and give us the cream of them in one moderately-sized volume instead of pouring them out wholesale, he would have had a far better chance of being read. He has certainly enjoyed opportunities of a certain kind for studying men and manners. After acting as Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Land from 1846 to 1854, he spent the next six years as Governor of New South Wales, and finally for about another six years was Governor of Madras. And for a brief space he held a far higher post than any of these. During the interval that elapsed between the death of Lord Elgin and the arrival at Calcutta of Sir John, now Lord, Lawrence, he acted as Viceroy of India. Nor was his tenure of these offices by any means unmarked by events of importance. At Van Diemen's Land he was in charge of Smith O'Brien and his associates in the abortive attempt at insurrection in 1848. As Governor of New South Wales it fell to him to inaugurate parliamentary government and free institutions, and to witness the mad excitement caused by the gold discoveries. And whilst at the head of affairs in India he had much to do with the management of one of our costly and vexatious "little wars," the winter campaign of 1863 against the Sitana fanatics, best known as the affair of the Umbeyla Pass. Here was ample material for a man who knew how to avail himself of it. But though we believe Sir William Denison to have well approved himself on the whole a worthy and valuable public servant, the gift of writing a book is one that has been bestowed on him in very niggardly measure. We are told a great deal that we do not at all care about, and what we should like to hear loses too often much of its flavour in the telling. At the same time, though we cannot speak favourably of the general merits of the book, it would be unjust not to admit that it is marked by a singularly frank and outspoken tone which must command our respect, and that some of its sketches, particularly those contained in Lady Denison's letters, of colonial life and society are decidedly amusing.



CATHOLICISM IN BAVARIA.

IT is well known that Bavaria, next after Austria, has been, since the Reformation, the stronghold of Catholicism in Germany. So great has been the influence of the Jesuits, and through them of the Pope, that it has been called the "German State of the Church." Even lately, after a hard battle with the Liberals, the Ultramontane Roman or Jesuit party, obtained a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Yet at the present time there goes out directly from Munich, the chief town of Bavaria, the most determined opposition to the Jesuits and the claims of the Papacy. This opposition proceeds not merely from the diplomatic action of the government; but also from two members of the University. Döllinger and Frohschammer represent, indeed, two different kinds of opposition. The one is concerned chiefly with the dogma of Papal infallibility and what is connected with it, Roman absolutism and the domination of the Jesuits. The other goes further, and is striving for the emancipation of the spiritual life from Papal authority, the constraint of dogmas, and the excesses of superstitious worship. It seeks also, by this means, to effect the reconciliation of religion with science and civilization. Before speaking more fully of these two oppositions, it will be desirable to take a brief glance at the previous ecclesiastical history of Bavaria.

Before the Reformation the Bavarian princes and people were not

in any way specially inclined to Romanism or Papalism. On the contrary, particularly under the Emperor Ludwig, Bavaria entered into a determined warfare with the Popes. The people, notwithstanding the Papal excommunication, clung faithfully to their prince, and Bavaria was then the refuge of the most decided opponents of the authority and immense claims of the Pope. It was here, for instance, that the celebrated William of Occam, with his fellow Minorites, found protection under Ludwig, and by his writings inflicted severe wounds on the Papacy itself. When the Reformation broke out, it spread in a short time over old Bavaria and the Oberpfalz: the latter of which now constitutes the darkest provinces in the kingdom of Bavaria. But a decided reaction followed. Duke William IV. was a zealous Catholic. He saw with anxiety and sorrow the progress of the Lutheran doctrine among his people, and resolved to check it. Judging that the recently established Order of the Society of Jesus was the best adapted to perform this object, he sent his Chancellor to Rome, to ask from Pope Paul III. three learned theologians for his University of Ingoldstadt. This request he of course obtained. Soon after this followed the proper settling of the Jesuits in Bavaria. This was in 1556, by the arrival of eighteen members of that Order. Then Bavaria, both princes and people, began to be disposed towards Papalism and Jesuitism. With this began the so-called "Ausländerei," or reign of foreigners. Among these Jesuits there was scarcely one native Bavarian. They were Italians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Germans from the western provinces. Ample means for accomplishing their object were placed at their disposal, and they soon ruled the University, the learned schools, the nobility, the women, and, above all, the princes. Non-Catholics were again made Catholic, either by preaching or by force. If any one refused to be converted, he was executed or banished. And thus the Bavarian people again became Catholic, and from this time intellectual life in Bavaria almost entirely ceased. The Pope became the ruler in the most important matters by means of his agents, the Jesuits. The people were allowed more of the sensuous pleasures of life. Because of the great number of festival days and pilgrimages they could pass much time in idleness. They were entertained with gorgeous ritual in the churches. They were lulled to sleep by rosaries and litanies. They were gratified and impoverished by frequent indulgences. But they were not allowed to think or to inquire for themselves. Their intellectual employment consisted in believing the Jesuits and obeying the Pope. And dear did this rule of the priests cost Bavaria. It is well known to what fearful sufferings the people were exposed in the Thirty Years' War through the policy of the Elector Maximilian I., led on by the Pope and the

Jesuits. But Adlzreiter, the Jesuit historian of Maximilian, says : "For all their many and great sacrifices and sufferings, God, after a wonderful manner, seemed to provide safety and deliverance for poor Bavaria when He restored the holy bodies of the physicians, Cosmas and Damian." The Elector had learned that their bodies lay in Bremen, altogether despised by the heretics, and he did not rest till, at great expense, he had them brought to Munich. This was what at that time was meant by care for the commonweal !

The dominion of the Jesuits in Bavaria kept itself firm, and for the most part immovable, until the middle of the eighteenth century. Then came the time of the "Aufklärung;" and in the measure that knowledge and education increased, dissatisfaction also increased against the Jesuits, who had not merely become ambitious of power, but greedy of wealth. They were first banished on this account from the southern kingdoms, and this could not be without its influence on the northern. That their power in Bavaria was not now what it had been is manifestly evident from this, that they could not prevent the establishment of the Academy of Sciences at Munich in 1759, nor hinder its prosperity, even though they were patronised by the Elector Maximilian III. and his consort. That a new era was expected, and that the wealth and dominion of the Church were in danger, is sufficiently manifest from the sayings and poems of that era.* The suppression of the Order in 1773 by Pope Clement XIV. put an end also to their existence in Bavaria. But their activity and influence did not end with their suppression. Under the Elector Karl Theodore, whose reign began in 1777, there came a good time for those whom we may call ex-Jesuits.

The mental oppression brought on by Jesuit domination had too

* In Landshut a Jesuit caused a drama, written by himself, to be performed by his scholars. It was called *Bavaria Vetus et Nova*. In this drama a "Pseudopoliticus" sang the following air :—

"Ad quid in templis aurum stat ?
Cur non per orbem ambulat
In bonum reipublicæ ?
Cur Christum facis divitem
Qui vitam amat pauperem
Et opes docet spernere ?
De aureo Apostolo
Vel martyre argenteo
Num legimus prodigia ?" &c.

Another air of this drama contains the following strophe :—

"Libertas sentiendi
Lex prima est sciendi
Si jura dat religio
Captiva gemit ratio
Qui vinculis Romanis
Ligatur instar canis
Nunquam mentem erigit,
Nunquam, se nil scire, scit, &c.

Of course this had to be sung by the vile person in the drama. The author attributed such bad principles to "New Bavaria," that he was not again tolerated in Bavaria.

long weighed on the Bavarian people to be without pernicious consequences. Powers and capacities which had not been used were lamed and crippled. Strivings which the people had been taught to suspect must at last have appeared hurtful, if not hateful. This also happened, that the people were entirely deprived of independent thinking, and were thus kept in mental nonage. The sense for mental effort, and the value of mental cultivation were lost by degrees, and even now cannot generally be awakened. There were not wanting, however, some agreeable exceptions. From the midst of the Bavarian people soon appeared some eminent men, who showed what the national intellect really was, and that the Jesuit way of thinking was a foreign importation, and not indigenous to Bavaria. We mention only three of these men—a theologian, an historian, and a philosopher. The first is Sailer, a theological author and professor, who died Bishop of Regensburg. As professor of theology he had already forsaken the usual scholastic and Jesuit track, and shown a more liberal tendency, both in his teaching and as an author. But the power of the Jesuits was still so great, that they were able to effect his removal from the professor's chair, and to keep him from it for ten long years. In the beginning of this century Sailer was nominated by the king Bishop of Augsburg, but the confirmation of the appointment was refused at Rome. When advanced in years, he succeeded in obtaining from the Pope his confirmation as Bishop of Regensburg. Sailer was a man of liberal sentiments, entirely opposed to hierarchical domination and ecclesiastical formalism, tolerant, humane, not without a measure of the mystical element, yet as clear in intellect as he was generous in heart. He died in great esteem, leaving behind him many friends and disciples. He was the good bishop. The old Bavarian clergy still hold his memory in the deepest reverence; but the younger clergy, for the most part, are of an entirely different way of thinking.

The second of the three men to be mentioned as representing the old Bavarian spirit is Westenrieder, to whom is dedicated one of the many statues which adorn the town of Munich. He also was a clergyman, but he occupied himself chiefly with history. He was of a liberal spirit, a great enemy to the doings of the Jesuits, and animated by a spirit of toleration and humanity. But on that very account he had to endure incessant hostility and persecution from the Jesuits. For the third representative of the Bavarian intellect and the free scientific spirit we may mention Baader, the philosopher. The active part of his life also falls into the end of the last or the beginning of this century. He sought everywhere to give a new life and impulse to philosophy and theology, already benumbed by narrow-heartedness and formalism. He had not indeed much

success, which was due to his unscientific method and his indulging in speculations which sometimes were lost in a fantastic theosophy. Towards the end of his life, he so far rebelled against the Roman yoke that he discussed the propriety of the separation of Germany from Rome. He manifested at last a predilection for the Greek Church.

In the beginning of this century Bavaria was erected into a kingdom, and greatly enlarged. Some provinces, the chief population of which were Protestant, were united under one government, and Munich became the chief town of a kingdom which had various confessions of faith. The former intolerant exclusiveness, by which Bavaria was shut up within itself, and all non-Catholics excluded from municipal and civil offices, was no longer reckoned just. In Munich itself Protestants obtained the rights of citizens; and civil offices, as well as professorships in the University, were held by Protestants. Men of moderate liberal tendencies, such as Thiersch the philologist, Schelling the philosopher, and Schubert the psychologist, all Protestants, received appointments in the University. This, indeed, was not done without much wrath, lamentation, and strife on the part of the strong Roman Catholics, with which was mingled also the jealousy of natives against foreigners. But neither these men, nor those who, somewhat later, were invited from other countries, were able to obtain much influence over the mental life of the Bavarian people. This was partly because the spirit of the people had been long oppressed through the Jesuit discipline, and was not merely indifferent to mental activity, but even suspicious of it. Doubtless, it was also partly due to the circumstance that foreigners rarely obtain so great an influence over a people as those born among them. To the latter they open their minds trustfully; but, as a rule, they shut them obstinately against foreigners. The result was the ordinary one of isolated appointments. When the foreign Jesuits arrived in Bavaria, they found themselves in favourable circumstances. They all worked after a plan, and by the same method. They laid hold of men by means of their religious wants; they were trusted because of their religious creed. They came in contact with all classes of society. They worked upon all the faculties of the soul. To favour their object, they could bring to bear on men supernatural as well as natural motives. It is then no marvel that they obtained a lasting influence, the consequences of which even now form both an active and a passive opposition to the liberal efforts of the government and the universities.

But the free "*Aufklärung*"-favouring disposition of the government did not continue long. After the death of Maximilian I. in 1825, Ludwig I. came to the throne, and under him followed a powerful

Catholic ecclesiastical reaction. At first, indeed, the king appeared to be animated by a liberal spirit. He promised at the solemn opening of the University of Munich that he would take science and free inquiry under his own special, royal protection. But his mind soon seems to have changed. To this the political commotions of the first thirty years of his reign may have largely contributed. For science he had but little taste: his whole soul was devoted to art. This taste for art must have made him particularly susceptible of the influences of the external ritual of Catholicism, and led him to promote as far as possible its restoration. Appointments of foreigners were now also made in the universities, but of an entirely different kind from those of which we have already spoken. Soon a great number of ecclesiastical Ultramontanes were collected, and with them were united like-minded native Bavarians, both men and women. With Görres from Coblenz as their leader, well known as an infatuated Jacobin in his youth, they united themselves to the ministry of Abel; and for a long time, particularly from 1837 to 1847, they in every respect ruled Bavaria. The legally guaranteed rights of Protestants were in danger. It was found that in some points the Concordat concluded in 1818 was in contradiction with the so-called edict of religion, which determines the religious relations of Protestants. The approaching revolution put an end to the rule of these Ultramontanes. This, in connection with the universal anger caused by the influence which a Spanish dancer had obtained over the king, at last caused him to abdicate the government in favour of Maximilian II. The happy time in which Ultramontanism had the government of the kingdom in its hands departed, and has not yet returned. But the genuine Ultramontanes were not entirely satisfied even with the government under the ministry of Abel. They found that the Catholicism which the king had promoted was too much "a royal Bavarian Catholicism." Indeed, this king, notwithstanding all his support of the Catholic reaction, maintained zealously a certain independence even in Church matters, and did not allow any direct authority to be exercised by the Roman Curia. And so Ultramontanism, in the proper sense of a Roman government within the State, such as the authorities at Rome wished and aimed at, was never able to establish itself. On some occasions King Ludwig resolutely opposed the Roman Curia. It was proposed at Rome to put into the Index the fantastical work of the celebrated Görres—"Christliche Mystik." When the king heard of it he remonstrated with the Congregation of the Index, and forbade such a useless and hurtful proceeding against a man so highly esteemed by himself, and so much revered in the Church. Genuine Ultramontanism was much better able to establish itself in Bavaria under Ludwig's

successor, the noble and liberal-minded King Maximilian II., against his will certainly, and without his knowledge.

Maximilian was more devoted to science than to art. As Ludwig tried to bring glory and renown to his kingdom, which was not politically influential, by the creation and collection of works of art, so Maximilian II. tried to effect the same object by furthering the interests of science. The appointments made, particularly in the University of Munich, were of a kind entirely opposed to the Ultramontanism of the former reign, the phalanx of which was broken in 1847. Men of liberal minds, and possessing the true scientific spirit, mostly Protestants from the North, were made professors. Among these, chief of all, is to be mentioned Liebig. An important remnant of the disarmed Ultramontane phalanx still existed in the University. With these were banded some native professors, not otherwise of any importance, but dissatisfied with the preference given to foreigners. This gave occasion to much dissension and party spirit in the University, now happily diminished, if not altogether extinct. Maximilian provided ample means for the study of the natural sciences. His main object of elevating the people mentally, and giving them a more liberal education, had but little success in the strong Catholic provinces. Indeed, as we have already said, Ultramontanism was able to make greater progress under this liberal government than under the former reign. The reasons of this peculiar fact are worth noticing. In the year of the revolution, 1848, the people everywhere demanded from governments greater rights than they had hitherto possessed. The bishops did not hesitate to seize this opportunity to demand a higher measure of ecclesiastical, that is to say, hierarchical, freedom. And, in truth, no one had greater gains out of these revolutionary movements than the Roman Catholics and the hierarchy. From that time the Jesuits were again able to obtain a firm footing in Germany, especially in Prussia, where their influence is now great. The Bavarian bishops met in the old episcopal town of Freising, to consider and to formulate their increased claims on the government. These claims, which in some things went beyond the existing Concordat, were not all granted; but in 1852 a part of them were admitted, and these of such importance, that in their consequences they must be dangerous to the government itself. The first was that the so-called inferior clergy were given up even more completely than before to the power and will of the bishops, without being able to expect or to claim any protection or help from the civil government. The bishops thereby obtained unlimited authority over the whole clergy, and were able in consequence successfully to lay the foundation of an absolute Ultramontanism of the Roman hierarchical state within the State. The

clergy had to submit. Not one of them, without endangering his whole existence, can take the side of the government, or show any spirit of patriotism. In accordance with this, the education of the clergy was entirely given up to the bishops and Rome without any control from the State. Roman ecclesiastical principles were inculcated on the clergy. They learned scholasticism, but of modern science they knew but little, and that only in the one-sided way of controversy. The institutions in which the clergy were educated, entirely in Roman principles, under the supervision of the bishops, are the episcopal seminaries and Lyceums. To these boys are brought at a very early age, and trained after the monastic fashion. As a rule they learn nothing of the world till, as young priests, they enter on the cure of souls with their narrow monastic view of human life. Their character is formed, by having learned to yield a blind obedience to those above them. A like obedience they demand from others. They are successful with women, but men feel themselves repelled from religion. The so-called Lyceums, in which the clergy, as a rule, receive their higher education, are institutions in which only theology and philosophy are taught. They have become entirely institutions of the bishops and nurseries of the Roman spirit. The teachers, indeed, are appointed and paid by the government, but the choice of them rests with the bishops, so only those obtain appointments who are of the bishops' way of thinking. This circumstance shows what great means the Bavarian government places at the disposal of the bishops successfully to carry on a war against itself, and to establish the power of the Roman hierarchy. Maximilian II. made it a principle to promote energetically in the University science and free inquiry, in spite of the outcry of the Ultramontanes. But, on the other hand, he gave up the Lyceums, as well as the theological faculties in the University, to the bishops. Such is the union of Church and State in Bavaria—no happy principle, surely, by which the Roman educated clergy exercise the greatest influence over the people, and can entirely frustrate all the efforts of the Universities to promote a free and liberal education. The bishops, as soon as they found the Lyceums given up to them, began to keep candidates in theology away from the Universities and their liberal training. They were confined to the Lyceums, where they might be educated entirely as the bishops directed. All this evil resulted from the circumstance that this noble-minded king made mistakes in his choice of bishops, not indeed from any fault of his own, but owing to unfortunate relations which he could not change. The king has the nomination of the bishops, but the appointment must be ratified by the Pope before it is valid. No one, therefore, can be made a bishop if the Papal confirmation is denied. The consequence is that it is

difficult to find anywhere a bishop who is an independent thinking man. In consequence of compromises, those who are made bishops are either men that are entirely insignificant, from whom nothing is to be feared, or they are of the Roman party. And so it has happened in Bavaria that almost all the sees are occupied by mental nonentities, under the control and guidance of the Papal nuncio. The exceptions are where they are filled by the disciples of the Jesuits, expressly educated for the office, who can put on the appearance of Liberalism when they have an object to obtain.

Into such hands were the theological faculties and Lyceums given up. It is then no wonder that the greater number of the theological professorships, especially in the Lyceums, with other important offices, are held by the so-called Roman doctors, that is, priests educated in German colleges in Rome.

It has thus happened that under the government of the liberal Maximilian, who was much opposed to the Jesuits, Ultramontanism proper has been able to establish itself. The blame of this, doubtless, was due to the Bavarian minister of worship, who either entirely lacked the necessary insight to perceive whither these relations tended, or the disposition to oppose the gradually increasing Ultramontanism, and to give the king that information concerning it which was his bounden duty. The Ultramontane plantation grew and spread forth its branches without experiencing any check from the representatives of government. By uniting with itself the political revolution and the long-nourished hatred of Prussia, the Ultramontane party was able, in 1869, to obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In the Upper House it had hitherto almost always the victory. So Bavaria now seems entirely to be undertaking afresh the part of the "German State of the Church."

And yet from Bavaria, and especially from Munich, there goes forth the most determined opposition to the newest Roman claims, and the misuse to be made of the Vatican Council for their ratification. We need not speak of the diplomatic action of the government through Prince Hohenlohe, that is well known. We shall consider more closely the two oppositions which we mentioned in the beginning.

The one, as we have said, proceeds from Döllinger, and at the present stands directly in the foreground. It is concerned chiefly with the personal infallibility of the Pope. Döllinger has been for forty-five years Professor of Theology in the University of Munich. He is also Provost of the "Hofkirche" of St. Cajetan, and only lately was nominated a member of the Bavarian Council. Formerly he was a very zealous Churchman, and during the administration of Abel was rightly accounted one of the pillars of

the "Royal Bavarian Catholicism," as the genuine Ultramontanes would say, of that time. He distinguished himself by a sharp, often bitter, polemic against Protestantism, whereby, as well as by his great learning, he obtained an immense reputation among Catholics and also at Rome. Since 1848 his early and very intolerant views seem to have become somewhat milder. In 1857 he undertook a journey to Rome and returned under great mental depression, owing to what he had seen of the Roman Church administration. But it was only in 1861 that, by a public act, he brought upon himself the greatest displeasure of the Roman-Jesuit Ultramontane party. At Easter in that year he delivered some lectures on the States of the Church and the temporal power of the Pope. He wished to prepare the Catholic public for what then appeared to be near at hand, the loss of the Pope's temporal dominion. He showed that this in no way belonged to the essence of the Catholic Church, that its loss would not bring any danger to the faith; yea, that the temporal dominion of the Pope was in many ways a hindrance to the fulfilment of his spiritual functions, and that its administration led to many evils. This only raised the highest displeasure among the Ultramontane zealots. The Papal Nuncio who was present at the lecture by Döllinger's special invitation, rose up in the midst of it, with great ostentation, and left the lecture-room. The Ultramontane papers wrote violent articles against the man who formerly had been regarded as an Ultramontane light of the Church. This displeasure had in some measure subsided when, in the autumn of the same year, at the General Assembly of the Catholic Unions at Munich, Döllinger read an explanation, which seemed very like a retraction of his lectures. But the satisfaction which this gave soon disappeared when the obnoxious lectures appeared in print, though in a somewhat milder form, and as the beginning of a greater work, with the title "The Church and the Churches, the Papacy and the States of the Church." The first part of this work contains a keen criticism of the different Protestant tendencies and parties. The second is occupied with the Roman Church, and reveals many evils and corruptions in the ecclesiastico-political government of the States of the Church. The first part naturally gave great satisfaction to the Ultramontane party, and the second in the same measure dissatisfaction. Yet the book was spared Roman censure, and escaped being put in the Index.

In the autumn of 1863 Döllinger, in union with two or three other professors of theology, called a Conference of learned Catholics at Munich. This was done in consequence of the excitement which had been caused by the collision into which Professor Frohschammer had been brought with Rome and the Archbishop of Munich, through

his demand of freedom for science. It was contemplated, according to the programme, to plead, though in a very temperate form, for the right of freedom in science, and to oppose the domination of scholasticism and the terrorism of the Jesuits. In this sense Döllinger expressed himself particularly in the opening address. But the protest and the firm opposition of a small number of Ultramontane zealots was sufficient to cause the original design, which was to plead for the right of science, to be abandoned. This telegraph was finally sent to Rome: "The important question concerning the relation of science to Church authority has been determined by the Conference in the sense of the subjection of the former to the latter." Nevertheless, notwithstanding this departure from the original programme, and though the Conference was summoned by the express permission of the Archbishop of Munich and by the written agreements of other bishops, and though it was expressly arranged that Frohschammer should not receive an invitation, yet there was great anxiety at Rome concerning this Conference. Fears were entertained as to the consequences of the independent step which these learned men had taken, and the somewhat freer tone which had been produced. But Döllinger's words caused most anxiety. He advocated a greater freedom for science, with reservations and some cautious limitations, and so far agreed to Frohschammer's demand. Moreover, he said, with emphasis, that, "as human things now are, error has its meaning in free inquiry as a stage in the journey to truth." Then he said that public opinion must be allowed to have some weight in Church matters. At last he added some remarks not very appreciative concerning the old scholasticism. On this the Roman and Jesuit fury broke forth, in a Papal brief to the Archbishop of Munich, December 21, 1863 (*Tuas libenter, &c.*), which was also published by the bishops. In this brief the Pope grievously laments that a few private doctors should take upon themselves to treat of scientific and ecclesiastical matters which belonged only to the legitimate authority which was over them. Of the freedom of science he wishes to know so little that he condemns the position that expressly defined dogmas only are to be regarded as the limits and boundaries of science. He tells them sharply that the Papal Constitutions, the Decrees of the Index, &c., are also to be esteemed the limits and boundaries of science. And so in this brief, in almost every respect, the very opposite of what Döllinger had asked was commanded and prescribed. He was silent. The desire to call a second Conference of learned Catholic men had departed from him. The authorities at Rome remained distrustful of Döllinger; and although he, with other professors of theology, took care, by a public explanation, to disown the full and decided scientific position

of Frohschammer, yet in Rome, and particularly by the Pope himself, he was regarded as scarcely better than Frohschammer. On the other hand, there were not wanting circumstances which tended to increase his irritation against the Roman Curia, particularly some chicanery against such as were reckoned his disciples.

Then came the time of the Vatican Council. The bull containing the summons appeared, and it became clearer than ever that the whole design of the Council was nothing else but to sanction the collected Syllabus Errorum of the Encyclica of 1864, and to make some new dogmas, especially that of the personal infallibility of the Pope. The Jesuits have laboured for this unceasingly. They announced in the beginning of last year, in their *Civiltà Catholica*, that all "good Catholics" desire the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope. On this provocation there appeared, in March of last year, in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, five articles under the title "Das Concil und die Civiltà." In these articles the scheme, betrayed by the Jesuits themselves, is criticized with great penetration. The inadmissibility, as well as the religious and political mischief, of passing the dogma of Papal infallibility, are particularly pointed out. The articles excited great attention, and soon it was known that Döllinger, though not their author, was yet their intellectual originator. They appeared later much enlarged, and with references to the sources of evidence, under the title of "The Pope and Council. By Janus." This work was chiefly directed against Papal absolutism and the infallibility of the Pope. It was very clearly shown how the Popedom had entered, and by degrees had established itself in the Church, by means of many fictions and forgeries. It was also shown what enormous evils and corruptions had been caused by its rule. Many errors were pointed out into which different Popes had fallen in the course of centuries. Soon after this work there appeared a little pamphlet, "Considerations for the Bishops of the Council concerning the question of Papal Infallibility," which, in a shorter and milder form, contains the substance of the work of "Janus." Of this pamphlet Döllinger expressly proclaims himself the author. There appeared also in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* two articles with Döllinger's name, "Some Words concerning the Address on Infallibility," to the majority of the bishops of the Council. The other is, "The New Programme of the Council, and its Theological Importance." These are written in the same spirit, and controvert in the same way the infallibility of the Pope, declaring it a historical untruth, and an unrighteous novelty in the Catholic Church. It is, then, chiefly this contemplated new dogma against which Döllinger brings to bear all his vast learning, and which he seeks to prevent, because he regards it as destructive of the Catholic Church itself. But

it does not appear that his labours, or those of his way of thinking, will have any success. Everything, rather, seems to show that his cause is wrecked, and that, in a short time, the dogma of Papal infallibility will be proclaimed by the Vatican Council.

The next question is, Will Döllinger admit the decision of the Council, or will he remain in opposition, refuse to acknowledge the authorized dogma, and deny obedience to the Pope? It appears that the last is contemplated—that he will declare the decision of the Council invalid, and endeavour to prevent its acceptance on the ground that the Council has not been free, that the programme has been imposed on the Council by the Curia, and because the dogma is a new one, in contradiction with the old principle of *Vincentius Lirinensis*, that that only is to be held for a dogma in the Catholic Church “which has been believed always everywhere and by all.” But this proceeding can only have success, indeed, can only be ventured on, if the bishops of the opposition in Rome refuse to submit to the decision of the majority and the Pope. In this case a schism will arise. But the prospect of success is not great, since in Germany and Austria there is an important number of bishops for the infallibility of the Pope. In Bavaria, for instance, about the one half. So that by an inner division the schism will lose its force. Again, on the side of the Pope and the majority of the Council, this will not pass merely for a schism. It will be designated a heresy, because it will be in contradiction to a defined article of the faith. When the Pope himself has become a living personal dogma, whoever opposes the Pope must be regarded and treated as a heretic; not as formerly, a mere schismatic. The settling of this question must come before long.

Much different, and reaching further, is Frohschammer's opposition to the Roman Church administration. He is much younger than Döllinger, and began his public life as a teacher in the University in the beginning of 1850. He was then in the theological faculty, but in 1855 he passed over to the philosophical, being appointed professor of philosophy. Besides the philosophical subjects, he has read lectures on logic, psychology, metaphysics, the history of philosophy, pedagogy, and especially the philosophy of religion, and the natural sciences. These two last subjects, which demand on the one side a knowledge of the entire history of religion, and on the other, of the newest natural sciences, specially determined his line of thought, and the character of his writings. He soon came in conflict with the Roman Curia. His treatise “On the Origin of the Human Soul,” which appeared in 1857, justifying the theory of the generation of souls, was put in the Index of forbidden books. It is for the most part theological, but containing some sharp remarks on the excessive authority which was yielded to the Schoolmen. The theory

vindicated was condemned by the scholastics of the Middle Ages, and by their successors of the present time. The author refused to submit to the decree of the Congregation of the Index, notwithstanding all entreaties. In 1858, appeared his "Introduction to Philosophy." Here, again, he criticized the scholastics, claimed independence for philosophy, and particularly controverted the principle furbished up again by the Jesuits and their retainers, that "philosophia est theologicæ ancilla." Soon after appeared the treatise on "the Freedom of Science."

A year later Frohschammer established his philosophical periodical, the *Athenæum*. In all these writings he continued to express his views with increasing decision, till suddenly, in 1862, he was threatened by the Archbishop of Munich with excommunication unless he submitted within ten days. But this did not come. The archbishop did not dare to fulfil his threat, but had recourse to Rome, and left it to take the necessary steps. All the writings already mentioned had been put in the Index, and the Pope sent to the archbishop a brief concerning Frohschammer (Dec. 11, 1862, Gravissimus inter), in which he was charged with ascribing too much right and power to human reason, with striving to explore the Christian mysteries, and with claiming freedom for science, which was described as a "lawless license." It was also said that he had made statements which were not true concerning the commendable proceedings of the Congregation of the Index. Finally, it was enjoined on the archbishop to bring back the erring one to the right path. Frohschammer gave an explanation, but refused submission. On this measures were taken against him: all students of the University that intended to be priests were forbidden by the archbishop and all other bishops to attend his lectures. In consequence of this there arose among the students of the University an important movement. It was decided that an address should be presented to Frohschammer, which was subscribed by more than a hundred students, expressing their attachment to him, and proclaiming their appreciation of his efforts. On the other hand, the professors of theology, of whom many had assured him of their agreement, by degrees began to stand aloof from him, and at last openly disowned him.

Frohschammer, however, carried on his *Athenæum* for some time, in spite of all opposition, until the publisher, who feared the injury which was threatened to his business, did not venture to continue its publication. When the Papal Encyclica, with the *Syllabus Errorum* of Dec. 8, 1864, appeared, Frohschammer devoted to it an anonymous pamphlet, of which a second edition was published with his name. In 1868 appeared his chief work, "Christianity and Modern Science," which was noticed briefly in this Review in July the

same year as a remarkable work, and again in the June number of this year. In 1869 he published "The Right of Private Judgment," which is chiefly occupied with determining the relations between Church and State, but which also discusses the question of the infallibility of the Pope, and establishes, from facts of history as well as from principles of reason, that infallibility must be denied to the Church, as well as to the Pope; that is, the Church as simply episcopal.

When the work of "Janus" appeared, in which the infallibility of the Church is assumed, while that of the Pope is controverted, Frohschammer ventured to give the work a thorough criticism in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*. This criticism was republished as a pamphlet, with the title—"An Estimate of the Infallibility of the Pope and the Church." The great merit of the work of "Janus" is admitted, but Frohschammer says emphatically, that its author goes but half way, and that he has not shown the necessary consequences of the facts which he has brought forward. If a Church in which all that "Janus" produces is possible—all these fictions, forgeries, and assumptions made to establish the claims of the Pope to an absolute dominion over the whole Church—then it is impossible that the Church itself can be infallible. Since the Popes for centuries really regarded themselves and acted as the Church, then it must be that infallibility was long ago taken away by this very fact that these fallible Popes acted as the infallible Church. The battle, then, against Papal absolutism cannot be isolated or localized. It touches necessarily the Church itself. As many historical facts can be adduced against the infallibility of the Church as against the infallibility of the Pope. In a second pamphlet, called "The Political Significance of the Infallibility of the Pope and the Church," he maintains that not much will be gained by preventing the infallibility of the Pope from passing into a dogma, since the Pope has hitherto governed the Church as an absolute ruler without the dogma. If the opposition, then, accomplishes no more than is proposed by the simple opponents of Papal Infallibility, it will have succeeded in doing but very little for the reforming of the Church, and satisfying the religious necessities of the present age.

What Frohschammer has in view and at present desires for the safety, as well as the renovation, of religion in its relation to science, is what has been called since Lessing "the Christianity of Christ," in contradistinction to the Christianity of Church decrees and dogmas. He considers that to be the true essence of Christianity which Christ Himself taught and practised. The original principles are the most important, not those which arose later. The

clear and simple doctrines themselves must be regarded as the necessary and certain, not the dark and doubtful, which have arisen from controversy, and which have made out of Christianity a religion of strife, hatred, and persecution, instead of a religion of love, peace, and reconciliation.

Frohschammer has been reproached with the charge of Rationalism. He does not admit that the reproach is just. Certainly he says science, so far as it goes, must be the rational work of the Ratio; but he does not resolve religion into knowledge, nor put science in the place of religion. Each has a peculiar region of its own. He distinguishes in religious faith itself between the historical and the mystical ingredients. Besides the truths that are traditional or grounded on authority, he acknowledges a peculiar immediate relation of the human soul to the Divine, by which the historically received faith becomes living. He wishes that the dogmatic formulas, which arose in the course of long controversies and by dialectical processes, be again dissolved by science, gradually as the necessity emerges. His views are received chiefly by educated laymen; while Döllinger's disciples are chiefly among the liberal-minded clergy. Great immediate results are not expected from these endeavours unless some unforeseen circumstances should arise; but they help to prepare the mind, to unloose beforehand the bands with which men's intellects are bound, and, above all, to awaken an interest for these high questions. The indifferentism of the educated, Frohschammer says, is, in fact, the stronghold of the Roman dominion over the souls of men.

Much will, of course, depend for the future position of Catholicism in Bavaria on the support of the young king. It has been believed hitherto that he had quite lost himself in Romantic enthusiasm; but he has lately shown some indications that he regards with a lively interest the intellectual conflicts of the present time, and is opposed to the Roman claims. There is a well-grounded hope that he will continue in this direction. Much will also depend on the future queen. A Russian princess has already been spoken of. Protestants and liberal Catholics are looking to England. It is expected that the Jesuits, as well as the king, will find a match, whether the future queen of Bavaria be a Russian or an English princess.

A. BAVARIAN CATHOLIC.



ON SOME FIXED POINTS IN BRITISH ETHNOLOGY.

IN view of the many discussions to which the complicated problems offered by the ethnology of the British islands have given rise, it may be useful to attempt to pick out, from amidst the confused masses of assertion and of inference, those propositions which appear to rest upon a secure foundation, and to state the evidence by which they are supported. Such is the purpose of the present paper.

Some of these well-based propositions relate to the physical characters of the people of Britain and their neighbours; while others concern the languages which they spoke. I shall deal, in the first place, with the physical questions.

I. *Eighteen hundred years ago the population of Britain comprised people of two types of complexion—the one fair and the other dark. The dark people resembled the Aquitani and the Iberians; the fair people were like the Belgic Gauls.*

The chief direct evidence of the truth of this proposition is the well-known passage of Tacitus:—

“Ceterum, Britanniam qui mortales initio coluerint, indigenæ an advecti, ut inter barbaros, parum compertum. Habitus corporum varii: atque ex eo argumenta: nam rutilæ Caledoniam habitantium comæ, magni artus Germanicam originem asseverant. Silurum colorati vultus et torti plerumque crines, et posita contra Hispaniam, Iberos veteres trajecisse, easque sedes

occupasse, fidem faciunt. Proximi Gallis et similes sunt; seu durante originis vi, seu procurrentibus in diversa terris, positio cœli corporibus habitum dedit. In universum tamen æstimanti, Gallos vicinum solum occupasse, credibile est; eorum sacra deprehendas, superstitionum persuasione; sermo haud multum diversus* . . ."

This passage, it will be observed, contains statements as to facts, and certain conclusions deduced from these facts. The matters of fact asserted are: firstly, that the inhabitants of Britain exhibit much diversity in their physical character; secondly, that the Caledonians are red-haired and large-limbed, like the Germans; thirdly, that the Silures have curly hair and dark complexions, like the people of Spain; fourthly, that the British people nearest Gaul resemble the "Galli."

Tacitus, therefore, states positively what the Caledonians and Silures were like; but the interpretation of what he says about the other Britons, must depend upon what we learn from other sources as to the characters of these "Galli." Here the testimony of "divus Julius" comes in with great force and appropriateness. Cæsar writes:—

"Britanniæ pars interior ab iis incolitur, quos natos in insula ipsi memoria proditum dicunt: maritima pars ab iis, qui prædæ ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierant; qui omnes fere iis nominibus civitatum appellantur quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerunt, et bello inlato ibi permanserunt atque agros colere cæperunt."†

From these passages it is obvious that, in the opinion of Cæsar and Tacitus, the southern Britons resembled the northern Gauls, and especially the Belgæ; and the evidence of Strabo is decisive as to the characters in which the two people resembled one another: "The men [of Britain] are taller than the Kelts, with hair less yellow; they are slighter in their persons."‡

The evidence adduced appears to leave no reasonable ground for doubting that, at the time of the Roman conquest, Britain contained people of two types, the one dark and the other fair complexioned, and that there was a certain difference between the latter in the north and in the south of Britain: the northern folk being, in the judgment of Tacitus, or, more properly, according to the information he had received from Agricola and others, more similar to the Germans than the latter. As to the distribution of these stocks, all that is clear is, that the dark people were predominant in certain parts of the west of the southern half of Britain, while the fair stock appears to have furnished the chief elements of the population elsewhere.

No ancient writer troubled himself with measuring skulls, and therefore there is no direct evidence as to the cranial characters of the

* Taciti Agricola, c. 11.

† De Bello Gallico, v. 12.

‡ "The Geography of Strabo." Translated by Hamilton and Falconeri: v. 5.

fair and the dark stocks. The indirect evidence is not very satisfactory. The tumuli of Britain of pre-Roman date have yielded two extremely different forms of skull, the one broad and the other long; and the same variety has been observed in the skulls of the ancient Gauls.* The suggestion is obvious that the one form of skull may have been associated with the fair, and the other with the dark, complexion. But any conclusion of this kind is at once checked by the reflection that the extremes of long and short-headedness are to be met with among the fair inhabitants of Germany and of Scandinavia at the present day—the South-western Germans and the Swiss being markedly broad-headed, while the Scandinavians are as predominantly long-headed.

What the natives of Ireland were like at the time of the Roman conquest of Britain, and for centuries afterwards, we have no certain knowledge; but the earliest trustworthy records prove the existence, side by side with one another, of a fair and a dark stock, in Ireland as in Britain. The long form of skull is predominant among the ancient, as among modern, Irish.

II. *The people termed Gauls, and those called Germans, by the Romans, did not differ in any important physical character.*

The terms in which the ancient writers describe both Gauls and Germans are identical. They are always tall people, with massive limbs, fair skins, fierce blue eyes, and hair, the colour of which ranges from red to yellow. Zeuss, the great authority on these matters, affirms broadly that no distinction in bodily feature is to be found between the Gauls, the Germans, and the Wends, so far as their characters are recorded by the old historians; and he proves his case by citations from a cloud of witnesses.

An attempt has been made to show that the colour of the hair of the Gauls must have differed very much from that which obtained among the Germans, on the strength of the story told by Suetonius (Caligula, 4), that Caligula tried to pass off Gauls for Germans by picking out the tallest, and making them "*rutilare et summittere comam.*"

The Baron de Belloguet remarks upon this passage:—

"It was in the very north of Gaul, and near the sea, that Caligula got up this military comedy. And the fact proves that the Belgæ were already sensibly different from their ancestors, whom Strabo had found almost identical with their *brothers* on the other side of the Rhine."

But the fact recorded by Suetonius, if fact it be, proves nothing; for the Germans themselves were in the habit of reddening their hair. Ammianus Marcellinus † tells how, in the year 367 A.D., the

* See Dr. Thurnam "On the two Principal Forms of Ancient British and Gaulish Skulls."

† *Res Gestæ*, xxvii.

Roman commander, Jovinus, surprised a body of Alemanni near the town now called Charpeigne, in the valley of the Moselle; and how the Roman soldiers, as, concealed by the thick wood, they stole upon their unsuspecting enemies, saw that some were bathing and others "comas rutilantes ex more." More than two centuries earlier Pliny gives indirect evidence to the same effect when he says of soap:—

"Galliarum hoc inventum rutilandis capillis . . . apud Germanos majore in usu viris quam fœminis."*

Here we have a writer who flourished only a short time after the date of the Caligula story, telling us that the Gauls invented soap for the purpose of doing that which, according to Suetonius, Caligula forced them to do. And, further, the combined and independent testimony of Pliny and Ammianus assures us that the Germans were as much in the habit of reddening their hair as the Gauls. As to De Belloguet's supposition that, even in Caligula's time, the Gauls had become darker than their ancestors were, it is directly contradicted by Ammianus Marcellinus, who knew the Gauls well. "Celsioris staturæ et candidi pœne Galli sunt omnes, et rutili, luminumque torvitate terribiles," is his description; and it would fit the Gauls who sacked Rome.

III. *In none of the invasions of Britain which have taken place since the Roman dominion, has any other type of man been introduced than one or other of the two which existed during that dominion.*

The North Germans, who effected what is commonly called the Saxon conquest of Britain, were, most assuredly, a fair, yellow, or red-haired, blue-eyed, long-skulled people. So were the Danes and Norsemen who followed them; though it is very possible that the active slave trade which went on, and the intercourse with Ireland, may have introduced a certain admixture of the dark stock into both Denmark and Norway. The Norman conquest brought in new ethnological elements, the precise value of which cannot be estimated with exactness; but as to their quality, there can be no question, inasmuch as even the wide area from which William drew his followers could yield him nothing but the fair and the dark types of men, already present in Britain. But whether the Norman settlers, on the whole, strengthened the fair or the dark element, is a problem, the elements of the solution of which are not attainable.

I am unable to discover any grounds for believing that a Lapp element has ever entered into the population of these islands. So far as the physical evidence goes, it is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that the only constituent stocks of that population, now,

* * *Historia Naturalis*, xxviii. 51.

or at any other period about which we have evidence, are the dark whites, whom I have proposed to call "*Melanochoi*," and the fair whites, or "*Xanthochroi*."

IV. *The Xanthochroi and the Melanochoi of Britain are, speaking broadly, distributed, at present, as they were in the time of Tacitus; and their representatives on the continent of Europe have the same general distribution as at the earliest period of which we have any record.*

At the present day, and notwithstanding the extensive intermixture effected by the movements consequent on civilization and on political changes, there is a predominance of dark men in the west, and of fair men in the east and north, of Britain. At the present day, as from the earliest times, the predominant constituents of the riverain population of the North Sea and the eastern half of the British Channel, are fair men. The fair stock continues in force through Central Europe, until it is lost in Central Asia. Offshoots of this stock extend into Spain, Italy, and Northern India, and by way of Syria and North Africa, to the Canary Islands. They were known in very early times to the Chinese, and in still earlier to the ancient Egyptians, as frontier tribes. The Thracians were notorious for their fair hair and blue eyes many centuries before our era.

On the other hand, the dark stock predominates in Southern and Western France, in Spain, along the Ligurian shore, and in Western and Southern Italy; in Greece, Asia, Syria, and North Africa; in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, and Hindostan, shading gradually, through all stages of darkening, into the type of the modern Egyptian, or of the wild Hill-man of the Dekkan. Nor is there any record of the existence of a different population in all these countries.

The extreme north of Europe, and the northern part of Western Asia, are at present occupied by a Mongoloid stock, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, may be assumed to have been so peopled from a very remote epoch. But, as I have said, I can find no evidence that this stock ever took part in peopling Britain. Of the three great stocks of mankind which extend from the western coast of the great Eurasiatic continent to its southern and eastern shores, the Mongoloids occupy a vast triangle, the base of which is the whole of Eastern Asia, while its apex lies in Lapland. The *Melanochoi*, on the other hand, may be represented as a broad band stretching from Ireland to Hindostan; while the *Xanthochroic* area lies between the two, thins out, so to speak, at either end, and mingles, at its margins, with both its neighbours.

Such is a brief and summary statement of what I believe to be the chief facts relating to the physical ethnology of the people of Britain. The conclusions which I draw from these and other facts are—

(1) That the *Melanochoi* and the *Xanthochroi* are two separate races

in the biological sense of the word race; (2) That they have had the same general distribution as at present, from the earliest times of which any record exists on the continent of Europe; (3) That the population of the British Islands is derived from them, and from them only.

The people of Europe, however, owe their national names, not to their physical characteristics, but to their languages, or to their political relations; which, it is plain, need not have the slightest relation to these characteristics.

Thus, it is quite certain that, in Cæsar's time, Gaul was divided politically into three nationalities—the Belgæ, the Celtæ, and the Aquitani; and that the last were very widely different, both in language and in physical characteristics, from the two former. The Belgæ and the Celtæ, on the other hand, differed comparatively little either in physique or in language. On the former point there is the distinct testimony of Strabo; as to the latter, St. Jerome states that the "Galatians had almost the same language as the Treviri." Now the Galatians were emigrant Volcæ Tectosages, and therefore Celtæ; while the Treviri were Belgæ.

At the present day, the physical characters of the people of Belgic Gaul remain distinct from those of the people of Aquitaine, notwithstanding the immense changes which have taken place since Cæsar's time; but Belgæ, Celtæ, and Aquitani (all but a mere fraction of the last two, represented by the Basques and the Britons) are fused into one nationality, "*le peuple Français*." But they have adopted the language of one set of invaders, and the name of another; their original names and languages having almost disappeared. Suppose that the French language remained as the sole evidence of the existence of the population of Gaul, would the keenest philologist arrive at any other conclusion than that this population was essentially and fundamentally a "Latin" race, which had had some communication with Celts and Teutons? Would he so much as suspect the former existence of the Aquitani?

Community of language testifies to close contact between the people who speak the language, but to nothing else; and philology has absolutely nothing to do with ethnology, except so far as it suggests the existence or the absence of such contact. The contrary assumption, that language is a test of race, has introduced the utmost confusion into ethnological speculation, and has nowhere worked greater scientific and practical mischief than in the ethnology of the British Islands.

What is known, for certain, about the languages spoken in these islands and their affinities may, I believe, be summed up as follows:—

I. *At the time of the Roman conquest, one language, the Celtic, under two principal dialectical divisions, the Cymric and the Gaelic, was spoken throughout the British Islands. Cymric was spoken in Britain, Gaelic in Ireland.*

If a language allied to Basque had in earlier times been spoken in the British Islands, there is no evidence that any Euskarian-speaking people remained at the time of the Roman conquest. The dark and the fair population of Britain alike spoke Celtic tongues, and therefore the name "Celt" is as applicable to the one as to the other.

What was spoken in Ireland can only be surmised by reasoning from the knowledge of later times; but there seems to be no doubt that it was Gaelic; and that the Gaelic dialect was introduced into the Western Highlands by Irish invaders.

II. *The Belgæ and the Celtæ, with the offshoots of the latter in Asia Minor, spoke dialects of the Cymric division of Celtic.*

The evidence of this proposition lies in the statement of St. Jerome before cited; in the similarity of the names of places in Belgic Gaul and in Britain; and, in the direct comparison of sundry ancient Gaulish and Belgic words which have been preserved, with the existing Cymric dialects, for which I must refer to the learned work of Brandes.

Formerly, as at the present day, the Cymric dialects of Celtic were spoken by both the fair and the dark stocks.

III. *There is no record of Gaelic being spoken anywhere save in Ireland, Scotland, and the Isle of Man.*

This appears to be the final result of the long discussions which have taken place on this much-debated question. As is the case with the Cymric dialects, Gaelic is now spoken by both dark and fair stocks.

IV. *When the Teutonic languages first became known, they were spoken only by Xanthochroi, that is to say, by the Germans, the Scandinavians, and Goths. And they were imported by Xanthochroi into Gaul and into Britain.*

In Gaul the imported Teutonic dialect has been completely overpowered by the more or less modified Latin, which it found already in possession; and what Teutonic blood there may be in modern Frenchmen is not adequately represented in their language. In Britain, on the contrary, the Teutonic dialects have overpowered the pre-existing forms of speech, and the people are vastly less "Teutonic" than their language. Whatever may have been the extent to which the Celtic-speaking population of the eastern half of Britain was trodden out and supplanted by the Teutonic-speaking Saxons and Danes, it is quite certain that no considerable displacement of the Celtic-speak-

ing people occurred in Cornwall, Wales, or the Highlands of Scotland ; and that nothing approaching to the extinction of that people took place in Devonshire, Somerset, or the western moiety of Britain generally. Nevertheless, the fundamentally Teutonic English language is now spoken throughout Britain, except by an insignificant fraction of the population in Wales and the Western Highlands. But it is obvious that this fact affords not the slightest justification for the common practice of speaking of the present inhabitants of Britain as an "Anglo-Saxon" people. It is, in fact, just as absurd as the habit of talking of the French people as a "Latin" race, because they speak a language which is, in the main, derived from Latin. And the absurdity becomes the more patent when those who have no hesitation in calling a Devonshire man, or a Cornish man, an "Anglo-Saxon," would think it ridiculous to call a Tipperary man by the same title, though he and his forefathers may have spoken English for as long a time as the Cornish man.

Ireland, at the earliest period at which we have any knowledge, contained, like Britain, a dark and a fair stock, which, there is every reason to believe, were identical with the dark and the fair stocks of Britain. When the Irish first became known they spoke a Gaelic dialect, and though, for many centuries, Scandinavians made continual incursions upon, and settlements among them, the Teutonic languages made no more way among the Irish than they did among the French. How much Scandinavian blood was introduced there is no evidence to show. But after the conquest of Ireland by Henry II., the English people, consisting in part of the descendants of Cymric speakers, and in part of the descendants of Teutonic speakers, made good their footing in the eastern half of the island, as the Saxons and Danes made good theirs in England ; and did their best to complete the parallel by attempting the extirpation of the Gaelic-speaking Irish. And they succeeded to a considerable extent ; a large part of Eastern Ireland is now peopled by men who are substantially English by descent, and the English language has spread over the land far beyond the limits of English blood.

Ethnologically, the Irish people were originally, like the people of Britain, a mixture of Melanochroi and Xanthochroi. They resembled the Britons in speaking a Celtic tongue ; but it was a Gaelic and not a Cymric form of the Celtic language. Ireland was untouched by the Roman conquest, nor do the Saxons seem to have had any influence upon her destinies, but the Danes and Norsemen poured in a contingent of Teutonism, which has been largely supplemented by English and Scotch efforts.

What then is the value of the ethnological difference between the Englishman of the western half of England and the Irish-

man of the eastern half of Ireland? For what reason does the one deserve the name of a "Celt," and not the other? And further, if we turn to the inhabitants of the western half of Ireland, why should the term "Celts" be applied to them more than to the inhabitants of Cornwall? And if the name is applicable to the one as justly as to the other, why should not intelligence, perseverance, thrift, industry, sobriety, respect for law, be admitted to be Celtic virtues? And why should we not seek for the cause of their absence in something else than the idle pretext of "Celtic blood?"

I have been unable to meet with any answers to these questions.

V. *The Celtic and the Teutonic dialects are members of the same great Aryan family of languages; but there is evidence to show that a non-Aryan language was at one time spoken over a large extent of the area occupied by Melanochroi in Europe.*

The non-Aryan language here referred to is the Euskarian, now spoken only by the Basques, but which seems in earlier times to have been the language of the Aquitanians and Spaniards, and may possibly have extended much further to the East. Whether it has any connection with the Ligurian and Oscan dialects are questions upon which, of course, I do not presume to offer any opinion. But it is important to remark that it is a language the area of which has gradually diminished without any corresponding extirpation of the people who primitively spoke it; so that the people of Spain and of Aquitaine at the present day must be largely "Euskarian" by descent in just the same sense as the Cornish men are "Celtic" by descent.

Such seem to me to be the main facts respecting the ethnology of the British Islands and of Western Europe, which may be said to be fairly established. The hypothesis by which I think (with De Belloguet and Thurnam) the facts may best be explained is this: In very remote times Western Europe and the British Islands were inhabited by the dark stock or the Melanochroi alone, and these Melanochroi spoke dialects allied to the Euskarian. The Xanthochroi, spreading over the great Eurasiatic plains westward, and speaking Aryan dialects, gradually invaded the territories of the Melanochroi. The Xanthochroi, who thus came into contact with the Western Melanochroi, spoke a Celtic language; and that Celtic language, whether Cymric or Gaelic, spread over the Melanochroi far beyond the limits of intermixture of blood, supplanting Euskarian, just as English and French have supplanted Celtic. Even as early as Cæsar's time, I suppose that the Euskarian was everywhere, except in Spain and in Aquitaine, replaced by Celtic, and thus the Celtic speakers were no longer of one ethnological stock, but of two. Both in France and in England a

third wave of language—in the one case Latin, in the other Teutonic—has spread over the same area. In France, it has left a fragment of the primary Euskarian in one corner of the country, and a fragment of the secondary Celtic, in another. In the British Islands only outlying pools of the secondary linguistic wave remain in Wales, the Highlands, Ireland, and the Isle of Man. If this hypothesis is a sound one, it follows that the name of Celtic is not properly applicable to the Melanochroic or dark stock of Europe. They are merely, so to speak, secondary Celts. The primary and aboriginal Celtic-speaking people are Xanthochroi—the typical Gauls of the ancient writers and the close allies by blood, customs, and language, of the Germans.

T. H. HUXLEY.



THE POWERS OF WOMEN, AND HOW TO USE THEM.

THERE has been, perhaps, a greater change of opinion in England on a greater variety of subjects—social, political, and religious—during the last ten years than had taken place in the whole period which had elapsed since Europe was convulsed by the Reformation. Whether the change has been for the better or the worse will be, of course, estimated differently by different minds, but the fact itself will hardly be disputed.

Ten years ago household suffrage was considered an impossible tenet belonging to the ultra-Radicals; we have lived to see it given by a Conservative Government. The abolition of the Irish State Church was the scheme of "philosophical levellers;" it has become the popular cry on which a party rides into power. "Essays and Reviews" was petitioned against as fraught with horrible novelties of heresy; the book may be said to have died in bringing forth a bishop, but scarcely a weekly paper or a monthly magazine now appears which does not contain doctrines almost as "advanced."

The revolution has been more tranquil and peaceful than any former one. The Bishop of Peterborough did not offer to go to the stake in defence of the Irish Establishment; Lord Derby swallowed the bitter draught of the suffrage instead of laying down his head like Strafford on the scaffold. Liberal admissions take out the sting of the strongest defences of orthodoxy; and the revision of the authorized version, headed by the Bishop of Winchester, looks a little like the

theological equivalent of Mr. Disraeli taking the political bread out of the mouths of his adversaries by the "ten minutes" Bill. Lastly, the whole question of the use of women in the world, their "rights" and their "wrongs," is being discussed in a manner which contrasts very remarkably with the tone of even a few years back; while the discussions in Parliament upon female suffrage, the municipal vote granted last year to single women possessing the necessary qualification, the Married Women's Property Bill, which has just passed the House of Commons, the education—artistic, medical, scientific, and literary—now offered to them by so many bodies, public and private, show the breach which has been made in the fortress of ancient opinion.

The movement has now indeed attained a wider, deeper significance than is even indicated by such changes in England. It is spreading over the whole world in the marvellously rapid way with which the interchange of ideas takes place at present among nations; through that "solidarity" which is at last comprehending even the unchanging East. It is showing itself in Russia and Spain, in India and America, the old world and the new alike. Russian ladies are taking medical degrees at Zurich, and now at St. Petersburg; schools for Hindoo girls are established and well attended at Madras and Calcutta. Monseigneur Dupanloup protests against the lowering effect of the poor education given to girls in France, and the Roman Catholic bishop is as urgent in his demand for a higher ideal of woman's life as our English radical philosopher.

But though both extremes of opinion agree as to the evil of the present state of things, though the *Saturday Review* is as strenuous in its description of the vacuity of the lives and occupations of thousands of women as the most strong-minded of the lady writers, there is the greatest possible divergence as to the remedy and the means of applying it. Give them the same education as men, says one side; but we are at this very moment revolutionising the instruction in our boys' schools, and declaring the subjects to be often ill-taught, and not always worth learning. Shut them up with governesses and in school-rooms more strictly, says the other; but it is the girls who are the result of this very training of whom we are now complaining.

Meantime two or three hard facts have come out in the discussions on the subject. The census of 1851 showed three millions and a half of women working for a subsistence, of these two millions and a half were unmarried. At the census of 1861 the number of self-supporting*

* The wretched gulf below into which so many of these are driven by misery, the wholesale destruction of soul and body which takes place, cannot here be entered on, and indeed this class is not included in these numbers.

women had increased by more than half a million, many with relations dependent upon them. The pretty, pleasant, poetic view of life by which man goes forth to labour for his wife, while her duty is to make his home comfortable, is clearly not possible for this large portion of womankind, since, although a certain number of them are single because they preferred celibacy to any choice offered to them, a very large proportion are so from necessity, and certainly find the burden of maintaining themselves a heavy one.

That the "highest result" of life both for men and women is a really happy marriage there can be no doubt; where each is improved by the other, and every good work is helped, not hindered, for both. It is an ideal which has existed, though it may not have been carried out, from very early times—and it is somewhat discouraging that, as Mr. Lecky has shown, some of the most beautiful pictures of the relation, and indeed of womanhood at large, are to be found in Homer and the Greek tragedians; "the conjugal tenderness of Hector and Andromache, the unwearied fidelity of Penelope, whose storm-tossed husband looked forward to her as to the crown of all his labours, the heroic love of Alcestis voluntarily dying that her husband might live," and many more such. Later in history, though Aristotle gives a touching account of a good wife, and Plutarch declares her to be "no mere housekeeper, but the equal and companion of her husband," we must go on to Rome for an equally high type of a wife. "The Roman matron was from the earliest times a name of honour," and a jurisconsult of the empire defined marriage as "a lifelong fellowship of all divine and human rights." Indeed, "the position of wives during the empire was one of a freedom and dignity which they have never since altogether regained."

That modern society has not always shown an advance on these questions may be seen in Mr. Maine's observation that the canon law, which nearly everywhere prevailed on the position of women, has on several points "deeply injured civilization."

Mr. Mill's description of the relation seems drawn from his own experience:—

"What marriage may be in the case of two persons of cultivated minds, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there exists the best kind of equality" (not that of powers, but of different capacities), "with each their respective superiority, so that each can have alternately the pleasure of leading and being led in the path of development . . . where the two care for great objects in which they can help and encourage each other, so that the minor matters on which their tastes differ are not all-important, . . . here is a connection of friendship of the most enduring character, making it a greater pleasure to each to give pleasure to the other than to receive it. . . . This is no dream of an enthusiast, but a social rela-

tion on whose general realization will depend the best development of our race."

To enable women to fulfil their share of this union it will be granted must require far more cultivation than they now generally attain. For the very large portion who cannot obtain this "highest result," and who yet have the misfortune to require food and clothing, which they must earn for themselves or starve, it is surely not too much to ask that they be furnished ungrudgingly with all possible means of fitting themselves to perform well whatever work society will permit them to carry out.

As to what is "unnatural" work, opinion varies so much in different ages and countries, that we are hardly yet entitled to dogmatise. "Nature," Mr. Mill thinks, "may be safely left to take care of itself, and that in any work for which women are really incompetent they will drop out of the race;" but he hardly seems to allow for the extraordinary plasticity with which women adapt themselves to the ideal required of them by public opinion. Among the North American Indians all the heavy labour—the carrying of burdens, &c.—falls to their share without any feeling of hardship, the duty of the "braves" being only to fight. In many parts of Germany the division is the same; the peasant woman digs, ploughs, manages the cattle, carries the fuel and the hay from the mountains, while the men are either with the army, or sitting smoking and drinking in the little "platz" of the village. In Scotland the stalwart fishwives would be horrified at their husbands doing anything but manage the sea share of the business; they have their boats and nets to look after, and have nothing whatever to do with matters on shore, where the woman reigns paramount.

An extremely curious instance of what habit and opinion can make of women appeared not long ago in that very unromantic source of information, a British Blue-Book. In the account of a mission sent by England in 1863 to induce the King of Dahomey to give up the slave trade, the envoy, Commodore Wilmot, remarks incidentally:—

"The Amazons are everything in this country. There are nearly 5,000 of them in the king's army;" and he adds, "there can be no doubt that they are the mainstay of the kingdom. They are a very fine body of women, remarkably well-limbed and strong, armed with muskets, swords, gigantic razors for cutting off heads, bows and arrows, blunderbusses, &c.; their large war-drum was conspicuous, hung round with skulls.

"They are first in honour and importance, all messages are carried by them to and from the king and his chiefs. They are only found about the royal palaces, form the body-guard of the sovereign, and no one else is allowed to approach them. At the reception of the embassy the king ordered them to go through a variety of movements and to salute me, which they did most creditably; they loaded and fired with remarkable rapidity, singing songs all the time. . . . They marched better than the men, and

looked far more warlike in every way ; their activity is astonishing—they would run with some of our best performers in England. On one occasion the king appeared in a carriage drawn by his body-guard of women. As soldiers in an African kingdom and engaged solely in African warfare, they are very formidable enemies, and fully understand the use of their weapons."

Besides 5,000 of these under arms, there are numerous women to attend on them as servants, cooks, &c. Their numbers are kept up by young girls of thirteen or fourteen, attached to each company, who learn their duties, dance, sing, and live with them, but do not go to war till they are considered old enough to handle a musket. They are fully aware of the authority they possess—their manner is bold and free ; but in spite of a certain swagger in their walk, he speaks particularly of "their good manners and modest behaviour ; most of them are young, well-looking, and without any ferocity in their expression, though an occasional skull or jaw-bone may be seen dangling at their waist-belts. They are supposed to live a life of chastity, and there is no doubt that they do so, as it would be impossible for them to do wrong without being found out, and such discovery would lead to instant death." "The only menial service they perform is to fetch water (which is extremely scarce) for the use of the king and his household, and morning and evening long strings of them may be seen with water jars on their heads silently and quietly wending their way to the wells in single file, the front one with a bell round her neck, which she strikes when any men are seen ; these immediately run off to leave the road clear, and must wait till the file has passed, for if an accident happened to the woman or her jar, any man near would be considered responsible, and either imprisoned for life or his head cut off. Business is stopped, and everybody delayed to their great inconvenience, by this absurd law." The Amazons enjoy their consequence, and laughed heartily when they saw the commodore obliged to step aside in order to avoid them.

It was mentioned by Bishop Crowther, in a lecture at Torquay, that in war, fewer prisoners by far are made among them than among the men soldiers ; they fight more fiercely, with more determination, and would rather die than yield. "Indeed," says Wilmot, "they are far superior to the men in everything—in appearance, in dress, in figure, in activity, in their performance as soldiers, and in bravery." It is curious to see the old Greek legends, which we have so long disbelieved, thus fully borne out.

The evidence is the more interesting as it appears merely as part of the report of the embassy, "presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty," with no object of proving anything to anybody in the matter.

Here is a whole body of women distinguished for the very qualities we should be most inclined to refuse them, the produce of a "well-directed" education to the end required.

It is difficult at present to make any sweeping assertions as to what women can or cannot do, as even if we decide categorically for England, we shall find the standard of their ability vary by merely crossing the Channel in France; and if such a discussion had been possible in India, and a Hindoo Mr. Mill had expressed hopeful views of their powers and of what might be expected from them under a different *régime*, the weekly papers of Benares would certainly have replied that the nature of women was tolerably well known since the beginning of the world; that they had had time enough in all conscience to give proof that their powers were but little above those of animals; that they could not be trusted out of the zenana to take care even of themselves; that it was doubtful whether they had any souls at all, and, at all events, certain to the orthodox, that their only chance of immortality was by burning themselves on the funeral pile of their husbands. Yet even with public feeling so strongly against them, "the best native Indian governments are those directed by women," says Mr. Mill, borne out by Sir Richard Temple and many other authorities.

Seven-eighths of the world is Pagan, Mahometan, or Buddhist, where the lowest opinion concerning women still prevails; and even in Christian countries the education given to them is so much for show, so little for use, so empty of real knowledge, that we have hardly yet the materials on which to found our judgment as to their powers, unless exceptionally.

That these will turn out to be the same as those of men is, to say the very least, most improbable; that God should have created two sets of beings, so different physically and outwardly, if he had intended one to be merely the repetition of the other, and unless they had been fitted to perform different functions in the world's great work. Such a variety of gifts is required to accomplish what is wanted around us, that it will be strange if we cannot arrive at a certain joint co-operative action between men and women which shall be better than that of either alone. "Two are better than one," as Solomon says, and even than one and one. There is a male and female side to all great work which will not be thoroughly carried out unless both can labour at it heartily together. The silent share contributed by women in man's work,—to take only a few of the instances found in late biographies, the assistance given by the sister of Mendelssohn in the composition of the "*Lieder ohne Worte*," by old Miss Herschel in her brother's calculations, by Mrs.

Austen and Lady Hamilton* in the production of their husbands' works on jurisprudence and metaphysics, and that which is told by M. Renan and Mr. Mill in their touching tributes, the first to his sister, the other to his wife,—is only known from magnanimous men, rich enough in ideas not to grudge such acknowledgments. "On ne prête qu'aux riches," says a French proverb. But how this joint work for the world can best be generally carried out remains still to be settled. To take, however, one instance: the administrative power with which Mr. Mill credits woman enables her to assist most efficiently conjointly with men in the management of philanthropic establishments—hospitals, reformatories, asylums, workhouses, &c., where she is found to give more comfort more economically than men, to spend less with greater results. She has generally more intuitive insight into character, and is less liable to be taken in (provided her affections are not concerned). She is both more considerate and considering, more observant of small indications than a man, and draws her conclusions more carefully, and carries out her kind intentions with more thought. "And Mary pondered all these things in her heart," is a very true picture of her sex. She is a particularly efficient teacher of male pupils, says one good educational authority; there is a certain rude chivalry among boys when they know that they cannot be compelled to do a thing by force, which will often make them yield. For example, a class of unruly lads in a ragged school, utterly unamenable to the discipline of a man, has been known to obey a young woman; as a difficult-tempered horse is sometimes most easily guided by a female hand, when it is at the same time both skilful and light.

There was one remarkable instance of such influence in the late American war. After the arrival of the lady nurses in the different field hospitals of the northern army, the degraded attendance which ordinarily follows a camp gradually melted away. The husbands, brothers, and relations of the women who had given up the protection of their homes for the sake of the wounded did not choose that their belongings should be exposed to such scenes, and the baser element almost entirely disappeared, at least from sight.

One of the most curious "changes of front" in public opinion which has taken place, is concerning the care of the sick. Surgery and medicine seem to have been regarded as peculiarly feminine occupations in the Middle Ages. Even queens and princesses were regularly instructed in the "healing arts." To be a good leech was as important in a complete education then as to play on the piano nowadays, and was certainly not less useful.

* The *Edinburgh Review* says:—"We are, in truth, indebted to these two ladies that the most profound and abstruse discussions of law and metaphysics which have appeared in our time became accessible and intelligible to the public."

That there are certain branches of the profession adapted for women most people will now admit—*i.e.*, midwifery and the diseases of women and children; we may indeed come to regard this part of the craft as one into which men have intruded themselves instead of the contrary cry. But it is clear that women physicians neither can nor ought to be consulted or trusted who have not undergone the most thorough training and submitted to the most searching examination. The difficulties which must result from a course of joint study for men and women together are such in the present state of things as to render it most undesirable; but in France, the question is solved by a separate training, which there for sixty-nine years has given as perfect an education to midwives, both practical and scientific, as well can be. It includes a course of instruction in a hospital of two hundred beds, where none but women pupils are received. A first-class certificate is not given under two years, a second-class not under one, and without a certificate no one can practise in France. The lady professors of this institution are physician accoucheurs, not merely midwives, and hold a rank, both scientific and practical, quite equal to our first-class "ladies' doctors" here. No classes or lectures such as are often proposed in England, could possibly afford the requisite training, unless accompanied by the practical work on the patients themselves such as is thus afforded in France. In the same way no certificates or examinations in nursing could be of any avail unless they are the result and the evidence of trained work in a hospital, to be judged of not by a board theoretically, but by the training surgeons and nurses.

Many foreign universities, however, Zurich, Stockholm, &c., have shown no jealousy of women doctors, but will now admit any woman who can pass their examination for a medical degree.

With regard to other special training, the greater facilities given in the classes at the Royal Academy, the female schools of design at South Kensington and elsewhere, the Academy of Music, &c., will now enable women to obtain the thorough knowledge necessary for good work in art. It is to be hoped that some proof of efficiency may soon be exacted for governesses and schoolmistresses: a diploma such as is required to be shown by them in Germany, France, and Switzerland, will be a natural result, indeed, of the examinations now offered by Cambridge, London, Dublin, Edinburgh, and, lastly, Oxford. The class of female teachers will thus be raised both in position and salary. In America, at this moment, they stand very high in the scale, and are even entrusted with a great share of the conduct of large boys' schools.

But it is for those women who do not intend to be either doctors, or artists, or schoolmistresses, that our improved education is most wanted. As it is, in the very fields which are considered to belong

to women by the most niggardly estimate of their powers, they are totally without training of any kind, and each individual is forced to make out the very A B C of useful knowledge for herself.

For instance, in the conduct of their houses and the management of their children, which the staunchest Conservative would declare to be their peculiar province, what pains is taken to give them even the most elementary knowledge of the things likely to be most useful to them? What woman has learnt how to prevent the frost from bursting the water-pipes, which flood half the houses in London unnecessarily every winter? or what has caused the cracking of the boiler, and how it may be avoided? or the facts concerning food, that proportion which is best for each different stage of life, and how to make the best of it? "I'm sure it was the bread was very nice last time; I can't think why it isn't so this while," says even a clever cook. The rule of thumb is universal, and the mistress cannot correct it.

Again, with regard to the health of the children and household, the frightful ignorance of mothers, both rich and poor, annually sacrifices the lives, and, what is really worse, the health, of thousands of human beings. It is a common saying that the first child is generally a victim to the experimental efforts of the poor mother, who, having never learnt what is good either for herself or her offspring, can only guide herself after having been taught by the bitter knowledge of experience.

Women will be found "sending for the doctor" for the slightest ailment, either of their own or of their children, which the commonest sense and the most easy acquaintance with hygiene ought to enable them to cope with; yet "laudamy and calomy" are the "simples" they have not scrupled to use. Every girl ought to go through a course of training as to what is required in all ordinary cases of emergency—how to bind up a cut, to put out fire, to treat a burn, the bad effect of air on a wound, its necessity to the lungs, the measures necessary to guard against infection—"common things," as they are called, but uncommonly little known at the present day. Questions of fresh air are beginning to be a little better understood; yet still, passing along the crowded streets of London, and looking up at most of the nursery windows, rows of little pale faces may be seen peering through the closed casements, "for fear they should catch cold," which is often the only form of care conceived of, and is carried out by making them as liable to cold as possible. A great medical authority declares that the children of the lowest and artisan class in London are healthier than those of the class above them, because they are allowed to play in the gutter, which cannot be permitted to "genteel" children, and the fresh air compensates for inferior living and much want of care. How much of the disease

and ill-temper of our children, and consequently of our own, is owing to ignorance in their keepers, which might be prevented by the better education of nursemaids (no very Utopian notion), it is grievous to think of.

Again, with regard to education, there is a peculiar appetite in a healthy-minded child, evidently placed there by nature, for observing the facts around it, and seeking for their interpretation—"why?" "what?" "where?" is the substance of the talk of intelligent children. Questions as to the reasons of everything, as to the birds, beasts, flowers, and stones they meet with. Instead, however, of satisfying this curiosity, we give them names, the hardest husks of knowledge, "Mangnall's Questions," and "Pinnock's Catechisms," the very dearest dry bones of information. As a general rule let what it can see, and touch, and taste, and smell, and the explanation thereof, come before things which its limited experience does not enable it to realise, and therefore take interest in, and which are generally to it mere words, such as history, geography, grammar. The abstract comes later in life. There can be no doubt that such instruction comes within a woman's province; let her, at least, learn how best it may be accomplished.

There are many questions still remaining to be solved as to how body and soul react on each other, which women are peculiarly fitted to assist in settling;—for instance, although asceticism and epicureanism are alike mistaken rules of life, how yet the good which exists undoubtedly in both is to be secured in education; how to give the mind the fairest play; to "have the body under subjection," in one sense—to make it the slave, and not the master, in the joint concern,—yet so to cultivate it as to render it the healthy organ, or interpreter to execute the intentions of the mind, and how neither mind nor body can do its best without a proper balance being attained. Education having gone too much in the cramming direction, the pendulum seems likely now to sway too far on the opposite side for men—athletics, for their own sake, (although the sitting still *regimen* is still required for women); while the wisest among the Greeks seem to have aimed at the perfection of outward form, chiefly as the instrument of the inward powers of man.

Again, the field of philanthropy has never been contested to woman: let her be taught to fulfil it wisely. Men have such respect apparently for her power of intuition that they seem to think she can do as well without as with study. The excellent women who undertake to assist the poor, probably at this moment are doing at least as much harm as good, demoralising them by teaching dependence, and diminishing their power of self-reliance; they are utterly ignorant in general of political economy, in its best sense; of the laws of

supply and demand; of that which constitutes real help, *i.e.*, that which rouses man to help himself; while their religious teaching too often resolves itself into proselytism and dissemination of doctrinal tracts. These are studies without which charity degenerates into the pouring of water into baskets, whereas in France the administration of the Poor Law, the *bureau de bienfaisance*, is committed by Government to the care of the Sisters of Charity, who are considered as the fittest instruments for the work.

With regard to comparatively smaller matters, such as art, there can be no doubt that if woman's knowledge of what really constitutes beauty were more cultivated, if her taste were higher, or, indeed, anything but the merest accident of feeling, our hideous upholstery, our abominable millinery-portraits, the vulgar or vapid colouring of our drawing-rooms, would improve. "Natural selection" would get rid of the monstrosities in our shops by the simple process of the bad not finding purchasers, as much as by any schools of design.

Again, with regard to dress, wider interests would probably indirectly tend to cure the extravagance which constant change of fashion produces. For a woman to take care that her outward clothing makes her as pleasing as circumstances comport, is a real duty to her neighbours; but this is not at all the aim of fashion. There is nothing which puzzles the male mind, and especially the artist mind, like its mystery—why every woman, short and tall, fat and thin, must wear exactly the same clothes; why their heads must all bud out in an enormous chignon one year, and their bodies expand into an immense bell in the next, under pain of being unpleasantly remarkable, by the edict of some irresponsible *Vehmgericht* which rules over us. The tyranny of opinion is such that no woman dreams of resisting beyond a certain point; she has been taught that to be singular is in her almost a crime, and she accordingly undresses her poor old shoulders, or swells out her short body, and is intolerably ugly and unpleasant to look at to her male relations, but is satisfied with the internal conviction of right given by the feeling that at least she is in the fashion! More knowledge of real art would show her that if certain lines are really becoming, their opposites cannot be so too; that there is a real science of the beautiful, to contravene which is as painful to the instructed eye as notes out of tune in music to the instructed ear.

The power wielded by woman is at present so enormous, that if men at all realized its extent, they would for their own purposes insist on her being better qualified to use it. If any man will candidly confess to himself the amount of influence on his habits of thought and feeling throughout his life, first of his mother and sisters, of young ladyhood in general, and

later of his wife, daughters, and female friends, the opinions modified, the incentives supplied by women, old and young, he will be almost appalled by the thought of the manner in which this potent being has been left to pick up what education she could from an ignorant governess or an indifferent school; while her ideas of right and wrong, her religion and morality, have generally been obtained by being carefully kept from hearing that there is another side to any question. The important and the trivial are generally strangely mixed up in her mind: traditional rules—such as that though it is wicked to read history on Sundays, you may make riddles out of the Bible; that you may cut paper for patchwork on the Sabbath, but if you sew it is a sin—being not seldom considered almost as binding as the Gospel itself.

A custom becomes in such a woman's eyes as sacred as morality; the inextricable confusion of the form with its meaning, which is so common, and which makes it so dangerous to touch or improve a symbol lest we damage the thing symbolized, may be greatly traced to the unreasoning traditional mode in which women, half the human race, regard everything. The sentimental part of their minds being stronger, their power of association more vivid than that of men, anything connected, however remotely, with their affections, is clung to more warmly, and makes it more difficult for them to part with the external shape which a thought has been in the habit of taking in their eyes.

Accordingly, even in matters of politics, which have been supposed to be out of their line, "the party of the roses and nightingales," as Mr. Grant Duff once euphuistically called it, has been a power in the State, a very sensible influence, which has often checked, and even prevented, useful reforms.

To give her the "responsibility of her opinions" might be a cure for this, but the question of the suffrage cannot be looked upon as an important one. During the past session the municipal franchise was granted to unmarried women, with this comment from the conservative ex-Chancellor, in assisting to pass the Bill: "Since an unmarried woman could dispose of her property, and deal with it in any way that she thought proper," said Lord Cairns, "he did not know why she should not have a voice in saying how it should be lighted and watched, and in controlling the municipal expenditure to which that property contributed." In one of the southern counties, five large, well-managed estates, almost adjacent to each other, belong to women either unmarried or widows. Here a district, amounting in size almost to a small county, is virtually unrepresented. If the representation of property is to be a reality, it seems as if these women ought to "have a voice in choosing the representatives who are to regulate" the national "expenditure" to which

they contribute so largely. A single woman is no infant to whom the law allots trustees; she can conduct her own affairs and dispose of her estate as she sees good. The franchise is certainly an inferior privilege to such functions as these.

It is perfectly true that these women would prefer being without the franchise, but the question is, what are the arrangements by which the duties of property may be best performed? They are called upon, as a matter of course, to use "the legitimate influence of a landlord" with their tenants: why should they be allowed to shirk the responsibility, to be spared the personal onus of decision in political opinions? Are not these likely to be better weighed, more justly and well considered, if they know they can be called to account for the proper employment of their power?

It is no new theory, after all, that women should be treated as political entities. One barony, at least, was bestowed by Pitt on a single lady in right of her borough influence; and the very fact of a woman being able to use the power of a great proprietor without the check of publicity and open responsibility, inclines her to make the question a personal one, and not a trust for the good of the "republic."

With regard to a married woman, it seems to be very unwise to press her claim. Any property she possesses is, after all, represented by her husband; if she votes contrary to him, it will merely neutralize his vote; if she votes with him, it is an unnecessary reduplication; there seems no good in putting such an abstract cause of contention among married people.

In England, by manners, although not perhaps by law, the influence of woman has been more useful, calmer, less dreaded, and more open, than in any country since the days of Eve. When they have ruled it has been by acknowledged sway; the difference between Queen Elizabeth and Queen Philippa, and the Montespons and Pompadours of France. The *Maitresse du Roi* has been no recognised part in our constitution; no fine ladies like Madame de Longueville, and the other lady leaders of the Fronde, have ruled the destinies of our country according to the influence of the lover of the moment. There have been names of power amongst us, but they have been good as well as great.

In Roman Catholic countries, where the feeling for women has culminated in the adoration of the Virgin and the deification of many female saints, where the longing for feminine tenderness which could not find satisfaction in the stern ideal to which they had reduced their Christ, has erected an intercessor in "the mother of God," woman, intellectually, has been degraded curiously to the utmost, the notion of her spiritual eminence having, as it were,

stifled any other. Christianity, great as its influence has been for woman, has not worked at all alike in this respect in different nationalities even close at home, and it would be curious to trace out the reason for her varying position at the present day in the different Christian countries—in America, where from the disparity of the sexes she takes a high hand as to her personal claims, but does not seem to have improved in wisdom beyond her old-world sisters; in Germany and Italy, where she holds a strangely inferior place, from the most different causes, for the German woman is generally and in some respects highly educated, while the Italian (with some exceptions in the north) is almost utterly ignorant; in France, where the influence of woman has always been more really great, probably, than in any country in the world, America not excepted, with the single exception, which however symbolizes a good deal, that they must not wear the crown—*i.e.*, be ostensibly sovereign. The Frenchman is said to be more good-tempered, the woman more imperious; in a household she is very really the better half. Partly, perhaps, in consequence of the drain upon the male part of the nation caused by its warlike propensities, the affairs of the shop, of the bureau, the management of the money of the family, in fact, has devolved in great part on her. Monsieur often is amusing himself at the *café*, while madame, nothing loth, is administering the joint affairs of the *commerce*, in which she has probably an equal stake in money, while her property is to a great extent under her own control, and is looked after very keenly; indeed, her strict attendance at the bureau is mentioned in an interesting article of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* as one reason for the fearful mortality among infants in France. Again, the power of the mother over her grown-up sons, both by law and custom, is in our eyes most extraordinary. One of Madame Sand's best-known novels runs on the refusal of the widowed mother of a marquis of forty, in full possession of his own estate, to let him marry a young lady, well-born and well-bred, but poor. No surprise is expressed; it is an ordinary incident in his social world—it is impossible for the marriage to take place without her permission.

The relation, however, between the sexes in France seems to be one of antagonism—an armed peace—constant resistance on one side, and terror of encroachment on the other. In the absence of any idea of justice, "a woman's rights are what she can get for herself;" and their amount is almost incredibly large to our notions. For instance, on the occasion of a marriage in the higher classes, the bridegroom is required as a matter of course by the young girl and her mother to renounce his profession, which is often mentioned as one reason of the frivolous life led by young men of family in France.

The sudden change in a French girl's life, the tremendous leap from her convent education to the rush of dissipation in the world, makes her temptation to independence still greater. She has not even been allowed the choice of the man who is to rule her; *he* is generally more or less in love, she has all the advantage that perfect coldness and self-possession can give. She rules by dint of her *esprit*, her strong will, her tact in pleasing the least worthy part of men; and her desire for power is evidently far greater than in England, where, after the first blush of youthful coquetry is over, a girl generally subsides rapidly after marriage into the "family woman," the wife and the mother; whereas the Frenchwoman's career only then begins. And what is considered at least to be its nature may be guessed from M. Taine's problem (for even a caricature is evidence of a popular mode of thought), "*Etant donnée la femme, c'est à dire un être illogique, subalterne, malfaisant, mais charmant comme un parfum délicieux et pernicieux,*" how is she to be treated?

In England, on the contrary, at the present moment, take it for all in all, the position of an educated woman of a certain class is probably unequalled both in legitimate influence and happiness. If she is at all qualified for it by character, she is trusted and consulted by her husband in everything; she is respected by her sons for her experience in life; she has a large field for her administrative capacities,—the schools, the cottages, the sick, the poor, both in London and the country, employ all her philanthropic energies. She is cut off from no great questions of national interest, political, literary, benevolent; if her opinion is worth having, she is listened to by men with perfect respect and attention. She wants nothing more of privilege for herself of any kind. It is not for these that any change is necessary. But because these have their "rights," in cant phrase, and indeed something more, by custom, if not by law, it is no use for them to blink the fact of the intolerable sufferings endured often by women of the lowest class without a chance of redress, or that the lives of the greater portion of the middle class are miserably wanting in interests and cultivation of any kind; while for the increasing number of women who must earn their own bread, there are hardly any fields open, and they have hitherto been even denied the facilities for fitting themselves to work which are provided so largely for men.

That this has happened by accident more than design, appears in the Reports upon Endowed Schools, which are proved to have often been intended by their founders for girls as well as boys. The committee, headed by Lord Lyttelton, sitting now upon them, has been requested to ascertain what means can be adopted in each case to add a separate provision for the education of girls, or to enable them to

share in the classes for boys, as in the national schools. At present the lower class is better provided for in this matter than the middle and upper. It is to be hoped that Government will not neglect so fair an opportunity of securing what might become a national and lasting provision for this want. Mr. Rogers has already led the way by starting a middle-class school for girls *pari passu* with the great school for boys in the City of London.

Meantime, as if to prove that girls would make use of any opportunities given them, several of the school inspectors in England and Scotland report that they found the capabilities of girls as good in general as those of boys; that although part of the school-day was devoted rightfully to needlework, they did as well as the lads of the same amount of training when taught by the same masters. In the few schools for the upper class which have existed, the acquirements of the average of boys and girls are found to run very evenly, though here and there a boy appeared who beat all the girls. The brains of women, says Dr. Barlow, quoting many authorities, English and foreign, are larger than those of men *in proportion* to the size of their bodies, while their temperaments are more nervous and sensitive; they thus require good education for their guidance more even than men; whereas cut off, as they too often have been, from the most interesting subjects in life, it is not surprising if they often throw their whole souls into petty questions with a vehemence which makes good men sigh and hard men laugh. "*Les femmes excellent à gâter leur vie,*" has been most truly said, and not seldom that of their belongings besides. Excellent women may be seen spoiling the comfort, as far as in them lies, of their "mankind," about some miserable little matter of anise and cummin to which their ill-directed conscience affixes an inordinate interest, while the greatest national questions of right and wrong (for which they have proved they can care so deeply) are to them uninteresting often because unknown; for how large a portion of them may still be said to be "brought up in the religion of darkness and fear," which Plato complained of even in his day? They are often accused of putting their affections above any abstract interest, however high, yet how many of them have shown the power to suffer and to die for the noblest causes. Martyrs are of no sex or time. "The mother of seven sons," as told in Maccabees, "saw them all slain in one day with horrible torments" for their faith, by Antiochus. Filled with courageous spirits, stirring up her womanish thoughts with a manly stomach, she stood by and exhorted them to remain firm for the right, "and last of all, after her sons, died also." Women like Vivia Perpetua, whose martyrdom for her faith was preceded by the agony of appeals from her husband holding up her baby before her, and her father entreat-

ing her to have compassion on his grey hairs. Through all the phases of persecution, Pagan, Catholic, and Protestant alike, women have never been found wanting, and not in religious questions alone—in the French Revolution the women suffered for their political faith like the men. It has been remarked that no woman ever then put forward her sex as a reason for being spared; they had “the courage of their opinions,” and went to the scaffold unflinchingly, although some of them, like Madame Roland, did not believe in any future state.

In the Indian mutiny there were no weak lamentations or complaints under the almost intolerable sufferings and privations to which the women were exposed. They had most of them spent their lives in the gossip and idleness of Indian stations, yet when courage and endurance were called for, their heroism was as great as that of the men.

The stuff is there, it only requires to be adequately made use of. In spite of what Mr. Mill says, there can be little doubt that women are by nature more pliable than men, more ready to take the colour which public opinion represents as right, and also to endure more for what they believe to be true, in small things* as well as great. But this only makes it more incumbent upon society, which in this case means men, to see that the ideal life held up to women is a wise one, and that their education is in a wise direction. The jealousy of women acquiring knowledge, in England at least, is quite modern. At the time of the Reformation, of the revival of learning through the classics, they were allowed to obtain whatsoever they pleased of the new fields of knowledge; and Latin and Greek, through which alone these could be obtained, were freely taught to them. They suffered death again and again in political risings in England, that unpleasant proof of their importance. Lady Salisbury, Jane Grey, Arabella Stewart, were not spared because they were women; and in the feudal times, Mr. Mill declares that both politics and war were considered part of their proper business in life. Sir Thomas More, in his ideal republic, even proposes that the “priests should be few in number, of either sex.” And though we are not very likely to follow out such a counsel as this, yet northern civilization has always been based, more or less, upon respect for women, as shown alike in the honour paid to female prophets and priestesses in the earlier faiths of Teutonic and Scandinavian nations, and the ideal held up by chivalry in later Christian ages. “We may, on the whole, well admire the instinct,” says Mr. F. Newman, “which made the old Germans regard women as penetrating nearer to the

* Would anything induce men to submit to the tortures of tight-lacing, or of the Chinese “lily feet”—utter absurdities of the most harmful kind—for the sake of being “comme il faut”—in the literal sense, “as one ought to be?”

mind of God than man does." That a large share of the higher moral and ideal work of the world may fairly be taken by her, is shown by the fact that though the male and female population is nearly equal in number, the crimes committed by men are usually five times as numerous.

Her influence now is more than sufficiently great; it is not desirable that it should be in any degree increased. What is wanted is to give her the training and discipline by which that which she has may best be used. There are symptoms on all sides of a change of thought, a desire to make more use of her powers in various work. Dean Alford, in his paper on "The Christianity of the Future," has observed, that "woman's action in the Church" has been neglected in our present civilization, that "the Reformers levelled in the dust, instead of attempting to regenerate, the whole conventual system of Catholicism." Mr. Tennyson hints in his *Guinevere* at the double power which the united action of men and women brings forth; and the reason he gives for his hero Arthur's failure is the failure of his wife. "If he could find," says the "bard,"

"A woman in her womanhood as great
As he was in his manhood, then, he sung,
The twain together well might change the world."

And again, in "The Holy Grail," he makes Arthur himself declare that if he can be joined to her whom he considers the pearl of women—

"Then might we live together as one life,
And reigning with one will in everything,
Have power on this dark land to lighten it,
And power on this dead world to make it live."

Mr. Tennyson has insisted on the "diverse" nature of men and women in lines which have become almost hackneyed by constant use, and therefore these hints at the joint action which shall make both more strong, the division of the work of the world between them, each supplying the deficiencies of the other, are the more important.

To enable women, by the wisest teaching which the nation can give, to make themselves ready for such a future, must be our object. A move of such an extent as is now taking place in women's minds cannot be repressed, their further advance is merely a question of time; let us insure that it is made in the right direction. Not in solitary action, for which with her quick sympathies and tender affections she is eminently unfit; not by usurping the work of men either as M.P.s, Amazons, or female lawyers, nor again by dooming half the human race to the most petty trivialities by way of keeping

them virtuous and contented, shall we obtain the best work for the world. It is Iago only who condemns women to "suckle fools and chronicle small beer." To find the use of everything is the grand discovery of modern science, to waste nothing of whatever kind, and certainly not power. The body politic can hardly be made stronger by bandaging one hand tightly (even if it be the left) to prevent it from getting into mischief. A beautiful Hungarian myth says, "Woman was not taken from man's heel, that he might know he was not to trample on her, nor from his head, for she was not to rule over him, but from the rib next his heart, that she might be nearest and most necessary in every action of his life." And not until this joint action shall have been fully carried out in all work (different in kind for man and woman, and therefore for that very reason each fitting into each) shall man indeed "have power on this dead world to make it live," as the Creator of both seems to have intended for the benefit of all.

V.



MR. MATTHEW ARNOLD AND THE NONCONFORMISTS.

MR. ARNOLD has recently shown so much solicitude for the moral and spiritual welfare of the Nonconformists, that I trust he will not think it a sign of sectarian presumption and conceit, if I express the regret that he has not written a book for our exclusive benefit. As he told us several months ago, he is no enemy of ours, though at times he rebukes us sharply; what he aims at is our "perfection." But if his estimate of us is just, the errors into which we have fallen are so fatal, our faults are so grave, and our separation from the National Church is so serious an obstacle to the free development of our Christian thought and life, that he can hardly render us the service on which he has set his heart, unless he devotes himself to his kindly task a little more seriously. In his essay on "St. Paul and Protestantism," though he intended to address himself specially to the Puritans, he has raised innumerable questions in which Puritans have no separate interest. Any one of them would have been large enough for a volume—for half-a-dozen volumes. He reconstructs the theology of St. Paul; presents us with a perfectly original and very surprising account of the ultimate principle which constitutes the foundation of the English Church; speculates on the science of theological method, and on the relations between theology and philosophy; and, in the course of a very few paragraphs, lands us

in the very melancholy conclusion that the creeds and formularies of all Churches—the Nicene Creed and the Westminster Confession, the decrees of the Council of Trent, and the Thirty-nine Articles—are all equally worthless, as being the results of premature attempts to solve problems which are likely to remain insoluble for several centuries to come. It is disheartening to a Nonconformist to find his own small affairs overshadowed and suppressed by such vast discussions as these.

Nor is it easy to separate what Mr. Arnold has said about English Dissent from those bold speculations of his, which affect the dogmatic creed of all Christendom. This, he will probably reply, is not his fault. It is, no doubt, impossible to touch any question relating to the spiritual life of a Church or even of an individual man, without assuming or appealing to principles which determine our whole conception of the history and destiny of our race, and of its relations to truth and to God. So far as I can, however, I intend to limit myself in this paper to what Mr. Arnold has said about Puritanism and Nonconformity.

Mr. Arnold tells us that his one qualification for his attempt to reconstruct the theology of St. Paul, and so to rescue the great Apostle from the hands of the Puritans, is that belief of his "so much contested by our countrymen, of the primary needfulness of seeing things as they really are, and of the greater importance of ideas than of the machinery which exists for them." He would probably say that this is his chief qualification for criticising the history, traditions, policy, creed, and institutions of the Nonconformists. Like most other Englishmen, we are in danger, he thinks, of following staunchly, but mechanically, certain stock notions and habits, "vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly, which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically." He wishes to assist us to turn "a stream of fresh and free thought" upon our theory of religious establishments, which appears to him to have become a mere fetish, and upon our theological dogmas to which we seem to be holding with a blind and superstitious fidelity. For himself he is resolved to look at the Nonconformist Churches—their life, their practices, their creed—with his own eyes, to see them "as they really are;" and he has frankly told the world what he has discovered.

To Mr. Arnold the Evangelical Nonconformists are the true heirs and representatives of the Puritans. The Nonconformist Churches are the Puritan Churches. He discusses the grounds on which our theological and ecclesiastical ancestors separated from the National Church, and the grounds on which the separation is perpetuated. The theory which he has formed of us and of our history is definite

and intelligible. I will give it as far as I can in his own felicitous language. He believes that the main title on which Puritan Churches rest their right of existing is the aim at setting forth purely and integrally the "three notable tenets of predestination, original sin, and justification." "With historic churches like those of England and Rome it is otherwise; these doctrines may be in them, may be part of their traditions, their theological stock; but certainly no one will say that either of these Churches was made for the express purpose of upholding these three theological doctrines jointly or severally." But it was precisely for the sake of these dogmas that the Puritan Churches were founded; and now that the dogmas—at least in the form in which the Puritan theologians stated them—are no longer credible, "Protestant Dissent has to execute an entire change of front and to present us with a new reason for existing." It is admitted that the Evangelical party in the Church of England holds the same scheme of doctrine as the Puritans; "but the Evangelicals have not added to the first error of holding this unsound body of opinions, the second error of separating for them." Nonconformist Churches are built on dogma; and to build on dogma is to build on sand. The Church exists for the culture of perfection, and rests on "the foundation of God, which standeth sure, having this seal—*Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity.*"

This is Mr. Arnold's account of the Nonconformists. That to most Nonconformists it has all the novelty of a discovery, that we never had the slightest suspicion that we and our Churches exist simply for the purpose of upholding the doctrines of predestination, original sin, and justification by faith, will be to him no proof that his theory is unsound. He thinks that he understands us better than we understand ourselves, and will ask us for some account of ourselves and of our ecclesiastical position which shall be truer than his own to history and to fact. Claiming no authority to speak for any one but myself, I will attempt to satisfy him. I think it can be shown that he has altogether missed the true "idea" of Puritanism; that he has misread our history; and that his capital charge against us—that of separating for opinions—rests either upon a misapprehension of facts, or upon a principle destructive of all morality.

I shall have something to say further on about Mr. Arnold's new explanation of the controversy between Puritanism and the Church of England—Mr. Arnold's history is, if anything, more original than his philosophy—but it may be well to consider at starting the "error" by which we are discriminated from the Evangelicals of the English Church. They remain in the Establishment; this is their virtue. We have left it; this is our offence. But our only reason

for leaving it was that we could not remain in it honestly. Are we to be blamed for this? There were Nonconformists before the Act of Uniformity, but modern Nonconformity dates from St. Bartholomew's Day, 1662. It is notorious that the "Two Thousand" did not secede from the National Establishment; they were "ejected" from it. Their Calvinism was not more rigid than that of the men who drew up the Articles. Nor were they very zealous for any particular form of ecclesiastical polity. The majority of them had been Presbyterians; they were willing to accept Episcopalianism; most of them soon became, in practice if not in theory, Independents. They had no desire, as Mr. Arnold suggests, to invent new organizations for enforcing more purely and thoroughly any schemes of theological doctrine. What they wanted was to remain where they were, and to continue to minister to the congregations they loved; but they were resolved not to lie either to man or God, and it was this resolution which forced them to a separation. They did not believe that every baptized child is regenerated of the Holy Ghost, and therefore they refused to say over every child they baptized, "We yield Thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it hath pleased Thee to regenerate this infant with Thy Holy Spirit, to receive him for Thine own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into Thy holy Church." They interpreted the service for the Visitation of the Sick as compelling them to address to the impenitent as well as the penitent the words, "I absolve thee from all thy sins; in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;" they refused to say such words as these to men whose sins, as they feared, God had not pardoned; and they doubted whether such authority as these words imply had been entrusted by Christ to His ministers. They believed that there are some men who at death pass into outer darkness, and suffer eternal destruction; and when they were asked to say at the mouth of every grave, "Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God of His great mercy to take unto Himself the soul of our dear brother here departed," they answered that it was impossible for them to say this honestly. Nor could they truthfully declare "their unfeigned assent and consent to all and everything contained and prescribed in and by the book intituled the Book of Common Prayer."

The modern Evangelicals, who are favourably contrasted by Mr. Arnold with the Nonconformists, hold that same body of opinions—sound or unsound—which seemed to the ejected, and which seems to us, inconsistent with the services of the Prayer-Book. In this, the "first error," of which we are guilty, they have their full share; in the "second error," of refusing to use the services, we stand alone. I do not mean to censure Evangelicals for using the formularies which

appear to us inconsistent with the creed which they and we hold in common. I am quite sure that vast numbers of them have discovered some subtle method, satisfactory to themselves, of reconciling their formularies and their faith. But are our fathers to be very severely blamed for not being equally subtle—for not seeing how they could honestly thank God for the spiritual regeneration of all baptized infants, though they believed that all baptized infants were not spiritually regenerate? Was it a crime to suffer the loss of home and income, and honourable place and great opportunities for doing the work for which they most cared, rather than thank God for the eternal salvation of people who, as they feared, might be eternally lost? It seems to me that the principle which, Mr. Arnold tells us, lies at the foundation of the National Church, *Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity*, lies at the foundation of Nonconformity.

Mr. Arnold admits that separation from a Church "on plain points of morals" is right and reasonable, "for these involve the very essence of the Christian Gospel;" but he does not appear to think that it would be immoral for Dr. Cumming to celebrate the service of the mass, or for Mr. Spurgeon to baptize infants, or for Mr. Martineau to profess his unfeigned assent and consent to the Athanasian Creed. For the true elucidation and final solution of questions about the Real Presence, about Baptism, about the Trinity, he argues that "time and favourable conditions are necessary," and no such conditions have as yet been fulfilled since the apostolic age. The controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists has not yet been determined; and since that controversy has very much to do with the doctrine of Transubstantiation, the Pope is precipitate in insisting on the adoration of the Host. But if Dr. Cumming, with all his present convictions, had happened to have been born in the Church of Rome, he would be just as precipitate in refusing to adore; it would be his duty to remain in the Church, and so to leave "the way least closed to the admission of true developments of speculative thought when the time is come for them;" for the Church does not rest on opinions, and "the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal—*Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity.*"

Mr. Spurgeon may believe that it is a lie to say that every baptized infant is regenerate. He may believe that to baptize infants at all is contrary to the will of Christ, and to the practice of the apostles; but "the happy moment" for solving these questions has not yet arrived; the science of historical criticism is as yet hardly constituted, and none of us can be quite sure what the will of Christ was on such a matter as this, or about any of the

practices of the apostolic Church. Mr. Spurgeon's opinions, therefore, are no "valid reason for breaking unity;" he ought to use the baptismal service as it stands, and to remember that "the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal—*Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity.*"

The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is nowhere expressly taught in Holy Scripture; it is a development of what is revealed concerning God in our sacred books; it is, moreover, a philosophical development, and therefore "of a kind which the Church has never yet had the conditions for making adequately." This may seem to Mr. Martineau a very valid reason for not accepting Athanasianism; but to Mr. Arnold it seems a reason for not rejecting Athanasianism, and he would, therefore, if I understand him aright, recommend Mr. Martineau not to remain "shut up in sectarian ideas" of his own, but to return to the National Church, join in the worship of Christ as God—because practice, not doctrine, is of the essence of the Gospel, and "the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal—*Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity.*"

It is only just to Mr. Arnold to say that he has expressly told us that "the object of this essay is not religious edification."

Perhaps Mr. Arnold might reply that all that he means by his theory of development is, that as yet no man can be quite sure that he has discovered the very truth of God, and that therefore Churches should be very careful of imposing creeds and enforcing the use of doctrinal formularies. But if this is his meaning, his homily should be addressed to the Church of England, not to the Nonconformists. Its "first error" was in holding with presumptuous confidence the absolute truth of the dogmas contained in its services; its "second error" was in resolving that the Puritans should either use the services or leave the Church.

But may not Mr. Arnold be right after all in his main thesis? Though the Nonconformists came out of the Church in 1662 simply because they could not remain there and yet remain on "the foundation of God, which standeth sure, having this seal—*Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity,*" the "ejectionment" may have only liberated an impulse which the wholesome influence and discipline of the Establishment had repressed. From the first, the true instinct of Puritanism may have been to separate for the sake of the "three notable tenets." Its characteristic spirit—so it may be argued—could find adequate expression only in Churches resting on a basis of dogma, instead of a basis of Christian morals. That the Puritans were forced into Nonconformity by the rigid imposition of formularies which they could not use honestly, was an accident; for the free development of

Puritanism, separate Churches, founded not for the culture of Christian perfection, but for the maintenance of the doctrines of election, original sin, and justification by faith, were a necessity. To Mr. Arnold, at least, it appears that modern Nonconformity can give no better or more rational explanation of its existence.

There is some excuse for his error; though the excuse should avail him less than any other man. Nonconformists themselves have often declared that it is their special function to maintain the true theology of the Reformation. Such statements have been sufficiently common both in popular meetings and in ecclesiastical assemblies. But if the speakers had been pressed for an explanation, very few of them would have admitted that their Churches had no surer, deeper foundation than the Westminster Confession. They never meant that their Churches were mere theological schools. Or even if some Nonconformists have honestly believed that Calvinistic dogma constitutes part, at least, of the very foundation of a Nonconformist Church, Mr. Arnold had no right to believe it on their bare authority. He is no Philistine, and he ought to maintain "a watchful jealousy" against the mistakes into which it is so natural for Philistines to be betrayed. Is it not our great peril—the very peril to deliver us from which he has been raised up—that we are always forgetting the difference between the mere machinery of religious life and its inner spirit and power? Should he not, therefore, have received with great suspicion any account that we may have given of ourselves? It was more likely to be wrong than right. When orators and controversialists exulted in the unswerving loyalty of the Independents and Baptists to the Calvinistic creed, ought he not to have said to himself, "Perhaps these men are wrong after all, and the true 'idea' of Nonconformity, and of the Puritanism from which it sprung, may be something very different from what they suppose?" Neither individual men, nor nations, nor Churches, are always distinctly conscious of the true significance and value of their position and history. "We know not" what we are, any better than "what we shall be." It is only as the characteristic life and principles of any spiritual movement are manifested under a great variety of conditions, and in a long succession of prosperous and disastrous circumstances, that any trustworthy theory of it becomes possible.

Looking back, then, upon the last three centuries of English ecclesiastical history, what is it that constitutes the unity, originality, and power of that great movement which Mr. Arnold has tried to interpret?

It is an historical blunder to suppose that the characteristic element of Puritanism has been any exceptional zeal for Calvinistic doctrine. Goodwin, the illustrious Arminian of the Commonwealth, was as

good a Puritan every whit as John Owen. In Elizabeth's reign Calvinistic doctrine was dominant in the English Church, but the Puritans were subjected to pains and penalties. Whitgift, their chief enemy, approved the Lambeth Articles, in which the Calvinistic theology is expressed in its most offensive form. With a fine and true instinct, Mr. Arnold recognises the old Puritan spirit in the various communities of Methodists, who have always denounced the Calvinistic dogmas as a blasphemous libel on the character of God. The Methodists are Puritans, he says, because of their excessive zeal for the doctrine of justification by faith. But this is the explanation of a mere Philistine, who mistakes "machinery" for "ideas;" and it is an explanation with which a moderately enlightened Philistine would not be quite satisfied. For surely the antagonism between Methodism and Calvinism on such capital doctrines as predestination, a limited atonement, and the perseverance of the saints, more than annuls what at first sight appears to be a merely accidental agreement on the doctrine of justification by faith.

Puritanism can hardly have its roots in any theological creed, for there have been Arminian Puritans and Calvinistic Puritans; the Puritans have been persecuted by Arminian Conformists, and they have been persecuted by Calvinistic Conformists; and on the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists, the living representatives of Puritanism are widely divided. The only doctrine not included in the confessions of all the great churches of Christendom in which the Puritans seem to have agreed—and they have not been perfectly agreed in that—is the doctrine of justification by faith.

I believe that the ultimate secret of Puritanism is to be found in the intensity and vividness with which it has apprehended the immediate relationship of the regenerate soul to God. To the ideal Puritan, God is "nigh at hand." He has seen God, and is wholly possessed with a sense of the divine greatness, holiness, and love. For him old things have already passed away, and all things have become new. His salvation is not remote; he is already reconciled to God, and his citizenship is in heaven. He is akin to God through a supernatural birth, and is a partaker of the divine nature. All interference between himself and God he resents. He can speak to God face to face.

This consciousness of the intimacy of the soul's present relationship to God underlies the Calvinistic Puritanism which destroyed the Church of England in the seventeenth century, and the Arminian Puritanism which was expelled from it in the eighteenth. It is this which explains that zeal for the Calvinistic discipline which divided so sharply the Elizabethan Puritans from the Conformists, though both were equally zealous for Calvinistic doctrine; and it is this which is the spiritual root of Independency. The true function

of Puritanism in the religious life of this country has not been to set forth "certain Protestant doctrines;" but to assert and vindicate the reality, the greatness, the completeness of the redemption that is in Christ, and the nearness of God to the soul of man.

It is not surprising that Mr. Arnold should have misinterpreted English Puritanism, for he has failed to apprehend the true spirit and scope of a still greater movement. He appears to suppose that the only ground and justification of what it is becoming fashionable to describe as the Protestant schism of the sixteenth century, lay in the moral corruptions of the Church of Rome. Separation for opinions on points of discipline and dogma would in his judgment have been neither right nor reasonable. "The sale of indulgences, if deliberately instituted and persisted in by the main body of the Church, afforded a valid reason for breaking unity; the doctrine of purgatory, or of the real presence, did not." But though Luther's moral indignation at the sale of indulgences was the accidental cause of his ultimate breach with Rome, the supreme force of Protestantism was spiritual, not ethical. For centuries the religious life of Christendom had been stifled and crushed. A vast mechanical system of "means of grace" came between the soul and the Fountain of mercy, life, and blessedness. Of immediate access to God men were taught to despair. Between Him and them there were sacraments, priests, and a constantly increasing crowd of interceding saints. The free grace of God had been so obscured by the portentous dogmas which the Church had developed from the simpler faith of earlier times, that salvation could never be anything more than a probability. The penitent could never be sure that he had finally done with his sin. Penances in this world were to be followed by purgatory in the next. Nor was it possible to learn the thought and will of God at first-hand. It was not to the individual soul that God spoke; no man could hear the divine voice for himself. The teaching of Christ and the supernatural illumination of the Holy Ghost, belonged to "the Church," and men were told to listen not to God, but to councils and popes.

Luther broke through all this. He declared that God was near enough to man to be spoken to without the intervention of saint or priest. Sacraments had their significance and worth; but the grace of God came directly into the soul of man. Men were not to depend on external rites for the pardon of sins and for the nourishment and strength of the supernatural life. From God's own lips every man who desired absolution might have it, and have it at once. Between the penitent child and his Father no elder brother, be he saint or angel, can be permitted to come. No intercession is needed to move the Father's heart to mercy—no good work to placate His anger. Let the prodigal who has wasted his substance

in riotous living come home, and while he is yet afar off the Father will see him, and go out to meet him, and at once the best robe shall be put upon him, and there shall be a ring for his finger and shoes for his feet, and the house shall be filled with music and dancing. Do you want salvation?—this was the gospel which Luther preached to Europe,—you may learn from God Himself how you are to be saved. The parables of Christ, and the Epistles of St. Paul, and the supernatural teaching of the Holy Ghost are within every man's reach. *God is nigh at hand, and not afar off.* Every man may speak to God for himself. God's mercy is so large and free, that all He asks for from those who desire to be saved is that they should have the courage and the faith to leave themselves in His hands.

The doctrine of justification by faith, as Luther preached it, was no mere dogma. It was the assertion of a most vital spiritual fact. To receive it was to pass out of bondage into freedom, and out of darkness into light. Its power lay in this, that it represented God as appealing directly to every human heart, and appealing to it for absolute trust. At a stroke it swept away priests, and popes, and councils, and saints, and penances, and purgatory, and left the soul alone with God. The terms in which the doctrine was defined may be very open to criticism. The human analogies by which it was illustrated may be very imperfect. The theological method of those days, common to the Reformers and to the Romanists, may have led theologians to draw out from the doctrine technical inferences which the moral sense vehemently rejects, and which the spirit pronounces absolutely unreal. But the world knew what Luther and the Reformers meant; Rome knew what they meant; and the real controversy was not about the form in which the fact was to be stated, but about the fact itself. I am very willing to leave Luther's "machinery" to Mr. Arnold's criticism, if he thinks it worth his while to criticise it; but Luther's "idea" seems to me to have been even a more valid ground of separation from Rome, when Rome rejected it, than Luther's moral wrath at the sale of indulgences. To make it possible once more for the human soul to stand face to face with God was a work worth doing at any cost. It is the very greatest work that any religious reformer can attempt. To accomplish it, is indeed the true aim of every religious reformation.

When the Reformers began to construct a scientific expression of the vital spiritual truths which had been committed to their trust, it was almost inevitable that they should revert to the doctrines of Augustine. The dogmatic system, which appeared to them to obscure the vision of God, was but another form of Pelagianism. The spirit of Pelagianism, as well as its creed, had taken possession of the Church. The work of the great African doctor had to be done over again. Between themselves and him, the Reformers felt that

there was the most perfect spiritual sympathy. His inspiration was essentially the same as their own. The mystical theology might have afforded a still more perfect expression than Augustinianism of the transcendent facts which they desired to vindicate; and a few of the less conspicuous Reformers became Mystics; but mysticism does not take kindly to the rigid definitions and the severe logical method which the scholastic training and habits of the Reformers compelled them to introduce into their theological system. The Augustinian theory was their only choice; and it was no slight controversial advantage for them to be able to appeal to the authority of one of the most illustrious of the fathers.

The Puritans strove hard, according to the light which was in them, to complete the work of the Reformation. They accepted the Calvinistic theology, and appear to have found in it a complete and satisfactory interpretation of the most appalling and the most glorious experiences and discoveries of the spiritual life. To many of us, in these days, Calvinism may be incredible. It seems very easy to demonstrate that its theory of moral inability annihilates moral obligation; that its dogma of imputed righteousness renders the solemnities of the final judgment an unmeaning pageant; that its confident assertion of the perseverance of the saints must take off the edge of the most urgent exhortations contained in the New Testament to spiritual vigilance and the repression of the lusts of the flesh; that its eternal decrees of election and reprobation must paralyze all human energy by reducing human effort to absolute insignificance; and that its unqualified and daring representations of the divine sovereignty, and its reference of all good and evil to the determination of the divine will, are destructive of the moral character of God, and render it irrational and impossible to claim for Him the love, and trust, and reverence of the human heart on the ground of His moral perfections. Calvinism—so most of us are accustomed to think—cuts away the roots both of morality and religion. And yet the Calvinistic Puritans, with their dogma of moral inability, were stern and vehement in their denunciation of sin; with their doctrine of imputed righteousness and the perseverance of the saints, they wrought out their own salvation with fear and trembling; with a theory of the universe which represents the whole course of events as predetermined by the eternal counsels of God, they were men of an iron will and of inexhaustible energy; and with a conception of God which surrounds His moral character with impenetrable mystery and a darkness that might be felt, they were not only filled with awe when they confessed His majesty and greatness, but they loved Him with a passionate affection.

The paradox is not inexplicable. Calvinism may be approached

from two precisely opposite points. It is the theological form of the philosophy of necessity. Let a man come to the conclusion that the will is determined by the forces which act upon it, and that every volition is the result of the sum of the motives which preceded it, and the logical result of his theory will be the denial of the reality of moral distinctions and a blind surrender of human destiny to the irresistible laws by which its development is controlled. If he adopts any form of Christian theology, he will call these laws the divine decrees, and will imagine that he is a Calvinist.

But the Puritans did not arrive at the Calvinistic theology through the philosophy of necessity. They began, not with Man but with God. Their philosophy was an accident; they learnt it from others; but their theology was their own. With their clear and immediate vision of God, their own nature and the nature of every man appeared to them altogether corrupt, a thing to be despised, and loathed, and cursed. Remembering their own unregenerate days, when their "carnal mind" was "enmity against God," the very virtues and good works of the unregenerate seemed to them deserving of no praise; "yea, rather," they said, "for that they are not done as God hath commanded them to be done, we doubt not but that they have the nature of sin." That a nature so infected with evil could have come in its present condition immediately from the hands of God they did not believe, and they explained "the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam" by ascribing it to Adam's sin. Through that offence "man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit, and therefore in every person born into this world it [the infection of our nature—Original Sin] deserveth God's wrath and damnation." To the philosophy of necessity the utter inability of man to escape from the law of his nature is a reason for denying human responsibility; but to Calvinism, filled with the vision of God, man's inability to keep God's commandments is the supreme crime. The moral instincts quickened into intense activity by the immediate presence of the personal God, refuse to be suppressed for the sake of preserving the coherence of a theological system. They insist on asserting human responsibility and guilt. The logical faculty, working under the control of a method in which moral ideas can find no legitimate place, is forced to yield, and the result is hideous confusion.

It is a common saying that all men are Calvinists when they pray. In the presence of God the regenerate soul claims nothing for itself. His infinite mercy pardoned its sin. Its perverse reluctance to receive salvation was overborne by his grace. The supernatural life is his free gift. It confidently relies on His compassions which

fail not and His mercy which endureth for ever, to preserve it from apostasy. Calvinism, with its noble incapacity to escape from the glory of the Divine presence, endeavoured to translate these intuitions of the soul into the language and forms of a mechanical philosophy. The doctrines of election, of irresistible grace, and of the perseverance of the saints, are but the best logical expressions it could find for the deepest truth of all philosophy and of all religion. Our highest life is a life in God. It is not we who live, but God that "liveth in us." Some day we may reach that "happy moment" in the intellectual history of the human race in which all the conditions will be fulfilled for the adequate scientific expression of this truth. But it is the great merit of Calvinism that however ignominiously it may have failed in a scientific task reserved for other centuries, it strove with sublime faith and magnificent courage and energy to assert the truth itself; and in asserting it Calvinism gave a fresh inspiration to the religious life of Europe.

Mr. Arnold says that "what essentially characterizes a religious teacher, and gives him his permanent worth and vitality, is, after all, just the scientific value of his teaching, its correspondence with important facts, and the light it throws upon them." Whether this proposition is true or false depends upon what he means by it. Does "the scientific value" of any religious teaching depend upon its "machinery" or upon its "ideas," upon its intuitions of divine and spiritual truths, or upon its expression of them? The Calvinism of the Westminster Assembly, with its "machinery of covenants, conditions, bargains, and parties—contractors," was trying to make men feel and believe that God is "nigh at hand;" it succeeded in making men feel and believe it. Notwithstanding its clumsy formularies, with which alone a shallow scientific and philosophical criticism occupies itself, Calvinism brought men face to face with God Himself, taught them to find their life in Him, to trust with immovable confidence in his mercy, and to suffer gladly the loss of all things rather than wilfully break any of his commandments. The formularies were powerless to destroy the supernatural virtue of the Truth which lay behind them. It was for the Truth that the Puritans cared; the formularies were dear only for its sake.

I have already said that Mr. Arnold has the penetration to recognise the essential unity of Methodism and Calvinistic Puritanism, notwithstanding striking divergencies of theological opinion. In his vindication of that unity, he touches for a moment the ultimate principle of the whole Puritan movement. He says that:—

"The foremost place, which in the Calvinistic scheme belongs to the doctrine of predestination, belongs in the Methodist scheme to the doctrine of justification by faith. . . . This doctrine, like the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, involves a whole history of God's proceedings, and *gives also,*

first, and almost sole place to what God does with disregard to what man does. It has thus an essential affinity with Calvinism. . . . The word 'solidarian' points precisely to that which is common to both Calvinism and Methodism, and which has made both these halves of Puritanism so popular—their sensational side, as it may be called, their laying all stress on what God wondrously gives and works for us; not on what we bring or do for ourselves."

It is hardly accurate, I think, to say that justification by faith occupies a position in Methodist theology quite analogous to that which is occupied by predestination in the theology of Calvinism. The theological characteristic of Methodism is, perhaps, the emphasis with which it has insisted on the necessity and the instantaneousness of the new birth. But in the present discussion this question is unimportant. Mr. Arnold might, however, have given us a very different account of Puritanism had he followed the clue on which he laid his hand when he tried to discover the hidden spirit which makes the Arminian Methodist one with the Calvinistic Puritan. His essay would have taken altogether a different form had he seen clearly that the great and constant endeavour of Puritanism has been to proclaim and exalt "what God wondrously gives and works for us," disregarding "what we bring or do for ourselves." This would have been a spiritual, not a mechanical interpretation of the movement, and it might have led him to the conclusion that the essential and permanent element of Puritanism is not zeal for the "three notable tenets," nor a blind attachment to any system of church order, but a vivid and intense sense of God's nearness to the regenerate soul.

The theology of Methodism, like the theology of the Calvinistic Puritans, begins not with Man, not with the Church, but with God. Like Calvinism, its basis is theological, not philosophical. It affirms the freedom of the will; but this is an accident, or holds at most a merely secondary position. Had Methodism commenced with the freedom of the will, it is doubtful whether it would have reached its great doctrines of the new birth, assurance, and sinless perfection. It began with God; but Wesley was happily free to accept some other conception of God's ways to man than that which had been forced upon Augustine and Calvin. Wesley's religious life had received a powerful stimulus from the mysticism of William Law and of the Moravians. The triumph of Calvinism at the Synod of Dort, early in the seventeenth century, had proved fatal to its power over Continental Protestantism, and his intercourse with Continental Protestants had very much to do with the development of his theological system. In England itself, Calvinism was sinking rapidly into decay even among the spiritual descendants of the Puritans. It was not the Anglican divines alone who had contributed to its fall. John Goodwin's "Redemption Redeemed" had not been written in vain. It had become possible for a man whose vision of God was as clear and as immediate as that

of any of the Puritans, to adopt an Arminian theology. But Wesley's Arminianism was penetrated and transfigured by the Puritan spirit. He can never claim enough for God. With him, as with the Puritans, God is all. He concedes that man has power to resist Divine grace, but only because the concession is necessary to explain why it is that the infinite love, of which he has so bright and rapturous a vision, does not rescue all men from sin and destruction. But when grace has once subdued the stubborn soul to penitence and inspired trust—for with Wesley, as with Calvin, it is God who seeks man, not man who seeks God—its triumphs are illimitable. Between the soul and God there is at once the most intimate union. It is made partaker of the Divine nature, and it is not wonderful if the sudden influx of a supernatural life floods the soul with unutterable joy. The change is so great, that for its reality to remain doubtful appeared to Wesley almost impossible. Immediate inspiration is among the prerogatives of the regenerate, and they receive the witness of the Spirit that they are the sons of God. All sin may not be expelled from the soul in the moment of regeneration, but to deny the possibility of perfect sanctification would be to dishonour the Holy Ghost. The regenerate man may, even in this world, be filled with God, and be perfectly restored to the image of God's holiness. Methodism takes little account of what man does for his own redemption. Like Calvinistic Puritanism it has seen God, and all its hope is in Him.

That the passion of the Puritans for plainness and severe simplicity in the external forms of worship, and for "the Geneva discipline," had its deepest root in the same spiritual experiences as their theology, appears to me incontestable. No doubt they were intolerant of everything that seemed to them to belong to Romanism. They dreaded altars because they dreaded the mass. They feared that priestly vestments might perpetuate the infection of the priestly spirit. Diocesan bishops might grow into patriarchs and popes. They fought against what roused their suspicion and their hostility in the English Church, with the same weapons with which Luther and Calvin, and the English Reformers, had fought against Rome. They appealed to the Scriptures. Texts were quoted with uncritical recklessness; but on neither side was there any intelligent appreciation of the value and limits of Scriptural precedents or precepts in a controversy like this. Passages from Leviticus and from the books of Kings, and the boldest images of the Apocalypse, were tossed about in astonishing profusion, and with inexhaustible energy. Whatever came to hand was good enough to fling at an opponent. Hooker appears to stand almost alone in his manner of conducting the argument.

But the struggle had a moral and spiritual meaning. It was not

to be decided by texts. The policy of the Conformists was controlled by the exigences of their position, by their solicitude to make sure of the ground which the Reformation had already won, by their sagacious estimate of the strong hold which the ancient forms still retained on the imagination and the sentiment of the great masses of the people. The spell of the ancient worship and stately organization of the Church was still unbroken. Their own hearts confessed its power. The practical task which they had in hand—the task of maintaining and defending Protestant doctrine, and of subduing to something like order the religious confusion and irregularities caused by the violent separation from Rome—was enough for their strength. They did not wish to provoke unnecessary difficulties, and they therefore endeavoured to avoid all unnecessary changes in the ceremonial of the Church and its government. They determined to accept and retain whatever was not flagrantly inconsistent with the Protestant faith. The Puritans were men of a different temperament. They were disposed to treat very lightly the suggestions of expediency and the common infirmities of human nature. For them, what they believed to be the divine voice had absolute authority, and in the organization of the Church, it was their great endeavour “to make reason and the will of God prevail.” Concessions to unreasoning superstition they could not tolerate; and they believed that mere human inventions had no place in a divine kingdom. The Church was the very palace and temple of God; He had founded it; He dwelt in it; it was treason to Him to allow any authority but His to determine the most insignificant details of its polity or worship. In the Church, the Puritan wanted to stand face to face with God. The instinct which impelled him to acknowledge God always and everywhere, his abiding conviction that between the regenerate soul and God nothing should be permitted to interfere, made him impatient of rites which appeared to him to corrupt the simplicity of spiritual worship, and of ecclesiastical authorities which could claim no direct divine sanction. No doubt he was blindly prejudiced against the most innocent ceremonies and symbols which perpetuated the remembrance of the days of darkness. No doubt he was the victim of the Protestant habit of appealing to the letter of Scripture for the decision of all controversies. But the instinct which governed the Puritan movement for a reformation of discipline and worship, and which revealed itself, after the manner of the age, in vehement and violent hostility against diocesan episcopacy, altars, vestments, the use of the ring in marriage, and the sign of the cross in baptism, painted windows, and other legacies from the old Romish days, was a real spiritual force; and was striving, often perhaps very blindly, to translate into a visible and organic form, a great spiritual “idea.”

What this "idea" was may be best understood by considering the Church government and the modes of religious worship of the Independents, among whom Mr. Arnold would probably admit that the characteristic spirit of Puritanism has received its most complete expression.

The Independents believe that a man's conscious surrender of himself to Christ is an act of transcendent significance. It is the critical moment in the history of the soul. It secures the gift of that supernatural life which the Lord Jesus Christ came to confer upon the human race, and as soon as this life is received a man passes into the kingdom of God. His moral habits may be faulty. His knowledge of spiritual truth may be very elementary. There may be little fervour or intensity in his spiritual affections. But the difference between himself and other men is infinite. He has received the Holy Ghost, and has become partaker of the divine nature.

For the development and perfect realization of this life it is necessary, or if not unconditionally necessary, it is something more than expedient—that there should be free fellowship between himself and those who have received the same supernatural gift. He and they have a common life. He is one not only with God but with them. In the absence of any mechanical bonds of union, and of all external signs of mutual recognition, and of all acts of common worship, the union is real and indestructible. But it requires expression, if the spiritual life is to attain all its possibilities of vigour and joy. God is hardly less solicitous to restore us to each other than to restore us to Himself, and He has made the nobler and more gracious forms of spiritual experience and perfection almost as dependent upon the influences and gifts which reach us through our brethren as upon those which come directly from his own hand. Churches exist by virtue of this law.

The idea of a Church requires that it should be constituted of regenerate men, for the purpose of united worship and free spiritual communion. The true condition of membership is not profession of any human creed, or of any rule of moral discipline, but possession of supernatural life. When an Independent Church receives a man into membership it acknowledges, therefore, his regeneration of God. It has a right to ask him for nothing beyond the evidence which ascertains the reality of this inward fact; it will imperil the realization of its "idea" if it is content with less. The right of excluding from the society is inseparable from the right of admitting into it.

A Church so constituted fulfils, according to the faith of the Independents, Christ's conception of an assembly of His disciples gathered in His name, and may therefore confidently rely on the promise that

He will be "in the midst of them." No recognition or assistance from without is necessary for the validity of its ecclesiastical acts, the efficacy of its sacraments, or the acceptableness of its worship. It is enough that He, the Lord of the Church, is with His disciples, and that they have received the Holy Ghost. As no society can exist without officers, and as the supernatural gifts of the Spirit for the instruction and edification of the Church are conferred on men according to the divine will, the Church appoints to office those who appear to be divinely qualified to fulfil the various functions and ministries necessary to the development of its life. It finds such men either among its own members or among the members of kindred societies. That the right of appointing a man to be its spiritual teacher should vest in a patron, and be a marketable commodity, that it should be the privilege of any Minister of State, appears too monstrous to require discussion. The Church has the special presence of Christ and the immediate inspiration of the Spirit; the interference of any external and merely secular power is a violation of its prerogatives, to be resisted at any peril.

On the same grounds Independency refuses to acknowledge the authority of diocesan bishops and of Presbyterian synods and general assemblies. The supernatural qualifications of ministers come direct from the Holy Ghost, and may be recognised by those in whom the Holy Ghost dwells. The intervention of Episcopal ordination, or of synodical authority, as though it were necessary either to confer ministerial gifts or to secure the Church from mistakes in ministerial appointments, is rejected as being a direct or implicit denial of the immediate intercourse between the Church and Christ, and of the direct action of the Spirit. Independents are in the habit of inviting the ministers and members of neighbouring churches to be present at the ordination of a minister, but their presence is not necessary to make the ordination valid.

Churches in the same county associate for mutual counsel, and for co-operation in various good works, but the "Association" has no ecclesiastical authority. It cannot appoint or remove a minister, or interfere in the internal discipline of any of the associated Churches. The Congregational Union of England and Wales is equally powerless. It is an Assembly for the discussion of questions in which Congregational Churches are interested; but the utmost care has been taken to prevent it from becoming a Court of Appeal. The principle of the Independent polity is the characteristic principle of Puritanism. Independency is an attempt to give form and expression to a vivid sense of God's nearness to every regenerate soul.

It is an obvious consequence of this principle that Independents should repudiate the fancy that buildings erected for Public

Worship have any peculiar sanctity. The revival during the last thirty years of a taste for ecclesiastical architecture has affected the style of their chapels; the old square "meeting-houses" are everywhere disappearing; their new "churches"—many of them, at least—have spires and transepts and chancels and apses and windows bright with angels and gorgeous with saints; but it is a mistake to suppose that there is any meaning in it all. There are some Independents who find a sentimental gratification in trying to make the buildings in which they worship as nearly like, as they can, the venerable churches around which cluster the solemn and pathetic associations of centuries; there are some who have an honest love and admiration for the beauty and grandeur of which Gothic is capable; there are others who think they show their freedom from prejudice against the Establishment, and their brotherly kindness for Episcopalians, by copying their architecture; there are others, again, and these, perhaps, are the most numerous, who accept Gothic because, as yet, architects seem to want either the courage or the genius to erect a building that would be really suitable for Independent preaching and worship; there are none, so far as I know, who have renounced the old Puritan contempt for the consecration of stone and mortar.

The hymns which are found in all Nonconformist Hymn Books, and which are sung at the opening of all Nonconformist Chapels, hymns in which chapels are called "Temples," and are dedicated to God, His presence being solemnly invoked, and the building presented as an offering to Himself, are never meant to be rigidly interpreted. It is quite understood that the "machinery" of Judaism, of which the hymn writers are thankful to avail themselves, is obsolete. The true Independent conviction is as strong as ever, that God's presence is promised, not to consecrated places, but to consecrated persons.

It is often alleged by Independents themselves that there is nothing in their ecclesiastical principles to prevent them from using a liturgy, the liturgy of the Church of England, or a liturgy composed by themselves, or compiled from the prayers of the saints of all churches and all ages. This is true in a certain sense. But it would be a departure from our traditions, and from the spirit of the movement from which we have sprung. It belongs to the "idea" of Independency that we are as near to God to-day as were any of the saints of former centuries. The Holy Ghost rests upon us and "helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us, with groans which cannot be uttered."

And if it is suggested that there may be a true and deep and

inspired yearning for fellowship with God, and for all spiritual blessings, where the "gift," which is necessary for expressing the devotional life of others, is not conferred, the reply is obvious; the "gift" may not be possessed by the head of every Christian household, and this may be a reason for tolerating the use of a prayer-book in the family. But to admit the possibility of its not being present in a Church—to despair of its recovery if it has been lost—is a surrender of the Independent idea of the Church. "Gifts" of teaching and "gifts" of prayer and intercession appear to be necessary to a Church which claims to stand in the immediate presence of God, and to be filled with the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. That, as a rule, there will be more to appeal to refined religious sentiment in a liturgy than in free prayer—that a liturgy is likely to be more stately and impressive, is no argument to a true Independent for a change in his mode of worship. When he prays he is thinking of God and speaking to God. His desire is to be absorbed in that high intercourse. He regards with jealousy and distrust whatever would invest worship with any charm for those elements of our nature which are not purely spiritual. To care for what men may think of the form in which the soul is expressing its reverence for the majesty and holiness of God, and imploring His mercy, appears an indignity to God himself. To try to give delight to a cultivated taste while he ought to be struggling for deliverance from sin and eternal destruction, would destroy the simplicity and energy of the supreme act of the soul. It is no concern of his whether men who are not as intent as himself upon glory, honour, and immortality, are charmed or repelled.

I am not vindicating the traditional severity and plainness of the religious services of the Independents—severity and plainness which are rapidly disappearing—but trying to explain how it was that they rejected the noble liturgy which had been enriched by the penitence, the trust, the sorrow, and the gladness of the saints of many ages and many lands. They were sure that the Spirit, who had dwelt in the great doctors and martyrs of the Church, dwelt in themselves. And if they were unable to confess their sin, invoke the divine grace, and give thanks for the divine goodness in forms of devotion which even the unregenerate might admire for their solemnity and beauty, this was a matter which Puritans and Independents regarded with perfect indifference.

Those who charge Puritanism with caring more for the "machinery" of the religious life than for "ideas," misunderstand and misrepresent it. It rejected the theology of Rome for Calvinism because in Calvinism it found a truer and fuller expression of its great discovery,

that the strength and glory of man come from the immediate inspiration of God. It accepted the Arminianism of John Wesley because Wesleyan Arminianism is a vindication, under other forms, of the same vital spiritual truth. It was restless under the restraints of Episcopacy, and the rites and ceremonies which Episcopacy had inherited from the Mediæval Church, because they seemed to interfere with the direct access of God to the soul. If it has found its highest ecclesiastical expression in the polity of the Independents, and if, disregarding all the suggestions of æstheticism and religious "sentiment," it has created among us what may be an unreasonable preference for extreme simplicity and bareness in the circumstances of public worship, its justification is to be found in this,—that in the Independent polity there is less of mere "machinery" than in any other form of church government—the Church stands almost unclothed in the presence of God,—and in its services the soul is left to the solitary aid of the Spirit, and is unsustained in its acts of prayer, of thanksgiving, and of adoration by the resources of Art, or by the more legitimate stimulus which it might derive from the devotion and genius of the saints of other generations.

To investigate the validity of Mr. Arnold's statement, that the Puritans were guilty of attempting to narrow the doctrinal freedom of the English Church, an attempt which the Church in the spirit of charity resisted, would require more space than I can command in this paper. "Everybody knows," he says, "how far Nonconformity is due to the Church of England's rigour in imposing an explicit declaration of adherence to her formularies. But only a few who have searched out the matter know how far Nonconformity is due also to the Church of England's invincible reluctance to narrow her large and loose formularies to the strict Calvinistic sense dear to Puritanism." That the Puritans were very zealous for Calvinistic doctrine is admitted. That they were very likely to desire that these doctrines should be maintained and defended by all those instruments of secular and ecclesiastical authority in which the members of an Episcopal and Established Church were, once at least, in danger of placing a blind reliance, may be admitted too. But some stronger proof of Mr. Arnold's charge is necessary than that which is contained in his essay.

"From the very commencement the Church, as regards doctrine, was for opening; Puritanism was for narrowing." This is the charge. How is it sustained?

We are reminded that though the Lambeth Articles of 1595 exhibit Calvinism as potent in the Church of England itself, and among the bishops of the Church, Calvinism could not establish itself there. The Lambeth Articles were recalled and suppressed,

and Archbishop Whitgift was threatened with the penalties of a *premunire* for having published them. These Articles consisted of nine propositions :—

- (1). God hath from eternity predestinated certain persons to life, and hath reprobated certain persons unto death.
- (2). The moving or efficient cause of predestination unto life is not the foresight of faith, or of perseverance, or of good works, or of anything that is in the persons predestinated, but the alone will of God's good pleasure.
- (3). The predestinate are a pre-determined and certain number, which can neither be lessened nor increased.
- (4). Such as are not predestinated to salvation shall inevitably be condemned on account of their sins.
- (5). The true, lively, and justifying faith, and the Spirit of God justifying, is not extinguished, doth not utterly fail, doth not vanish away in the elect, either finally or totally.
- (6). A true believer, that is, one endued with justifying faith, is certified, by the full assurance of faith, that his sins are forgiven, and that he shall be everlastingly saved by Christ.
- (7). Saving grace is not allowed, is not imparted, is not granted to all men, by which they may be saved if they will.
- (8). No man is able to come to Christ unless it be given him, and unless the Father draw him, and all men are not drawn by the Father that they may come to His Son.
- (9). It is not in the will and power of every man to be saved.

But are the Puritans to be held responsible for this terrible Calvinistic manifesto? Was it the production of a knot of sour and rigid fanatics, who, although they may accidentally have found a refuge in the Church—for which, from the commencement of its history, Mr. Arnold has claimed the credit of generous doctrinal toleration—had no sympathy with her large and catholic spirit? The Lambeth Articles were drawn up by a Conference at Lambeth, assembled by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and consisting of the Bishop of London, the Bishop of Bangor, Tindal, the Dean of Ely, Dr. Whitaker, the Queen's Divinity Professor, and other learned men from Cambridge. They were framed in opposition to the teaching of William Barrett, a Fellow of Caius College, who had preached against predestination, and who appears to have been forced to make a public recantation.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Whitgift, as is well known, hated Puritanism, and did his best to extirpate it. His severity inspired Lord Burleigh with indignation. The "oath *ex officio*," which was tendered by the Archbishop to such of the clergy as were suspected of Puritanical tendencies, was described by the treasurer as "so curiously penned, so full of branches and circumstances, as he thought the inquisitors of Spain used not so many questions to comprehend and to trap their preys." And yet Mr. Arnold produces a series of doctrinal Articles drawn up by Whitgift as proof

that "from the very commencement, as regards doctrine, the Church was for opening, Puritanism was for narrowing."

It is true that at the Hampton Court Conference in 1604, when Arminianism was beginning to find its way into the Church of England, the Puritans proposed that the Lambeth Articles might be inserted in the Book of Articles, and that the bishops resisted. But if any value is to be attached to the imperfect reports which we have of that Conference, the whole pressure of the Puritan demand was for relaxation in the stringency of regulations touching rites and ceremonies. The suggestion that the Thirty-nine Articles should be "explained in places obscure, and enlarged where some things are defective;" and that "the nine assertions orthodoxal . . . concluded upon at Lambeth" should be added to them, appears to have been made only to be dropped. However this may have been, the worst that can be said about the Puritan demands at the Hampton Court Conference is that the Puritans were guilty of forgetting their old grudge against Whitgift, and of accepting the scheme of their inveterate enemy for narrowing the doctrine of the Church.

The complaints of the Committee appointed by the House of Lords in 1641 amount to little more than this, that the Calvinistic doctrines which the Articles of the Church were plainly intended to maintain were being preached against by many of the clergy. Opinions were held by Laud and his party which Whitgift would have punished with the utmost severity. In condemning them the Puritan Committee showed no greater zeal for "the two cardinal doctrines of predestination and justification by faith" than their enemies had shown before them. The alterations in the Prayer-Book which the Committee suggested would not have made the formularies more Calvinistic, but only less Romish.*

* Cardwell gives the following summary of the changes which the Committee proposed, p. 240:—

"They advised that the Psalms, sentences, epistles, and Gospels should be printed according to the new translation; that fewer lessons should be taken from the Apocrypha; that the words 'with my body I thee worship,' should be made more intelligible; that the immersion of the infant at the time of baptism should not be required in case of extremity; that some saints which they called legends should be excluded from the calendar; that the 'Benedicite' should be omitted; that the words 'which only workest great marvels,' should be omitted; that 'deadly sins,' as used in the Litany, should be altered to 'grievous sins;' that the words 'sanctify the flood Jordan,' and 'in sure and certain hope of resurrection,' in the two forms of baptism and burial, should be altered to, 'sanctify the element of water,' and 'knowing assuredly that the dead shall rise again.' To these and other changes of a like nature they added the following more difficult concessions:—That the rubric with regard to vestments should be altered; that a rubric be added to explain that the kneeling at the communion was solely in reference to the prayer contained in the words, 'preserve thy body and soul:' that the cross in baptism should be explained or discontinued; that the words in the form of confirmation, declaring that infants baptized are undoubtedly saved, should be omitted; and that the form of absolution provided for the sick should be made declaratory instead

Mr. Arnold thinks, of course, that the Church has much to blame herself for in the Act of Uniformity. "Blame she deserves, and she has had it plentifully; but what has not been enough perceived is, that really the conviction of her own moderation, openness, and latitude, as far as regards doctrine, seems to have filled her mind during her dealings with the Puritans, and that her impatience with them was in great measure impatience at seeing these so ill appreciated by them." His account of the Savoy Conference in 1661 leaves the impression on one's mind that in his belief the Puritans left the Church, not merely because other men insisted that they should use formularies which they could not use honestly, but also because they did not succeed in so narrowing the formularies that other men, with an equal right to be in the Church with themselves, would be unable to use them honestly; that the struggle of Baxter and his party was, therefore, not merely to obtain freedom for themselves, but also to impose bondage on others. To sustain this original representation of the transactions immediately preceding the ejection, no better proof is given than that the Puritans complained that "the confession is very defective, not clearly expressing original sin." This is surely very inadequate ground on which to rest so grave a charge. The doctrine or the fact which the Puritans desired to recognise in the confession may be true or false, but it was not the characteristic tenet of a party. None of their enemies, so far as I know, denied it; it was expressed in the Articles with all the vigour and decisiveness which they could desire; and no man who signed the articles could have objected on doctrinal grounds to Baxter's proposal to insert it in the confession. The real nature of the proposal would have been explained had Mr. Arnold given the whole of the paragraph from the "Exceptions against the Book of Common Prayer," in which it occurs, which reads thus, "The confession is very defective, not clearly expressing original sin, nor sufficiently enumerating actual sins, with their aggravations, but consisting only of generals; whereas *confession, being the exercise of repentance, ought to be more particular.*" The same ground of exception is taken in a subsequent paragraph against "the whole body of the Common Prayer." The Puritans contended that "it consisteth very much of mere generals, as 'to have our prayers heard, to be kept from all evil, and from all enemies, and all adversity, that we might do God's will,' without any mention of the particulars in which these generals exist."

of being authoritative.' These concessions, surrendering by implication some of the most solemn convictions of a great portion of the clergy, on the authority of the Church, the nature of the two sacraments, and the sanctity of the priesthood, would meet with the most strenuous opposition, and tend to increase the causes of discontent, instead of abating them."

Towards the end of the Conference, Bishop Cosins offered a paper drawn up by "some considerable person," and intended to lead to a reconciliation. In their answer to the proposals contained in this Eirenicon, Baxter and his friends made this statement:—"Though we find by your papers and conferences that in your own personal doctrines there is something that we take to be against the Word of God, and perceive that we understand not the doctrine of the Church in all things alike; yet we find nothing contrary to the Word of God in that which is indeed the doctrine of the Church, as it comprehendeth the matters of faith, distinct from matters of discipline, ceremonies, and modes of worship." From this it appears that to the doctrine of the Church the Puritans made no objection. It is remarkable that in many of the trust-deeds of early Presbyterian chapels it is provided that the doctrine preached in them should be in harmony with the doctrinal Articles of the Church of England; and in the "Heads of Agreement," drawn up in 1691, as the basis of a union between the Presbyterians and Independents, it is declared to be sufficient if a Church acknowledges the divine origin of the Scriptures, and accepts the doctrinal part of the Articles, or the Westminster or Savoy Confessions.

It is possible that those "who have searched out the matter" may be able to allege more substantial evidence of the contrast between the catholic moderation of the Church and the narrowness of Puritanism than Mr. Arnold has thought it worth while to adduce; but to persons like myself, who have not made it their special business to study the unfamiliar aspects of the Puritan controversy, Mr. Arnold's discovery appears to be very inconsistent with facts. Neither Puritans nor Conformists—this has been the general impression—could claim much credit for their generous treatment of theological adversaries.

There may seem to be better ground for Mr. Arnold's allegation that the free development of religious thought is possible only in a National Establishment, and that separatist Churches are by their very position rigidly bound to the theological system and formularies of their founders.

But it should never be forgotten that the Independents have from the first protested against the imposition of creeds and articles of faith, and that one of the very earliest and noblest of them declared, in words which are familiar to all English Congregationalists, the inalienable right and duty of the Church of every age to listen for itself to the Divine teaching. John Robinson, preaching in 1620 to the Independents who were about to leave Delft Haven to found the Puritan colonies of New England, "charged us," writes Winslow, "to follow him no farther than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of His, to be

as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth by his ministry: for he was very confident that *the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of His holy Word*. . . . Here also he put us in mind of our Church covenant, at least that part of it whereby we promise and covenant with God and one with another to receive whatsoever light or truth shall be made known to us from His written Word; but, withal, exhorted us to take heed what we received for truth, and well to examine and compare it and weigh it with other scriptures of truth before we received it. For, saith he, it is not possible the Christian world should come so lately out of such thick anti-Christian darkness, and that full perfection of knowledge should break forth at once." John Robinson was not alone in his assertion of the principle of "development," and his repudiation of all human authority that might thrust itself between the soul and the Fountain of all Truth. In 1658 the ministers and delegates of the Independent Churches met at the Savoy, and drew up the well-known Savoy "Declaration of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational Churches in England." In the preface they say, "Such a transaction" [as a confession of faith] "is to be looked upon but as a meet or fit medium or means whereby to express their 'common faith and salvation,' and no way to be made use of as an imposition upon any. Whatever is of force or constraint in matters of this nature of confessions causeth them to degenerate from the name and nature, and turns them, from being confessions of faith, into exactions and impositions of faith." Mr. Thomas S. James, in his curious and learned "History of the Litigation and Legislation respecting Presbyterian Chapels and Charities," makes the following pertinent comment on this passage:—

"They declare that they published and recorded in the face of Christendom, 'the faith and order which they owned and practised' for the information of their fellow Christians, and not for any practical use for themselves. That such a document was necessary to defend them from the attacks of the enemies of their religious and political opinions may be learnt from the calumnies against them noticed by Mosheim and Rapin. If they had followed the example of all other bodies they would have legislated for their infant Churches under the notion of giving definiteness and permanence to their opinions, but they trusted their Churches, and the truths they held, to the blessing and protection of God, being satisfied that they were according to His will, and they disregarded the devices and safeguards which human affection and foresight could supply. It should be remembered that the declaration copied above is to be found in a synopsis of Calvinistic doctrine, published in the middle of the seventeenth century, by men on the one hand supported by the party then in power, and on the other fully convinced that the belief of great part of what they stated was necessary to salvation, and that no part of it could even be doubted without peril to the soul. The non-use of creeds by such men is a very different matter from the rejection of them by persons who hold that there

are no essential and fundamental doctrines of Christianity. With the latter it is a matter of course ; with the former it is a proof of the highest wisdom."

It is also a singular fact that, so far as published accounts go, the trust-deeds of the Independent chapels founded during the twenty years following the Toleration Act—a period within which the Independents were of course very active in chapel-building—did not contain any provisions as to the doctrines to be preached in them. Mr. James thinks that this shows that the Independents "trusted to the rule of law, that the simplest form of trust for the benefit of a particular denomination is tantamount to a detailed statement of the principles and practices by which it is characterized." I agree with him that the absence of doctrinal provision from the trust-deeds does not prove that the Independents of those times regarded definite theological doctrine with indifference ; this is contradicted by their whole history. But is not the true explanation to be found in their traditional hostility to the authoritative imposition of human creeds ? I believe that they held, with John Robinson, that "the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of His holy Word."

It was in this spirit that the men who seceded in the middle of the last century from the Presbyterian congregation in Birmingham on the election of an Arian minister, and founded the Independent Church which still worships in Carr's Lane, made no attempt to secure the orthodoxy of their successors by inserting any doctrinal safeguards in the trust-deed of their new "meeting-house." For the maintenance of what they believed to be the truth of the Gospel, the instincts and traditions of the Independents have led them to rely not on parchments and courts of equity, but on the promise of Christ that the Spirit of Truth should abide in the Church for ever. The practice which has grown up among us, and become almost universal within the last sixty or seventy years, of appending a doctrinal schedule to the deeds of our chapels, is a departure from the habits of our fathers. It should, however, be understood that this schedule, except in cases in which the deeds have been drawn up by solicitors absolutely ignorant of our principles and usages, never touches the "Church" directly ; it simply provides that the trustees are not to permit the *building* to be used for the propagation of doctrines contrary to those determined by the trust. The provision is defended on the principle that people who contribute money to create a property have a right to control to the end of time the purposes to which it shall be devoted. The principle is as bad as any principle can be ; and the particular application of the principle is a violation of the fundamental idea of Independency. No true Independent will desire to impose any pecuniary penalties on a Church for the defence of his own conception of Christian doctrine. That

doctrinal trust-deeds should have been adopted by Independent Churches is a proof, I think, that Independency has lost something of the ardour of its "first love" for perfect religious freedom.

But doctrinal trust-deeds are not of the essence of Independency. They are hardly less contrary to its spirit than authoritative confessions and creeds. Our principles and traditions require us to leave the theological development of our Churches unrestrained by any human tests, formularies, or articles of faith; and practically that development is absolutely free.

Can equal freedom be claimed for the religious thought of the English Church? Its Articles it might dispense with. I am not sure that their authority has not already disappeared under the influence of what I think is described in law books as the law of obsolescence. But every religious community must have some bond of union, and in the Establishment this bond is the enforced use of the services of the Book of Common Prayer—services which have great merits, but which perpetuate the theological conceptions of centuries which have vanished away. Every fresh movement of thought in the English Church has to accommodate itself, as best it can, to the formularies. The new wine must be put into the old bottles. The new doctrine must express itself in the old technicalities. The first task of every man who believes that God has revealed to him any truth which has not already vindicated for itself a secure position in the Establishment, is to show how it can be made to agree with the Services; or, if he finds this difficult, he takes refuge in the Articles. Dr. Newman has to write *Tract Ninety*, and Dean Goode his treatise on Baptism. The sensitive spirit of Rowland Williams was stung to the quick, not so much because men thought that his free criticism of Holy Scripture was illegitimate in itself, as because they charged him with a dishonest violation of the obligations of subscription.

What real "development" of theological thought has there been in the Establishment since its separation from Rome? There has been a succession of theological movements, but they have never found their highest expression in the English Church itself. Calvinism was triumphant for two generations; but in the Church its growth was repressed, and it had to leave the Church to reveal its true spiritual genius, and to obtain a visible embodiment of its essential principle. The High Church movement in the reign of Charles I. was brought to a premature end by the Puritan revolt against the bishops and the throne; but it reappeared in 1833, and for a time seemed likely to take complete possession of the Church. What was its fate? It had no room for growth in the Establishment. It found itself "cribb'd, cabin'd, and confin'd" by the

Articles, and by what it regarded as the poverty of the Services. To breathe free air, the true chiefs of the Anglo-Catholic party, those in whom the spirit of the movement was strongest, went over to Rome. Methodism was born in the English Church, but it hardly began to feel its limbs before it discovered that they were fettered; and for the "development" of Methodism, the Methodists had to become Nonconformists. Will Mr. Arnold explain this paradox? The Church, he alleges, is eminently favourable to the free development of theological thought and religious life, and yet every fresh growth, whether of thought or life, appears to want air and sunlight and soil and room to expand, so long as it remains in the Church; and just when it promises to flower, it either dies off, or has to be transplanted.

He may say that the very function of the Church is to regulate the excesses of religious movements, and by its moderation to discipline their strength to practical religious uses. But this is to remove the whole question to another ground—a ground on which a Nonconformist need not fear to continue the discussion. If, however, the plea is to be maintained that in the English National Church the principle of development has fairer play than among the Nonconformists, it requires explanation how that principle is recognised in a system which refuses to grant to any new religious forces freedom to create an organization and a ritual in which they might reveal the fulness of their strength. For perfect development every living "seed" must have "its own body." This condition of growth the English Church refuses to any new ideas or impulses which may struggle to assert themselves within the limits of its communion. It cannot be said that there has been in the English Church a continuous unfolding of any great theological and spiritual ideas. Not a single movement of religious thought has had time to work itself fairly out. No sooner has any spiritual impulse begun to make itself felt than there has been a reaction against it. The history of the Church has not been a history of development, but of revolutions.

It has not been so with Nonconformity. Whatever life there has been in the Churches outside the Establishment has had freedom to grow. For good or for evil, the intellectual tendencies and spiritual forces which have revealed themselves among us have been able to assert themselves without restraint. Within a few years after the ejection, "the irresistible breath of the *Zeit-Geist*" began to make itself felt in a very large number of the Presbyterian Churches in England, and under the disastrous guidance of the unspiritual philosophy of Locke, they made a rapid descent, first into Arianism, and then into Socinianism. The Independents, for the most part, continued faithful to Calvinism; but since among them Calvinism was not a mere system of dogmas, but the expression of a vital faith,

it gradually alleviated the severity of its doctrinal definitions, and, without losing its characteristic life, embodied itself in new intellectual forms. The transformation was assisted by the writings of theologians who are almost unknown to the divines of the Established Church, but who exerted in their day a very powerful influence on the thought of the Nonconformists. Pre-eminent among them are Andrew Fuller and Dr. Edward Williams. Within the present century it has gone on still more rapidly, and received a powerful impulse from the controversies which thirty or forty years ago divided the Presbyterians of the United States. Methodism developed a new type of Arminianism, and created for itself a new ecclesiastical organization—admirable, notwithstanding all its imperfections, for the union of extraordinary elasticity with the solidity and strength derived from an almost imperial centralization of authority—a system equally effective for defence and for aggression.

The modern Nonconformist "idea"—I venture to call it so with all deference to Mr. Arnold—touching the true relations between the Church and the State, is not an after-thought suggested to us by the necessity of discovering some new ground for our ecclesiastical position, now that what he supposes to have been the old ground is melting away under our feet. Nor does our proposal to disestablish the English Church originate, as he seems to think, in any feeling of discomfort, like that of the fox who had lost his own tail, and who proposed to put all the other foxes in the same boat, by a general cutting off of tails. Our conviction that there should be a clear separation between the organization of the State and the organization of the Church, and that the separation would make the Church less worldly and the State more Christian, is a genuine spiritual "development." It is one of the growths of our freedom. Men must be virtuous before they create theories of virtue. Science had already begun to work on the inductive method before Bacon could write the "*Novum Organum*." The early Nonconformists believed in religious establishments. Had we remained in the Church, we might have continued to believe in them too; and the "idea" of ecclesiastical freedom which has now taken possession of Nonconformity might never have been revealed to us. Many Churchmen are beginning to receive it; but we think that this is partly owing to the illustration it has had in our own history—an illustration which, though necessarily incomplete, and on a very inconsiderable scale, has contributed something to the wealth of the common thought of Christendom. For two centuries our Churches have been free from the control of politicians; we have not been dependent on the will of Parliament for any modifications we have desired in the form of our worship and in our ecclesiastical polity; we have had to rely for the support of our religious institu-

tions on the unforced contributions of those who love Christ and desire the salvation of men; and we have come to learn that there is a strength and blessedness in liberty of which our fathers never dreamed.

The more entertaining passages in Mr. Arnold's recent animadversions on us, which I had marked for notice, must be dismissed with a word. The two main types of Nonconformist provincialism of which he speaks—the "bitter type" and the "smug type"—are they quite unknown among those adherents of the English Church who belong to the same social rank as ourselves? I quite admit that what Joubert says of the Romish services—" *Les cérémonies du Catholicisme plient à la politesse*," an aphorism verified in the manners of the common people of all Catholic countries—is true in a measure of the ritual of the English Church; but is not something of the alleged difference between ourselves and Churchmen due to the fact that Nonconformity is strongest among the rough and vigorous people of the great towns who live together in masses, and whose social habits are not controlled by intercourse with those who inherit the traditions of many generations of culture? And if in villages and small towns there is something more of self-assertion and hardness in the Dissenter than in the Churchman, is not this also partly due to the long exclusion of Dissenters from all free intercourse with the "gentry," who have had the advantage of a university education, of foreign travel, and of the refining influence of the recreations and intellectual pursuits which are at the command of leisure and wealth?

That "watchful jealousy" of the Establishment with which he reproaches us—whose fault is it? When farmers are refused a renewal of their leases because they are Nonconformists, when the day-school is closed against a child on Monday because it was at the Methodist Sunday-school the day before, when in the settlement of great properties it is provided that no site shall be sold or let for a Dissenting chapel, and that if a tenant permits his premises to be used for a Dissenting service his lease shall be void, can Mr. Arnold wonder that we are "watchful"? Does he think that the uniform conduct of the clergy has been calculated to encourage an unsuspecting confidence in their fairness and generosity? Have we not had reasons enough for maintaining a "watchful jealousy" against the growth of their power? If sometimes we speak roughly and harshly, and bear ourselves ungraciously, does all the blame lie with us? It might be more creditable to ourselves and more agreeable to others if we could always "writhe with grace and groan with melody;" but our critics should remember the infirmity of human nature.

Nor does it seem to us quite true, as Mr. Arnold seems to imply, that all "strife, jealousy, and self-assertion" come from breaking with the Church. The literature of the controversies which have


disturbed the Church itself as long as we have known it, does not appear to us to be more distinguished for "mildness and sweet reasonableness" than the pamphlets of the Liberation Society. Prosecutions for heresy and for the introduction of unauthorized innovations into the service of the Church, do not confirm Mr. Arnold's theory that if we had only remained in the Establishment, the religious peace of the country might never have been disturbed. In the *Record* and in the *Church Times*, the evangelical asserts his "ordinary self," and the ritualist asserts his "ordinary self," with quite as much vigour as the Dissenting Philistine displays in the *Nonconformist* or the *English Independent*.

Mr. Arnold thinks that it is a special failing of the mind of a Dissenter that it is "pleased at hearing no opinion but its own, by having all disputed opinions taken for granted in its own favour, by being urged to no return upon itself, no development." But surely this is a vice of nature for which the Establishment has discovered no specific. The evangelical Churchman drives by the Church of the ritualist on Sunday morning and travels four or five miles to hear a clergyman appointed by Simeon's trustees, and the ritualist trudges into a neighbouring parish to delight himself in the "People's Hymnal," in vestments, and in a fervent, passionate sermon on Penance, thinking with bitter contempt of the Protestant baldness of the service and the Protestant coldness of the sermon in the Church which stands within a stone's throw from his own door.

Mr. Arnold's representations of us are too much like the engravings in some of the cheap illustrated papers. The blocks are kept ready for all emergencies. A few slight touches will make them available for a railway accident in France or a similar catastrophe in America, for a yacht race at New York or at the Isle of Wight, for the "Derby" or for the "Grand Prix" at Paris. He has not given us descriptions of the characteristic vices of Nonconformity,—perhaps I could assist him with a few confidential hints about these if he wishes to try his hand at work of this kind again,—he has only amused us with a collection of clever but unfinished sketches of faults and follies common to men of all churches and all creeds.

Let us part good friends. Mr. Arnold bears a name which Nonconformists regard with affection and veneration. From his own writings we have received intellectual stimulus and delight, for which we are grateful to him. Nor is this all. Every man who is striving to know at first hand the truth which most concerns the higher life of the soul is the friend and ally of all who, with whatever resources and whatever success, are attempting the same great task. We can but bid each other God-speed.

R. W. DALE.



ON THE MIGRATION OF FABLES.

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION, ON FRIDAY,
JUNE 3, 1870.

“COUNT not your chickens before they be hatched,” is a well-known proverb in English, and most people, if asked what was its origin, would probably appeal to La Fontaine’s delightful fable, “*La Laitière et le Pot au Lait*.”* We all know *Perrette*, lightly stepping along from her village to the town, carrying the milk-pail on her head, and in her day-dreams selling her milk for a good sum, then buying a hundred eggs, then selling the chickens, then buying a pig, fattening it, selling it again, and buying a cow with a calf. The calf frolics about, and kicks up his legs—so does *Perrette*, and, alas! the pail falls down, the milk is spilt, her riches gone, and she only hopes when she comes home that she may escape a flogging from her husband.

Did La Fontaine invent this fable? or did he merely follow the example of Sokrates, who, as we know from the *Phædon*,† occupied himself in prison, during the last days of his life, with turning into verse some of the fables, or, as he calls them, the myths of *Æsop*.

* La Fontaine, *Fables*, livre vii., fable 10:

† *Phædon*, 61, 5. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Θῖον, ἐννοήσας, ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δίοι, εἰπερ μάλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιῶν μύθους, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικὸς, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὕς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμεν μύθους τοὺς Διῶπυς, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρότερος ἔτυχον.

La Fontaine published the first six books of his fables in 1668,* and it is well known that the subjects of most of these early fables were taken from Æsop, Phædrus, Horace, and other classical fabulists, if we may adopt this word "fabuliste," which La Fontaine was the first to introduce into French.

In 1678 a second edition of these six books was published, enriched by five books of new fables, and in 1694 a new edition appeared, containing one additional book, thus completing the collection of his charming poems.

The fable of Perrette stands in the seventh book, and was published, therefore, for the first time in the edition of 1678. In the preface to that edition La Fontaine says: "It is not necessary that I should say where I have taken the subjects of these new fables. I shall only say, from a sense of gratitude, that I owe the largest portion of them to *Pilpay*, the Indian sage."

If, then, La Fontaine tells us himself that he borrowed the subjects of most of his new fables from *Pilpay*, the Indian sage, we have clearly a right to look to India in order to see whether, in the ancient literature of that country, any traces can be discovered of Perrette with the milk-pail.

Sanskrit literature is very rich in fables and stories; no other literature can vie with it in that respect; nay, it is extremely likely that fables, in particular animal fables, had their principal source in India. In the sacred literature of the Buddhists fables held a most prominent place. The Buddhist preachers, addressing themselves chiefly to the people, to the untaught, the uncared for, the outcast, spoke to them, as we still speak to children, in fables, in proverbs and parables. Many of these fables and parables must have existed before the rise of the Buddhist religion; others, no doubt, were added on the spur of the moment, just as Sokrates would invent a myth or a fable whenever that form of argument seemed to him most likely to impress and convince his hearers. But Buddhism gave a new and permanent sanction to this whole branch of moral mythology, and in the sacred canon, as it was settled in the third century before Christ, many a fable received, and holds to the present day, its recognised place. After the fall of Buddhism in India, and even during its decline, the Brahmans claimed the inheritance of their enemies, and used their popular fables for educational purposes. The best known of these collections of fables in Sanskrit is the *Pañkatantra*, literally the Pentateuch, or the Pentamerone. From it and from other sources another collection was made, well known to all Sanskrit scholars by the name of the *Hitopadesa*, i.e., Salutory Advice. Both these books have been published in England

* Robert, "Fables Inédites," des XII^e, XIII^e, et XIV^e Siècles; Paris, 1825; vol. i. p. cccxxvii.

and Germany, and there are translations of them in English, German, and French.*

The first question which we have to answer refers to the date of these collections, and dates in the history of Sanskrit literature are always difficult points. Fortunately, as we shall see, we can in this case fix the date of the *Pañkatantra* at least, by means of a translation into ancient Persian, which was made about 550 years after Christ, though even then we can only prove that a collection somewhat like the *Pañkatantra* must have existed at that time; but we cannot refer the book, in exactly that form in which we now possess it, to that distant period.

If we look for La Fontaine's fable in the Sanskrit stories of the *Pañkatantra*, we do not find, indeed, the milkmaid counting her chickens before they are hatched, but we meet with the following story:—

"There lived in a certain place a Brahman, whose name was Svabhāva kripāna, which means 'a born miser.' He had collected a quantity of rice by begging (this reminds us somewhat of the Buddhist mendicants), and after having dined of it, he filled a pot with what was left over. He hung the pot on a peg on the wall, placed his couch beneath, and looking intently at it all the night, he thought, 'Ah, that pot is indeed brimful of rice. Now, if there should be a famine, I should certainly make a hundred rupees by it. With this I shall buy a couple of goats. They will have young ones every six months, and thus I shall have a whole herd of goats. Then, with the goats, I shall buy cows. As soon as they have calved, I shall sell the calves. Then, with the cows, I shall buy buffaloes; with the buffaloes, mares. When the mares have foaled, I shall have plenty of horses; and when I sell them, plenty of gold. With that gold I shall get a house with four wings. And then a Brahman will come to my house, and will give me his beautiful daughter, with a large dowry. She will have a son, and I shall call him Somasarman. When he is old enough to be danced on his father's knee, I shall sit with a book at the back of the stable, and while I am reading, the boy will see me, jump from his mother's lap, and run towards me to be danced on my knee. He will come too near the horses' hoof, and, full of anger, I shall call to my wife, 'Take the baby; take him!' But she, distracted by some domestic work, does not hear me. Then I get up, and give her such a kick with my foot.' While he thought this, he gave a kick with his foot, and broke the pot. All the rice fell over him, and made him quite white. Therefore, I say, 'He who makes foolish plans for the future will be white all over, like the father of Somasarman.'"[†]

I shall at once proceed to read you the same story, though slightly modified, from the *Hitopadesa*.[‡] The *Hitopadesa* professes to be

* "*Pantschatantrum sive Quinquepartitum*," edidit I. G. L. Kosegarten. Bonnæ, 1848.

"*Pantschatantra, Fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt*." Von Th. Benfey. Leipzig, 1859.

"*Hitopadesa*," with interlinear translation, grammatical analysis, and English translation, in Max Müller's *Handbooks for the study of Sanskrit*. London, 1864.

"*Hitopadesa, eine alte indische Fabelsammlung aus dem Sanskrit zum ersten Mal in das Deutsche übersetzt*." Von Max Müller. Leipzig, 1844.

[†] *Pañkatantra*, v. 10.

[‡] "*Hitopadesa*," ed. Max Müller, p. 120; German translation, p. 159.

taken from the Pañkatantra and some other books; and in this case it would seem as if some other authority had been followed. You will see, at all events, how much freedom there was in telling the old story of the man who built castles in the air.

"In the town of Devikotta there lived a Brāhman of the name of Devasarman. At the feast of the great equinox he received a plate full of rice. He took it, went into a potter's shop, which was full of crockery, and, overcome by the heat, he lay down in a corner and began to doze. In order to protect his plate of rice, he kept a stick in his hand, and began to think, 'Now, if I sell this plate of rice, I shall receive ten cowries (kapardaka). I shall then, on the spot, buy pots and plates, and after having increased my capital again and again, I shall buy and sell betel nuts and dresses till I grow enormously rich. Then I shall marry four wives, and the youngest and prettiest of the four I shall make a great pet of. Then the other wives will be so angry, and begin to quarrel. But I shall be in a great rage, and take a stick, and give them a good flogging.' . . . While he said this, he flung his stick away; the plate of rice was smashed to pieces, and many of the pots in the shop were broken. The potter, hearing the noise, ran into the shop, and when he saw his pots broken, he gave the Brāhman a good scolding, and drove him out of his shop. Therefore I say, 'He who rejoices over plans for the future will come to grief, like the Brāhman who broke the pots.'"

In spite of the change of a Brahman into a milkmaid, no one, I suppose, will doubt that we have here in the stories of the Pañkatantra and Hitopadesa the first germs of La Fontaine's fable. But how did that fable travel all the way from India to France? How did it doff its Sanskrit garment and don the light dress of modern French? How was the stupid Brahman born again as the brisk milkmaid, "*cotillon simple et souliers plats*?"

It seems a startling case of longevity that while languages have changed, while works of art have perished, while empires have risen and vanished again, this simple children's story should have lived on, and maintained its place of honour and its undisputed sway in every school-room of the East and every nursery of the West. And yet it is a case of longevity so well attested that even the most sceptical would hardly venture to question it. We have the passport of these stories *viséd* at every place through which they have passed, and, as far as I can judge, *parfaitement en règle*. The story of the migration of these Indian fables from East to West is indeed wonderful; more wonderful and more instructive than many of these fables themselves. Is it not wonderful that we should teach our children the first, the most important lessons of worldly wisdom, nay, of a more than worldly wisdom, from books borrowed from Buddhists and Brahmins? from heretics and idolaters? Is it not instructive that wise words spoken a thousand, nay, two thousand years ago, in a lonely village of India, should, like precious seed scattered broadcast all over the world, still bear fruit a hundred and a thousand

fold in that soil which is the most precious before God and man, in the soul of a child? No lawgiver, no philosopher has made his influence felt so widely, so deeply, and so permanently as the author of these children's fables. But who was he? We do not know. His name, like the name of many a benefactor of the human race, is forgotten. We only know he was an Indian—a nigger, as some people would call him—and that he lived at least two thousand years ago.

No doubt, when we first hear of the Indian origin of these fables, and of their migration from India to Europe, we wonder whether it can be so; but the fact is, that the story of this Indo-European migration is not a matter of theory, but of history, and that it was never quite forgotten either in the East or in the West. Each translator, as he handed on his treasure, seems to have been anxious to show how he came by it. *Huet*, the learned Bishop of Avranches, had only to examine the prefaces of the principal translations of the Indian fables in order to track their wanderings, as he did in his famous "*Traité de l'Origine des Romans*," published at Paris in 1670, two years after the appearance of the first collection of *La Fontaine's* fables. Since his time the evidence has become more plentiful, and the whole subject has been more fully and more profoundly treated by *Sylvestre de Sacy*,* by *Loiseleur Deslongchamps*,† and by Professor *Benfey*.‡ But though we have a more accurate knowledge of the stations by which the Eastern fables reached their last home in the West, Bishop *Huet* knew as well as we do that they came originally from India through Persia by way of Bagdad and Constantinople.

In order to gain a commanding view of the countries traversed by these fables, let us take our position at Bagdad in the middle of the eighth century, and watch from that central point the movements of our literary caravan in its progress from the far East to the far West. In the middle of the eighth century, during the reign of the great Khalif *Almansur*, *Abdallah ibn Almokaffa* wrote his famous collection of fables, the "*Kalila and Dimna*," which we still possess. The Arabic text of these fables has been published by *Sylvestre de Sacy*, and there is an English translation of it by Mr. *Knatchbull*, formerly Professor of Arabic at Oxford. *Abdallah ibn Almokaffa* was a Persian by birth, who after the fall of the *Omeyyades* became a convert to Mohammedanism, and rose to high office at the court of the Khalifs. Being in possession of important secrets of state, he

* "*Calilah et Dimna, ou, Fables de Bidpai en Arabe, précédées d'un mémoire sur l'origine de ce livre.*" Par *Sylvestre de Sacy*. Paris, 1816.

† *Loiseleur Deslongchamps*, "*Essai sur les Fables Indiennes, et sur leur introduction en Europe.*" Paris, 1838.

‡ "*Pantschatantra, Fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, Märchen und Erzählungen, mit Einleitung.*" Von *Th. Benfey*. Leipzig, 1859.

became dangerous in the eyes of the Khalif Almansur, and was foully murdered.* In the preface, Abdallah ibn Almokaffa tells us that he translated these fables from Pehlevi, the ancient language of Persia; and that they had been translated into Pehlevi (about two hundred years before his time) by *Barzûyeh*, the physician of Khosru Nushirvan, the king of Persia, the contemporary of the Emperor Justinian. The king of Persia had heard that there existed in India a book full of wisdom, and he had commanded his Vezier, Buzurjmihr, to find a man acquainted with the languages both of Persia and India. The man chosen was Barzûyeh. He travelled to India, got possession of the book, translated it into Persian, and brought it back to the Court of Khosru. Declining all rewards beyond a dress of honour, he only stipulated that an account of his own life and opinions should be added to the book. This account, probably written by himself, is extremely curious. It is a *Religio Medici* of the sixth century, and shows us a soul dissatisfied with traditions and formularies, and striving after truth; and finding rest only where many other seekers after truth have found their only rest before and after him, in a life devoted to alleviating the sufferings of mankind.

There is another account of the journey of this Persian physician to India. It has the sanction of Firdûsi, in the great Persian epic, the *Shah Nâmeh*, and it is considered by some† as more original than the one just quoted. According to it, the Persian physician read in a book that there existed in India trees or herbs supplying a medicine with which the dead could be restored to life. At the command of the king he went to India in search of those trees and herbs; but, after spending a year in vain researches, he consulted some wise people on the subject. They told him that the medicine of which he had read as having the power of restoring men to life had to be understood in a higher and more spiritual sense, and that what was really meant by it were ancient books of wisdom preserved in India, which imparted life to those who were dead in their folly and sins.‡ Thereupon the physician translated these books, and one of them was the collection of fables, the *Kalila and Dimnah*.

It is possible that both these stories were later inventions; but the fact remains that *Abdallah ibn Almokaffa*, the author of the oldest Arabic collection of our fables, translated them from Pehlevi, the language of Persia at the time of Khosru Nushirvan, and that the Pehlevi text which he translated was believed to be a translation of a book brought from India in the middle of the sixth century.

* See Weil, "Geschichte der Chalifen," vol. ii. p. 84.

† Benfey, p. 60.

‡ Cf. Barlaam et Joasaph, ed. Boissonade, p. 37.

In this Arabic translation the story of the Brahman and the pot of rice runs as follows :—

“A religious man was in the habit of receiving every day from the house of a merchant a certain quantity of butter (oil) and honey, of which, having eaten as much as he wanted, he put the rest into a jar, which he hung on a nail in a corner of the room, hoping that the jar would in time be filled. Now, as he was leaning back one day on his couch, with a stick in his hand, and the jar suspended over his head, he thought of the high price of butter and honey, and said to himself, ‘I will sell what is in the jar, and buy with the money which I obtain for it ten goats, which, producing each of them a young one every five months, in addition to the produce of the kids as soon as they begin to bear, it will not be long before there is a large flock.’ He continued to make his calculations, and found that he should at this rate, in the course of two years, have more than four hundred goats. ‘At the expiration of this term I will buy,’ said he, ‘a hundred black cattle, in the proportion of a bull or a cow for every four goats. I will then purchase land, and hire workmen to plough it with the beasts, and put it into tillage, so that before five years are over I shall, no doubt, have realized a great fortune by the sale of the milk which the cows will give, and of the produce of my land. My next business will be to build a magnificent house, and engage a number of servants, both male and female; and, when my establishment is completed, I will marry the handsomest woman I can find, who, in due time becoming a mother, will present me with an heir to my possessions, who, as he advances in age, shall receive the best masters that can be procured; and, if the progress which he makes in learning is equal to my reasonable expectations, I shall be amply repaid for the pains and expense which I have bestowed upon him; but if, on the other hand, he disappoints my hopes, the rod which I have here shall be the instrument with which I will make him feel the displeasure of a justly-offended parent.’ At these words he suddenly raised the hand which held the stick towards the jar, and broke it, and the contents ran down upon his head and face. . . .”*

You will have observed the coincidence between the Arabic and the Sanskrit versions, but also a considerable divergence, particularly in the winding up of the story. The Brahman and the holy man both build their castles in the air; but, while the former kicks his wife, the latter only chastises his son. How this change came to pass we cannot tell. One might suppose that, at the time when the book was translated from Sanskrit into Pehlevi, or from Pehlevi into Arabic, the Sanskrit story was exactly like the Arabic story, and that it was changed afterwards. But another explanation is equally admissible, viz., that the Pehlevi or the Arabic translator wished to avoid the offensive behaviour of the husband kicking his wife, and therefore substituted the son as a more deserving object of castigation.

We have thus traced our story from Sanskrit to Pehlevi, and from Pehlevi to Arabic; we have followed it in its migrations from the hermitages of Indian sages to the court of the kings of Persia, and

* “*Kalila and Dimna*; or, the *Fables of Bidpai*, translated from the Arabic.” By the Rev. Wyndham Knatchbull, A.M. Oxford, 1819.

from thence to the residence of the powerful Khalifs at Bagdad. Let us recollect that the Khalif Al Mansur, for whom the Arabic translation was made, was the contemporary of Abderrhaman, who ruled in Spain, and that both were but little anterior to Harun al Rashid and Charlemagne. At that time, therefore, the way was perfectly open for these Eastern fables, after they had once reached Bagdad, to penetrate into the seats of Western learning, and to spread to every part of the new empire of Charlemagne. They may have done so, for all we know; but nearly three hundred years pass before these fables meet us again in the literature of Europe. The Carlovingian empire had fallen to pieces, Spain had been rescued from the Mohammedans, William the Conqueror had landed in England, and the Crusades had begun to turn the thoughts of Europe towards the East, when, about the year 1080, we hear of a Jew, of the name of *Symeon*, the son of Seth, who translated these fables from Arabic into Greek. He states in his preface that the book came originally from India, that it was brought to the King Chosroes of Persia, and then translated into Arabic. His own translation into Greek has been preserved, and has been published, though very imperfectly, under the title of *Stephanites and Ichnelates*.* Here our fable is told as follows (p. 337):—

"It is said that a beggar kept some honey and butter in a jar close to where he slept. One night he thus thought within himself: 'I shall sell this honey and butter for however small a sum; with it I shall buy ten goats, and these in five months will produce as many again. In five years they will become four hundred. With them I shall buy one hundred cows, and with them I shall cultivate some land. And what with their calves and the harvests, I shall become rich in five years, and build a house with four wings,† ornamented with gold, and buy all kinds of servants, and marry a wife. She will give me a child, and I shall call him Beauty. It will be a boy, and I shall educate him properly; and if I see him lazy, I shall give him such a flogging with this stick. . . . ' With these words he took a stick that was near him, struck the jar, and broke it, so that the honey and milk ran down on his beard."

This Greek translation might, no doubt, have reached La Fontaine; but as the French poet was not a great scholar, least of all a reader of Greek MSS., and as the fables of Symeon Seth were not published till 1697, we must look for other channels through which the old fable was carried along from East to West.

* Specimen Sapientiae Indorum Veterum, id est Liber Ethico-Politicus pervetustus, dictus Arabice Kalilah ve Dimnah, Græce Stephanites et Ichnelates, nunc primum Græce ex MSS. Cod. Holsteiniano prodit cum versione Latina, opera S. G. Starkii. Berolini, 1697.

† This expression, a four-winged house, occurs also in the Pañkatantra. As it does not occur in the Arabic text published by De Sacy, it is clear that Symeon must have followed another Arabic text in which this adjective, belonging to the Sanskrit, and no doubt to the Pehlevi text also, had been preserved.

There is, first of all, an Italian translation of the Stephanites and Ichnelates, which was published at Ferrara in 1583.* The title is, "Del governo de' regni. Sotto morali essempli di animali ragionanti tra loro. Tratti prima di lingua Indiana in Agarena da Lelo Demno Saraceno. Et poi dall' Agarena nella Greca da Simeone Setto, philosopho Antiocheno. Et hora tradotti di Greco in Italiano." This translation was probably the work of Giulio Nuti. There is, besides, a Latin translation, or rather a free rendering of the Greek translation, by the learned Jesuit, Petrus Possinus, which was published at Rome in 1666.† This may have been, and, according to some authorities, has really been one of the sources from which

* Pertsch, *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii. p. 261. Here the story is told as follows:—"Perche si conta che un certo pover huomo hauea uicino a doue dormiua, un mulino & del buturo, & una notte tra se pensando disse, io uenderò questo mulino, & questo butturo tanto per il meno, che io comprerò dieci capre. Le quali mi figliaranno in cinque mesi altre tante, & in cinque anni multiplicheranno fino a quattro cento; Le quali baratterò in cento buoi, & con essi seminarò una càpagna, & insieme da figliuoli loro, & dal frutto della terra in altri cinque anni, sarò oltre modo ricco, & farò un palagio *quadro*, adorato, & comprerò schiaui una infinità, & prenderò moglie, la quale mi farà un figliuolo, & lo nominerò Pancalo, & lo farò ammaestrare come bisogna. Et se vedrò che non si curi con questa bacchetta così il percoterò. Con che prendendo la bacchetta che gli era uicina, & battendò di essa il vaso doue era il buturo, e lo ruppe, & fuse il butturo. Dopò gli partorì la moglie un figliuolo, e la moglie un dì gli disse, habbi un poco cura di questo fanciullo o marito, fino che io uo e torno da un seruigio. La quale essendo andata fu anco il marito chiamato dal Signore della terra, & tra tanto auuenne che una serpe sali sopra il fanciullo. Et vna donzella uicina, corsa là, l'uccise. Tornato il marito uide insanguito l'uscio, & pensando che costei l'hauesse ucciso, auanti che il uedesse, le diede sul capo, di un bastone, e l'uccise. Entrato poi, & sano trouando il figliuolo, & la serpe morta, si fu grandemente pentito, & piase amaramente. Così adunque i frettolosi in molte cose errano." (P. 516.)

† Georgii Pachymeris Michael Palaeologus, sive Historia rerum a M.P. gestarum, ed. Petr. Possinus. Romæ, 1666.

Appendix ad observationes Pachymerianas, Specimen Sapientiæ Indorum veterum liber olim ex lingua Indica in Persicam a Perzoe Medico: ex Persica in Arabicam ab Anonymo: ex Arabica in Græcam a Symeone Seth, a Petro Possino Societ. Iesu, novissime e Græca in Latinam translatus.

"Huic talia serio nuganti haud paulo cordatior mulier. Mihi videris, Sponse, inquit, nostri cujusdam famuli egentissimi hominis, similis ista inani provisione nimis remotarum et incerto eventu pendentium rerum. Is diurnis mercedibus mellis ac butyri non magna copia collectâ, duobus ista vasis e terra coctili condiderat. Mox secum ita ratiocinans nocte quadam dicebat: Mel ogo istud ac butyrum quindecim minimum vendam denariis. Ex his decem Capras emam. Hæ mihi quinto mense totidem alias parient. Quinque annis gregem Caprarum facile quadringentarum confecero. Has commutare tunc placet cum bobus centum, quibus exarabo vim terræ magnam et numerum tritici maximum congeram. Ex fructibus hisce quinquennio multiplicatis, pecuniæ scilicet tantus existet modus, ut facile in locupletissimis numerer. Accedit dos uxoris quam istis opibus ditissimam nansciscar. Nascetur mihi filius quem jam nunc decerno nominare Pancalum. Hunc educabo liberalissime, ut nobilium nulli concedat. Qui si ubi adoleverit, ut juvenus solet, contumacem se mihi præbeat, haud feret impune. Baculo enim hoc illum hoc modo feriam. Arreptum inter hæc dicendum lecto vicinum baculum per tenebras jactavit, casuque incurrens in dolia mellis et butyri juxta posita, confregit utrumque, ita ut in ejus etiam os barbamque stillæ liquoris prosilirent; cætera effusa et mixta pulveri prorsus corrumperebantur; ac fundamentum spei tantæ, inopem et multum gementem momento destitueret." (P. 602.)

La Fontaine drew his inspirations. But though La Fontaine may have consulted this work for other fables, I do not think that he took from it the fable of Perrette and the milk-pail.

The fact is, that these fables had found several other channels through which, as early as the thirteenth century, they reached the literary market of Europe, and became familiar as household words, at least among the higher and educated classes. We shall follow the course of some of these channels. First, then, a learned Jew, whose name seems to have been *Joel*, translated our fables from Arabic into Hebrew (1250?). His work has been preserved in one MS. at Paris, but has not yet been published, except the tenth book, which was communicated by Dr. Neubauer to a German journal, *Orient und Occident* (vol. i. p. 658). This Hebrew translation was translated by another Jew, Johannes of Capua, into Latin. His translation was finished between 1263—1278, and, under the title of *Directorium humanæ vitæ*, it became very soon a popular work with the select reading public of the thirteenth century.* It was translated into German at the command of Eberhard, the great Duke of Würtemberg, and both the Latin text and the German translation occur, in repeated editions, among the rare books printed between 1480 and the end of the fifteenth century.† A Spanish translation, founded both on the German and the Latin texts, appeared at Burges in 1493;‡ and from these different sources flowed in the sixteenth

* *Directorium Humanæ Vitæ alias Parabolæ Antiquorum Sapientum*, fol. a. l. c. a. k. d.: —“Dicitque olim quidam fuit heremita apud quendam regem. Cui rex providens quolibet die pro sua vita. Scilicet provisionem de sua coquina et vasculum de melle. Illo vero comedeat decocta, et reservabat mel in quodam vase suspensum super suum caput donec esset plenum. Erat autem mel porcarum in illis diebus. Quadam vero die: dum jaceret in suo lecto elevato capite, respexit vas mellis quod super caput ei pendebat. Et recordatus quoniam mel de die in diem vendebatur pluri solito seu carius, et dixit in corde suo. Quum fuerit hoc vas plenum: vendam ipsum uno talento auri: de quo mihi emam decem oves, et successu temporis he oves facient filios et filias, et erunt viginti. Postea vero ipsis multiplicatis cum filiis et filiabus in quatuor annis erunt quatuor centum. Tunc de quibuslibet quatuor ovibus emam vaccam et bovem et terram. Et vaccæ multiplicabuntur in filiis, quorum masculos accipiam mihi in culturam terre, præter id quod percipiam de eis de lacte et lana, donec non consummatas alia quinque annis multiplicabuntur in tantum quod habeo mihi magnas substantias et divitias, et ero a cunctis reputatus dives et honestus. Et edificabo mihi tunc grandia et excellentia edificia pro omnibus meis vicinis et consanguineis, itaque omnes de meis divitiis loquantur, nomen erit mihi illud jocundum, cum omnes homines mihi reverentiam in omnibus locis exhibeant. Accepim postea uxorem de nobilibus terre. Cumque eam cognovisset, concepit et pariet mihi filium nobilem et delectabilem cum bona fortuna et de consanguineis qui erant in scientia et virtute, et relinquent mihi per ipsum bonam memoriam post mei obitum, et castigabo ipsum dicens: si meo consilio fueris devotus: ac mihi in omnibus eris obediens, et si non: percutiam eum lito baculo et arcto baculo ad percutiendum: percutit vas mellis et fregit ipsum et scissit mihi super caput ejus.”

† Beaufay, *Orient und Occident*, vol. II. p. 128.

‡ Beaufay, *Orient und Occident*, vol. II. p. 381. Its title is: “*Exemplaris contra los concupisça y peligras del mundo*,” 1493. p. 167-68.

century the Italian renderings of Firenzuola (1548)* and Doni (1552).† As these Italian translations were repeated in French‡ and English, before the end of the sixteenth century, they might no doubt have supplied La Fontaine with subjects for his fables.

But, as far as we know, it was a third channel that really brought the Indian fables to the immediate notice of the French poet. A Persian poet, of the name of Nasr Allah, translated the work of Abdallah ibn Almokaffa into Persian about 1150. This Persian translation was enlarged in the fifteenth century by another Persian poet, *Husain ben Ali*, called *el Vaez*, under the title of *Anvâri Suhaili*.§ This name will be familiar to many members of the Indian Civil Service, as being one of the old Haileybury class-books which had to be construed by all who wished to gain high honours in Persian. This work, or at least the first books of it, were translated into French by David Sahid of Ispahan, and published at Paris in 1644, under the title of *Livre des Lumières, ou, la Conduite des Rois, composé par le Sage Pilpay, Indien*. This translation, we know, fell into the hands of La Fontaine; and a number of his most charming fables were certainly borrowed from it.

But Perrette with the milk-pail has not yet arrived at the end of her journey, for if we look at the "*Livre des Lumières*," as published at Paris, we find neither the milkmaid nor her prototype, the Brahman who kicks his wife, or the religious man who flogs his boy. That story occurs in the later chapters, which were left out in the French translation; and La Fontaine, therefore, must have met with his model elsewhere.

Remember that in all our wanderings we have not yet found the milkmaid, but only the Brahman or the religious man. What we want to know is who first brought about this metamorphosis.

No doubt La Fontaine was quite the man to seize on any jewel which was contained in the Oriental fables, to remove the cumbersome and foreign-looking setting, and then to place the principal figure in that pretty frame in which most of us have first become acquainted with it. But in this case the charmer's wand did not belong to

* Discorsi degli animali, di Messer Agnolo Firenzuola, in Prose di M. A. F. (Firenza, 1548.)

† La Moral Philosophia del Doni, tratta da gli antichi scrittori. Vinegia, 1552.

‡ Trattati Diversi di Sendebâr Indiano, philosopho morale. Vinegia, 1552.

§ Le plaisant et facétieux discours des animaux, nouvellement traduit de tuscan en françois, Lyon, 1556, par Gabriel Cottier.

Deux livres de philosophie fabuleuse, le premier pris des discours de M. Ange Firenzuola, le second extraict des traictés de Sandebâr indien, par Pierre de La Rivey. Lyon, 1579.

The second book is a translation of the second part of Doni's "Filosofia morale."

§ The Anvar-i Suhaili, or the Lights of Canopus, being the Persian version of the Fables of Pilpay, or the Book, Kalilah and Damnah, rendered into Persian by Husain Vâ'iz U'l-Kâshifi, literally translated by E. B. Eastwick, Hertford, 1854.

La Fontaine, but to some forgotten worthy, whose very name it will be difficult to fix upon with certainty.

We have, as yet, traced three streams only, all starting from the Arabic translation of Abdallah ibn Almokaffa, one in the eleventh, another in the twelfth, a third in the thirteenth century, all reaching Europe, some touching the very steps of the throne of Louis XIV., yet none of them carrying the leaf which contained the story of "Perrette," or of the "Brahman," to the threshold of La Fontaine's home. We must, therefore, try again.

After the conquest of Spain by the Mohammedans, Arabic literature had found a new home in Western Europe, and among the numerous works translated from Arabic into Latin or Spanish, we find in the middle of the thirteenth century a Spanish translation of our fables, called "*Calila é Dymna*.*" This was translated into Latin by Raimond de Beziens in 1313.

Lastly, we find in the same century another translation from Arabic straight into Latin verse, by Baldo, which became known under the name of "*Æsopus alter*."†

* This translation has lately been published by Don Pascual de Gayangos in the *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, Madrid, 1860, vol. li. Here the story runs as follows (p. 57):—

"Del religioso que vertió la miel et la manteca sobre su cabeza.

"Dijo la mujer:—'Dicen que un religioso habia cada dia limosna de casa de un mercader rico, pan é manteca é miel e otras cosas, et comia el pan é lo al condesaba, et ponía la miel é la manteca en un jarra, fasta que la finchó, et tenía la jarra colgada á la cabecera de su cama. Et vino tiempo que encareció la miel é la manteca, et el religioso fabló un dia consigo mismo, estando asentado en su cama, et dijo así: Venderé quanto está en esta jarra por tantos maravedís, é compraré con ellos diez cabras, et empreñarse-han, é parirán á cabo de cinco meses; et fizo cuenta de esta guisa, et falló que en cinco años montarian bien cuatrocientas cabras. Desí dijo: Venderlas-he todas, et con el precio dellas compraré cien vacas, por cada quatro cabezas una vaca, é habéré simiente é sembraré con los bueyes, et aprovecharme-he de los becerros et de las fembras é de la leche é manteca, é de las mieses habré grant haber, et labraré muy nobles casas, é compraré siervos é siervas, et esto fecho casarme-he con una mujer muy rica, é hermosa, é de grant logar, é empreñarla-he de fijo varon, é nacerá cumplido de sus miembros, et criarlo-he como á fijo de rey, é castigarlo-he con esta vara, si non quisiere ser bueno é obediente.' E él diciendo esto, alzó la vara que tenía en la mano, et ferió en la olla que estaba colgada encima dél, é quebróla, é cayóle la miel é la manteca sobre su cabeza." &c.

† See *Poésies inédites du moyen âge*, par M. Edéstand Du Méril. Paris, 1854. XVI. De viro et vase olei (p. 239):—

"Uxor ab antiquo fuit infecunda marito.
Mesticiam (l. mœstitiam) ejus cupiens lenire vix (l. vir) hujus,
His blandimentis solatur tristi[ti]a mentis:
Cur sic tristaris? Dolor est tuis omnis inanis:
Pulchræ prolis eris satis amodo munere felix.
Pro nihilo ducens conjunx hæc verbulâ prudens,
His verbis plane quod ait vir monstrat inane:
Rebus inops quidam . . . (bone vir, tibi dicam)
Vas oleo plenum, longum quod retro per ævum
Legerat orando, loca per diversa vagando,
Fune ligans ar(c)to, tecto[que] suspendit ab alto.
Sic præstolatur tempus quo pluri ematur[atur]
Qua locupletari se sperat et arte beari.
Talia dum captat, hæc stultus inania jactat

From these frequent translations, and translations of translations, in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, we see quite clearly that these Indian fables were extremely popular, and were, in fact, more widely read in Europe than the Bible, or any other book. They were not only read in translations, but having been introduced into sermons, homilies, and works on morality, they were improved upon, acclimatized, localized, moralized, till at last it is almost impossible to recognise their Oriental features under their homely disguises.

I shall give you one instance only.

Rabelais, in his "Gargantua," gives a long description how a man might conquer the whole world. At the end of this dialogue, which was meant as a satire on Charles V., we read :—

"There was there present at that time an old gentleman well experienced in the wars, a stern soldier, and who had been in many great hazards, named Echephron, who, hearing this discourse, said : 'I do greatly doubt that all this enterprise will be like the tale, or interlude, of the pitcher, full of milk, wherewith a shoemaker made himself rich in conceit; but when the pitcher was broken, he had not whereupon to dine.'"

This is clearly our story, only the Brahman has, as yet, been changed into a shoemaker only, and the pot of rice or the jar of butter and honey into a pitcher of milk. Now it is perfectly true that if a writer of the fifteenth century changed the Brahman into a shoemaker, La Fontaine might, with the same right, have replaced the Brahman by his milkmaid. Knowing that the story was current—was, in fact, common property in the fifteenth century, nay, even at a much earlier date, we might really be satisfied after having brought the germs of Perrette within easy reach of La Fontaine. But, fortunately, we can make at least one step further, a step of about two centuries. This giant step backward brings us to the thirteenth century, and there we find our old Indian friend again, and this time really changed into a milkmaid. The book I refer to is written in Latin, and called *Dialogus Creaturarum optime moralizatus*; in English, the *Dialogue of Creatures moralized*. It was a book intended to teach the principles of Christian morality by examples taken from ancient fables. It was evidently a most successful book, and was translated into several modern languages. There is an old translation of it in

Eecce potens factus, fuero cum talia nactus,
Vinciar uxori quantum queo nobiliori :
Tunc sobolem gignam, se meque per omnia dignam,
Cujus opus morum genus omne præbit avorum.
Cui nisi tot vitæ fuerint insignia rite,
Fustis hic absque mora feriet caput ejus et [h]ora.
Quod dum narraret, dextramque minando levaret,
Ut percussisset puerum quasi præsto fuisset
Vas in prædictum manus ejus dirigit ictum
Servatumque sibi vas il[li]co fregit olivi."

PAN̄KA-TANTRA.

581—579. Khosrow Nushirvan, King of Persia; his physician, Barzēyah, translates the Indian fables into *Pahlavī*, s.t. Kells and Dimma (lost). 754—775. Khalīf al-Mansūr. Abūlhasan ibn Almoḳarrā (d. 780) translates the *Pehlavi* into *Arabic* (ed. du Saury, 1810).

[illegible]

English, first printed by Caxton, and afterwards repeated in 1816. I shall read you from it the fable in which, as far as I can find, the milkmaid appears for the first time on the stage, surrounded already by much of that scenery which, four hundred years later, received its last touches at the hand of La Fontaine.

"DIALOGO C. (p. cccxiii.) For as it is but madnesse to truste to moche in surete, so it is but foly to hope to moche of vanyteys, for vayne be all erthly thinges longynge to men, as sayth Davyd, Psal. xciiii: Wher of it is tolde in fablys that a lady uppon a tyme delyvered to her mayden a *galon of mylke* to sell at a cite, and by the way, as she sate and restid her by a dyche side, she began to thinke that with the money of the mylke she wold bye an henne, the which shulde bringe forth chekyns, and when they were growyn to hennys she wolde sell them and by piggis, and eschaunge them in to shepe, and the shepe in to oxen, and so whan she was come to riches she sholde be married right worshipfully unto some worthy man, and thus she reioyced. And whan she was thus mervelously comfortid and ravished inwardly in her secrete solace, thinkynge with howe greate ioye she shuld be ledde towarde the chirche with her husbond on horsebacke, she sayde to her self: 'Goo we, goo we.' Sodaynlye she smote the grounde with her fote, myndynge to spurre the horse, but her fote slypped, and she fell in the dyche, and there lay all her mylke, and so she was farre from her purpose, and never had that she hopid to have." *

Here we have arrived at the end of our journey. It has been a long journey across fifteen or twenty centuries, and I am afraid our following Perrette from country to country, and from language to language, may have tired some of my hearers. I shall, therefore, not attempt to fill the gap that divides the fable of the thirteenth century from La Fontaine. Suffice it to say, that the milkmaid, having once taken the place of the Brahman, maintained it against all comers. We find her as Doña Truhana, in the famous *Conde Lucanor*, the work of the Infante *Don Juan Manuel*,† who died in

* The Latin text is more simple:—"Unde cum quedam domina dedisset ancille sue lac ut venderet et lac portaret ad urbem juxta fossatum cogitare cepit quod de p̄cio lactis emerit gallinam quæ faceret pullos quos auctos in gallinas venderet et porcellos emeret eos que mutaret in oves et ipsas in boves. Sic que ditata contraheret cum aliquo nobili et sic gloriabatur. Et cum sic gloriaretur et cogitaret cum quanta gloria duceretur ad illum virum super equum dicendo gio gio cepit pede percutere terram quasi pungeret equum calcaribus. Sed tunc lubricatus est pes ejus et cecidit in fossatum effundendo lac. Sic enim non habuit quod se adepturam sperabat."—*Dialogus Creaturarum optime moralizatus* (ascribed to Nicolaus Pergaminus, supposed to have lived in the thirteenth century). He quotes Elynandus, in *Gestis Romanorum*. First edition, per Gerardum leeu in oppido Goudensi inceptum, munere Dei finitus est, Anno Domini, 1480.

† He tells the story as follows:—"There was a woman called Dona Truhana (Gertrude), rather poor than rich. One day she went to the market carrying a pot of honey on her head. On her way she began to think that she would sell the pot of honey, and buy a quantity of eggs, that from those eggs she would have chickens, that she would sell them and buy sheep; that the sheep would give her lambs, and thus calculating all her gains, she began to think herself much richer than her neighbours. With the riches which she imagined she possessed, she thought how she would marry her sons and daughters, and how she would walk in the street surrounded by her sons and daughters-in-law; and how people would consider her very happy for having amassed

1347, the grandson of St. Ferdinand, the nephew of Alfonso the Wise, though himself not a king, yet more powerful than a king; renowned both by his sword and by his pen, and possibly not ignorant of Arabic, the language of his enemies. We find her again in the *Contes et Nouvelles of Bonaventure des Periers*,* published in the sixteenth century, a book which we know that La Fontaine was well acquainted with. We find her after La Fontaine in all the languages of Europe.

You see now before your eyes the bridge on which our fables came to us from East to West. The same bridge which brought us Perrette brought us hundreds of fables, all originally sprung up in India, many of them carefully collected by Buddhist priests, and preserved in their sacred canon, afterwards handed on to the Brahmanic writers of a later age, carried by Barzûyeh from India to the court of Persia, then to the courts of the Khalifs at Bagdad and Cordova, and of the emperors at Constantinople. Some of them, no doubt, perished on their journey, others were mixed up together, others were changed till we should hardly know them again. Still, if you once know the eventful journey of Perrette, you know the journey of all the other fables that belong to this Indian cycle. Few of them have gone through so many changes, few of them have found so many friends, whether in the courts of kings or in the huts of beggars. Few of them have been to places where Perrette has not also been. This is why I selected her and her passage through the world as the best illustration of a subject which otherwise would require a whole course of lectures to be treated in its completeness.

But though our fable represents *one* large class or cluster of fables, it does not represent all. There were several collections, besides the Pañkatantra, which found their way from India to Europe. The

so large a fortune, though she had been so poor. While she was thinking over all this, she began to laugh for joy, and struck her head and forehead with her hand. The pot of honey fell down, was broken, and she shed hot tears because she had lost all that she would have possessed if the pot of honey had not been broken."

* Bonaventure des Periers, *Les Contes ou les Nouvelles*. Amsterdam, 1735: Nouvelle XIV. (vol. i. p. 141). (First edition, Lyon, 1558.) "Et ne les (les Alquemistes) scauroit-on mieus comparer qu'à une bonne femme qui portoit une potée de lait au marché, faisant son compte ainsi: qu'elle la vendroit deux liards: de ces deux liards elle en achèteroit une douzaine d'œufs, lesquelz elle mettroit couvrir, et en auroit une douzaine de poussins: ces poussins deviendroient grands, et les feroit chaponner: ces chapons vaudroient cinq solz la piece, ce seroit un escu et plus, dont elle achèteroit deux cochons, masle et femelle: qui deviendroient grands et en feroient une douzaine d'autres, qu'elle vendroit vingt solz la piece; apres les avoir nourris quelque temps, ce seroient douze francs, dont elle achèteroit une jument, qui porteroit un beau poulain, lequel croistroit et deviendroit tant gentil: il sauteroit et feroit *Hin*. Et en disant *Hin*, la bonne femme, de l'aise qu'elle avoit en son compte, se print à faire la ruade que feroit son poulain: et en ce faisant sa potée de lait va tomber, et se respandit toute. Et voila ses œufs, ses poussins, ses chapons, ses cochons, sa jument, et son poulain, tous par terre."

most important among them is the Book of the Seven Wise Masters, or the Book of Sindbad, the history of which has lately been written with great learning and ingenuity by Signor Comparetti.*

These large collections of fables and stories mark what may be called the high roads on which the literary products of the East were carried to the West. But there are, beside these high roads, some smaller, less trodden paths on which single fables, sometimes mere proverbs, similes, or metaphors, have come to us from India, from Persepolis, from Damascus and Bagdad. I have already alluded to the powerful influence which Arabic literature exercised on Western Europe through Spain. Again, a most active interchange of Eastern and Western ideas took place at a later time during the progress of the Crusades. Even the inroads of Mongolian tribes into Russia and the East of Europe kept up a literary bartering between Oriental and Occidental nations.

But few would have suspected a Father of the Church as an importer of Eastern fables. Yet so it is.

At the court of the same Chalif Almansur, where Abdallah ibn Almokaffa translated the fables of Calila or Dimna from Persian into Arabic, there lived a Christian of the name of Sergius, who for many years held the high office of treasurer to the Chalif. He had a son to whom he gave the best education that could then be given, his chief tutor being one *Cosmas*, an Italian monk, who had been taken prisoner by the Saracens, and sold as a slave at Bagdad. After the death of Sergius, his son succeeded him for some time as chief counsellor (*πρωτοσύμβουλος*) to the Chalif Almansur. Such, however, had been the influence of the Italian monk on his pupil's mind, that he suddenly resolved to retire from the world, and to devote himself to study, meditation, and pious works. From the monastery of St. Saba, near Jerusalem, this former minister of the Chalif issued the most learned works on theology, particularly his *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*. He soon became the highest authority on matters of dogma in the Eastern Church, and he still holds his place among the saints both of the Eastern and the Western Churches. His name was *Joannes*, and from being born at Damascus, the former capital of the Chalifs, he is best known in history as *Joannes Damascenus*, or St. John of Damascus. He must have known Arabic, and probably Persian; but his mastery of Greek earned him, later in life, the name of *Chrysorroas*, or Gold-flowing. He became famous as the defender of the sacred images, and as the determined opponent of the Emperor Leo the Isaurian, about 726. It is difficult in his life to distinguish between legend and history, but that he had held high office at the court of the Chalif Almansur, that he boldly opposed the iconoclastic

* Ricerche intorno al Libro di Sindibad. Milano, 1869.

policy of the Emperor Leo, and that he wrote the most learned theological works of his time, cannot easily be questioned.

Among the works ascribed to him is a story called *Barlaam and Joasaph*.* There has been a fierce controversy as to whether he was the author of it or not. Though for our own immediate purposes it would be of little consequence whether the book was written by Joannes Damascenus or by some less distinguished ecclesiastic, I must confess that the arguments hitherto adduced against his authorship seem to me very weak.

The Jesuits did not like the book, because it was a religious novel. They pointed to a passage in which the Holy Ghost is represented as proceeding from the Father "and the Son," as incompatible with the creed of an Eastern ecclesiastic. That very passage, however, has now been proved to be spurious; and it should be borne in mind, besides, that the controversy on the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son, dates a century later than Joannes. The fact, again, that the author does not mention Mohammedanism,† proves nothing against the authorship of Joannes, because, as he places Barlaam and Joasaph in the early centuries of Christianity, he would have ruined his story by any allusion to Mohammed's religion, then only a hundred years old. Besides, he had written a separate work, in which the relative merits of Christianity and Mohammedanism are discussed. The prominence given to the question of the worship of images shows that the story could not have been written much before the time of Joannes Damascenus, and there is nothing in the style of our author that could be pointed out as incompatible with the style of the great theologian. On the contrary, the author of Barlaam and Joasaph quotes the same authors whom Joannes Damascenus quotes most frequently—*e.g.*, Basilus and Gregorius Nazianzenus. And no one but Joannes could have taken long passages from his own works without saying where he borrowed them.‡

* The Greek text was first published in 1832 by Boissonade, in his "Anecdota Græca," vol. iv. The title as given in some MSS. is:—*ιστορία ψυχωφέλης ἐκ τῆς ἐνδοξίας τῶν Αἰθιοπῶν χώρας, τῆς Ἰνδῶν λεγομένης, πρὸς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν μετενεχθεῖσα διὰ Ἰωάννου μοναχοῦ* [other MSS. read, *συγγραφείσα παρὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰωάννου τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ*], ἀνδρὸς τιμίου καὶ ἐναρέτου μονῆς τοῦ ἁγίου Σάβα· ἐν ᾧ ὁ βίος Βαρλαάμ καὶ Ἰωασάφ τῶν αὐοιδίων καὶ μακαρίων. Joannes Monachus occurs as the name of the author in other works of Joannes Damascenus. See Leo Allatius, *Prolegomena*, p. L., in *Damasceni Opera Omnia*. Ed. Lequien, 1748. Venice.

At the end the author says: "Ἐως ὥδε τὸ πέρας τοῦ παρόντος λόγου, ὃν κατὰ δύναμιν ἐμὴν γεγράφηκα, καθὼς ἀκήκοα παρὰ τῶν ἀψευδῶς παραδεδοκότων μοι τιμίων ἀνδρῶν. Γίνονται δὲ ἡμᾶς, τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντάς τήν ψυχωφελῆ διήγησιν ταύτην, τῆς μερίδος ἀξιοθῆναι τῶν ἐναρεστησάντων τῷ κυρίῳ εὐχαῖς καὶ πρεσβείαις Βαρλαάμ καὶ Ἰωασάφ τῶν μακαρίων, περὶ ὧν ἡ διήγησις. See also Wiener Jahrbücher, vol. lxxiii. p. 44—83; vol. lxxii. p. 274—88; vol. lxxiii. p. 176—202.

† Littre, *Journal des Savants*, 1865, p. 337.

‡ The *Martyrologium Romanum*, whatever its authority may be, states distinctly

The story of "Barlaam and Joasaph"—or, as he is more commonly called, Josaphat—may be told in a few words: "A king in India, an enemy and persecutor of the Christians, has an only son. The astrologers have predicted that he would embrace the new doctrine. His father, therefore, tries by all means in his power to keep him ignorant of the miseries of the world, and to create in him a taste for pleasure and enjoyment. A Christian hermit, however, gains access to the prince, and instructs him in the doctrines of the Christian religion. The young prince is not only baptized, but resolves to give up all his earthly riches; and, after having converted his own father and many of his subjects, he follows his teacher into the desert."

The real object of the book is to give a simple exposition of the principal doctrines of the Christian religion. It also contains a first attempt at comparative theology, for in the course of the story there is a disputation on the merits of the principal religions of the world—the Chaldæan, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Jewish, and the Christian. But one of the chief attractions of this manual of Christian theology consisted in a number of fables and parables with which it is enlivened. Most of them have been traced to an Indian source. I shall mention one only which has found its way into almost every literature of the world: *—

"A man was pursued by a unicorn, and while he tried to flee from it, he fell into a pit. In falling, he stretched out both his arms, and laid hold of a small tree that was growing on one side of the pit. Having gained a firm footing, and holding to the tree, he fancied he was safe, when he saw two mice, a black and a white one, busy gnawing the root of the tree to which he was clinging. Looking down into the pit, he perceived a horrid dragon with his mouth wide open, ready to devour him, and when examining the place on which his feet rested, the heads of four serpents glared at him. Then he looked up, and observed drops of honey falling down from the tree to which he clung. Suddenly the unicorn, the dragon, the mice, and the serpents were all forgotten, and his mind was intent only on catching the drops of sweet honey trickling down from the tree."

An explanation is hardly required. The unicorn is Death, always chasing man; the pit is the world; the small tree is man's life, constantly gnawed by the black and the white mouse—i.e., by night and day; the four serpents are the four elements which compose the human body; the dragon below is meant for the jaws of hell.

that the acts of Barlaam and Josaphat were written by Sanctus Joannes Damascenus. "Apud Indos Persis finitimos sanctorum Barlaam et Josaphat, quorum actus mirandos sanctus Joannes Damascenus conscripsit." See Leonis Allatii Prolegomena, in Joannis Damasceni Opera, ed. Lequien, vol. i p. xxvi. He adds: Et Gennadius Patriarcha per Concil. Florent., cap. 6. οὐχ ἦπτον δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἰωάννης ὁ μίγας τοῦ Δαμασκοῦ ὁφθαλμοῦς ἐν τῷ βίῳ Βαρλαάμ καὶ Ἰωσάφατ τῶν Ἰνδῶν μαρτυρεῖ λέγων.

* The story of the caskets, well known from the *Merchant of Venice*, occurs in Barlaam and Josaphat, though it is used there for a different purpose.

Surrounded by all these horrors, man is yet able to forget them all, and to think only of the pleasures of life, which, like a few drops of honey, fall into his mouth from the tree of life.*

But what is still more curious is, that the author of Barlaam and Josaphat has evidently taken his very hero, the Indian Prince Josaphat, from an Indian source. In the "*Lalita Vistara*"—the life, though no doubt the legendary life, of Buddha—the father of Buddha is a king. When his son is born, the Brahman Asita predicts that he will rise to great glory, and become either a powerful king, or, renouncing the throne and embracing the life of a hermit, become a Buddha.† The great object of his father is to prevent this. He therefore keeps the young prince, when he grows up, in his garden and palaces, surrounded by all pleasures which might turn his mind from contemplation to enjoyment. More especially he is to know nothing of illness, old age, and death, which might open his eyes to the misery and unreality of life. After a time, however, the prince receives permission to drive out; and then follow the three drives,‡ so famous in Buddhist history. The places where these drives took place were commemorated by towers still standing in the time of Fa Hian's visit to India, early in the fifth century after Christ, and even in the time of Hiouen Thsang, in the seventh century. I shall read you a short account of the three drives:§ —

"One day when the prince with a large retinue was driving through the eastern gate of the city, on the way to one of his parks, he met on the road an old man, broken and decrepit. One could see the veins and muscles over the whole of his body, his teeth chattered, he was covered with wrinkles, bald, and hardly able to utter hollow and unmelodious sounds. He was bent on his stick, and all his limbs and joints trembled. 'Who is that man?' said the prince to his coachman. 'He is small and weak, his flesh and his blood are dried up, his muscles stick to his skin, his head is white, his teeth chatter, his body is wasted away; leaning on his stick, he is hardly able to walk, stumbling at every step. Is there something peculiar in his family, or is this the common lot of all created beings?'

"'Sir,' replied the coachman, 'that man is sinking under old age, his senses have become obtuse, suffering has destroyed his strength, and he is despised by his relations. He is without support, and useless; and people have abandoned him, like a dead tree in a forest. But this is not peculiar to his family. In every creature youth is defeated by old age. Your father, your mother, all your relations, all your friends, will come to the same state; this is the appointed end of all creatures.'

"'Alas!' replied the prince, 'are creatures so ignorant, so weak, and foolish as to be proud of the youth by which they are intoxicated, not seeing the old age which awaits them? As for me, I go away. Coachman,

* Cf. Benfey, *Pantschatantra*, vol. i. p. 80; vol. ii. p. 528; *Les Avadanas*, contes et apologues indiens, par Stanislas Julien, i. 132, 191; *Gesta Romanorum*, cap. 168; *Homāyun Nameh*, cap. iv.; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 758-59.

† *Lalita Vistara*, ed. Calcutt, p. 126.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

§ See Max Müller's "*Chips from a German Workshop*," 2nd edit., vol. I., p. 211.

turn my chariot quickly. What have I, the future prey of old age—what have I to do with pleasure?’ And the young prince returned to the city without going to the park.

“Another time the prince was driving through the southern gate to his pleasure-garden, when he perceived on the road a man suffering from illness, parched with fever, his body wasted, covered with mud, without a friend, without a home, hardly able to breathe, and frightened at the sight of himself and the approach of death. Having questioned his coachman, and received from him the answer which he expected, the young prince said, ‘Alas! health is but the sport of a dream, and the fear of suffering must take this frightful form. Where is the wise man who, after having seen what he is, could any longer think of joy and pleasure?’ The prince turned his chariot, and returned to the city.

“A third time he was driving to his pleasure-garden through the western gate, when he saw a dead body on the road, lying on a bier, and covered with a cloth. The friends stood about crying, sobbing, tearing their hair, covering their heads with dust, striking their breasts, and uttering wild cries. The prince, again, calling his coachman to witness this painful scene, exclaimed, ‘Oh, woe to youth, which must be destroyed by old age! Woe to health, which must be destroyed by so many diseases! Woe to this life, where a man remains so short a time! If there were no old age, no disease, no death; if these could be made captive for ever!’ Then, betraying for the first time his intentions, the young prince said, ‘Let us turn back, I must think how to accomplish deliverance.’

“A last meeting put an end to his hesitation. He was driving through the northern gate on the way to his pleasure-gardens, when he saw a mendicant, who appeared outwardly calm, subdued, looking downwards, wearing with an air of dignity his religious vestment, and carrying an alms-bowl.

“‘Who is that man?’ asked the prince.

“‘Sir,’ replied the coachman, ‘this man is one of those who are called Bhikshus, or mendicants. He has renounced all pleasures, all desires, and leads a life of austerity. He tries to conquer himself. He has become a devotee. Without passion, without envy, he walks about asking for alms.’

“‘This is good and well said,’ replied the prince. ‘The life of a devotee has always been praised by the wise. It will be my refuge, and the refuge of other creatures; it will lead us to a real life, to happiness and immortality.’

“With these words the young prince turned his chariot, and returned to the city.”

If now we turn to the story of Joannes of Damascus, we find that the early life of Josaphat is exactly the same as that of Buddha. His father is a king, and after the birth of his son, an astrologer predicts that he will rise to glory; not, however, in his own kingdom, but in a higher and better one; in fact, that he will embrace the new and persecuted religion of the Christians. Everything is done to prevent this. He is kept in a beautiful palace, surrounded by all that is enjoyable; and great care is taken to keep him in ignorance of sickness, old age, and death. After a time, however, his father gives him leave to drive out. On one of his drives he sees two men, one maimed, the other blind. He asks what they are, and is told

that they are suffering from disease. He then inquires whether all men are liable to disease, and whether it is known beforehand who will suffer from disease and who will be free; and when he hears the truth, he becomes sad, and returns home. Another time, when he drives out, he meets an old man with wrinkled face and shaking legs, bent down, with white hair, his teeth gone, and his voice faltering. He asks again what all this means, and is told that this is what happens to all men; that no one can escape old age, and that in the end all men must die. Thereupon he returns home to meditate on death, till at last a hermit appears, and opens before his eyes a higher view of life, as contained in the Gospel of Christ.

No one, I believe, can read these two stories without feeling convinced that one was borrowed from the other; and as Fa Hian, three hundred years before John of Damascus, saw the towers which commemorated the three drives of Buddha still standing among the ruins of the royal city of Kapilavastu, it follows that the Greek father borrowed his subject from the Buddhist Scriptures. Were it necessary, it would be easy to point out still more minute coincidences between the life of Josaphat and that of Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist religion. Both in the end convert their royal fathers, both fight manfully against the assaults of the flesh and the devil, both are regarded as saints before they die. Possibly even a proper name may have been transferred from the sacred canon of the Buddhists to the pages of the Greek writer. The driver who conducts Buddha when he flees by night from his palace where he leaves his wife, his only son, and all his treasures, in order to devote himself to a contemplative life, is called *Chandaka*. The friend and companion of Barlaam is called *Zardan*.*

How palpable these coincidences are between the two stories is best

* In some places one might almost believe that Joannes Damascenus did not only hear the story of Buddha, as he says, from the mouth of people who had brought it to him from India, but that he had before him the very text of the "Lalita-Vistara." Thus in the account of the three drives we find indeed that while the Buddhist canon represents Buddha as seeing on three successive drives, first an old, then a sick, and at last a dying man, Joannes makes Joasaph meet two men on his first drive, one maimed, the other blind, and an old man, who is nearly dying, on his second drive. So far there is a difference which might best be explained by admitting the account given by Joannes Damascenus himself, viz., that the story was brought from India, and that it was told him by worthy and truthful men. But, if it was so, we have here another instance of the tenacity with which oral tradition is able to preserve the most minute points of the story. The old man is described by a long string of adjectives both in Greek and in Sanskrit, and many of them are strangely alike. The Greek γέρων, old, corresponds to the Sanskrit gṛha; πεπαλιώμενος, aged, is Sanskrit vṛiddha; ἑρρικνόμενος τὸ πρόσωπον, shrivelled in his face, is balinīkṛitakāya, the body covered with wrinkles; παρσίμενος τὰς κνήμας, weak in his knees, is pravedhayamānaḥ sarvāṅgapratyangail, trembling in all his limbs; συγκεκυφώς, bent, is kubḥa; πεπωλιώμενος, grey, is palitakesa; ἰσπερήμενος τοὺς ὀδόντας, toothless, is khaṇḍadanta; ἐγκεκόμενα λαλοῦν, stammering, is khurakhurāvasaktakāntḥu.

shown by the fact that they were pointed out, independently of each other, by scholars in France, Germany, and England. I place France first, because in point of time M. Laboolaye was the first who called attention to it in one of his charming articles in the *Débats*.* A more detailed comparison was given by Dr. Liebrecht.† And, lastly, Mr. Beal, in his translation of the "Travels of Fa Hian,"‡ called attention to the same fact—viz., that the story of Josaphat was borrowed from the "Life of Buddha." I could mention the names of two or three scholars besides who happened to read the two books, and who could not help seeing, what was as clear as daylight, that Joannes Damascenus took the principal character of his religious novel from the "Lalita Vistara," one of the sacred books of the Buddhists.

This fact is, no doubt, extremely curious in the history of literature; but there is another fact connected with it which is more than curious, and I wonder that it has never been pointed out before. It is well known that the story of Barlaam and Josaphat became a most popular book during the Middle Ages. In the East it was translated into Syriac (?), Arabic, Ethiopic, Armenian, and Hebrew; in the West it exists in Latin, French, Italian, German, English, Spanish, Bohemian, and Polish. As early as 1204 a King of Norway translated it into Icelandic, and at a later time it was translated by a Jesuit missionary into Tagala, the classical language of the Philippine Islands. But this is not all. Barlaam and Josaphat have actually risen to the rank of saints, both in the Eastern and in the Western Churches. In the Eastern Church the 26th of August is the saints' day of Barlaam and Josaphat; in the Roman Martyrologium, the 27th of November is assigned to them.

There have been from time to time misgivings about the historical character of these two saints. *Leo Allatius*, in his *Prolegomena*, ventured to ask the question, whether the story of Barlaam and Joasaph was more real than the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, or the *Utopia* of Thomas More; but, *en bon Catholique*, he replied, that as Barlaam and Josaphat were mentioned, not only in the *Menæa* of the Greek, but also in the Martyrologium of the Roman Church, he could not bring himself to believe that their history was imaginary. *Billius* thought that to doubt the concluding words of the author, who says that he received the story of Barlaam and Josaphat from men incapable of falsehood, would be to trust more in one's own suspicions

* *Débats*, 1859, 21 and 26 Juillet.

† Die Quellen des Barlaam und Josaphat, in *Jahrbuch für roman. und engl. Litteratur*, vol. ii. p. 314, 1860.

‡ Travels of Fah-Hian and Sung-Yun, Buddhist Pilgrims, from China to India. (400 A.D. and 518 A.D.) Translated from the Chinese by Samuel Beal. London, Trübner & Co. 1869.

than in Christian charity which believeth all things. *Bellarminus* thought he could prove the truth of the story by the fact that, at the end of it, the author himself invokes the two saints Barlaam and Josaphat! *Leo Allatius* admitted, indeed, that some of the speeches and conversations occurring in the story might be the work of *Joannes Damascenus*, because Josaphat, having but recently been converted, could not have quoted so many passages from the Bible. But he implies that even this could be explained, because the Holy Ghost might have taught St. Josaphat what to say. At all events, *Leo* has no mercy for those "quibus omnia sub sanctorum nomine prodita male olent, quemadmodum de sanctis Georgio, Christophoro, Hippolyto, Catarina, aliisque nusquam eos in rerum natura extitisse impudentissime nugantur." The Bishop of Avranches had likewise his doubts; but he calmed them by saying: "Non pas que je veuille soutenir que tout en soit supposé: il y auroit de la témérité à desavouer qu'il y ait jamais eu de Barlaam ni de Josaphat. Le témoignage du Martyrologe, qui les met au nombre des Saints, et leur intercession que Saint Jean Damascene reclame à la fin de cette histoire ne permettent pas d'en douter."*

With us the question as to the historical or purely imaginary character of Josaphat has assumed a new and totally different aspect. We willingly accept the statement of *Joannes Damascenus* that the story of Barlaam and Josaphat was told him by men who came from India. We know that in India a story was current of a prince who lived in the sixth century B.C., a prince of whom it was predicted that he would resign the throne, and devote his life to meditation, in order to rise to the rank of a Buddha. The story tells us that his father did everything to prevent this; that he kept him in a palace secluded from the world, surrounded by all that makes life enjoyable; and that he tried to keep him in ignorance of sickness, old age, and death. We know from the same story that at last the young prince obtained permission to drive into the country, and that, by meeting an old man, a sick man, and a corpse, his eyes were opened to the unreality of life, and the vanity of this life's pleasures; that he escaped from his palace, and, after defeating the assaults of all adversaries, became the founder of a new religion. This is the story, it may be the legendary story, but at all events the recognised story of *Gautama Sākyamuni*, best known to us under the name of Buddha.

If, then, *Joannes Damascenus* tells the same story, only putting the name of Joasaph or Josaphat in the place of Buddha; if all that is human and personal in the life of St. Josaphat is taken from the "Lalita Vistara"—what follows? It follows that, in the same sense in which *La Fontaine's* Perrette is the Brahman of the *Pañkatantra*,

* Littré, *Journal des Savants*, 1865, p. 337.

St. Josaphat is the Buddha of the Buddhist canon. It follows that Buddha has become a saint in the Roman Church ; it follows that, though under a different name, the sage of Kapilavastu, the founder of a religion which, whatever we may think of its dogma, is, in the purity of its morals, nearer to Christianity than any other religion, and which counts even now, after an existence of 2,400 years, 455,000,000 of believers, has received the highest honours that the Christian Church can bestow. And whatever we may think of the sanctity of saints, let those who doubt the right of Buddha to a place among them read the story of his life as it is told in the Buddhist canon. If he lived the life which is there described, few saints have a better claim to the title than Buddha ; and no one either in the Greek or in the Roman Church need be ashamed of having paid to his memory the honour that was intended for St. Josaphat, the prince, the hermit, and the saint.

History, here as elsewhere, is stranger than fiction ; and a kind fairy, whom men call Chance, has here, as elsewhere, remedied the ingratitude and injustice of the world.

MAX MÜLLER.



DR. PUSEY AND THE ULTRAMONTANES.

First Letter to the Very Rev. J. H. Newman, D.D. By the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. James Parker & Co. 1869.

Is Healthful Reunion Impossible? A Second Letter to the Very Rev. J. H. Newman, D.D. By the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. James Parker & Co. 1870.

The Reunion of Christendom. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1896.

Essays on the Reunion of Christendom. With an Introductory Essay by the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. J. T. Hayes. 1867.

A Letter to the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D., on his recent Eirenicon. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1866.

Peace Through the Truth. By the Rev. T. HARPER, S.J. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1866.

Le Mouvement Catholique dans l'Anglicanisme.—Revue du Monde Catholique. Février et Mars. 1866.

THE peace between Rome and England is not yet concluded. Earnest, simple-hearted Dr. Pusey continues his "Eirenicon." He speaks of peace, and he is answered,—What hast thou to do with peace? His words, they say, are very swords. The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. Dr. Pusey is regarded by Roman Catholics as a Jehu at the gate of Jezreel, a Zimri who slew his master; yea, he has even been called an incarnation of the arch-fiend who has taken upon him the office of the accuser who accuses the brethren day and night. Jesus said, "Blessed are the peace-makers;" but Rome's blessing is "anathema sit."

Dr. Pusey, however, is undaunted. To use his own words, he is not to be "discouraged by censures, disheartened by mistakes, sickened by the supercilious tone of some in high station, or cowed by rebuffs." There is such a thing as faith, and men whose convic-

tions are firm, and who act upon them, certainly do great things in this world. Faith "laughs at impossibilities." The greatest revolutions that have taken place among men have been brought about by faith. It is not necessary to suppose anything supernatural in this, for faith leads to action, energy, and sacrifice.

But, whether Dr. Pusey succeeds or fails, the movement in which he has borne so conspicuous a part will ever be regarded as one of the greatest events in the history of Christianity. The multitude of men may despise it. They may laugh at the certainly ludicrous imitation of Catholicism to which it has given rise. Sorrow and anger may alternate in their breasts, as they seem to be deprived of the Protestant heritage of their forefathers, won for them at the stake and the scaffold. But even granting that all this is just, yet the "Catholic revival" is a great event in the religious history, not merely of England, but of the world. It has pressed the demand for an answer to two urgent questions, which, strange as it may appear, have never yet been fully answered,—What is Protestantism? and, What is Catholicism?

The reunion question is the most recent phase of "Anglo-Catholicism." We can scarcely be wrong in saying that Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon" is founded on Tract XC., written by Dr. Newman, who soon after found himself at rest in the Church of Rome. Dr. Newman had been led to embrace some doctrines that had been rejected by the Reformers of the Church of England. He was anxious to reconcile these doctrines with the formularies of the Church of which he was a minister. The Prayer-Book, from its very nature, was found not to have many difficulties; but the Thirty-nine Articles, which defined the doctrines of the Church, were seriously in the way. They were, in a great measure, taken from the confessions of the Reformed Churches abroad. The men who compiled them were known to have had intimate relations with the Reformers of these Churches. The Articles themselves abounded in negative propositions, and these were almost entirely aimed at what was understood to be the doctrine of the Church of Rome. Yea, even the affirmative parts were mostly counter-statements of what was called Roman teaching. At first sight the Articles appeared to be, what the Reformers really intended them to be, a moat and a fortification to defend the Church of England in prospect of the Roman enemy. But Dr. Newman had an intellect of marvellous ingenuity, yet, so far as intention went, perfectly honest. He could not ignore the fact that the Articles were Protestant—the product of a Protestant age; but he thought that a "Catholic" meaning might be put upon them, so that they might be subscribed by those who believed the contrary of what the compilers intended. It was admitted that they condemned,

not merely the dominant errors of the time when they were written, but also the "authoritative teaching of the Church of Rome." They were, however, supposed to be compatible with what was called "Catholic" or "primitive truth." Dr. Newman was at last convinced that they were not. The result is known.

Dr. Pusey, while admitting that he does not take the Articles in the sense of those who wrote them, yet maintains that, without violence to their literal and grammatical meaning, they may be interpreted so as to agree with the decrees of the Council of Trent. Here then is a basis for reunion, founded on the creeds of the two Churches. Of course the Tridentine creed has also to be *explained*. But in the natural uncertainty of human words, and the remarkable uncertainty of what is Roman Catholic doctrine, it is even easier to find a serviceable interpretation of the decrees of Trent than of the English Articles.

At the Reformation the greatest doctrinal question between the Reformers and the Church of Rome concerned the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Archbishop Cranmer said that it was with this sacrament that "the devil had craftily juggled." The Church of Rome taught that, by an act of omnipotence greater than the act of creation, by means of the blessing of the priest, the bread and wine were changed into the actual body and blood of Christ. This was, and is, the central doctrine of the Roman system. It is called Transubstantiation. Article XXVIII. of the Church of England says that it "cannot be proved by Holy Writ; but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions." Here, surely, is a sufficiently distinct renunciation of the Roman doctrine. But it happens that substance is just one of the things of which we know nothing. We only know accidents or qualities. The underlying essence or substratum cannot be defined. In fact, its existence, apart from these accidents, cannot be demonstrated. What is the meaning then of a change of *substance*? Is it a change of accidents, or of this unknown quantity? The authorized Roman teaching is that the accidents remain. The body and blood of Christ exist under the species of bread and wine. But there was also a popular doctrine, or "dominant error," that Christ's body with its accidents was present, and that it was eaten as the men of Capernaum understood the discourse about eating His flesh. The Article is evidently directed against the authorized doctrine, and *à fortiori* against the "dominant error." But then the change is an unknown change of something unknown. Perhaps the matter or *ὕλη* of the philosophers is only an illusion. Perhaps the substratum of all things is spirit. The Church of England admits a spiritual presence. The Roman doctrine at the

most is an invisible presence, under the accidents or species of the bread and wine. Dr. Pusey says that the Schoolmen taught that the bread and wine in the Eucharist lost their qualities of supporting and nourishing. But the Council of Trent declared that the "bread retains the quality natural to bread." The presence of Christ then is the presence of a spiritual substance, so that the Roman Church agrees with the Anglican in teaching a spiritual and not a carnal presence.

Connected with this doctrine was the sacrifice of the mass. The Reformers called the Church of Rome "the Upas tree of superstition." They determined to cut it to pieces, root and branch. Article XXXI. says—"The sacrifices of masses, in which it was commonly said that the priest did offer Christ for the quick and the dead, to have remission of pain and guilt, were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits." In all ages of the Church of England, in all controversies, by all theologians since the Reformation to the days of Dr. Newman, this Article was understood to condemn the sacrifice of the mass in the Church of Rome. The counterpart of the phraseology is found in Bishop Ridley, who calls the mass "a new blasphemous kind of sacrifice to satisfy and pay the price of sins both of the dead and of the quick." To this correspond the words of Archbishop Cranmer: "The Romish Antichrist, to deface this great benefit of Christ, hath taught that His sacrifice upon the cross is not sufficient hereunto without another sacrifice devised by him, and made by the priest." As Cranmer and Ridley lived before the Council of Trent, it is possible that they may not have known the authorized doctrine of the Church of Rome. They may have spoken of the mass as they had themselves learned it, and as it was generally taught and understood by the priests and people of that time. Gardiner and the defendants of Catholicism denied the inference that the sacrifice of the mass interfered with the one sacrifice of Christ. Yet the deliberate judgment of the Reformers clearly was that the mass is a blasphemous fable and a dangerous deceit. But the Article does not say so. It only speaks of "masses." It may, therefore, be understood as referring to a custom prevalent at the time of buying and selling masses, which was afterwards condemned by the Council of Trent.

These questions, with many others in debate between the Reformers and the Church of Rome, ran up into the higher questions which related to the authority of the Church and the place of the Scriptures in reference to the Church. Article XX. says—"The Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies and authority in controversies of faith." This clause was not in the Articles in 1552 nor in 1562, when they were subscribed by both Houses of Convocation; but it effected a surreptitious entrance before the Articles

received the assent of the Crown. It first appeared in the Latin edition of 1563; but it was not in the English edition ratified by Parliament that same year. The second clause of the Article is usually understood to limit, if not to neutralize, the authority claimed in the first. It says—"Yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." Nevertheless, the clause remains, declaring that the Church has "authority in controversies of faith." This, Dr. Pusey says, is a Divine authority. It must be if the Church has power to decide in matters of faith. It implies the necessary preservation of the Church as a whole from error. It is the fulfilment of the promise, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world." The Church tells us what is the Catholic faith, and what must be believed as necessary to salvation. The Church must not contradict Scripture nor herself. The Fathers of the later Councils began by expressing their assent to the earlier. It is not open to individuals to criticize, by their private judgment, the "Catholic truth," which has been agreed on by the whole Church. This, of course, is a long way short of the claim of the Church of Rome to speak infallibly on any controversy that may arise. But then the infallibility of the Church of Rome is something afloat. Nobody knows exactly where it is or what it is. Two things so indefinite as the authority of the Catholic Church and the infallibility of the Roman Church may meet somewhere and touch each other at some point.

Article VI. says—"Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be thought necessary or requisite to salvation." Then follows a list of the books which are "Scripture," that is, Scripture to be used for establishing doctrine. From this list the Apocryphal writings are excluded. It is not said who is to decide whether or not any doctrine has been "proved" by Scripture. The Article, in its obvious meaning, seems to imply the Protestant doctrine of the right of private judgment. But if connected with the clause in Article XX., about the authority of the Church in controversies of faith, it may be understood to have another meaning. We cannot adopt the doctrine of the infallibility of General Councils, for Article XXI. says, that "they may err, and sometimes have erred, in things pertaining to God;" but we have the "Catholic Church," with traditional creeds, doctrines, and interpretations. Some General Councils may have erred, but all have not. Those which have not erred are Catholic. That they have not erred is the test of their Catholicity or Œcumenicity. Who is to

decide which General Councils have erred and which have not, is still in debate between Dr. Pusey and the Church of Rome. But the apparent Protestantism of Article VI. is removed. The right of private judgment is denied. The meaning of the Scriptures is to be learned from the traditional interpretations of the "Catholic" Church.

It is assumed by Dr. Pusey and his party that the Church of England was not reformed according to the Scriptures alone, but according to the Scriptures as understood by the Fathers. It can scarcely be a mistake to say at once that, in the sense intended, this is a supposition without any foundation. It is a principle never announced in the writings of the Reformers. Cranmer and Ridley, considering the great ignorance of the common people, decided, as a matter of policy, that the changes in the services of the Church should be as few as possible consistently with the entire elimination of Roman doctrine. It is a matter of history that in this they had not the agreement of Hooper, and were but partially favoured by Latimer. The principle of the English Reformation, stated expressly by Bishop Jewel, is, that the appeal is made to the Scriptures alone. Then followed the question as to the Fathers, which simply was, that they are on the side of the Church of England rather than on that of Rome. The solitary passage adduced by Newman and Pusey for their views of the Patristic character of the English Reformation is from a canon in the reign of Elizabeth. This canon enjoins that "preachers should be careful that they never teach aught in a sermon to be religiously held by the people except that which is agreeable to the doctrines of the Old and New Testament, and which the Catholic Fathers and ancient Bishops have collected from that very doctrine." But there is nothing to intimate that this canon meant more than Bishop Jewel's principle, that Roman doctrine was not to be found in the Fathers. It was in the same reign that a Convocation gave a semi-official authority to Bullinger's "Decades," commanding the less educated clergy to find there the material for their sermons.

Article XXV. reduces the sacraments of the Gospel to two, rejecting five of the Roman sacraments. With these five were connected many of the superstitions which the Reformers had to remove. They declared that they were not sacraments of "like nature with Baptism and the Lord's Supper, for that they have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God." But the word sacrament has a very general meaning. Whatever is a visible sign of the Divine goodness may be a sacrament. The rainbow is a sacrament. The flowers of spring are sacraments. All nature is a sacrament. The Protestant meaning of the Article was clear enough. The five rejected sacraments were regarded as merely of ecclesiastical authority, and might, therefore, be either retained or laid aside. Confirmation, orders, and matrimony were

retained: the first because it was an old and useful custom, the second for the sake of order, and the third because no reformation could abolish matrimony. Penance and extreme unction were closely interwoven with the popular superstitions. The Prayer-Book recommends confession to those who are troubled in conscience, as a preparation for the Lord's Supper. But penance, properly speaking, as well as extreme unction, departed from the Church of England at the Reformation.

Dr. Pusey passes in review these five rejected sacraments, lamenting the loss of extreme unction, yet maintaining that in substance the other four are still retained as sacraments. The mode of proof is to have recourse to the Prayer-Book and Homilies, connecting together some stray passages, and interpreting them by the light of what is called the "Catholic" Church. The principle by which Dr. Pusey interprets the Articles is to take them as they stand, and see what the words may mean apart from the history of the times or the known sentiments of the Reformers. But while all external light on the Protestant side is excluded, the Articles are to yield to every "Catholic" phrase, and every overlooked remnant of the old superstition that can be picked up in any unswept corner of the Homilies or the Prayer-Book. There is no Protestant who is unwilling to abide by the Homilies, and to subscribe to the words of Article XXXV., that they contain a "godly and wholesome doctrine and necessary for these times." But no man is required to subscribe to every sentence in the Homilies; and Dr. Pusey, least of all men living, would like to be bound even by their general teaching. They were written by men whose sentiments differed widely; by the "Catholic" Bishop Bonner and the Presbyterian Prebendary of Canterbury, Thomas Becon, the judicious Archbishop Cranmer, and the glory of the Elizabethan prelates, the learned Jewel. The Homilies indeed *contain* a "godly and a wholesome doctrine;" but they are full of blasphemy, both against the Pope and the devil. When Dr. Newman applied his alembic to the Homilies, all the "Catholic truth" he could distil out of them was a few unguarded sentences chiefly from the Fathers, some general statements about the primitive Church, the application of the word "Scripture" to the Apocryphal writings, and sometimes ordination or matrimony called a sacrament. The exility of the evidence from the Homilies was in strange contrast with the immensity of the conclusion.

It is naturally an important matter for Dr. Pusey's object to be able to prove that the Church of England has retained valid Orders. Without this it would be idle to speak of the Church of England being a part of the Catholic Church, while the necessity of an Episcopal succession is the first requisite of Catholicity. Now, what-

ever Roman Catholics have to say against the validity of English ordination, the historical fact cannot be denied that at the Reformation the Episcopal succession was not broken. Dr. Pusey makes a great matter of this. He finds the consecrators of Parker were anxious to adhere to the ancient forms. They looked out for a precedent, and found one in the case of Archbishop Chichele, who was consecrated at a time when the intercourse between Rome and England was interrupted. They used as the words of consecration, "Take the Holy Ghost," which they had translated from the Exeter Pontifical. To make sure work of it, all the four consecrating bishops put their hands on the archbishop's head, and all four repeated the words of consecration. Dr. Pusey adds, "Surely this care to do what the Church had done is, in itself, evidence enough of the *intention* required!" It is difficult to enter into men's intentions, but it is not difficult to know that there were many reasons in simple policy why the old forms of consecration should be retained. We say nothing of the fact that the establishment of an Episcopal Church at all was the will of the Queen rather than of the men who were made bishops. The Zurich Letters sufficiently reveal the unepiscopal dispositions of Elizabeth's first prelates. But to speak only of the four consecrators of Parker. They were Barlow, Coverdale, Scory, and Hodgskins. The last was only a suffragan. Of him and Scory we know nothing, except it be that they preferred exile rather than conformity under Mary. Miles Coverdale, all the world knows, was a Puritan. He and Scory refused to wear Episcopal robes at the consecration, and officiated in Geneva gowns. Coverdale was never restored to his diocese. Conformity to the Church was so little to his mind that the rest of his days were spent, for the most part, in poverty and persecution. As to Barlow, his judgment of the value of consecration is on record. He said in a sermon, that "if the king's grace, being supreme head of the Church of England, did choose, denominate, and elect any layman, being learned, to be a bishop, he, so chosen, without mention being made of orders, should be as good a bishop as I am, or the best in England." This is enough; but he adds, "Wheresoever two or three simple persons, as cobblers or weavers, are in company, and elected in the name of God, there is the true Church of God." So far as Barlow was concerned, the renowned Nag's Head in Cheapside was as fit a place for the consecration of an archbishop as the chapel at Lambeth Palace. We cannot undertake to speak of his "intention." But we can scarcely doubt that if William Barlow and Miles Coverdale had known the use which Dr. Pusey was to make of their consecrating an archbishop, they would sooner have put their hands into the fire than laid them on the head of Matthew Parker.

Dr. Pusey's Church of England is something altogether different from the old Church of England, of which we read in history, and which we find in the writings of the old English divines. The reunionists generally make an effort to reconcile the old Reformed Church with their "Catholic" ideas. When they fail they usually revenge themselves by a kick at the Reformers. The bishops of whom Dr. Pusey speaks, as so anxious to preserve the "Catholic" faith and order, are dismissed by one of the Reunion Essayists as "the whole tribe of Calvinistic prelates under Elizabeth." They were not able, he adds, "to root out faith and love" from the people, nor to prevent them still "piously drawing the sign of the cross on forehead and breast." Beyond all controversy Elizabeth's bishops were Calvinists. They simply conformed to Episcopacy. There is no evidence that one of them believed in the divine institution of bishops. In fact, that doctrine was unknown in the Church of England till Bancroft, in 1588, preached his famous sermon at St. Paul's Cross. Whitgift was then archbishop, and, tired of his long warfare with the Puritans, he wished that Bancroft's doctrine were true, for it would be a short and easy method of dealing with the Nonconformists. An ecclesiastical polity by divine right was first maintained by the Presbyterians. It is almost the sole subject of the discourses of Thomas Cartwright. It was the essence of the railings of Martin Marprelate. "The Lord's discipline" was the Puritan's phrase for the polity of the Church as it ought to be. The doctrine continued among the Independents. It is traceable, for instance, in the works of Thomas Goodwin, in the form of grace coming by the appointed ministers as by a sort of material channels. The Stuart divines took up the idea, and connected it with Episcopacy. After the Restoration, when Presbyterians and Independents became brothers in adversity, it was gradually obscured. In the practical, common-sense eighteenth century it was almost extinct. In the Episcopal form it has turned up again in our own day. On whatever authority it may rest its claims, it is as certain as any matter of history that it was not the doctrine of the Reformers of the Church of England.

Again, in Dr. Pusey's two favourite doctrines, the Real Presence in the Eucharist and Baptismal Regeneration, we could show that he is not in agreement with the old Reformed Church of England. Cranmer, while using the strongest language concerning the presence of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament of the Supper, takes care to explain it as meaning only that the faithful feed upon Christ in the Eucharist in the same way as they feed upon Him in every act of worship. All the Reformers, even Calvin, Bucer, and Peter Martyr, were anxious to retain the rhetorical language of the Fathers concerning this

sacrament, and this caused them sometimes to speak as if they really intended a transubstantiation. Then they had to explain themselves by incomprehensible speeches, such as eating a body spiritually, and feeding in the sacrament upon that which is really in heaven. This was not peculiar to the Church of England. It passed into all the Reformed Churches. Even the Westminster Assembly's Confession declares that the body and blood of Christ "are as really but spiritually present to the faith of believers in that ordinance as the elements themselves are to their outward senses." Clear-headed men, like John Hales of Eton and Ralph Cudworth, rejected this way of speaking as bordering upon nonsense. Even Bishop Jewel had light enough to declare that the only use of the Supper was a commemoration of Christ's death, and that all other uses are abuses. But, while the language remained in the formularies, it is not remarkable that some took it literally. It suited the Stuart divines when they tried to convert the Reformed Church of England into a "Catholic" Church. They talked about altars and sacrifices, but it was a long time before they knew what they had to sacrifice. Andrewes and Buckeridge gave the grotesque explanation that we offer on the altar the elect or mystical Church, which is the body of Christ.

The language of the Baptismal service had a like origin. Calvinistic Reformers retained it, but in connection with their doctrine of absolute predestination. It is found in all the Reformed Confessions as strongly as in our Prayer-Book. It really meant that every elect child was regenerated in baptism. But as no man could distinguish which children were elect, and which were not, it was charitably supposed that all were regenerated. This is the only explanation which a Calvinist could put on it if he believed the regeneration to be actual. And it is the interpretation which the Calvinist divines of that age did put upon it. Hooker, speaking of baptism in connection with predestination, says, that "all do not receive the grace of the sacrament who receive the sacrament." It is remarkable that, at the Savoy Conference, the Puritans did not object to the baptismal regeneration of the Baptismal service. They asked that the words "remission of sins by spiritual regeneration" might be changed into "may be regenerated and receive remission of sins." This was asked, not because they objected to the doctrine, but because the words seem to confound remission of sins with regeneration. We have as little desire as Dr. Pusey can have to be bound by the meaning of the service as understood by the "Calvinistic prelates," who made it part of the Prayer-Book; and while the words are there, we are not surprised that some persons will take them literally. They are fairly capable of Dr. Pusey's interpretation, but it will do no harm to remember the truth and the whole truth concerning their history.

But the greatest of all difficulties in the way of reunion between the Church of England and the Church of Rome, are the two latest Roman dogmas. The infallibility of the Pope, if not already proclaimed, will be, it is generally believed, before many days. This must put an end to all hopes of the reunion of England in any other way than by penance and absolution. If the Pope is infallible, England is in the fearful pit of heresy and schism. The Immaculate Conception of the mother of Jesus has been a dogma since 1854. This is the great *crux* to Anglicans. The Protestant doctrine that Christ alone is without sin, and that He alone is the Mediator, displaced the worship of the Virgin in all Protestant countries. In the Church of England there is not a vestige of it to be found. Mary is no more worshipped than any other holy matron. It is peculiarly the doctrine of English Christians that "Jesus is all." In Him they see supremely all that in man is great and noble, all that in woman is pure and gentle. The first thing that strikes and repels a Protestant when he goes into a Roman Catholic Church, is the supremacy that seems everywhere given to Mary.

Apart from the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, there is a *cultus* which has grown wild and luxuriant, sometimes checked by the authorities, and sometimes encouraged, as the devotion best suited to certain classes of people. The account which Dr. Pusey gives of the extent of Mary-worship in some Roman Catholic countries, is a very sad one. The passages he quotes "from Roman Catholic authors, some authorized and some not," drew even from Dr. Newman the confession that he read them with sorrow and anger. Dr. Pusey shows that Roman Catholics pray to Mary to have remission of sins, to be led into the way of truth, to have grace, life, and glory. Catholicism, it is said, does not flourish in England, because English Catholics do not give sufficient worship to Mary. "Here in England," says a pious Roman Catholic writer, "Mary is not half enough preached: devotion to her is low and thin. It is frightened out of its wits by the sneers of heresy. It is always inviting human respect and carnal prudence, wishing to make Mary so little of a Mary, that Protestants may feel at ease about her. Jesus is obscured, because Mary is kept in the back-ground. *Thousands of souls perish because Mary is withheld from them.*" Italian priests have lamented by the death-beds of their English converts, that they were but half converted, for when dying they put their trust in Jesus, and never uttered a prayer to Mary. Dr. Pusey has often been told that before he can expect to be converted he must learn to pray to Mary. In the Church of Rome, Mary is all in all. She is the "Queen of heaven, and Mistress of the world," "the Great One Herself," "the Holy Mother of God," "Companion of the Redeemer," "Co-redemp-

treß," "Authoress of eternal salvation," "the Destroyer of heresies throughout the world," "the Ring in the chain of creatures," "the Mediatress not of men only, but of angels," "the Complement of the Trinity." One Catholic writer says, that in the Eucharist they eat and drink not only the flesh and blood of Christ, but the flesh and blood of the virgin Mary, and that there is present in the sacrament, not only the body and blood of the Lord Jesus Christ, but also the virgin milk of His virgin mother. Another writer says that the regenerate are born not of flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, but of God and *Mary*.

It is sometimes very provoking to have the plain truth told. Of course this well-evidenced charge of Mariolatry implied that "the Church of Rome hath erred, not only in their manner of living and ceremonies, but also in matters of faith." Dr. Pusey's proposals for reunion were met with a howl of indignation. The authorities at Rome put his book in the Index of books forbidden, along with two others which, Dr. Pusey says, contain "blasphemies against our Lord's All-Holiness." The Church of Rome crucified Dr. Pusey, nailing him to the back of the door of St. Peter's along with two malefactors, who only received the just reward of their deeds. Dr. Pusey did not relish the society of his two companions in tribulation. He did not see that "*Ecce Homo*" was really an "*Eirenicon*," that its brilliant pages portrayed the human life of Him who even in His humanity was divine, and thereby drew all men unto Him. And did not the other book also speak peace? Was it not an *Eirenicon*, and with no "sword wreathed in myrtle?" Did it not appeal to the Catholic reason of mankind to find in that reason a basis for the essential doctrines of the religion of Jesus Christ, and so to unite all men into one Church wide as the human race, and Catholic as God's universe? The *Dublin Review* complains that there are some things which they "cannot hammer into Dr. Pusey's head."*

Of the two great parties into which the Church of Rome is divided it was from one only that Dr. Pusey could expect even a patient hearing, and that party is not the one which rules the Church of Rome. It only exists on sufferance. Taking it as represented by such Catholics as Dr. Döllinger there is scarcely a doctrine or ceremony on which they could not come easily to at least a temporary agreement with Dr. Pusey. But they meet each other only by accident. Like travellers lodging at the "Three Taverns," they are within a day's journey of Rome. But while Dr. Pusey has set his face as if he would go to the great city, Dr. Döllinger and his

* In the *Essays on Reunion* Dr. Pusey complains bitterly of the treatment he had received at Rome. He adds afterwards, in a note, that he has received reliable information that his book escaped the Index.

friends have been there already, and have no wish to return. To them it is not like

"A little heaven below."

The intimate relations that have long existed between Dr. Pusey and Dr. Newman give a peculiar human interest to this controversy. We say controversy, for such it has really become. Dr. Newman's conversion to Roman Catholicism will never have any other significance than that of a curious study for the psychologist. A great reasoner adopts some principles which have no foundation in reason. He reasons upon them till he becomes troubled with the incongruities between his reason and what he believes. To get peace and to *save his soul* he at last abandons reason, and clings only to authority. He wants to be delivered from the responsibility of reason. So he joins the Church of Rome because it makes the oldest and the boldest claim to speak infallibly in the name of God. There is an acknowledged principle in physiology that a well-developed organ often has its strength at the expense of some other organ or organs. The same principle is probably applicable to the faculties of the mind, and explains the co-existence of strength and weakness in the same man. Dr. Newman actually speaks of "saving his soul" by leaving the Church of England for the Church of Rome, and the principle is the one of being on the safe side after a reckoning of probabilities. The turning-point of the conversion of this great master of reasoning was a rhetorical sentence in the very illogical St. Augustine. "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum!*" cried the Bishop of Hippo, in his controversy with the Donatists. The world must be right against a sect that exists only in the north of Africa. The world must be right, echoed Dr. Newman, against Anglicans who exist only in England. It is always an argument that a man is in the wrong when the whole world is against him. But what was St. Augustine's "*orbis terrarum?*" The great saint really believed that the Roman empire embraced the world, and that the whole world was converted to Christianity. What was Dr. Newman's world whose universal judgment was to overrule his reason? It was not the eight or nine hundred millions that people the globe. It was not the judgment of the wise men of all ages which he sought. It was not even the judgment of the learned men of Europe. It was only, we may say, the judgment of the Council of Trent received by Roman Catholics, not as the conclusion of their reason, but as the evidence of their submission to the authority of a Church.

Dr. Pusey's first letter to Newman, which we take to form Part II. of the "*Eirenicon*," is entirely devoted to the Immaculate Conception. This was the subject on which Dr. Newman had undertaken to enlighten his "dear Pusey," whom he congratulates with a superb piece of the most delicate sarcasm on his seeing his way to lay down

definite proposals as a basis of corporate reunion. Dr. Pusey is here told that the Church of England is fundamentally in error, and that he must come to the Catholic Church in the spirit of obedience, not reserving to himself so much private judgment as whether or not he shall kiss a crucifix. Immaculate conception is explained as simply meaning that, from the first moment of her existence, Mary had a superadded fulness of grace, which put her in a state of innocence corresponding to that of Eve. St. Augustine explained original sin as birth by concupiscence. And in this sense Mary was not without it. Her birth was not supernatural, like that of Jesus. But she had supernatural graces added. She did not fall, as Eve did, but merited to become the mother of the Redeemer. In this sense, she too is a Saviour. Dr. Newman justifies to a great extent the popular Mariolatry. The silly things which devout people say in their devotions to Mary are compared to the silly things that fall from lovers' lips, to be whispered only in lovers' ears. Dr. Pusey naturally asks the question, If this worship of Mary was in the primitive Church? He applies the old rule of Catholicism, laid down by Vincentius Lirinensis—"What was believed by all, always, and everywhere." Dr. Newman answers from his theory of "Development," that it existed in germ. Mr. Harper illustrates the process by development in nature. We do not look for vertebrates in the earliest geological strata; yet we find germs or rudiments of the organisms that now exist. This means, we imagine, that if Mr. Darwin had proved that men are developed from fishes, it would therefore be right to say that fishes are men, because men are developed from fishes. In this way the unity of "Catholic truth" is preserved.

The passages which Dr. Newman quotes from the Fathers in support of Mary-worship are such as the words of St. Jerome,— "Death by Eve, life by Mary," or this of Tertullian, Mary "blotted out" Eve's fault, and brought back "the female sex," or "the human race" to salvation. The old Fathers had a great fondness for contrasts. St. Paul's illustration of the first and second man may have suggested that of the first and second woman. The language, indeed, of the Fathers is not to be justified, but it is unfair to take their fanciful parallels, and convert them into doctrines. If this were done only by Roman Catholics we might have a word to say for Dr. Pusey; but Dr. Newman argues, we think justly, that from Dr. Pusey's own doctrine concerning the mother of Jesus, he ought not to be offended by some of the titles used in the Church of Rome. Dr. Pusey delights to call Mary the "Mother of God." This is a title which to modern ears sounds like blasphemy. Taken literally, it is destructive of the "Catholic faith," for even the creed of St. Athanasius does not say that the man Jesus was God, but ex-

pressly the contrary, that He was "man, of the substance of His mother." A General Council decreed that Mary was Theotocos Deipara, or Mother of God. It must then be received as an article of the faith by all who believe in the infallibility of Councils. It originated in the fond fancies of such Fathers as St. Ignatius, who says "Our God was carried in the womb of Mary," and of St. Chrysostom, who speaks of the "Everlasting" as born of a woman. It is continued by Dr. Newman, who does not scruple to say that "Mary bore, suckled, and handled the Eternal." Even with Dr. Pusey she is "Our Lady."

"Eirenicon," Part III., or the second letter to Dr. Newman, is a defence of the original positions of the "Eirenicon." It still maintains that reunion is possible if we can treat with the Church of Rome on the Gallican principles as expounded by Bossuet. This leads Dr. Pusey to repeat the well-known arguments and facts against Papal infallibility. But the repetition of them is an offence to the very party which rules the Church of Rome.

For the spirit and claims of that party we must turn to Dr. Manning's Pastoral. Some Roman Catholics and some Anglo-Catholics had formed an association, and agreed to pray together for the reunion of Christendom. The Roman Catholic bishops in England submitted the constitution of the "association" to the judgment of the "Congregation of the Holy Office" at Rome. The association was condemned, and "Catholics" were forbidden to pray with Anglicans for any such object. The grounds of the condemnation involved the condemnation of the principles on which the Anglicans proposed reunion. The "Congregation" said that there were not three Churches of Christ—the Greek, the Roman, and the Anglican—but only one Church, which was that of Rome. Christ's Church had never lost its unity, and never could lose it. Under pain of eternal death, it was declared to be the duty of every man to enter the only Church of Christ, which was that presided over by the Bishop of Rome. Dr. Manning described the scheme of union as based, not on the Thirty-nine Articles as understood by Englishmen, nor on the Council of Trent as understood by Catholics, but in a sense known neither to the Church of England nor the Church of Rome. He declares it to be as impossible to be saved out of the "one fold," which is that of Rome, as it is to be regenerated without baptism. The Church of England is the "Anglican separation," the Greek Church is the "Greek schism." To call these Churches parts of the Church Catholic is to destroy the boundaries of truth and falsehood. If these Churches are Catholic, then the infallibility and œcumenicity of Trent must be denied. Dr. Manning says that if Anglicans appeal to Bossuet, they must believe with Bossuet. The infallibility of the Pope may be denied,

but there remains the infallibility of the Church. Bossuet lived in Catholic unity, Anglicans are in separation. It is not enough to accept the decrees of Trent because we agree with them. This is mere private judgment. They must be accepted because the Council spoke with authority. To decide, because of evidence, to agree with the Church in doctrine, through an exercise of private judgment, does not make a man a Catholic. That requires submission and obedience. It is the Church which interprets both antiquity and the Scriptures. Its office is to assert, not to argue; to declare, not to give reasons. It is no sign of humility, Dr. Manning says, and no evidence of faith, to appeal from the Pope to a General Council of Greeks, Anglicans, and Romans, who shall put down Ultramontaniam, declare the Pope fallible, and restore the Immaculate Conception to the region of pious opinions. True faith is obedience to the Church of Rome; "other foundation can no man lay."

Of the same tone and character is Mr. Harper's elaborate work, "Peace through the Truth." The Church, that is, the Church of Rome, is the visible kingdom of Christ, "His Incarnation." It is a supernatural institution, and lives a supernatural life. A religious society, like the Church of England, outside of the "true Church," has no rights. The question is between "the Incarnate Word" and "a body of men." To say that the Church has erred for twelve centuries is to say that the Holy Ghost has failed in His mission. The Church being, as it were, the body of Christ, not by a figure, but in reality, from Him, through the hierarchy, flows a never-ceasing stream of supernatural grace; but it flows only through those in union with the body. The Anglican priesthood are, therefore, but "high and dry" channels, without even a globule of sacramental grace. In Dr. Pusey's objections to the extravagances of Roman devotion Mr. Harper only sees hatred to the practical life of the Church. The "dominant errors," against which Dr. Newman said our Articles were chiefly directed, are regarded as the "perfected consciousness" of the Church. It cannot, we think, be denied that Mr. Harper has here caught the spirit by which the Church of Rome lives. This accords with the claims of an infallible Church. The consistency of the ideal is preserved. Our Reformers agreed with Mr. Harper that the popular superstitions were a part of the consciousness of the Church of Rome, and just on that account they did not trouble themselves to distinguish between authorized dogma and what was commonly believed. And this is really the vital question. It is not whether a harmony can be effected between the creeds of the two Churches, but whether the two Churches can have one life, one consciousness. All Protestants have felt instinctively, as Mr. Harper feels, that between the Church of England and the Church of Rome

there is "a great gulf." On which side are the companions of Dives or Lazarus will be a matter of difference. But Mr. Harper is consistent with himself when he says, that but for the Reformation in England "thousands now in hell might have been eternally saved." He denies that there is one well authenticated case of a Pope falling into error. The Anglican doctrine of the "Real Presence," even as explained by Dr. Pusey, is declared to be in direct contradiction to that of the Council of Trent, while the history of the "Black Rubric" determines, with historical certainty, that Dr. Pusey's doctrine is not that of the Church of England. Mr. Harper announces a "Second Series" of Essays, and Dr. Pusey advertises a reply to Mr. Harper.

Of all the answers to Dr. Pusey, we know of none to be compared with that in the *Revue du Monde Catholique*. It consists of three articles by a Jesuit Father, written with a fascinating precision, with a penetrating insight into the minutest bearings of the question, and with a delicate raillery worthy of the happiest moments of Voltaire. The literary and theological value of the "Eirenicon" is estimated at about nothing. The arguments are simply those advanced thirty years ago by Father Newman, and by the same Father afterwards solidly refuted. The Anglicans reject the name of Protestant, and take upon them that of Anglo-Catholics, "or even Catholics." Of all the Protestant sects the Anglican is the most inconsequent, precisely because it is that which has preserved most Catholic truth while revolting against the Catholic Church. It professes to follow antiquity, and yet there is nothing in antiquity more clearly proclaimed by the first Councils, or more energetically demonstrated by the Fathers, than the supremacy of the Roman See. When Cardinal Wiseman got the Anglicans upon antiquity, he crushed them under the weight of decisive texts. Anglicans rest on Episcopacy because of the privileges which the Fathers say are possessed by the bishops; but these same Fathers show that the first condition of enjoying these privileges is legitimate appointment. Catholics have always denied the validity of the consecration of the Anglican bishops under Elizabeth. With only one exception they had all been violently introduced into their sees by the royal authority, and contrary to the holy canons. From the Fathers the Anglicans learned some vague ideas about the necessity of the unity of the Church. On the strength of this they pronounced a severe sentence against the Dissenters. They even called John Wesley a heresiarch. More than that, their simplicity was such that they charged Catholics with quitting the great unity of the Christian world. Anglicans saw the necessity of an authority, but they could not determine where it was to be found. Article XX. gives the Church a right to propose decisions, but not to impose

them. The Church has some authority in appearance, but none in reality.

In the early days of "Anglo-Catholicism," Newman and Oakley simply maintained that the Thirty-nine Articles could bear a Catholic sense; but now Dr. Pusey says this is their real sense. But to make Dr. Pusey a Catholic one thing is lacking. Without that one thing he will be a Protestant all the days of his life. He wants that which in itself constitutes orthodoxy. He wants *submission to the authority of the Church*. He must believe the doctrines of the Church, not because of their agreement with Scripture and tradition, but because the Church declares them. It is true he believes the Church, but then it is the Church of another age—a Church which speaks by documents of which Dr. Pusey remains the sole judge. Like other Protestants, he still exercises his private judgment. The only difference is that they interpret the Bible only, while Dr. Pusey interprets decrees of Councils and writings of Fathers. But in both cases there is private judgment and an equal absence of true faith, which is submission.

The Church of the first centuries was infallible, according to Dr. Pusey. That is to say, Christ's promise to His Church was only kept till the Church was invaded by heresy and schism. The guides of the Church now are to be the writings of the Fathers. But does Dr. Pusey know the meaning of the Fathers? Their writings may be understood in many senses. Moreover, if Christianity can only be learned from the Fathers, what is to become of the multitude of people who have no time to read either Fathers or decrees of Councils? Did Jesus Christ place His truth within the reach of Oxford doctors only, and not also of infants and little children? There is nothing, the French writer says, peaceful in Dr. Pusey's book except its title. It is "a sad book." It proposes to unite "Anglicans" and "Catholics," by converting both into "Puseyites."


The Reunion Essays, published by Mr. Hayes, are in their way curiosities. We might have given the volume a word of commendation, but for the utter inanity of three or four of the essays about the middle and towards the end of the book. One writer proposes nothing less than to *un-Protestantize* and to *Catholicize* England. Another speaks of the restoration of the "Daily Sacrifice." One charges the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge with "an overt act of heresy," in striking out of all its books, at the instigation of a late Archbishop of Canterbury, without a protest from a single bishop, the expression "Mother of God." Another bemoans the infidelity of the age, which has almost ceased to believe that there is "material fire" in hell. But the gem of the collection is the Essay by "A Priest of the Archdiocese of

Constantinople," who tells the Anglicans, in the spirit of Mr. Harper, that they and the Roman Catholics "must hear the words of truthful warning from the unvarying lips of orthodoxy;" that "the truth which the orthodox hold must be affirmed" by all, and that "orthodoxy is ready and willing to explain when the uninformed are prepared to be taught."

With the Greek Church reunion is more probable than with the Roman; but the great interest of the question turns on the relation of Rome to separated or national Churches. The claim which Rome makes is peculiar, and as generations pass, that claim is increasingly urged. The events of the passing hour take away all hope that those who rule the Church of Rome will ever make even a sign to Dr. Pusey and his friends, till, on bended knees, they receive from the "Holy Father" that blessing which will purify them from the birth-sin of heresy. Nor in one sense do we blame Rome. If it really is what it professes to be, it is right in making no surrender. But, on the other hand, if it is not what it professes to be, then Protestants are justified in the severest things that they have said against it. If Mr. Harper's view of the Church of Rome really is the correct one, it either is what he calls it, an "incarnation" of Christ, or it is Antichrist. In the latter case the claim to infallibility will be its destruction, and Protestants may say, "Ephraim is joined to his idols, let him alone."

We might urge this on "Anglo-Catholics," but we are too conscious that their position is not one reached by reason. It is simply due to a certain tendency of mind. The same men who are "Anglo-Catholics" in the Church of England would be Ultramontanes in the Church of Rome. There are two tendencies in all Churches. One is the disposition to rely on authority; the other is to mental independence. We sometimes see Roman Catholics claiming the right to reason for themselves, and Protestants rejoicing in the renunciation of reason. Dr. Pusey, in the nineteenth century, still looks for grace coming through a hierarchy, as through a material channel. Bishop Jewel, three centuries ago, was able to say that divine grace is not given to sees and successions, but to them that fear God.

JOHN HUNT.



EPIGRAMMATISTS AND EPIGRAMS.

The Epigrammatists. A Selection from the Epigrammatic Literature of Ancient, Mediæval, and Modern Times. By the REV. H. P. DODD, M.A., Pembroke Coll., Oxon. Bell and Daldy. 1870.

Epigrams, Ancient and Modern. Edited by the REV. JOHN BOOTH, B.A. 2nd thousand. Longman & Co., 1865.

Idylls and Epigrams. Chiefly from the Greek Anthology. By RICHARD GARNETT. Macmillan & Co., 1869.

THERE are signs and tokens that that long-lived but latterly depreciated plant, the epigram, is again coming into fashion and favour. That it is an exotic need not be said; but it may not be amiss to note that it is probably owing to mis-cultivation that it has at any time failed of kindly growth in this country. Brought originally from the Attic clime, where all poesy ripened of old so speedily and splendidly, it suffered rough usage in the process of transplantation: it deteriorated in tone and form when it came amongst the coarser captors of enslaved Hellas; and though a choice band of appreciators did their utmost to restore it to pristine fashion, when the Italo-Latinists took it up (circ. 1453, A.D.) at the revival of Greek literature, it fell again into the spoiler's hands when the Frenchman taught it to grow according to his standard. Its very name, however, ought at all times to define its scope and limits—to be used for purposes of inscription or superscription, as in the case of votive tablets or of memorial epitaphs: and, from such use on brass or stone, to pass to the brief commemoration, in words of bright and brief minstrel-fire, of noble deeds, important decisions, emotions of patriotism, affection, love, gaiety and mirth. If we ransack the Greek Anthology—consisting, in round numbers, of some five thou-

sand epigrams by nearly five hundred writers—the most striking general feature in it is the absence of that which, to modern notions, has always seemed of the essence of an epigram—a sting-like point. Whereas the modern recipe—borrowed from the French, who were indebted for it to the worse manner (for he has many redeeming points), of the Roman Martial—is expressed in the lines:—

“Take a portion of wit,
And fashion it fit,
Like a needle with point and with eye,
A point *that can wound*,
An eye to look round,
And at folly or vice let it fly:—”

that which the Anthologists seem to have thought of most concern was, that the epigram should be brief as well as sparkling, concentrate itself in a distich or two that should impress, but not pain or tire, and leave behind a pleasurable remembrance, through lightly touching some chord of sympathy, whether it were love, or mirth, or occasionally a sense of the ridiculous. No doubt there are just enough Greek epigrams which strike this last chord, to give colour to the view taken by Martial and the wits who in after-days have preferred his type as to what an epigram ought to consist of; and it would be a misstatement of facts to say that the Greek Anthology has no disfigurements in the way of impurity and indecency, such as modern literature would justly bann. But—as a rule—indelicacy, scurrility, lampoonery, can be imputed to but few out of the many, whilst there is scarcely one that does not exemplify the fine clear wit, the union of brevity with singleness of drift and brilliancy of execution, which make the *tout ensemble* of a Greek epigram “a thing of beauty and a joy for ever.” Gazing forth from the outlook of the Anthology at the subsequent history of epigrammatic literature, we shall no doubt here and there rest our eye upon epigrams and epigrammatists that have won name and remembrance principally through sharpening the arrow of smart, bitter words: but these have not permanently influenced our own or any other literature; whereas the Greek epigram, and the mediæval Latin epigram, which is moulded on its type—nay, even the better, truer, and finer touches of the Martalian epigram—have borne a part in studding other literature (prose and poetry in different proportions) with gems shining anew in fresh settings, and by undimmed lustre attesting original and enduring worth.

The taste of the present day, it should seem, is setting in the direction of this elder and better type. Mr. Booth, an octogenarian collector and compiler of infinite zeal and industry, found that the “first thousand” of his “Epigrams, Ancient and Modern,” pub-

lished in 1863, had not sufficient samples of ancient epigram to satisfy the demand for it; and also, we suspect, discovered that it was a mistake in these days to give admission to the sort of epigram—much in vogue a century ago—in which personality and scurrility was the chief feature. Two years later he put forth another “thousand,” or rather an entirely remodelled volume, wherein the curtailment of that which was purely personal and sting-fraught allowed much ampler room for cullings from the Greek Anthology and from another rare and till then little-rifled garland, the “*Delitiæ*” of the mediæval epigrammatists. Though this latter treasure had been almost forgotten in our day, until an article in the *Quarterly* (No. 233) sent Mr. Booth to the examination of it, between the publication of his first and his second volumes, it had served as a rich but often unacknowledged mine to our earlier poets and epigrammatists; and it is with interest and satisfaction that we find the latest editor of epigrams, Mr. Dodd,—whose volume “*The Epigrammatists*,” indeed, has suggested our present article,—not only alive to the rich material which the mediæval epigrammatists have to yield, but also quick and acute in tracing the influence of these upon our poets and poetry. He, like the mediævalists, elects the model of the Greek epigram; and in his just remarks (p. xxi. *Introd.*) upon the prejudicial effects of Martial on modern epigram, bears, it may be, a trifle too hardly on an offender who, after all, gave his readers and imitators a choice, and cannot be made answerable for their choosing the bad and leaving the good behind them. There is some reason for supposing that at the present day we are, for the most part, better Greek scholars than Latin: and this may in part account for the sweeping verdict apt to be pronounced on Martial’s palpable faults, without any extenuatory mention of his tenderer touches and his exquisite little bits of landscape and rural picture. We cannot help thinking that, over and above what has been done for Martial by Booth and Dodd by way of specimen extracts in translation, there is a field for some lover of epigrammatic literature to give us a fuller and a fairer taste of his best material; just as there is also a field of Greek and mediæval epigram yet unfurrowed, that would repay with interest an intelligent upturner and cultivator. A modest and a promising worker in this way is Mr. Richard Garnett, who has shown much taste and skill in the little volume of “*Idylls and Epigrams*” which he published last year. A few original epigrams, which he has inserted among his translations, are so clever, bright, and “Greekish,” that it is to be hoped that he will not desert the field which he has so happily entered—a hope in which we are sure our readers will join after perusing the extracts from his volume with which we are able to make them acquainted in passing.

Mr. Dodd's recent volume has this advantage over its precursors, that its arrangement is chronological, and so introduces us to epigram writers as well as epigrams. It is thus rendered easier to take a general view or to deal with a particular portion of the history of epigrams by help of his manual, than by the unsystematic collections of a century ago, or even the far more available and amusing pages of Mr. Booth. We propose, with it for guide, to glance at some few fruits of the tree of epigram, at various periods of its growth,—not binding ourselves to strict acceptance of Mr. Dodd's samples and specimens when it seems to us we can find better; but freely and gratefully availing ourselves of the broad lines which he lays down, and occasionally exhibiting upon these lines translations from other quarters than those to which he has availed himself of access. To Major Macgregor's complete version of the Greek Anthology a word of warm commendation is due at this point. An Indian officer, who at fourteen years of age exchanged the place of an alumnus of Dr. Valpy's famous school at Reading for that of a subaltern in one of our Indian regiments, and who afterwards added to his occupations that of an active and able banker, this accomplished man retained to the end of his days the keenest love for the pages of the Anthology, and found time—in addition to other literary work—to reproduce it in English. His task was too heavy to admit of being achieved with even excellence of execution. In many pieces a critical eye may miss a nice point, that lurks rather than stands out boldly in the original. But as a whole, his translation is a marvel of good taste and labour; and no volume on epigrams can afford to evince an ignorance of it. His pages, however, are more useful for reference and comparison than as a history of epigram: for which reason Mr. Dodd's volume is likely to serve as a useful introduction and handbook, with which English readers may approach the Major's less carefully arranged heap of quarried treasures.

From the threshold, however, of Mr. Dodd's work we should like to clear away a good deal of what is not strictly epigram. From Sappho, for instance, his extracts are manifestly irrelevant; if we except one which is not set down in its chronological order, but occurs in a page of notes upon a kindred epigram by Philip of Thessalonica. The version given by Mr. Dodd is that of Fawkes, a prolific translator, who, like so many of his own age, and of later days also, seems to have ignored the wholesome hint of the old Greek epigram (Jacobs, 201, i. p. 184), that many lines detract from the merit of an epigram. The original, consisting of four lines, is by Fawkes spun out into six; and so there arises a departure from the unadorned simplicity of a tale which the Muse of Greek epigram was

ever fond of telling—of the “Epithalamie,” as Herrick would have put it, being converted into an Epitaph. It is found in Jacobs, i. 50, iii., and Fawkes’s version is in p. 45 of Dodd. We substitute a truer, though less ornate version:—

“This dust was Timas, who, or ere she wed,
For death’s dark couch exchanged the bridal bed.
In keen regret for whom each virgin mate
Her loveliest locks doth shear and consecrate.”

This epigram, however, with one or two others extant, is sufficient to entitle Sappho to rank with the earliest Greek epigrammatists of whom we have any record, Cleobulus of Lindus, a tyrant and sage (B.C. 586), coming betwixt her and Anacreon, whose slender claims to notice, in this walk of poetry, must pale before those of the far more famous epigram writer of the same century, Simonides. This poet’s perfection in this kind of poetry is happily caught up and approximately reproduced in the English versions of Mr. Sterling, of which, perhaps, Mr. Dodd has been a little too chary, giving room, in one instance, to a friend (whose contributions to the translated portion of the volume will be distinguished by the letter C.), with perhaps too easy and confiding an acquiescence. The epigram in question is entitled the “Young Greek Exile’s Grave,” and is to be found in Jacobs, i. 76. lxxxix.

σῶμα μὲν ἀλλοδαπῇ κεύθει κόνης· ἐν δὲ σε πότινι,
Κλείσθηνες, Εὐξείνῃ μῶιρ’ ἔκειχεν θανάτου
πλαζόμενον. γλυκεροῦ δὲ μελίφρονος οἴκαδε νόστου
ἡμπλακες, οὐδ’ ἵκεν Χίον ἐς ἀμφιρρύτην.

C.’s version runs:—

“A foreign land enwraps its dust around thee,
And foreign waves by Euxine strand surround thee.
No more for thee thy home, thy native shore!
To Chios’ sea-girt isle thou’lt come no more.”

But it needs not to be a fastidious critic to desiderate here the *ἔκειχεν πλαζόμενον* of the second verse, and the honey-sweet epithets of “home” in the third. We hazard a substitute in what follows:—

“’Tis foreign earth that shrouds thee. Destined fate
Caught thee a-roaming in the Euxine strait,
Barred thy return, and robbed thee of the smile
Of home, sweet home, in Chios’ sea-girt isle.”

Of C.’s version of an epigram attributed to Plato, in p. 17, we can speak more warmly; and taking a long chronological leap to Diotimus (B.C. 275 circ.), the same translator’s version of a “Winter-thunderstorm in Greece” (Jacobs, i. 186. x.) is neat, true, and tasteful:—

“The gentle herd returned at evening close,
Untended from the hills and white with snows:
For, ah! Therimachus beneath the oak
Sleeps his long sleep, touched by the lightning stroke.” (P. 26.)

To take another skip over a few pages, we come upon an unfathered translation in Mr. Dodd, of the "Cupid turned Ploughman" of Moschus, (p. 30). It is not amiss, but for neatness and pith we prefer Mr. Garnett's, which is as follows :—

"Cupid, pert urchin, did himself unload
Of bow and torch, and wallet take and goad,
And bulls reluctant 'neath the yoke constrain,
And trace the furrow, and disperse the grain,
And looking up, 'Good weather! Jove, or thou
Shalt be a bull again, and drag this plough.'" (P. 4.)

The same writer imports more ease, too, than C., into his translation from Meleager (Jac. i. 31, cviii.) anent "The Bee that settled on his Mistress's Neck" (Dodd, p. 38; Garnett, Ep. xxx.), and gives us, to our thinking, happier specimens than Mr. Dodd of this delightful epigrammatist. In his 36th epigram he catches Meleager in his most sportive vein, and hits off to a nicety the playfulness of the Greek (Meleager, xvi.) :—

"Friends, when I breathe no more (and 'tis well known
That I am principally skin and bone;)
See that my urn this epitaph presents,
'Cupid to Pluto with his compliments.'"

In the only couplet of Meleager's "Murmur of Love" (Jac. i. 17, liii.) which he translates, Mr. Garnett, too, is more successful than Shepherd, whose entire version is given in p. 36 of Dodd. In the Greek the last lines are—

[ὦ πτανοί, μὴ καὶ ποτ' ἐφίπτασθαι μιν, Ἐρωτες,
οἶδαν', ἀποκτῆναι δ' οὐδ' ὅσον ἰσχύετε.
"Oh Love! that flew so lightly to my heart,
Why are thy wings so feeble to depart?"

A leap from Meleager over half a century will bring us to Leonidas of Alexandria and Philip of Thessalonica; and of the epigrams by the former Mr. Dodd could not have chosen a better sample than "The Mother and Child," which gave Rogers the idea for his well-known lines. C.'s version does not quite compass the second and fourth lines of the Greek, but we cannot withhold what is in itself so pretty a picture :—

"Lysippe's infant neared the steep cliff's brow,
And instant would have passed to depths below,
But the fond, love-taught mother bared her breast,
And back he sprung to that safe home of rest." (P. 43.)

That by the same hand on "Xerxes and the dead Leonidas," is so laxly translated that we substitute another, which will be found nearer to the Greek :—

"When Xerxes saw his patriot foeman slain,
Straight in his cloak to shroud him he was fain

Of regal dye. Then found the corpse a voice.
 'A traitor's fee was never Spartan's choice.
 With shield for shroud thy Persian gauds I hate;
 And, Spartan-like, would knock at Hades' gate.'"

Of Lucian and Lucilius—epigrammatists with more of a comic vein than most who wrote in Greek—Mr. Dodd scarcely gives the most characteristic specimens. That of the latter, "A Miser's Dream"—

"Flint dream'd he gave a feast: 'twas regal fare:
 And hanged himself in 's sleep in sheer despair," (P. 48.)

is an exception, to which C. has done full justice; and his "Miser and the Mouse" is well known in Dr. Jortin's version and others. Mr. Garnett's version may be a novelty:—

"A miser in his chamber saw a mouse,
 And cried, dismay'd, 'What dost thou in my house?'
 She, with a laugh, 'Good landlord, have no fear,
 'Tis not for board, but lodging I came here.'" (P. 55.)

A characteristic epigram of Lucian on a Garden Priapus, rendered into English by Mr. Garnett, may also be given, as supplementary to Mr. Dodd's specimens:—

"Priapus by devout Actemon placed,
 Protector of his garden's wintry waste,
 Warns all disposed to search its bounds for pelf,
 That there is nought to steal except himself." (P. 46, Garnett.)

In one of the two epigrams translated by C., with which Mr. Dodd represents the Samian, Nicarchus, of the second century, A.D.,—

"Phido nor hand nor touch to me applied;
 Fever'd I thought but of his name—and died," (P. 52.)

one finds the germ of Martial's epigram (vi. 53) and an evidence, one out of many, that he did not scorn to borrow from the Greek. Mr. Dodd has nothing to tell about the biography of that graceful epigrammatist, Rufinus, of whom readers will conceive a favourable estimate from the translation of an epigram "On the Transitoriness of Youth and Beauty," p. 52, though to the version there given we prefer, as more equal-lengthed and compact, Mr. Garnett's version in "Idylls and Epigrams," p. 11:—

"A various wreath these hands have woven for thee,
 Dark violet and moist anemone;
 Pliant narcissus, bloom of rosy bowers,
 And lily, Rhodoclea. May the flowers
 Thy lofty pride to lowlier thoughts persuade;
 Like thee they bloom, and thou like them must fade."

No name is attached to the happy version (p. 57) of Palladas' epigram "On Human Life," which may have in it the germ of Jacques' famous "All the world's a stage," &c.; but one of the best

translations of this section, "Cupid in the Cup," an epigram of Julius Ægyptus, is translated by Bishop Blomfield. A glance at it will serve to show the bright idea of the Greek poet, and justify the Italo-Latinist, Naugerius, who got a wrinkle from it for his pretty epigram to Hiella, translated in p. 58:—

"While for my fair a wreath I twined,
Love in the roses lay reclined.
I seized the boy: the mantling cup
Received him, and I drank him up.
And now, confined, the feathered guest
Beats, storms, and flutters in my breast."

A number of other pretty, graceful, witty, and humorous epigrams might be instanced that do not find translation in either of the books which head our article. But this is only natural. "Chacun à son goût." The accidents of taste, fancy, or a translation at hand have of course a great deal to do with this or that selection. One would like to have seen Agathias, and Paul the Silentary, of the Christian era, and Theocritus and Callimachus of the Alexandrian period more fully represented. A livelier impression of the Theocritean epigram would have resulted from citation of this from Calverley—

"Friend, Ortho of Syracuse gives thee this charge,
Never venture out drunk on a wild winter night;
I did so and died. My possessions were large,
Yet the turf that I'm clad in is strange to me quite."

Another on "Caicus's Bank," commonly given to Theocritus, though referable perhaps rather to Artemidorus, the grammarian, should have been translated by D. or C. We give it as Chapman translates (Ep. 23):—

"With stranger and with citizen the same
I deal: your own deposit take away,
Paying the charge: excuse let others frame,
His debts Caicus e'en at night will pay."

Turning to the Latin epigrammatists, what strikes us most is their poverty, with at most two exceptions, in quality and in quantity. The section allotted to them by Mr. Dodd has to be eked out with ode and elegy, with Tibullus and Propertius. Catullus, no doubt, set the fashion to Martial, and has a few pretty epigrams, and the Latin Anthology will supply here and there a happy specimen; but of Roman epigram Martial has the lion's share, and he is liable to the charge of turning the clear Greek stream into a less wholesome current. Still, after regret for these, we are bound to give him credit for a residuum of neat little *jeux d'esprit*, perfect in kind, and in high favour with even the correcter mediævalists. To Mr. Dodd's samples of Martial's vein, in their chronological place or in illustrative notes, might have been added not a few, which exist in clever

and happy English versions. His latest editor, Mr. Paley, does Martial no more than justice when he says that—

“His wit is of that peculiarly pointed and brilliant kind which must be felt to be appreciated. It is wit in the very highest and most perfect definition of it. A single word at the end of an epigram perhaps contains the point of the whole thing, or a ‘double entendre,’ or a turn (*παρά προσδοκίαν*) different from what you thought was to come, gives the colour to the epigram. . . . Although fun is his liking, pathos is his forte. Many of his epigrams breathe the most exquisite tones of sentiment and affection.”*

This side, however, of Martial can only be fairly looked at by one who can read him in the original. While such epigrams as i. 75:—

“Dimidium donare Lino quam credere totum
Qui mavolt, mavolt perdere dimidium.”

“Lend Sponge a guinea! Ned, you’d best refuse,
And give him half. Sure, that’s enough to lose!” (Booth);

or vi. 12:—

“Jurat capillos esse, quos emit, suos
Fabulla: numquid, Paule, pejerat?”

“The golden hair that Galla wears
Is hers, who would have thought it?
She swears ’tis hers, and true she swears,
For I know where she bought it.” (Harington)—

have tempted *bels esprits* to translate them, it is a more serious cost of pains and skill that is required for turning into English verse those tenderer and more sentimental pieces of this Roman epigrammatist, to which perhaps Mr. Amos,† in his prose samples has done more justice than the verse translators. Mr. Garnett, in Ep. 157 of his little book, gives token of an aptitude for the representation of this pleasing aspect of Martial; but he has limited his drafts on Martial to three or four epigrams, and we look in vain for a translator, who reproduces worthily such of this poet’s remains as lament the premature death of the young, evince an appreciation of steadfast conjugal love, rejoice over a friend’s safety, or commemorate fraternal love with a just admiration. Bits of description, like “Faustinus’s Farm” (iii. 68), running over fifty lines, can only be called “epigrams” by courtesy; and, though not a few of these vindicate Mr. Paley’s estimate of Martial “as a perfect master of Latinity,” he is best known, and likely to remain best known, to moderns by those short and sparkling, but too often scurrilous, or adulatory squibs and trifles, which his patrons paid for, and by which he lived. By these it was that he placed epigram on the narrow basis which it came afterwards to occupy, and set a rule of “sharp point,” which became a *sine quâ non* in the eyes of French

* Paley and Stone’s “Martial,” Pref. p. viii.

† “Martial and the Moderns,” by Andrew Amos, Esq.

and English. We must leave to others the representation of what we must esteem Martial's higher and better vein, and pass on—for there is little else to linger upon in classical Latin epigrams—to the mediæval epigrammatists, who drank deep at the Greek sources reopened by the labours of John Lascaris and the patronage of Lorenzo de Medicis, and who repaid the price of their draughts in libations of very pure and refined Latin versification. These affect for the most part the Greek model, though now and then they give a taste of Martial's humour and satire. Their chaplets are generally woven of Attic flowers. Although the influence of these mediævalists on modern English poetry has been not inconsiderable, it has been so little acknowledged, that till recently it was well-nigh forgotten. Mr. Booth first, and now again Mr. Dodd, have taken a hint from the article, above referred to, in the *Quarterly Review*, and multiplied largely the few specimens of translation from mediæval Latin epigram which its writer included in his survey. More is yet to be done. The pieces brought to light are mainly taken from Abraham Wright's "*Delitiæ Delitiarum*," a small 18mo, which is itself a selection from selections. The fertility of the writers of whom he gives specimens, defies the friendly and zealous efforts of their English champion, and the reader who cares to attack the squat, bulky, close-printed tomes which enclose these writers in their fulness, will find amidst much repetition of frivolous conceits not a few gems hitherto unseen of common eyes, one writer praising his Phillis, another complimenting his Hiella, and all exhibiting infinite skill in imparting variety to the old, old story. Mr. Dodd's work, by means of its copious annotations, enables us to trace the loans contracted by those that came after upon Greek, Latin, and mediæval Latin epigram in their turns; and it is impossible to evade the conclusion that the last-named model was in highest favour with many English poets. "They were well known," he remarks in his preface, p. xxiv., "to Pope and a few of our greater poets, and have exercised an important influence over those who were acquainted with them, by displaying a style of epigram-writing, pure as the Greek, but more humorous; and lively as Martial, but generally free from his coarseness;" and he goes on to note that in epigram-collections of the last century are to be found frequent imitations of their worse specimens, *i.e.*, those most in conformity with Martial's type. What is passed off as an original English epigram in the "Poetical Farrago":—

"How fitly joined the lawyer and his wife!
He moves at bar, and she at home, the strife,"

is a translation, in reality, "from the Latin of Petrus Ægidius, Peter Giles, of Antwerp." (P. xxv.)

We cannot pass in review as much as even a tithe of the specimens from this class of epigrammatists which the pages of Booth and Dodd exhibit or suggest, although, as has been said, these pages do but give a limited supply. Perhaps it will be better, while noticing any that particularly strike us in them, to supplement these, where we have the means, with our own versions of others from the same hands. Thus, at any rate, something will have been added to the store, which is still small, something which may serve till better samples are provided.

Mr. Dodd has been sparing of specimens from a very good and early epigrammatist, Janus Pannonius (A.D. 1434—1472). These we take leave to supplement with two others, of true epigrammatic flavour in the original, and we trust not unintelligible in our copy. They need no heading, for they tell their own story:—

"Pirating Virgil, thou art apt to use
His loans on Homer as a fair excuse.
Quit shalt thou be: nay, placed on post-roll,
If only thou wilt steal as Virgil stole."

"The verses, Paul, you sent me to correct,
Return, by pencil-marks at faults unspecked:
Yet boast not, nor delusive hope prolong,
'Tis idle to mark faults, where all is wrong."

From an early French poet, *Martialis Monerius*, Mr. Dodd translates a humorous epigram on one who lost a wooden leg at Calès, which comes out happily in English:—

"When 'gainst Calès the Gallic forces drove,
Machon, a soldier, raw, but smart, by Jove,
To the tall rampart's height most boldly dashed,
When thro' his wooden leg a bullet crashed:
'All right!' he cried, 'I am not hurt a peg,'
At home I've got in store another leg." (P. 103.)

From Sannazaro (1458 A.D.) he has some half-dozen by various hands, of various excellence, but none more characteristic in the original, or better translated than the lines "*De amore fugitivo*" ("*Delit. Delitiarum*," p. 112) beginning "*Quæritat huc illuc raptum*," and translated in Mr. Garnett's "*Idylls and Epigrams*" by his father, the Rev. R. Garnett. It runs:—

"Fair Venus seeks her son with anxious eyes,
Who close concealed within my bosom lies;
What can I do, who with like reverence own
The empire of the mother and the son?
If he remains, my breast no peace will know;
If I betray him, he becomes my foe!
Then, Cupid, stay, but ah! be not unkind!
For ne'er wilt thou a safer shelter find."

We cannot congratulate Mr. Dodd on his sole specimen of Car-

dinal Bembo, an elegy rather than epigram on the death of Politian. He had better given two little couplets; one on a lapdog's death, the other on that of Raphael. The first may be Englished:—

"What is there, whelp Bembino, that thy lord denies to thee?
From whom thou hast thy name, thy tomb, and tearful elegy;"

the second:—

"Here Raphael lies. While he lived, Nature's dread
Was base defeat; but death, since he is dead!"

Not a bad epigram from Euricius Cordus, a German poet and physician of the fifteenth century, is given by Dodd from the *Gentleman's Magazine* (xciv.):—

"Three faces wears the doctor: when first sought,
An angel's; and a god's, the cure half wrought;
But when, that cure complete, he seeks his fee,
The devil looks then less terrible than he." (P. 110.)

And it would be the more interesting if we could trace it home to him. Unfortunately the Latin of it is not given in the larger and more copious "*Delitiæ*," to which one refers for what does not appear in Wright; so that we are not in a position to know whether this epigram was based on professional experience. We have had a like ineffectual hunt after the Latin original of the "*Lover's Wreath*," translated, it is said, from Hiero Angerianus, in the 119th page of Dodd; and this although *Cælia* is celebrated almost *ad nauseam* through at least sixty pages of that amatory epigrammatist. We confess, however, that it may have been overlooked. These Italo-Latinists go the round of possible compliments to their mistresses in most amusing assiduity, and, when this is exhausted, often resort to paradox. Thus one of them, of whom Mr. Dodd has three specimens, two from the *Quarterly Review*, in pp. 157-8, Balthazar Bonifacius, after divers conceits anent his fair Phillis, has one ("*Delitiæ Delitiarum*," p. 91) "*in Phillida luscæ*;" "*Ad pictorem*." We will vouch for the exactness, though not so sanguine as to the elegance, of our own English version:—

"Painter, my Phillis' features do not doubt
To paint with their sole blemish—one eye out!
Love closed her left eye, not to spoil or maim,
But that her right might take more certain aim."

One has heard of it being said of a pretty girl, similarly circumstanced, that if she had only one eye, *that was a piercer*! This Bonifacius must have had a penchant for "*luscæ*," unless "*Chariclita*," whom he celebrates in an epigram, quoted by Dodd in p. 157, was only Phillis under another name. But these Latinists did not always stick to the sentimental. Two samples of the epigrams of Andrew Alciati of Milan, A.D. 1492—1550, are to be found in

p. 122 of Mr. Dodd, and may be said to represent the classicosentimental style; but another, not given by Mr. Dodd, has arrested our attention by its similarity to a fable of Babrius and of Æsop in its chief features, though, oddly enough, in the fabulists a *boy*, and in the epigrammatist a *kite*, plays the chief part, contrariwise to what might have been expected. It is on the text of "*Malè parta malè dilabuntur*," and we give English and Latin:—

"Milvus cdax, nimis quem nausea torserat escæ,
'Hei mihi, mater' ait, 'viscera ab ore fluunt.'
Illa autem: 'quid fles? cur hæc tua viscera credas?
Qui rapto vivens sola aliena vomis.'" ("Delit." p. 58.)

"A greedy kite, by sickness overta'en,
Unto its mother sadly did complain;
'Alas! good mother, all is ill with me!
This nausea turns my inside out, d'ye see?'
'Weep not,' said she, 'nor others' losses moan,
Who lives on others' bowels, spares his own!'"

We shall be excused for toning down in English the outspoken plainness of the Latin; and, in token that we do not reckon this the more congenial vein of epigram, will return to the better tone, more in accordance with the present taste.

To fulfil this promise we must not tarry with George Buchanan, whose epigrams affect Martial and his sarcasm, longer than to draw attention to a capital translation of one of his best by Mr. J. O. W. Haweis, which is reprinted from *Notes and Queries*, by Mr. Dodd, in p. 125. Buchanan treated his Leonoras with less deep homage than his Italian brethren of the epigram poured at the feet of a Phillis or a Cælia. Perhaps climate had something to do with this. To turn from him to his contemporary, Jerome Amalthei, is to taste honey after gall. Amalthei's verses to Hiella beginning "*In me oculos quoties*," &c., are a pretty conceit, for which Mr. Booth gives the *Quarterly* reviewer's version as an equivalent, and Mr. Dodd the following anonymous lines:—

"On me my love, Hiella, casts her eyes,
And then so oft my love, Hiella, sighs;
Hence the flames, brightened by her breath, which dart
From those deep orbs, to ashes burn my heart."

The same Italian's conceit, "*On an Hour-glass as the Lover's Tomb*" (Dodd, p. 129), is almost worthy to rank beside his far-famed epigram, "*On two beautiful monoculi*" [*Lumine Acon dextro, &c.*]; in the selection of a version of which we cannot but think Mr. Dodd unfortunate. Of Joannes Secundus—the author of the "*Basia*," and sometime Latin Secretary to Charles V., a prettier and briefer sample may be taken from James Wright's "*Sales Epigrammatum*" than the epigram on Charinus, of which Mr. Dodd gives Whaley's version

(p. 131). Here is Wright's specimen, *à propos* of Hercules bearing a Cupid:—

"Ante quibus coelum fuerat leve pondus, eisdem
Nunc gravis est humeris sarcina parvus Amor."
"Once the vast heavens were light to thee: now Love,
A little boy, doth far too heavy prove."

And of Theodore Beza—whose "three wives" may be a myth constructed on the basis of Paschasius's witty epigram (Dodd, p. 133 *ad fin.*), but whose Greek learning and share in the Reformation abroad are matters of history, it is more interesting to note the modesty shown in his distich,—

"Brevem, Zoile, dicis hunc libellum,
O si possit idem omnibus videri."
"My book to you, O Zoilus, seems too small,
I only wish it would seem so to all!"

than his laboured common-places on the fame of Erasmus and Luther (Dodd, pp. 135-6). *A propos* of Muretus's graceful epigram on "Venus Anadyomene," of which a translation is given by Mr. Dodd in p. 137, a paradoxical epigram is introduced from Petronius Afranius, the subject of which is a lady inflaming her lover by well-plied snow-balls! The conceit is an odd one, but not unprecedented in the mediævalists. Jerom Angerianus, if we are not mistaken, has resorted to it in one of his amatory epigrams; and it occurs in others of his school. Of Paschasius, or Pasquier, a genial French epigrammatist, A.D. 1615, Mr. Dodd gives five or six specimens, longer and shorter. The versions of two of these, to a Physician and to Harpalus, may be compared with James Wright's versions, which are as follows:—

- (1) "Your pains are free to me. The gift is brave,
But yet not worth the hazard of a grave."
- (2) "The poor his heir makes Harpalus, that he
Who should be so might weep unfeignedly."

A version, by the same hand, of Joseph J. Scaliger's distich, "On the Fear of Death,"—

"The fear of death is worse than death: we may
Contemn, we cannot shun, the fatal day,"

is worthy to supplement the sole specimen of this epigrammatist in Dodd. Another, and that a curious one, of Joseph Scaliger, is to be found in Booth, p. 161. The subject is "Lexicography," and Lord Neaves, the translator:—

"Is there a wretch whose crimes a sentence craves
Of toil and torture, till he reach the grave?
Let not the mill his wasted body wear!
Let not the mine immerse him in despair.
'Make dictionaries'—be the doom assigned;
All other punishments are there combined."

The point of this epigram, it must be allowed, was sufficient for its day; but now that co-operation is successfully applied, it is no longer a penal servitude for life to embark in lexicography.

The Welshman, Owen or Audoenus, who wrote so many good Latin epigrams, deserves to be better known of his countrymen than he is in the present day. He is often witty; and not seldom points a moral with classical brevity. Here is a distich from Hayman's "Quodlibets," a nearly contemporary collection of original and translated epigrams:—

"Sweet, let thy soul be smooth as is thy skin!
As thou art fair without, be so within."

An epigram of Owen's, which we have never seen translated,

"Stultorum *Bedlem*, nebulonum regia *Bridewell*,
Utrum harum mavis, ingrediare licet,"

hits off a dilemma as puzzling in other days, it would seem, as in our own. The space which we can spare for the mediævalists is well-nigh exhausted; but we must just notice two more of them, Bauhusius the Jesuit, and the Scotch minister, Ninian Paterson. To the former we draw attention chiefly to show that he is not to be judged by the ten lines on Fortune, wherein Mr. Dodd reproduces a pithy Latin epigram of six. The Latin runs:—

"Siccine in humanis ludis, sors perfida, rebus,
Et sanctâ bellum cum ratione geris?
Dives prolis eget Proclus dux; pignora Lauso
Ter tria sunt: prolis non eget, æris eget.
Vertito cœca Tyche: da cui rapis, et rape cui das!
Lauso aliquid Proculi, Lausi aliquid Proculo."

It could hardly be that expansion of such an epigram should result in aught but failure; and Mr. Dodd here is both prolix and rugged. We are constrained to offer an alternative version, of corresponding length to the Latin:—

"Is't thus, Jade Chance, that thou with men dost play,
And wage keen war with reason's better way?
Proclus is rich but childless; children nine
Has Lausus, who for brass, not bairns, doth pine.
Blind Fortune, turn thy wheel! By 'give and take,'
Richer make Proclus, richer Lausus make!"

Paterson came fifty years later in date, and that for which we linger awhile upon his name and verses, is his exceptional praise of conjugal affection. This is not noticed by Mr. Dodd; but one who has waded through the larger "Delitiæ" cannot be unaware that the complimentary epigrams are more often addressed *ad amicum* than *ad uxorem*. This is not so in Paterson, who herein does not follow Buchanan. Paterson has a tribute to his wife in a six-line

epigram, entitled "Conjugium Felix." It is a trifle commonplace, and we prefer to cite his criticism on "Woman" generally, with our translation of it:—

"Quæ levis Elysio miseros prius expulit horto,
Rettulit amissi fœmina regna poli;
Ultima naturæ sapientis machina: sed quâ
Sî mala, nil pejus, sî bona, nil melius."

"To men, from Eden erst thro' woman driven,
Woman restores the forfeit realm of heaven;
An all-wise Maker's latest work is she,
His best, if good, His worst, if bad she be."

And now to part with these pleasant companions, some of whom, and not the least pleasant, we have felt unable so much as to name, and to glance at the large field of modern English epigram, most of the cultivators of which have got their cue from one or other of the three sets of models we have been discussing. The elder Wyatt, for example, in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Mary, Sir John Harington in that of Elizabeth, and Sir John Davies, the lawyer and poet, savour strongly of Martial's spirit. The second of this trio, indeed, when not a direct translator, is a manifest imitator of the Latin epigrammatist. The old Eton grammar's first example of a dative after "verba dandi" is the gist of Harington's distich "On Fortune," and his epigram "On Galla's Hair" is only a lengthier paraphrase of Martial. Davies reminds us of the Latin poet in tone rather than form or phrase, and his epigram upon a mushroom nobleman and his airs and graces is worth referring to, apart from the copious and happy parallels with which Mr. Dodd bestuds it:—

"When Priscus, raised from low to high estate,
Rode through the streets in pompous jollity;
Caius, his poor familiar friend of late,
Bespake him thus, 'Sir, now you know not me.'
'Tis likely, friend (quoth Priscus) to be so,
For at this time myself I do not know!" (P. 182.)

Hayman, Parrot, and others of the same date, strike us as a cross between Martial and the Cambro-Briton, Owen, while—to skip over a century—such epigrams as "A Reasonable Affliction" (p. 283) show that Prior went chiefly to the former for pattern and matter:—

"In a dark corner of the house
Poor Helen sits, and sobs, and cries:
She will not see her loving spouse,
Nor her more dear picquet allies:
Unless she find her eyebrows,
She'll e'en weep out her eyes."

To return to Elizabethan days, we cannot doubt that Ben Jonson had a smack both of the Greek and Latin; the Greek in such pieces as "Life and Death" (Dodd, p. 191), and the epitaph on Sir John

Roe, a line of which is seemingly borrowed from Antiphanes, the Greek comic poet, and is one form of our phrase, "Not lost, but gone before;" the Latin—ay, and Martial's best Latin—in those beautiful epitaphs to his children and young choristers, which will be read with admiration so long as the English language lasts. Mr. Dodd traces Jonson's influence in an epitaph by Aaron Hill, a prime epigram-writer of the eighteenth century; and the resemblance is as much to the credit of Hill's taste as of Jonson's ideal. Drummond of Hawthornden, Browne of *Britannia's Pastorals*, Herrick, and their lesser contemporaries, clung more to the Greek; whilst in Carew, and one or two others, we fancy there are traces of the mediævalists. The evidence for Browne's authorship of the famous epitaph on "Sidney's sister, Pembroke's mother" (Dodd, 218—19), upsetting as it does the ascription of it to Ben Jonson, is a rare curiosity of literature, on which we must not dilate; but rather pass on to an epigram of a somewhat later date, and of a less-known author, Dr. John Strode, a Canon of Christ Church, which probably owes its existence to the original of Strato (Jacobs, iii. 75; xxx. of Dodd, p. 240). Strode's archly-expressed conceit is as follows:—

"My love and I for kisses played:
She would keep stakes; I was content;
But when I won, she would be paid.
This made me ask her what she meant.
'Pray, since I see (quoth she) your wrangling vain,
Take your own kisses; give me mine again.'"

With this exception the English names cited hitherto are not unknown to poetic fame; but the English epigram thrives on less splendid soil. We know little of John Heath who published epigrams (A.D. 1610); but his lines "On the Death of Beatrice"—

"In Beatrice did all perfections grow,
That she could wish, or Nature could bestow;
When Death, enamoured of that excellence,
Straight grew in love with her, and took her hence," (P. 209.)

are an early and beautiful expression of a fancy of which, in our day, Longfellow has availed himself in his lines "There is a Reaper whose name is Death." Another little-known epigrammatist of the same date is Thomas Freeman, in one of whose epigrams we note the early use of an old English proverb:—

"Virtue we praise, but practise not her good;
Athenian-like, we act not what we know.
So many men do talk of Robin Hood,
Who never yet shot arrow from his bow."

According to Mr. W. C. Hazlitt, the earliest occurrence of this proverb in our literature is about A.D. 1600.

That which will constitute the great value of Mr. Dodd's volume

is its chronological and biographical arrangement, and it would be only too pleasant to the writer to run on through the later pages of the epigrammatists, and tarry, at will, where there seemed good entertainment. We dread, however, lest it should be said that the virtue of an epigrammatist has not extended to him that criticizes. We shall, therefore, just glance at one or two lower types of modern epigram, note two or three of the moderns who have really enriched epigram literature, and then make an end. One of the resorts of modern epigram—affected by Dean Swift and others who might have disdained it—is “bathos.” In p. 292 Mr. Dodd gives us an instance of this in Swift’s “Power of Time,” an epigram, the first two couplets of which are grand and general, while the third concentrates itself in the particular application of the whole to a Welsh divine’s old cassock. It is true that the trick is traceable to the Greek Lucilius, but it was unworthy of him; and it could only have been in caricature of such catchpenny devices of the Muse that Dr. Johnson extemporized the stanzas anent the “hermit hoar, in solemn cell.” It crops out, however, in the days of Prior and his successors: and is a trifle less creditable headwork than those “plays on words” and “surprises” (*παρὰ προσδοκίαν*) which have from time to time been the vogue in epigram-writing. Of the former, one of the best is Francis Fuller’s distich “On a Left-handed Writing Master,” p. 297,—

“Though Nature thee of thy right hand bereft,
Right well thou writest with the hand that’s left;”

and, in this kind, the reward of merit is just so much *κῶδός* as attaches to a pun. The latter is of Greek ancestry; but the best example of it is in Leigh Hunt’s version of a French epigram “On Hanging as a Cure for Disappointment.”

“’Tis done; I yield; adieu, thou cruel fair,
Adieu, th’ averted face, th’ ungracious check!
I go, to die, to finish all my care,
To hang.—To hang?—Yes, round another’s neck.” (Dodd, p. 18, note.)

But Lord Erskine’s epigram “On French Taste” is, as Rogers remarked, “not bad” for a play on words:—

“The French have taste in all they do,
Which we are quite without;
For Nature, that to them gave *goût*,
To us gave only gout.” (P. 463.)

And Thomas Campbell’s resort to a “surprise”—in compliance with the importunities of a young lady that he write something original in her album—

“An original something, fair maid, you would win me
To write—but how shall I begin?
For I fear I have nothing original in me—
Excepting ‘Original Sin,’” (P. 496.)

was justifiable and even commendable under the circumstances. But, as a matter of taste, fame, or ambition—who would covet to be remembered by such ephemeral trifles, and who would not rather have written such an enduring memorial of genius as Dr. Young's "Wit" [As in smooth oil, &c., p. 312], Aaron Hill's "Modesty" [As lamps burn silent, &c., p. 313], or that beautiful but unfathered epitaph "On Two Twin-sisters" (p. 314), to which it is curious that, amidst many cases of appropriation, no one has hitherto advanced a claim? or the perfect epitaph "On an Infant" (Dodd, p. 342) which is traceable to Samuel Wesley, the orthodox brother of the better-known John and Charles? or Samuel Taylor Coleridge's epitaphs "On an Infant" (p. 489), and Hartley Coleridge's "On a Mother and Three Infants" (p. 511)?

"From God they came, to God they went again;
No sin they knew, and knew but little pain:
And here they lie, by their fond mother's side,
Who lived to love and lose them—then she died."

These concentrations of poetic genius add a precious page to our literary history: these will outlive the endless sparkles of a less-estimable cleverness, of which the highest effort is a pun, a retort, or a repartee. There is as much scurrility as wit in Dr. Wolcot's epigram to Dr. Geach about "Asses' milk" (Dodd, 453); and simple spite might have produced Rogers' distich—

"Ward has no heart, they say, but I deny it:
He has a heart, and gets his speeches by it." (P. 481.)

We could almost wish that in such works as those of Mr. Booth and Mr. Dodd those epigrams which have the merit of grace, finish, and Greek refinement could be distinguished from those which go in for wit and point of a biting kind by separate sections. Another division or subdivision would be between genuine and spurious or shallow wit, *jeux d'esprit* and personalities. The Fellow of Trinity, who pronounced the "a" in Euphrates short, was fair game for Porson's Latin distich (472); but a distich worthier to live is Schiller's on the "Best governed State," which has a universal not a personal point. In Lord Lytton's version it runs—

"How the best state to know? It is found out;
Like the best woman—that least talked about."

We advocate a sifting and sorting, nay more, a weeding of epigrams, in the persuasion that, under censorship, the epigram is a branch of poesy which it were impolitic to let drop into desuetude. Not only is it, as Mr. Dodd urges in p. xxxviii. of his Introduction, a field in which those may exhibit talent whose powers would have been ill-adapted for a more sustained effort; not only does it, as an

exercise, tend to promote terseness, conciseness, elegance in a writer's prose, as well as poetry; not only does it serve as a brief record of history, and a photographic glimpse at manners and customs—but it is in itself a standing engine of commemoration for whatever is good, gallant, bright, gracious, and beautiful, in that shape and fashion most adapted for everlasting remembrance. The valour of a Leonidas, the devotion of a fond mother, the special charm of some peerless beauty, may thus live and flourish through the lapse of ages. And it is not the less a virtue of the epigram, that, if it has a fling at the abstract and not the concrete, vices and follies rather than the vicious and foolish, it does good service prospectively as well as at the time being. But it is apt to run riot, without censorship, and to wander from its scope and limits, through misapprehension and misappreciation. "Non omnia possumus omnes." He that sits down to turn out an *epigram* and indites a *squib*, has never properly understood his task. Of course there is a still graver disqualification—dulness. A college of wits should exist to stifle dull epigrams. And such there are, written by the sort of men, whose old jokes call up

"A laughter grown

Most weary, since so often laughed, that men

Look almost sad upon the jest outworn;"

and whose puns fall dead upon the ears of those who have to endure them. Of a supposed writer of such, Mr. Garnett, whom we have already quoted more than once, has the following original epigram:—

"Fired with the thirst of Fame, thus honest Sam :

'I will arise and write an epigram.'

An epic, Sam, would still more glorious be,

And much more easily achieved by thee."

JAMES DAVIES.



IS THERE ANY "AXIOM OF CAUSALITY" ?

Ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνο, ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον.—PLAT. *Phædo*, 99 B.

THE cultivation of the Natural Sciences has advantageously contracted the meaning of the word "*Cause*," which formerly was identified (as its derivative "*Because*" still is) with every answer to the question "*Why?*" and was said to lurk in the conditional clause of every hypothetical proposition. But now, we withdraw the word both from the *logical ground* of a belief (*causa cognoscendi*), and from the *interdependence* of mathematical magnitudes (*causa essendi*). We do not, with Aristotle, call the *premisses* of a syllogism the *causes* of the conclusion (An. Post. I. ii. 22), and, with Spinoza, the *essence* or *definition* of Substance, the *Cause* of its existence. And though we say "*If* two circles touch each other internally, their centres and point of contact will be in the same straight line," we do not speak of the internal contact as the *cause* of straightness in the uniting line. The order of consecutive *thought* is expressed by the word "*Reason*." The relations with which mathematical truth is concerned have no origin or consecution *inter se*; but exist in *reciprocal* interdependence, which may be traversed in various orders. Were there only an unchanging universe, there would be, in the modern sense, no Cause and Effect. Between "*Things*," as such, this relation cannot exist; it requires *Phenomena*. It is only with

the *causa nascendi* that we have now to do. We speak, no doubt, of objects,—a glacier, a coal-bed, an asteroid,—being caused by this or that; but only as having assumed their present form in time.

Change alone, however, does not suffice to give entrance to causality. A body existing in a state of uniform rectilinear motion would be always under change, but the change would not be an effect; nor for the body's movement through one segment of its course should we assign as cause its movement through the previous segment. Successive stages of continuous and unvaried change do not constitute the relation: the two terms must be *heterogeneous*. There are thus two marks of an *effect*: it must be a *phenomenon*, and not *homogeneous* with the Cause. Whatever carries these marks obliges us to look beyond itself; for what? for its origin in something different. This difference might be satisfied either by simply *another phenomenon*, or by what is *other than phenomenon*.

I. Suppose the Cause to be *another phenomenon*; in what does the relation between the two consist?

1. Is it in Time-succession? Is habitual antecedence tantamount to Causality? This hypothesis is already excluded by the rule of *heterogeneity* already given, for habitual antecedence, belonging equally to successions of the like and of the unlike, makes no provision for satisfying this rule. After using up the resources of habitual succession, we should therefore still have to set up a supplementary law of Thought, that every change must be referred to something other than its own prior stage.

2. Is it in *Sequence + Heterogeneity*; so that where two different phenomena are invariably successive in the same order, the prior is cause of the posterior? Not so, unless the blossoms of the almond are the cause of its leaves; and low water the cause of high; and the off fore leg of a horse moves his hind near one; and the fall of the leaf is the cause of winter; and (to recur to an old example not yet tortured to death) night the cause of day. Successions of this kind, constant yet independent of each other, we can conceive multiplied to any extent. Suppose them to be universal, so as to occupy the whole field of observation. There would still be laws of invariable order; definite rules of co-existence and succession, securing the means of prediction; but no causality. Premonitory signs are still something short of causes.

3. Is the shortcoming remedied by stipulating that the sequence shall be "*unconditional*"? By decorating his "*invariable antecedent*" with this new mark, Mr. Mill completes its promotion to the rank of Cause. First, let us see whether we have got here a *new* mark at all. When does an antecedent become invested with this "*unconditionality*" of relation? When upon its presence, whatever

else may be or not be, the second phenomenon regularly happens. Whether it has this character or not can be learned only by letting all other conditions absent themselves by turns, and so reveal their indifference to the result; and finding the residuary element to be the sole constant. What we discover thus, however, is nothing but our old acquaintance "invariableness," cleared by comparison with its inconstant companions. Or, in order to make "unconditionality" mean more than "invariableness," shall we insist that the antecedent is to be the sole condition "requisite," on the occurrence of which the second phenomenon is "*sure to happen*," and "*will follow in any case*"? How, then, am I to know such an antecedent when I see it? What test do you give me of this exclusive requisiteness, —this sureness to happen? If it be anything else than the old invariableness, it cannot be got out of your time-succession; but assumes a cognition of *necessity* other than that of habitual sequence, a certainty of the future other than lies in the juxtaposition of prior and posterior. In short, it is not from foreseeing its sequel in the future that we recognise anything as Cause; but from knowing it as Cause that we are sure of its sequel. Either, therefore, the mark "unconditional" is simply "invariable" over again; or else the rule given to us is, "Take an antecedent: see that it is invariable: mind that nothing else is requisite: and you have the Cause"—a prescription more prudent than instructive.

It is a vain attempt, then, as Sir John Herschel remarks, "to reason away the connection of cause and effect, and fritter it down into the unsatisfactory relation of habitual sequence." (Treatise on Ast., ch. vii.)

Yet between phenomenon and phenomenon, as occurring in time, no other relation is observable. Three things only can we notice about them; their resemblance or difference; their order in space; their order in time; and scrutinise them as we may under this last aspect, we can never (as Hume and Brown have adequately shown) make out anything more about them than which comes first and which next. Higher magnifying powers, new refinements of discovery, may detect unsuspected intermediaries, and bisect and re-bisect the intervals, till a pair of seeming proximities is pulverized into a long series; as the light of Sirius, once regarded as a simple transaction between the star and the eye, cannot now be scientifically described without many a chapter on undulations, and refraction, and physiological optics, and the mental interpretation of the visual field. But the process only introduces more terms into the consecution, and reveals nothing other than consecution. Perceptive experience and observation, then, can never, it is plain, carry us beyond premonitory signs, laws of co-existence and succession; and

if, as we have maintained, these fall short of Causality, Comte is so far right in expunging the quest of causes from the duties of Inductive Science, and confining it to the work of generalization, measurement, and deductive prediction. In this he seems to me to be more correct than Brown and the Mills, who continue to use the language of Causation, after it has been atrophied by reducing it to live on "habitual sequence."

And if premonitory signs are all that Science can *find*, so are they all that Science *wants*. It culminates in prevision and its counterpart, retrospection; and in order to read truly the past and future of the world, it is needful and it is sufficient to know the groups of concomitant and the order of successive phenomena. Were they all loose from each other as sand-grains, or as soldiers filing out of a barrack-gate, still, so long as they were regularly disposed and regimented, we should know what to look for behind, before, and around, and this would satisfy our scientific curiosity. But that there is something else which it does not satisfy is plain, from our not being content with the language of succession and premonition, but trespassing into terms of causation. We compel the antecedents to profess more than antecedence. We look on the perceptible conditions as *standing for* an imperceptible Causality, hiding within them or behind them. That they only *represent* it to our mind, and are not identical with it, is evident from the way in which the word "Cause" may be shifted about amongst them, settling now on this condition, now on that, and again upon the aggregate of them all; never absent, but always movable. For instance, the clock strikes twelve: required the Cause. The answer may be,—the hands have reached that point; or, there is a bell for the hammer to hit; or, there is a hammer to hit the bell; or, the beats of the pendulum keep the time; or, the iron weight gives motion to the works; or, the earth's attraction operates on pendulum and weight. The principle on which we select among the conditions that which we designate as Cause has been variously stated. It has been often said that we pitch upon the most *active* element, and single it out in disregard of the passive conditions; but it would be a good account of a robbery to say that the safe was *not locked*. Mr. Mill thinks that we elect as cause "the proximate antecedent *event*," rather than any antecedent *state*. And it is, he says, in order to indulge this tendency, and escape the necessity of admitting permanent things, like the earth, into the list of causes, that we have set up the "logical fictions" of "*Force*" and "*Attraction*," and stowed them away into the earth, to execute for us any jerks and pulls that we may require; for so I understand the statement, that we represent to ourselves the "*attraction*" of the earth "as exhausted by each effort, and therefore constituting at each successive instant a fresh

fact, simultaneous with, or only immediately preceding, the effect." (Log., B. III., ch. v., s. 3.) This bold attempt to reclaim the province of dynamical language for the successional theory of causation seems to me to belong to the class of "heroic remedies," getting over a difficulty by adopting it, and formulating it as an advantage. Surely the earth's "attraction" is held to be no less "permanent" than the earth itself; and the spasmodic conception of it, as put forth *per saltum* wherever it has some new thing to do, is a peculiarity of Mr. Mill's imagination. To the idea of "*Force*" we resort, not to break down but to gain persistency, and fill the measure of power fully up to the durability of matter; so that, instead of being an escape into the phenomenal theory of Causality, it is precisely our method of deliverance from it.

To avoid the difficulty of singling out a cause from among the conditions, it is now usual to take them all in the aggregate, and to deny causality to anything short of the whole. This conception, in which Mr. Mill rests, is due to Hobbes, who says:—"When we seek after the Cause of any propounded effect, we must in the first place get into our mind an exact notion or idea of that which we call Cause, viz., that a cause is the sum or aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agent and the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect propounded; all which existing together, it cannot be understood but that the effect existed with them; or that it can possibly exist, if any one of them be absent." (Elem. Phil., P. I., ch. vi., s. 10.) However well this definition may work for the purposes of natural science, it does not satisfy the psychological condition of saying what *we mean* by "Cause," and why we habitually distinguish between *αἰτία* and *συναιτία*, and refuse to put the members of the "aggregate" upon a level. Is it not thus? In asking for a Cause, we ask always an *alternative* question—why *this* phenomenon rather than *that*—why *some* phenomenon rather than *none*: and whatever it be that upsets the equilibrium of conditions and turns the scale of this alternative is selected by us as the Cause. As the two members are not explicitly stated, the positive phenomenon inquired about may, in different hearers, undergo comparison with a different suppressed term; and hence they will not all alight upon the same condition as the cause. Why does the clock strike twelve (rather than eleven)? because the hands have just reached that point: (rather than not strike)? because of the hammer and bell: (rather than not go at all)? because of the pendulum and weight. I believe that this principle gives an adequate account of the apparently random selection of a cause from among a host of indispensable conditions.

No phenomena, however, whether thus divided or left in the group, can pass beyond the rank of premonitory signs, or give us more than

the *nidus* of Causality, inasmuch as they disclose nothing but their order; and by causality we mean more than order.

II. The required heterogeneity, then, of Effect and Cause must be sought on the remaining side of the alternative; the Cause, not being another phenomenon, must be *other than phenomenon*, i.e., "*Noumenon*," or entity given by the very make of the intellect itself. The axiom, "Every phenomenon has a cause," instead of meaning, "Every phenomenon invariably succeeds another phenomenon," really means, "Every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon." That this is a true account of the law of thought appears:—

1. From its *à priori* character. This character it plainly has. For how can the causal law be inductively gathered by experience, when it is the *incunabula* of experience itself, the condition of the very scene in which we gain it? The external world springs up for us simply in answer to our intellectual demand for a Cause of our sensations; which, apart from that demand, could never present themselves to us as *effects*, with counterparts elsewhere in space. Why, but for this primary law, should we want any exit from our own immediate states? Why not take them as they come, stop with them where they are, and let them weave their tissue upon the inner walls? Moreover, as Helmholtz has observed, there is a clear indication of the logical character of the causal law in this—that no experience is of the least avail to refute it. We often have occasion to discharge our long-established explanations of phenomena; but however often baffled, we can never raise the question whether perhaps they are without cause. In this persistency of search, however, there are, I think, two distinct beliefs involved—one, in the uniformity of nature; the other, in the derivative origin of phenomena. These, I think, are not on the same footing. Of the former, Mr. Mill's inductive explanation seems to be sufficient; and it might perhaps be unlearned in such a world as he supposes, where all uniformity should be broken up. But the second belief would, I conceive, survive such experience; nor is there any tendency in the apparent lawlessness of phenomena to make us think that they issue from no power. Of these two beliefs—often confounded together—it is the second alone which I designate as the principle of Causality, and claim as an axiom *à priori*. It has nothing to do with the consecution of phenomena. Amid order or disorder, we equally regard them as the outcome of power. The other belief—not in causation, but in premonitions—can only be copied from the successions which it attests, and it would be absurd to suppose that if their uniformity were broken up, the mind would be driven by intuitive necessity to rely upon it when it was gone.

If the principle of Causality is an *à priori* intellectual law, the

"Cause" which it obliges us to think will naturally be, not phenomenon, but noumenon.

2. From the indispensableness of *Dynamical* language for the proper expression of causal relations, and the confessed impossibility of translating the literature of science into terms of mere co-existence and succession among phenomena. The very writers who most rigorously limit us to laws of uniformity—Comte and Mill—are obliged, no less than others, to speak the dialect of "*Force*;" and in a single page I find the latter recognising "the action of forces," "the propagation of influences," "instantaneous" and "continuous forces," "centres of force" (Log., B. III., ch. v., s. 1); while the former, falling in with the phraseology of physical astronomy, tells how the equilibrium of the solar system is the "necessary consequence of gravitation;" and, in his anthropological exposition, assures us that, in *force and intensity*, each lower principle has the advantage over the higher. What is this idea of "*Force*" still clinging to those who insist that "all we know is phenomena"? Hume, admitting that we have it, treated it as a figment of customary association,—a subjective nexus of ideas turned into an illusory objective bond. The more recent representatives of his doctrine deny that such phrases are more than a shorthand compend for invariable succession, or carry any other meaning to the mind. This construction of the phrases is assisted by the fact that *Force* is inconceivable without gradations, while *Succession* is inconceivable with them: and the difference between the more and the less, the difficult and the easy, the intense and the remiss, which intelligibly enters into dynamical facts, brings only nonsense to the relation of Prior and Posterior. Another device for recalling "*Force*" into the Time-field is to define it as "*Tendency to Motion*." *Motion* I know as a phenomenon; but what sort of phenomenon is the "*Tendency*"? If it is outwardly there at all, is it anything else than just the dynamical element which it tries to expel? The only way of constructing it in harmony with the theory is to treat it as *not* outwardly there, but as intimating *our belief* that, under certain supposed conditions, there *would be* motion. This subjective interpretation puts into the language a meaning which will work; only it is not *our meaning*; for we intend to assert something, not about our hypothetical beliefs, but about the bodies outside us. And it is incumbent on one who accepts the construction to explain the objective character of the language, and why it is that, without mistake of phrase, we mean one thing, and ought to mean another? On the whole, the language of *Agency*, with its measures of intensity, could never have sprung from an experience limited to successions. Laws of order are not yet causes; and if we know anything of causes, we know more than Laws.

The axiom, then, stands, that "Every phenomenon springs from something other than phenomenon;" and this *Noumenon* is *Power*.

III. It remains to find the form in which it is given to us.

1. The cognition of an external world is the most conspicuous primary application of the Causal law. In virtue of this law the understanding sets up in space before it the Cause of what is felt in the organs of Sense, and effects the transition from Sensation to Perception. In sensation itself there is nothing objective; and that we ever escape beyond our skin is due to the intellectual intuitions of Space, Time, and Causality. Physiologically, not less than psychologically, it seems, the distinction is marked between mere sense and perception. Flourens attests that the removal of a tubercle will destroy visual *sensation*; the retina becomes insensible, the iris immovable. The removal of a cerebral lobe leaves undisturbed the visual sensation, the sensibility of the retina, the contractibility of the iris; but it destroys *perception*. (*De la Vie et de l'Intelligence*, 2^{me} Edit., p. 49.) *Objectivity*, then, is given to us by the Causal law, and is not itself a phenomenon, but the construction which the Understanding puts upon phenomena.

2. Mere objectivity, however, or external existence, would still not appear in the form of Power, were it not introduced to us as the antithetic term (the non-Ego) to our own personality (the Ego). Two functions, fundamentally contrary, co-exist in our nature;—a sensitive receptivity, in virtue of which we are the theatre of feelings;—and a spontaneous activity, in virtue of which we expend energy and effect movements. These are contraries, as taking opposite lines of direction; to the centre and from the centre; the initiative abroad, and the initiative at home; sensation arriving without notice, and sensation earned by executive act signalled from within. In the crossing lines of these functions do we first find ourselves, and, as distinguished from ourselves, the objective world. Had we only the passive receptivity, we should not *have* sensations, but *be* sensations; we should feel, without knowing that we feel. But with the exercise of living force or will, the self-consciousness arises; balanced, in the encounter with limitation and impediment, by the recognition of something other than self. This pair of existences becomes known to us merely in relation and antithesis: in whatever capacity we apprehend the one, in the same must we oppose to it the other. Now, in putting forth our Will (using the word for the whole activity which may become voluntary), we certainly know the Self as *Force*; we get behind the phenomena which we produce, and are let into the secret of their origin in a way which we should miss if we only looked upon them. In other words, we know ourselves as *Cause* of them. In this same capacity, then *i.e.*, dynamically, is the other than Self, known as our own opposite

and the universe has its Causal priority, in which the outer sphere is but the envelopment of our own Power. Concurrent with this dynamical synthesis is the geometrical or local synthesis by which the Eye is known as *left*, and the non-Eye as *right*, and whatever is foreign to ourselves is pictured out as external to ourselves. In virtue of the inseparable union of these two syntheses, as factors of Perception, Objectivity and Causality necessarily blend in our outer world; and we cannot separate Matter from Force, or Force from Matter.

The use frequently made of the "Muscular Sense" to explain our introduction to the outer world is unsatisfactory, because the muscular feelings occur during the history of the act, and happen to us just like the passive feelings of any other sense: whilst the Causal mind *moves* the act, and may perform it, though, through sensory paralysis, the muscles do not feel at all.

Mr. Mill denies our self-knowledge of Causality, on the ground that, *prior to experience*, we have no foresight of what we can do. The question is not whether we can *know*, but whether we can *try*; and whether the putting forth of force, with or without success, is an experience *in potentia*. Frustration, from want of foresight, is indeed an important part of the lesson, by which we learn the meaning of *Can* and *Cannot*.

It is, then, under the form of Will that we are introduced to Causality: and the axiom resolves itself into the proposition, "Every phenomenon springs from a Will." The universe, it is admitted, appears to men in simple times, to young eyes still, to poets in all times, as Living Objective Will. But it is supposed that, with the aids of Science, we learn something better. And certainly we do learn to discharge the host of invisible powers once distributed through the world, and, as Law flings its arms more wide, to fuse the multiform life of nature into One. But no fresh way of access to the cognition of Power is opened to us. We have to reach it through the same representative type: and to this hour it has no meaning to us except what we take from Will. The scientific idea of Force is nothing but Will *cut down*, by dropping from it some characters which are irrelevant for the purposes of classification and prediction. The idea of Will is not arrived at by the addition of Force + Purpose; but that of Force is arrived at by the subtraction of Will - Purpose. Such artificial abstractions supply a notation highly serviceable for the prosecution of phenomenal knowledge, but they can gain no authority against the original intuition on which they work, and to which they owe their own validity. The necessity may be disguised, but can never be escaped, of interpreting the universe by man.

JAMES MARTINEAU.

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
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